Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1986-138

1986-138Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
September 30, 1986
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 86-138
The Honorable Roy M. Erlich
State Senator
Thirty-Fifth District
Route 1, Box 92
Hoisington, Kansas 67544
Re: Oil and Gas--Oil and Gas Wells;
Regulatory Provisions--Use of Conservation
Fee Funds
Synop s i s : Under its police power, a state may reimburse
itself for the cost of regulating and
supervising a business by assessing the necessary
expenses to the business which created the
necessity for such regulation and supervision.
Use of conservation fee fund monies for the
prevention and cleanup of pollution from oil
and gas activities regulated by the state
corporation commission is sufficiently related
to the regulatory function to make its use
for such purposes a valid exercise of the
police power. The conservation fee fund may be
used to fund the study and cleanup of oil and
gas pollution pursuant to section 37 of 1986
House Bill No. 3078 (K.S.A. 55-143, as amended
by 1986, ch. 201, S 37), to the extent that
such study and cleanup are reasonably related
to those activities of the oil and gas industry
which are regulated by the commission.
Use of the conservation fee fund by the state
corporation commission for those oil and
gas activities it does not regulate (as
authorized by K.S.A. 55-143, as amended by L.
1986, ch. 201, § 37, which references
subsection (a)(2)(A)-of K.S.A. 65-171d, as
amended by L. 1986, ch. 201. § 22), is
contrary to the findings of the Kansas Supreme
Court in Panhandle Eastern Pipeline v. Fadeley.
Such use exacts revenue from the oil and gas
industry under the guise of a regulatory fee
in violation of article 11, section 1 of the
Kansas Constitution, and the commerce clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
State Constitution. Cited herein: Kans. Const.,
Art. 11, § 1; U. S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment;
K.S.A. 55-131; 55-143; 65-171d, as amended by
L. 1986, ch. 33, S 10(f); L. 1986, ch. 201,
§1, 2, 10, 17, 22, 28, 37, 39 and 40; and
K.A.R. 28-41-1.
* *
Dear Senator Erlich:
You have asked for our opinion regarding the legality
of using the conservation fee fund (Fund) of the state
corporation commission (commission) for purposes not considered
"regulating" the oil and gas industry under Panhandle Eastern
Pipeline v. Fadeley, 183 Kan. 803 (1958). In conjunction with
that question, the following issues are also raised.
1. Is pollution control sufficiently related to
the regulatory function to make it a valid
exercise of the police power?
2. Can regulatory fees in the Fund be used to fund
the study and clean up of oil and gas pollution?
3. Is the use of the Fund to clean up pollution
not regulated by the commission a valid exercise
of the police power?
In your request letter you indicate that there have
been two major withdrawals or transfers by the legislature
from the commission's conservation fee fund for purposes
other than "regulating" the oil and gas industry. The first
withdrawal was for $100,000 as authorized by the legislature
in 1985 for the first phase of a study of the Dakota acquifer
promoted by the Kansas Water Office and undertaken by the
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Kansas Geological Survey pursuant to a contract with the
commission. The second was pursuant to 1986 House Bill No.
3161, the omnibus bill, which authorized the transfer of
$453,687 from the commission's conservation fee fund to the
conservation fee fund of the department of health and
environment (department). L. 1986, ch. 33, § 10(f).
The basic question you have presented is whether it is
legal to use the Fund for purposes not considered "regulating"
the oil and gas industry under the Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.
v. Fadeley, id.
Under 1986 House Bill No. 3078 (L. 1986, ch. 201),
the fund must be used to regulate oil and gas activities,
including (1) exploration for and gathering of oil and gas
and the drilling, production, lease storage, treatment,
abandonment and post-abandonment of oil and gas wells,
except refining, treating or storing of oil and gas after
transportation; and (2) prevention and cleanup of pollution
of oil and gas activities, which jurisdiction shall be
exercised in cooperation with the department. L. 1986, ch.
201, § 1(a). Subsection 1(b) provides that the department
shall have jurisdiction and authority relating to the cleanup
of pollution from oil and gas activities to be exercised in
cooperation with the commission pursuant to a memorandum of
understanding entered into between the two agencies (See L.
1986, ch. 201, § 38). The transfer of certain powers to the
commission are presented in section 1(c) which provides:
"The state corporation commission shall be the
successor in every way to the powers, duties and
functions of the bureau of oil field and
environmental geology of the Kansas department of
health and environment relating to the authority
to regulate oil and gas activities, which activities
shall include all practices involved in the exploration
for and gathering of oil and gas and the drilling,
production, lease storage, treatment, abandonment
and postabandonment of oil and gas wells. Every act
performed in the exercise of such powers, duties and
functions by or under authority of the state corporation
commission shall be deemed to have the same force and
effect as if performed by the department of health and
environment."
The transfer of funds from the department to the commission
is address in L. 1986, ch. 201, § 2. It states in part:
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"On the effective date of this act, the balance of
all funds appropriated and reappropriated to the
department of health and environment for the
activities of the bureau of oil - field and environmental
geology of the department of health and environment
relating to the protection of surface water and
groundwater from pollution by oil and gas activities,
which activities shall include all practices involved
in the exploration for oil and gas and the drilling,
production, lease storage, treatment, abandonment and
postabandonment of oil and gas wells and salt water
disposal or injunction wells are hereby transferred
to the state corporation commission and shall be
used only for the purpose for which the appropriation
was originally made."
The use of the conservation fee fund is statutorily
detailed in K.S.A. 55-143, as amended by L. 1986, ch. 201,
§ 37, which provides in pertinent part:
"There is hereby created in the state treasury
the conservation fee fund. All deposits credited
to the conservation fee fund shall be for the
use of the state corporation commission in
administering the provisions of K.S.A. 55-128 to
55-142, inclusive, 55-601 to 55-613, inclusive,
55-701 to 55-713, inclusive, 55901, 55-902
and 55-1201 to 55-1206, inclusive, and subsection
(a)(1) and subsection (a)(2)(A) of K.S.A. 66-171d,
and amendments thereto, and sections 24 to 36,
inclusive, of this Act. All expenditures from
the conservation fee fund shall be made in
accordance with appropriation acts upon warrants
of the director of accounts and reports issued
pursuant to vouchers approved by the chairperson
of the state corporation commission or by a person
or persons designated by the chairperson. The
corporation commission, with the approval of the
director of accounts and reports, shall formulate
a system of accounting procedures to account for
the money credited to the conservation fee fund
pursuant to this section." (Emphasis added, new
provisions.)
Although 1986 House Bill No. 3078, among other things,
deleted the concurrent regulatory jurisdiction previously
granted to the department pursuant to chapter 55 of the
Kansas Statutes Annotated, it authorized the commission to
utilize the Fund to pay for cleanup of pollution resulting
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from oil and gas activities by the department whether or not
it resulted from oil and gas activities regulated by the
commission.
In the Panhandle case, it was the company's contention
that the legislature's transfer of $100,000 from the unexpended
balance of the natural gas conservation fund of the state
corporation commission to the general fund, and its decision
to transfer twenty percent of all future funds to the general
fund, constituted an attempt to raise revenue under the
guise of police power. It was further argued that this
constituted a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce,
deprived the company of its property without due process of
law and denied it equal protection in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
article 11, section 1 of the Kansas constitution. In declaring
the act invalid, the court held:
"Under its police power, the state may reimburse
itself for the cost of regulating and supervising
a business or commodity by assessing the necessary
expenses to such business or commodity which
created the necessity for such regulation and
supervision." Syl. $ 1.
"Where a statute which purports to assess expenses
of regulation and supervision shows on its
face that some part of the exaction is to be used
for other purposes, the police power is exceeded
and the statute is void." Syl. 1 2.
The statutes involved in Panhandle directed that $100,000
from the unexpended balance of the commission's natural gas
conservation fund and twenty percent of all costs collected
by the commission pursuant to the natural gas conservation
act be transferred to the state general fund. These statutes
showed on their faces that the amounts transferred were to
be used indiscriminately for the general expenses and
obligations of the state. Only the remaining eighty per
cent of the collections went to a special fund for the use
of the commission in administering the provisions of the
statutes. The Panhandle case held that the police power of
a state is exceeded if the statute purports to assess expenses
for regulation and supervision but on its face shows that
part of the exaction is to be used for other purposes. 183
Kan. at 808.
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Panhandle does not directly apply to the question posed
here because it deals with the constitutionality of statutes
which show on their face that the regulatory fees are to be
used for purposes other than regulation and supervision.
That issue will be addressed later: - The case is relevant,
however, in a more general sense, to the extent it describes
what constitutes a valid exercise of police power.
The pronouncement in Syllabus 1 1 of Panhandle, supra,
regarding the police power of the state to charge regulatory
fees is not new. In State, ex rel. v. Cuminskey, 97 Kan.
343 (1916), the Kansas Supreme Court considered the validity
of a law requiring inspection of petroleum products and
prescribing a schedule of inspection fees, one-half of which
were to be retained by the inspectors as compensation for
their services, and the balance paid to the state treasurer.
The court stated:
"As an incident of the police power the state may
reimburse itself for the cost of inspection by
charging the necessary expense upon the business
or commodity creating the necessity for inspection.
When, however, adequate remuneration has been
secured the police power is exhausted." 97 Kan.
at 352.
It was held that the fees grossly exceeded the amount required
to effectuate the lawful purposes of the act, constituted
revenue raising measures and were therefore void.
The rule announced in Cuminskey has been repeatedly
recognized. In State, ex rel., v. Ross, 101 Kan. 337 (1917),
the court found that the fees required of exhibitors of
motion picture films for inspection under a censorship
statute was not disproportionate to the expenses of enforcement
and did not turn the act into a revenue raising measure
under the guise of police power. In its determination, the
court considered not only the direct costs of inspection but
also the incidental expenses that would be required. 101
Kan. at 381. See also City of Beloit v. Camborn, 182 Kan.
228 (1958).
The constitutionality of an ordinance requiring building
contractors to pay fees for the occupancy of streets and
sidewalks for storage during construction was considered in
Watson v. City of Topeka, 194 Kan. 585 (1965). The court
reasoned that the city could, under its exercise of police
power, regulate the extent to which street and sidewalk
space could be used for storage purposes because it was the
city's responsibility to further the safety and general
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welfare of its citizens. 194 Kan. at 589. The test used
was whether the fees fixed by the ordinance were reasonably
related to the expenses they were intended to pay. The
court found that the fees charged for the use of the street
and sidewalk space bore no reasonable relationship to the
costs of inspection and therefore exceeded the police powers
of the state. As a revenue raising measure, the ordinance
violated article 11, section 1 of the Kansas constitution
which provides that the legislature shall provide for the
uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation.
In Fidelity Investment Co. v. Hale, 212 Kan. 321 (1973),
a mortgage banker engaged in real estate loans challenged
the application and validity of the truth-in-lending act,
particularly that part requiring annual payment of a fee
based on volume of business. The defendant banker argued
that the fee was a revenue raising measure because twenty percent
of the fees went to the state general fund to be used
indiscriminately by the state. The court found that the
fees collected were a reasonable reimbursement for supportive
services performed for the regulatory agency and that these
services were applicable to the consumer credit commission
which enforced the truth-in-lending act.
The Kansas cases on the subject of regulation deal with
whether the fees charged exceed the costs of regulating (the
"how much" question), i.e., whether the fees charged are
reasonably related to the costs of regulation thus making
them a valid exercise of police power. However, none of
them address the specific question of whether the purpose
for which the fees are being charged is reasonably related
to regulating (the "what for" question). It is our opinion
that the purpose for which the fees are charged must be
reasonably related to regulating the industry in order for
the assessment to be a valid exercise of police power. The
question thus becomes whether pollution control is sufficiently
related to the regulatory function to make it a valid exercise
of the police power.
In searching other jurisdictions, the most enlightening
case found on the subject comes from New Hampshire. In the
Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 749, 379 A.2d 782 (1977),
the New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed the question of
using license fees to fund an oil pollution control fund.
The questions propounded by the senate to the justices
included:
1. "Can the general court within the provisions
of the constitution of New Hampshire enact a
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statute as proposed by House Bill 439, which
provides for the establishment of an oil
pollution control fund to be funded by license
fees, penalties or other fees and changes [sic]
generated by the chapter as well as any federal
or other funds which are made available for the
purposes of oil pollution control?"
2. "Can the general court impose a contingent
annual license fee on an operator of an oil
terminal facility having a storage capacity in
excess of 500 barrels, within the framework of
the provisions of the constitution of New
Hampshire?"
3. "Would the provisions of this bill impose
any unwarranted restrictions on interstate
commerce in violation of the commerce clause
of the constitution of the United States?"
4. "Would any provision of the constitution
of the United States or of this state be
violated by the provisions of this bill?" 379
A.2d at 785, 786.
In pertinent part, the court found that license fees
could be used to fund an oil pollution control program and
that there was no apparent violation of either the federal
or state constitutions apparent on the face of the proposed
statute. This case allows regulatory fees to fund pollution
control and clearly establishes a reasonable relationship
between pollution control and the regulatory function.
Although there is no specific language actually stating
that pollution control is a regulatory function, that conclusion
is inescapable. That there exists a reasonable relationship
between oil pollution control and regulation is implicit in
this case.
Another case generally consistent with the reasoning in
the New Hampshire case is State v. Washington State
Utilities & Transportation, 93 Wash. 2d 398, 609 P.2d 1375
(1980). It deals with amounts expended by the state in
defending and paying judgments in tort claims involving
grade railroad crossing accidents. Plaintiff railroad
companies charged that these costs were not regulatory costs
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and not properly chargeable to the regulation of the industry.
They sought therefore to prevent reimbursement of these
costs from the railroad regulatory fee account. The question
addressed in this case was whether these legal expenses
could properly be considered a cost of regulating the industry.
609 P.2d at 1380. The court noted that the costs were a
result of the commission not requiring more adequate safeguards
at crossings (i.e., the commission's failure to regulate).
The administrative costs of determining what grade crossing
devices were to be used were to be paid by the separate
Grade Crossings Protection Fund and not funded by regulatory
industries through the Public Service Revolving Fund. The
court found that it was not reasonable to expect the industry
to reimburse the state for the state's failure to adequately
govern the industry's actions. The court explained that
regulatory fees were not in this instance available to
benefit a third party not directed regulated and not included
within the commission's regulatory power, and the legal
expenses were not demonstrated by the state to be a reasonable
cost of regulation. 609 P.2d at 1382.
The analysis in this case would apply in our present
situation if the commission were attempting to use the
conservation fee fund to pay an individual third party for
damages as a result of oil pollution. Our case, however, is
more akin to the state seeking reimbursement for the cost of
supervising railroad grade crossings in order to make them
safe. This is at least implicitly sanctioned under State
v. Washington, 609 P.2d at 1381, 1382, where the court
states:
It may not be reasonable to expect the industry
to reimburse the state for the state's failure
to adequately govern the industry's actions,
particularly in the absense of proof of Commission
involvement, even though the industry might be
compelled to pay for additional Commission
regulation that might prevent the state's
liability. (Emphasis added).
By analogy, using the conservation fee fund to reimburse the
state for the costs of making the environment safe from
pollution resulting from oil and gas activities would be
reasonably related to regulation and supervision of the
industry.
Pollution is an incidental consequence likely to
subject the public to some cost resulting from activities of
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the business licensed. From our research, the payment of
social costs attributable to the oil and gas industry as a
regulatory function has not been addressed. In so far as
pollution deals with public health, however, the state may
exercise its police power to enact laws to promote and
preserve public health. 39A C.J.S. Health and Environment
§ 5.
With the exception of the Opinion of the Justices
case in New Hampshire, supra, we find no cases addressing
the question of whether oil pollution is reasonably related
to the regulatory function. To "regulate" is "[t]o fix,
establish or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established
mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to governing
principles or laws." Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth
Edition. That the legislature wanted and intended Fund
monies to be used by the commission to regulate oil and gas
activities and cleanup of pollution from those activities is
clear from the language of K.S.A. 55-143, both prior to and
after being amended by L. 1986, ch. 201, § 37. Although you
have suggested that "cleanup, protection, and remedial
activity" are not synonomous with "regulating" the industry,
the key question is whether or not those activities are
reasonably related to the business responsible for the need
for regulation. In this instance, those activities appear
to fall within the regulatory authority the legislature
intended the commission to have. At this point it should be
noted that our discussion focuses solely upon those activities
referenced in section 37 which are regulated, as opposed to
those not regulated, by the commission, and which are referenced
therein [K.S.A. 65-171d, as amended by L. 1986, ch. 201, §
22(a)(2)(A)].
We are satisfied that use of the conservation fee fund
for pollution control necessitated by oil and gas activities
regulated by the commission is sufficiently related to the
commission's regulatory function to make its use for such
purposes a valid exercise of the police power. Conversely,
it is our opinion that to use Fund money for purposes other
than such regulatory functions is an invalid application of
the police power. Such a use would make the regulatory fees
a revenue measure in violation of article 11, section 1 of
the Kansas constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
You also inquire whether regulatory fees in the Fund
may be used to fund the study and cleanup of oil and gas
pollution. For the reasons previously addressed, we are
satisfied that the conservation fee fund may be used to fund
the study and cleanup of oil and gas pollution as provided
by section 37 of L. 1986, ch. 201 to the extent that they
are reasonably related to regulation and the prevention and
cleanup of pollution arising from the activities of the oil
and gas industry (L. 1986, ch. 201, § 1). For example, a
situation where fifty percent of a study was reasonably related
to oil and gas activities regulated by the commission, and
the other fifty percent to agricultural contamination, only
that portion spent on studies involving oil and gas activities
regulated by the commission could be drawn from the Fund.
To do otherwise would amount to a invalid application of the
police power.
Finally, you ask whether the use of the Fund to cleanup
pollution resulting from oil and gas activities not regulated
by the commission is a valid exercise of the police power.
Prior to the enactment of L. 1986, ch. 201, the department
had certain regulatory authority pursuant to chapter 55 of
the Kansas Statutes Annotated, K.S.A. 65-171d and as further
detailed in K.A.R. 28-41-1 et seq. Although the department
no longer has independent regulatory authority (L. 1986, ch.
201), it does have authority in cooperation with the commission
to clean up pollution from oil and gas activities regulated
by the commission. K.S.A. 65-171d, as amended by L. 1986,
ch. 201, § 22(a)(1).
The specific question presented is whether the inclusion
of subsection (a)(2)(A) of section 22 of L. 1986, ch. 201,
authorizing protection from oil and gas activities not
regulated by the commission goes beyond the authority of the
legislature under its police powers. From the reasoning
previously noted in an analogous situation in Panhandle,
supra, regarding a statute dealing with commission funds
(K.S.A. 55-131) and use of Fund monies generated through
regulatory fees and assessments pursuant to various statutory
provisions (L. 1986, ch. 201, SS 10, 17, 28, 39 and 40), it
appears that the legislature exceeded its authority under
its police powers.
In holding that the enactment amounted to a "tax and a
revenue measure levied under the guise of a regulatory fee,"
the court in Panhandle found that it violated article 11,
section 1 of the state constitution and the commerce clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
183 Kan. at 808. In declaring segments of the objectional
statutes void, the court stated that where a statute which
purports to assess expenses of regulation and supervision
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shows on its face that some part of the exaction is to be
used for other purposes, the police power is exceeded. id .
at Syl. 1 2.
In the instant situation, use of the conservation fee
fund is broadened by section 22 of L. 1986, ch. 201 to
cleanup not only oil and gas activities regulated by the
commission, but also such activities not regulated by it.
This amendment clearly represents a substantial expansion in
the prior law which did not specifically authorize use of
those funds for other than regulatory activities. Thus, we
are of the belief that the inclusion of subsection (a)(2)(A)
of K.S.A. 65-171d, as amended by L. 1986, ch. 201, § 22, and
referenced in section 37 of that act (allowing utilization
of commission conservation fee fund monies available to the
department for activities not regulated by the commission),
amounts to a revenue enactment which fails as a valid exercise
of the police power. On its face that section shows that
the Fund money is to be used for purposes totally unrelated to
regulatory purposes within the commission's jurisdiction.
In conclusion, under its police power, a state may
reimburse itself for the cost of regulating and supervising
a business by assessing the necessary expenses to the business
which created the necessity for such regulation and supervision.
Use of conservation fee fund monies for the prevention and
cleanup of pollution from oil and gas activities regulated
by the state corporation commission is sufficiently related
to the regulatory function to make its use for such purposes
a valid exercise of the police power. The conservation fee
fund may be used to fund the study and cleanup of oil and
gas pollution pursuant to section 37 of 1986 House Bill No.
3078 (K.S.A. 55-143, as amended by 1986, ch. 201, S 37), to
the extent that such study and cleanup are reasonably related
to those activities of the oil and gas industry which are
regulated by the commission.
Use of the conservation fee fund by the state corporation
commission for those oil and gas activities it does not
regulate (as authorized by K.S.A. 55-143, as amended by L.
1986, ch. 201, § 37), which references subsection (a)(2)(A)
of K.S.A. 65-171d, as amended by L. 1986, ch. 201, § 22), is
contrary to the findings of the Kansas Supreme Court in
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline v. Fadeley. Such use exacts
revenue from the oil and gas industry under the guise of a
regulatory fee in violation of article 11, section 1 of the
Kansas constitution, and the commerce clause and the Fourteenth
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Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Carl M. Anderson
Assistant Attorney General
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