Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-088

1987-088Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL June 9, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 88
Mr. Gerald E. Williams
City Attorney
City of Lenexa
40 Corporate Woods
P.O. Box 25830
Overland Park, Kansas 66225
Re: Cities and Municipalities -- Parks, Public Squares,
and Market Squares -- Land for Park Purposes;
Acquisition by Lease
Synopsis: K.S.A. 12-1301 empowers a city to acquire by lease
land to be used as a public park for the use and
benefit of the people of the city. As long as the
lease specifies that the city's obligation is
limited to periodic payments made from funds
budgeted and appropriated for that purpose, the
cash-basis law is not a barrier to such an
agreement. In the absence of contrary legislation,
the home rule powers conferred upon cities by
Article XII, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution
empower a city to sublease public park land to an
individual for the purpose of constructing and
maintaining a public golf course. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 10-1101; 10-1116b; 12-1301; Ks. Const.
Art. XII, § 5.
*
Dear Mr. Williams:
As City Attorney for the city of Lenexa, you request our
opinion on the legality of a lease and a subsequent sublease
proposed by the city for the provision of park services. The
agreements call for a lease of land by the city from a private
party for the purpose of establishing a golf course, and a
sublease by an individual from the city to construct and
maintain the golf course. Specifically, you inquire whether
the lease conforms with the cash-basis statutes, and whether
the city has the power to enter into the sublease.
Initially, we note that cities may enter into contracts and
leases for various reasons, including parks and recreational
purposes. Such power is expressly granted by K.S.A. 12-1301,
which states in relevant part:
"[a]ny city may acquire by purchase, or
lease . . . land within or without the
limits of said city to be used as a public
park for the use and benefit of the people
of said city."
In our opinion, the proposed recreational facility may be
included within the definition of a public park. In City of
Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100 (1928), an airport was
held to be within the proper and legitimate uses for which
public parks are created. The court noted that a "park may be
devoted to any use which tends to promote popular enjoyment
and recreation." 125 Kan. at 101, citing Dillon,
Municipal Corporations, 5th ed. § 1096, p. 1749. Since
a golf course will be used to promote popular enjoyment and
recreation, we believe that it too falls within the statutory
definition of a public park.
Your first inquiry involves the application of the cash-basis
law, K.S.A. 10-1101 et seq. Lease agreements which do not
result in the creation of obligations extending beyond the
budget year are not prohibited by the act. K.S.A. 10-1116b
states in relevant part:
"[n]othing in the provisions of K.S.A.
10-1101 et ea . shall prohibit a
municipality from entering into . . . a
lease agreement . . . if [the agreement]
specifically states that the municipality
is obligated only to pay periodic payments
or monthly installments under the
agreement as may lawfully be made from
. . . funds budgeted and appropriated for
that purpose during such municipality's
current budget year . . . ."
Article III, section 3.01(c) of the proposed lease appears
to satisfy the requirement of K.S.A. 10-1116b, as the city's
failure to budget necessary funds for the lease in the future
results in the termination of the agreement.
Your second inquiry concerns whether the city may sublease
land to an individual for the purpose of constructing and
maintaining a golf course. We are aware of case law which
indicates that such a sublease would be invalid. See,
e.g., State, ex rel., v. City of Coffeyville, 127 Kan.
663 (1929); Dickinson Theatres v. Lambert, 136 Kan.
498 (1932). In City of Coffeyville, the court noted that
municipal corporations may exercise only those powers which
are conferred by law. As the city had no statutory power to
sublet an airport to a private individual, the court held that
the city's agreement was an improper exercise of corporate
power. 127 Kan. at 668. In Lambert, the court held
that the city's lease of a public building for the purpose of
carrying on a purely commercial enterprise was void as against
the public policy of the state. 136 Kan. at 502. While
this authority initially appears relevant to the situation at
hand, we believe a subsequently enacted constitutional
amendment has rendered these cases inapplicable to your
inquiry.
Effective July 1, 1961, Article XII, § 5 of the Kansas
Constitution was amended granting to cities the powers of home
rule. The Constitution provides that:
"[c]ities are hereby empowered to
determine their local affairs and
government . . . . Cities shall exercise
such determination by ordinance passed by
the governing body . . . subject only to
enactments of the legislature of statewide
concern applicable uniformly to all cities
. " Ks. Const., Art. XII, § 5(b).
Prior to passage of this amendment, the legislature granted
powers to cities by statute. Martin, Home Rule for Kansas
Cities, 10 Kan. L. Rev. 501 (1962). However, the effect
of home rule is that the legislature now limits, rather than
grants, authority to cities. C.F., Moore v. City of
Lawrence, 232 Kan. 353, 356 (1982) and Syl. 1 1.
Attorney General Opinion No. 61-302 addressed the effect of
the Home Rule amendment upon the power of a city to lease
municipally owned real property to a private corporation. In
that opinion, Attorney General William M. Ferguson was asked
whether the city of Herington could lease to a private
corporation for profit a portion of its municipal airport
property. General Ferguson recognized that in the past the
Attorney General's office had consistently opined that Kansas
cities could not lease municipally owned real property to
private persons or corporations for use in private enterprises
without specific statutory authority. (See State, ex rel.,
v. City of Coffeyville, 127 Kan. 663 (1929); Dickinson
Theatres v. Lambert, 136 Kan. 498 (1932), supra.)
However, he emphasized that the rationale of these opinions
was that prior to 1961 Kansas cities had only such powers as
were specifically granted by the legislature. In this
instance, there was no specific statutory authorization for a
city to lease its airport.
Opinion No. 61-302 took into consideration the effect of the
Home Rule amendment, which clearly states that cities are
empowered to determine their local affairs. Since there was
no statutory prohibition effective under the Home Rule
amendment which would prohibit the city from leasing
municipally owned property, General Ferguson opined that the
city could lease its property to a privately owned corporation
even without specific statutory authorization.
We concur with the conclusion reached in Opinion No. 61-302,
and believe similar reasoning can be applied to the situation
at hand. In our opinion, the language in the Home Rule
amendment can only be interpreted to mean that cities now
possess the authority to do all things not specifically
restricted or prohibited by the legislature or which
contravene public policy. See also Attorney General
Opinions No. 61-279; 61-302. The question of leasing property
to a private individual is a local affair, and we know of no
restrictive legislation which would prohibit such an
arrangement. Further, we do not feel such an agreement would
violate public policy.
We recognize that cities may not exercise their home rule
powers unreasonably under the guise of their police power.
Community Antenna TV of Wichita, Inc. v. City of Wichita,
205 Kan. 537 (1970). However, we do not believe that the
creation of a joint commercial enterprise between a city and a
private developer is an unreasonable exercise of home rule
powers. Private gain may accompany public benefit. See
generally, State ex rel., Tomasic v. City of Kansas
City, 237 Kan. 572 (1985). Accordingly, in our opinion,
the city of Lenexa may, through the exercise of its home
rule powers, sublease public park land to a private individual
for the development of a recreational facility, as long as the
facility will benefit the general public.
In conclusion, K.S.A. 12-1301 empowers a city to acquire by
lease land to be used as a public park for the use and benefit
of the people of the city. As long as the lease specifies
that the city's obligation is limited to periodic payments
made from funds budgeted and appropriated for that purpose,
the cash-basis law is not a barrier to such an agreement.
In the absence of contrary legislation, the home rule powers
conferred upon cities by Article XII, § 5 of the Kansas
Constitution empower a city to sublease public park land to an
individual for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a
public golf course.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Barbara P. Allen
Assistant Attorney General
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