Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-175

1987-175Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL December 1, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87-175
The Honorable Michael L. Johnston
Senate Minority Leader
P.O. Box A
Parsons, Kansas 67357
Re: State Departments; Public Officers and
Employees--State Health Care Benefits
Program--Kansas State Employees Health Care
Commission
Synopsis: The statutes granting authority to the Kansas state
employees health care commission to establish
employee participation charges do not limit the
commission's discretion in establishing such
charges. Further, the distinctions drawn between
higher and lower income employees and smokers and
nonsmokers do not rise to the level of Equal
Protection violations.
Expenditures by the commission are subject to
relevant appropriations acts. Promulgation of
rules and regulations to provide for such
expenditures would be appropriate and desirable.
Alternatively, the legislature could establish
statutory guidelines for the expenditure of this
money. Cited herein: K.S.A. 75-6501; 75-6504;
75-6506; 75-6507; 77-415; U.S. Const., Fourteenth
Amend.
Dear Senator Johnston:
As Senator for the Fourteenth District, you request our
opinion regarding the state's health benefits plan for 1988.
Your specific questions are based on your understanding of
portions of the plan:
"For the first time, employees will be
required to pay a monthly charge for
participating in the employee health
insurance program. This charge is based
on the employee's income level. Employees
who consume tobacco must pay an additional
$10 surcharge per month. It is my
understanding that the money collected
from the participation fee will be used to
pay premiums, and the tobacco surcharge
will be used to implement wellness
programs for employees. What is not spent
on wellness programs may be kept in
reserve."
Your first question is whether the Kansas state employees
health care commission is authorized by K.S.A. 75-6501 et
sea. to levy a participation charge based on employee
income. To fully answer this question, we must determine (1)
whether the commission has the authority to levy a
participation charge, and (2) whether this charge may be based
on income level.
K.S.A. 75-6501 et seq. authorize the Kansas state
employees health care commission (commission) to "develop and
provide for the implementation and administration of a state
health care benefits program." K.S.A. 75-6501(a). Pursuant
to K.S.A. 75-6504(b), and subject to the limitations of
appropriations made or available therefor, the commission is
authorized "to negotiate and enter into contracts with
qualified insurers, health maintenance organizations and other
contracting parties for the purpose of establishing the state
health care benefits program." K.S.A. 75-6506 provides in
part:
"(a) The participation of a person
qualified to participate in the state
health care benefits program shall be
voluntary, and the cost of the state
health care benefits program for such
person shall be established by the Kansas
state employees health care commission.
"(b) Periodic deductions from state
payrolls may be made in accordance with
procedures prescribed by the secretary of
administration to cover the costs of the
state health care benefits program payable
by persons who are on the state payroll
when authorized by such persons. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
All moneys received by or for the commission pursuant to the
state health care benefits program are to be remitted to the
state treasurer for deposit in the state treasury to the
credit of the health care benefits program fund. K.S.A.
75-6507.
The above-underscored language in K.S.A. 75-6506 appears to
contemplate employee contributions to help pay the cost of the
state health care benefits program. While in the past
employees have paid only for spouse and dependent coverage,
the statutes do not limit the commission to those
assessments. Thus, in our opinion K.S.A. 75-6501 et
!pa . authorize the commission to establish an employee
participation charge.
We turn now to the question of whether this charge may be
assessed based on employee income level. In a memorandum to
members of the legislature dated November 17, 1987, the
chairman of the state employees health care commission states
that a provision establishing a charge varying by employee
income on all employees participating in the health care
benefits program was adopted by the commission on September 3,
1987 (p.4). The chairman explains that this monthly charge
for all state employees participating in the health care
benefits program is to help offset the costs of family
coverage (p.6). "The Commission was concerned that the cost
of family coverage available to state employees was becoming a
barrier to health benefits for the families of state employees
on the low end of the wage scale," (p.6). Thus, the
commission has determined that higher income employees with
employee-only coverage should help subsidize the costs of
health care to lower income employees with family coverage.
K.S.A. 75-6501 et seq. do not restrict the commissioner's
discretion in establishing employee costs. We must therefore
determine whether the commission exceeded constitutional
bounds in establishing a charge based on level of income.
In establishing classifications for differential treatment,
the state is bound by the Equal Protection amendment to the
United States Constitution. U.S. Const., Fouteenth
Amend. In that the provision of health care benefits is not a
fundamental right and wealth is not a suspect classification
in this instance, the state must show only a rational basis
for the differential treatment, and that the means selected
have a real and substantial relation to the objective sought.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26, 81 S.Ct. 1101,
6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937); Manhattan
Buildings, Inc. v. Hurley, 231 Kan. 20, 30 (1982). The
differential treatment in question was apparently based upon
the employees' ability to pay. While this theory seems to
overlook the fact that the state employee's income is often
only a portion of that employee's family's total income, we
cannot say conclusively that the differential charges
established are completely devoid of any rational basis.
Further, according to the information provided by the chairman
of the commission, the charges established help achieve the
goal of holding down the increase in premiums for family
coverage. In all fairness to the commission, it has
apparently approached this goal from several directions, thus
not placing the total burden on higher income employees. The
commission is requesting a supplemental appropriation for
fiscal year 1988 to increase the government's contribution
(pp. 6, 11), and has negotiated a change in benefits
available to further reduce projected costs to the state and
its employees (p. 5). Employees with family coverage will
also experience an increase in premiums (p. 7).
You next ask whether the commission has the authority to
selectively impose a surcharge on one particular group of
employees based on their personal habits. You are referring
to the tobacco surcharge implemented by the commission.
According to Chairman Flentje's memorandum to members of the
legislature dated November 17, 1987, the commission adopted a
provision for a non-smoker's "discount" on August 27, 1987.
The commission views this "discount" as an incentive for
preventive health care (p. 7). The commission's decision to
adopt this incentive was reportedly based on the claims
experience of the state employees group over the past two
years (p. 7), a random-sample survey of state employees and
retirees (p. 8), and the U.S. Surgeon General's conclusion
that "[c]igarette smoking is the single most important
preventable environmental factor contributing to illness,
disability, and death in the United States," (p. 8). Revenues
generated from the differential charges between smokers and
non-smokers is to be dedicated to preventive health measures
such as health-risk appraisals, employee assistance programs,
and smoking cessation clinics (p. 8). Though the term
"discount" is used by the commission to describe this
differential charge between smokers and non-smokers, it is in
reality a surcharge on tobacco smokers, not a discount for
nonsmokers. See reference to "revenues generated," (p. 8).
K.S.A. 75-6501 authorizes the commission to develop and
provide for the implementation of a state health care benefits
program. The program may provide any number of health
services, and may include such "reasonable provisions as may
be established by the commission." K.S.A. 75-6501(b). The
statutes do not limit the commission's discretion in
establishing employee contributions to the program. Again we
must look to constitutional proscriptions on discriminatory
state activity.
The basis for the distinction between smokers and non-smokers
is the perceived correlation between smoking and increased
health care costs (pp. 7, 8). See also Kansagram,
Vol. 4, No. 7, p. 4 (October 1987). Again, we cannot say
conclusively that this is not a rational basis for the
distinction. The two goals sought by implementing this charge
are to encourage smokers to stop smoking (as well as
discourage non-smokers from taking up smoking) (p. 8), and to
generate revenues to support preventive health measures. In
other words, the provision is designed to reduce health care
costs in the long run by encouraging and assisting employees
who are believed to be a cause of the increased costs to
change their habits. The means chosen to accomplish this seem
reasonably related to the desired result. Thus, we find no
legally proscribed discrimination with this provision, or the
provision to base premiums on employee income level.
You further inquire as to the limitations, if any, on the
spending of money collected from the tobacco surcharge. As
mentioned previously, all moneys received by or for the
commission pursuant to the health care benefits program are to
be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the state
treasury to the credit of the health care benefits program
fund. K.S.A. 75-6507. All expenditures from the health care
benefits program fund are to be made in accordance with the
provisions of appropriations acts relating thereto. K.S.A.
75-6501(a), 75-6507. Thus, expenditures of the revenues
collected from the tobacco surcharge are subject to
legislative appropriations acts. Additionally, we believe
moneys generated by the smoking surcharge should be used to
benefit smokers in some way. The mere incentive to stop
smoking may be sufficient benefit, but it is hoped that
smoking cessation programs and overall health cost reduction
will be targets of these funds. We feel compelled to note
that the surveys conducted and used as a basis for the tobacco
surcharge indicated that smokers would be charged more for
their insurance. There was no indication that smokers might
be charged to help fund wellness programs of little or no
benefit to smokers.
Your final question is whether the commission must promulgate
and file rules and regulations for the expenditure of money
pursuant to K.S.A. 77-415 et seq. K.S.A. 77-415 defines
"rule and regulation" as "a standard, statement of policy or
general order . . . of general application and having the
effect of law, issued or adopted by an agency to implement or
interpret legislation enforced or administered by such state
agency or to govern the organization or procedure of such
state agency." The Kansas state employees health care
commission meets the definition of "state agency" found at
K.S.A. 77-415(1). Since the expenditure of revenues generated
by the tobacco surcharge will affect the rights and interests
of state employees, and guidance for expenditure is not given
in the controlling statutes, it is our opinion that the
promulgation of rules and regulations for the expenditure of
this money would be appropriate and desirable. Alternatively,
the legislature could establish statutory guidelines for the
expenditure of this money.
In conclusion, the statutes granting authority to the Kansas
state employees health care commission to establish employee
participation charges do not limit the commission's discretion
in establishing such charges. Further, the distinctions drawn
between higher and lower income employees and smokers and
nonsmokers do not rise to the level of Equal Protection
violations.
Expenditures by the commission are subject to relevant
appropriations acts. Promulgation of rules and regulations to
provide for such expenditures would be appropriate and
desirable. Alternatively, the legislature could establish
statutory guidelines for the expenditure of this money.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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