Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1986-132

1986-132Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL September 17, 1986
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 86-132
Mr. Douglas F. Martin
Shawnee County Counselor
Shawnee County Courthouse
200 E. 7th, Room 203
Topeka , Kansas 66603-3922
Re: Taxation--Property Exempt From Taxation--Farm
Machinery and Equipment Held as Inventory
Synopsis: The exemption from property and ad valorem taxes of
— farm machinery and equipment held as inventory does
not violate the uniform and equal rate of taxation
requirement of the Kansas Constitution, as such
exemption meets the public purpose test. The
exemption for hand tools exclusively used by a
mechanic on the construction or repair of machinery
is somewhat suspect, but due to the presumption of
constitutionality of legislative acts, we conclude
that this section also meets the constitutional
requirement of Art. 11, §1. In any event, the
statutory sections containing each of these
exemptions are severable and therefore one may be
upheld though the other is found unconstitutional.
Cited herein: Kan. Const., Art. 11, §1; K.S.A.
79-201i; K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 79-201j; L. 1986,
ch. 364, §§1, 2, 3 and 4.
Dear Mr. Martin:
As Shawnee County Counselor, you have requested our opinion
concerning L. 1986, ch. 364. Specifically you have inquired
whether the provisions of the Kansas Constitution, Art. 11, S1
are violated by the act.
The purpose of L. 1986, ch. 364 is stated in section one of
the act. In language parallel to that of K.S.A. 79-201i, the
legislature sets forth a public purpose of promoting the
general welfare of the state by fostering the growth and
development of agricultural endeavors within the state. It Is
noted that:
"[a]griculture, as conducted in farming
and ranching operations throughout the
state, is the primary basis of the Kansas
economy. . . . It is a benefit to
agriculture and the economy of the state
generally to preserve readily available
and affordable farm machinery and
equipment within the farming communities
of this state." L. 1986, ch. 364, §1.
To further the above-stated purpose, section two of chapter
364 provides that farm machinery and equipment, as defined in
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 79-201j, which is held as inventory by a
merchant, and which has been taxed in the merchant's inventory
in any preceding year, shall be exempt from all property or ad
valorem taxes levied under the laws of this state. Such
property "shall be listed by the merchant as exempt property
in all succeeding tax years during which the machinery or
equipment remains in that merchant's inventory." L. 1986,
ch. 364, §2. Section three of the act extends a similar
exemption to hand tools used "exclusively by a mechanic in the
construction or repair of machinery and equipment, including
motor vehicles." L. 1986, ch. 364, §3.
You have expressed your concern that these statutory
provisions violate the equal taxation clause of article 11, Si
of the Kansas Constitution, which states in relevant part:
"Wile legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate
of taxation. . . ." For the reasons stated below, it is our
opinion that the exemption for farm machinery in inventory and
for hand tools used by mechanics in the construction and
repair of machinery are not invalidated by the constitutional
mandate.
Article 11, §1 of the Kansas Constitution "prohibits
favoritism, and requires uniformity in valuing property for
assessment purposes so that the burden of taxation will be
equal. "State, ex rel. v. Martin, 227 Kan. 456, 468
(1980). In holding unconstitutional a statute which reduced
by 20% the fair market value of farm machinery, the court in
Martin, stated:
"all property which is subject to general
property taxation must be valued or
assessed on an equal basis. . . . When
the rate of property assessment is uniform
throughout a taxing district, the
constitutional mandate of uniform and
equal taxation has been fulfilled."
(Emphasis added.) 227 Kan. at 461-62.
However, the constitution does not preclude the legislature
from exempting property in addition to that specifically
exempted in the constitution. See, e.g. Harper v. Fink,
148 Kan. 278, 280 (1938), and cases cited therein.
Statutory exemptions may be broader than the constitutional
exemptions. State, ex rel., v. Board of Regents, 167 Kan.
587, 595-96 (1949).
In State ex rel, Tomasic v. City of Kansas City, 237
Kan. 572 (1985), the Kansas Supreme Court discusses and
applies the public purpose exception to uniform taxation.
Four key elements are considered:
"(1) whether the exemption furthers the
public welfare . . .; (2) whether the
exemption provides a substantial, peculiar
benefit . . .; (3) whether the exemption
provides for large accumulations of
tax-exempt property . . .; and (4) whether
the exemption is an improper or
preferential classification of property."
Id. at 579. [citations omitted]
We believe that the exemption for farm machinery held as
inventory, as provided in L. 1986, ch. 364, §2, meets the
test quoted above.
In determining whether or not the exemption furthers the
public welfare, the court stated in Tomasic that judicial
restraint must be exercised unless the legislature's judgment
was "entirely devoid of a rational basis." 237 Kan. at
579. The court held in that case that concern for economic
growth was a legitimate public purpose. 237 Kan. at 580.
As previously indicated, the purpose of L. 1986, ch. 364 is
to promote the general welfare of the state by fostering the
growth and development of agricultural endeavors, the basis of
the state's economy. We believe that such a purpose is not
devoid of a rational basis.
The second requirement set forth in Tomasic is that the
exemption provide a substantial, peculiar benefit to the
state. In L. 1986, ch. 364, §1, the legislature notes:
"the property tax burden has become a
deterrent to the operation of an implement
business and, in many instances, an
encouragement to abandonment of that
business."
Encouraging implement merchants to continue doing business in
the state may provide a benefit to the state peculiar to that
business. The exemption attempts to go beyond favoritism, as
the legislature has indicated a need to protect the supply of
equipment necessary to the economic basis of the state. In
Tomasic, it was held that enabling an industry to
construct factories in the state assisted in economic growth
and provided a means of livelihood for the people. 237 Kan.
at 581. The court further stated that when the legislature
determines that the public welfare would benefit, unless the
determination is "capricious or without foundation in reason'
the judiciary would not interfere. 237 Kan. at 580.
The third element for consideration is whether the exemption
provides for large accumulations of tax-exempt property. The
purpose of this consideration is to avoid disturbing general
equality and uniformity. 237 Kan. at 581. This factor has
been contemplated by the legislature. L. 1986, ch. 364, §4
states that the provisions of §2 shall expire on December 31
of 1988. Section four may be dispositive of the issue,
however further support for the validity of the act is found
in the mechanics of the exemption itself. The exemption
applies to "[a]ll farm machinery and equipment held in a
merchant's inventory which has been listed for tax purposes
and taxed in such merchant's inventory in any preceding tax
year." (Emphasis added.) L. 1986, ch. 364, §2. In short,
the exemption is not total. The act requires that at least
one year of taxes be assessed and paid before the exemption
applies. Thus, the act protects against large accumulations
of tax-exempt property by merchants who might otherwise use
the guise of public purpose to their advantage when that
purpose is no longer benefiting the public because of market
saturation.
The final consideration is whether the exemption is an
improper or preferential classification of property. The
purpose of this consideration is grounded in equal protection
analysis. In Tomasic, the relator argued that a
classification which discriminated among private investors in
favor of those who can obtain financing through internal
revenue bonds violated Art. 11, §1 of the Kansas
Constitution. It was noted, however, that the exemption in
question was based on municipal ownership of the property, not
on what type of entity leases the property. In essence, the
court held that the exemption was not based on who could take
advantage of the exemption, but rather on the type of property
involved. The exemption for farm machinery and equipment held
in inventory is not limited to certain merchants; the
exemption is directed at the merchandise itself. Any merchant
who holds defined farm machinery and equipment in his
inventory, if the other provisions of the act are satisfied,
is eligible to list the property as exempt.
In Topeka Cemetery Association v. Schnellbacher, 218
Kan. 39 (1975), the court invalidated a statute which gave
an exemption to persons who owned cemetery lands, but did not
extend the exemption to persons who held cemetery lands for
future sale. The court stated:
"We have consistently held that where
public property is not involved, a tax
exemption must be based upon the use of
the property and not on the basis of
ownership alone. The reason for the rule
is that a classification of private
property for tax purposes based solely
upon ownership unlawfully discriminates
against one citizen in favor of another
and therefore is a denial of equal
protection of the law." 218 Kan. at
42-43.
Section two of L. 1986, ch. 364 satisfies the anti-bias
requirement. The problem addressed in Topeka Cemetery
Association is actually remedied by the act. Tax exempt
status is no longer based on whether the farm machinery is
owned by a consumer or a merchant. K.S.A. 1985 Supp.
79-201j already provides that farm machinery and equipment
which is "actually and regularly used exclusively in farming
or ranching operations" is exempt from property or ad valorem
taxes. There is, therefore, no discrimination in the taxation
of farm machinery and equipment based on whether the property
is used or held for future sales. Thus, section two of the
act has a public benefit and purpose, and complies with the
"uniform and equal assessment and taxation" requirement of
art. 11, §1, of the Kansas Constitution.
In considering section three of the act, we opine that the
exemption for hand tools used by a mechanic in the
construction or repair of machinery also meets the requirement
of Art. 11, §1 of the Kansas Constitution. Because the
legislature did not specifically state the public purpose for
which this exemption was created, its constitutionality is
somewhat suspect. However, the Kansas Supreme Court has set
forth certain basic principles to be applied in determining
the constitutionality of a statute. These principles are
stated in City of Baxter Springs v. Bryant, 226 Kan.
383, Syl. §§1-4 (1979), as follows:
"The constitutionality of a statute is
presumed, all doubts must be resolved in
favor of its validity, and before the
statute may be stricken down, it must
clearly appear the statute violates the
constitution.
"In determining constitutionality, it is
the court's duty to uphold a statute under
attack rather than defeat it and, if there
is any reasonable way to construe the
statute as constitutionality valid, that
should be done.
"Statutes are not stricken down unless the
infringement of the superior law is clear
beyond substantial doubt.
"The propriety, wisdom, necessity and
expedience of legislation are exclusively
matters for legislative determination and
courts will not invalidate laws, otherwise
constitutional, because the members of the
court do not consider the statute in the
public interest of the state, since,
necessarily, what the views of members of
the court may be upon the subject are
wholly immaterial and it is not the
province nor the right of courts to
determine the wisdom of legislation
touching the public interest as that is a
legislative function with which courts
cannot interfere."
Also, as stated by the court in Sumner County v.
Wellington, 66 Kan. 590, 593 (1903):
"Our constitution limits, rather than
confers, power, and, hence, we look to it
to see what it prohibits, instead of what
it authorizes. Unless the sovereign power
of taxation, which includes the power to
make exemptions, is actually prohibited by
the constitution it may be exercised by
the legislature. In the absence of
constitutional restrictions, the general
rule is that the legislature has full
power to grant exemptions from taxation,
and, there being no such limitation, we
cannot say that property like that in
question, owned by a city, may not be
exempted by the legislature."
Due to the presumption of validity of legislative acts, we
cannot say, as a matter of law, that the exemption for all
hand tools used exclusively by a mechanic in the construction
or repair of machinery and equipment is unconstitutional. We
note, however, that it may be wise for the legislature to
amend this exemption to state its public purpose.
In light of our opinion that section three is somewhat
suspect, we feel compelled to comment on that section's
severability from the rest of the act. It is
well-established that if an invalid or unconstitutional part
of a statute can readily be severed from the valid parts, that
which is constitutional may stand. But if the legislative
purpose were violated by such separation, then the entire
statute must fail. See, e.g., State ex rel, v. City of
Overland Park, 215 Kan. 700, Syl. §7 (1974); State, ex
rel, v. Consumers Warehouse Market, 185 Kan. 363, Syl. §2
(1959); State v. Smiley, 65 Kan. 240, 247 (1902). The
legislative purpose and justification for L. 1986, ch. 364
is easily discernible by section one of the act. Section two
logically follows that justification and furthers the
purpose. Sections one, two and four are logically
interrelated. We believe that, as the legislative intent is
clearly expressed, and section three of the act is not
necessary to the fulfillment of the other sections, section
three is severable.
In conclusion, the exemption from property and ad valorem
taxes of farm machinery and equipment held as inventory does
not violate the uniform and equal rate of taxation requirement
of the Kansas Constitution, as such exemption meets the public
purpose test. The exemption for hand tools exclusively used
by a mechanic on the construction or repair of machinery is
somewhat suspect, but due to the presumption of
constitutionality, we conclude that this section also meets
the constitutional requirement of Art. 11, §1. In any event,
the statutory sections containing each of these exemptions are
severable and therefore one may be upheld though the other is
found unconstitutional.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
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