Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1986-055

1986-055Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL April 17, 1986
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 86- 55
Theodore J. Nichols
Harper County Attorney
119 West Main Street
P.O. Box 35
Harper, Kansas 67058-0035
Re: Counties and County Officers -- Clerk of District
Court -- Exemption from Limitations Imposed by
County Home Rule Powers
Synopsis: A county may not exempt itself by charter
resolution from limitations imposed by K.S.A. 1985
Supp. 19-1322, subsection (a), which establishes
limits on the tax the clerk of the district court
shall impose as a filing fee for the benefit of the
county law library. Such resolution would violate
the limitation placed on the home rule powers a
county is authorized to exercise under K.S.A. 1985
Supp. 19-101a, subsection (a)(3), that "counties
may not affect the courts located therein." Cited
herein: K.S.A. 19-101; K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-101a;
K.S.A. 19-1310; K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-1322; K.S.A.
20-101; Kan. Const., Art. 3, §1; Art. 12, §5.
*
Dear Mr. Nichols:
As County Attorney for Harper County, you request our opinion
on several questions concerning the home rule powers of a
county. You first inquire whether K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-1322
is an act non-uniform in its application to all counties,
and whether any entity other than a county or a city is
granted home rule powers. K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-1322 is not
uniformly applicable to all counties, in that the statute
makes special provisions for the clerks of the district courts
in Sedgwick and Wyandotte Counties. Further, home rule
powers are granted to counties and cities only: the home
rule powers of a county are derived from the legislature
(K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-101a), while the home rule powers of a
city are derived from the Home Rule Amendment to the Kansas
Constitution (Kan. Const., Art. 12, 55).
You next inquire whether a county may exempt itself by charter
resolution from limitations imposed by K.S.A. 1985 Supp.
19-1322, subsection (a), which establishes limits on the tax
the clerk of the district court shall impose as a filing fee
for the benefit of the county law library. Further, you ask
whether such a resolution would violate the limitation placed
on the home rule powers a county is authorized to exercise
under K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-101a, subsection (a)(3), that
"counties may not affect the courts located therein."
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-1322(a) states:
"Except as provided in subsection (b),
the clerk of the district court shall
tax in all cases commenced pursuant to
chapter 60 of the Kansas Statutes
Annotated and in all felony criminal cases
a library fee of not less than $2 or more
than $5 and shall tax in all other cases a
library fee of not less than $.50 or more
than $4, for the benefit and account of
the law library in the county." (Emphasis
added.)
The statute goes on at subsection (b) to provide:
"The clerks of the district courts in
Sedgwick and Wyandotte counties shall
tax in all cases commenced pursuant to
chapter 60 of the Kansas Statutes
Annotated and in all felony criminal cases
a library fee of not less than $2 or more
than $8 and shall tax in all other cases a
library fee of not less than $.50 or more
than $5 for the benefit and account of the
law library in the county."
You inform us that additional funds are deemed necessary by
the board of trustees of the Harper County law library, in
order to purchase equipment and materials for the library.
Thus, the board of trustees has attempted to exempt Harper
County from limitations set by K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-1322,
subsection (a), and bring the county within the limitations
set forth by subsection (b) of that statute.
In order to determine whether a county is empowered to opt out
from under a state statute, it is necessary to examine the
general provisions which govern the home rule powers of
counties, as contained in K.S.A. 19-101 et seq. K.S.A.
19-101 covers the general powers which are granted by statute
to a county as a public corporation. As provided in K.S.A.
19-101, a county is authorized to exercise the home rule
powers to determine its local affairs and government, as
authorized under the provisions of K.S.A. 19-101a. K.S.A.
1985 Supp. 19-101a, subsection (a), provides:
"The board of county commissioners may
transact all county business and perform
all powers of local legislation and
administration it deems appropriate,
subject only to the following limitations,
restrictions or prohibitions:
"(3) Counties may not affect the courts
located therein." (Emphasis added.)
Among the 20 limitations, restrictions and prohibitions
mentioned, only this one appears to be applicable to the case
at hand. As noted earlier, the home rule powers of a county,
as provided in K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-101a, are derived from the
legislature, not from the Kansas Constitution. Thus, they are
subject to the specific statutory limitation and restriction
that a county may not affect the courts located therein.
Accordingly, we must determine whether the maintenance of the
law library pertains to the government and affairs of Harper
County and is a home rule function, or alternatively, whether
its management is a matter of statewide concern and is a
judicial function under our unified court system, as provided
in Article 3, §1 of the Kansas Constitution.
We have found no Attorney General opinions which address
whether it is the state or the local government which has the
ultimate responsibility for a law library located within a
county, the management of which is vested in the district
judges and representatives of the bar. However, several
recent court cases are helpful in examining this issue. In
Board of Sedgwick County Commr's. v. Noone, 235 Kan. 777
(1984), the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether any statutory authority exists by which Sedgwick
County could require the Clerk of the Eighteenth Judicial
District, who is a state officer, to turn over moneys
generated by county traffic resolutions to the county
treasurer. The attorney general, on behalf of the defendants,
took the position that no such statutory authority exists, and
that the clerk of the district court is bound by the clear and
unequivocal provisions of the statutes in the handling of
public moneys. The Supreme Court agreed, stating:
"It cannot be denied that the clerk of the
court is a ministerial officer and is
bound by statutes in the performance of
his or her official duties involving the
handling of public moneys. Cook v. City
of Topeka, 232 Kan. 334 (1982)."
The court went on to explain:
"Under K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 19-101a, the home
rule powers of a county are derived from
the legislature, not from the Kansas
Constitution. They are subject to the
specific statutory limitation and
restriction that a county may not affect
the courts located therein. A county
under its home rule powers, does not have
the authority to control the official acts
of a clerk of the district court."
(Emphasis added.)
The court concluded that the attorney general was correct in
his argument that the clerk of the District Court, as a state
officer, was bound by statutory provisions to remit the fines,
penalties and forfeitures generated by county traffic
regulations to the state treasurer. Board of Sedgwick County
Commr's., 235 Kan. at 784. Clearly, the county's home rule
powers did not authorize it to exercise control over matters
which did not pertain to the county's own affairs.
In Brewster v. City of Overland Park, 233 Kan. 390 (1983),
the issue was whether a city could, under authority of the
Home Rule Amendment to the Kansas Constitution (Kan. Const.,
Art. 12, §5), opt out from under K.S.A. 19-1310, which exempts
attorneys registered for county law library purposes from
payment of any occupation tax or city license fee. In
discussing whether the cities could exempt themselves from the
statute, the court noted that the county law library statutes
are located in Article 13 of Chapter 19, which concerns the
functions of the clerk of the district court. The court went
on to state:
"The clerk has charge of the election,
registration, and fees paid by attorneys
as well as deducting the appropriate
docket fees for the library's
maintenance. Management of the library is
vested in the district judges and
representatives of the bar. The county
law library is only peripherally a
governmental function, although the
county commission is required to provide
space therefor or pay a sum in lieu
thereof." Brewster, 233 Kan. at 392.
(Emphasis added.)
The court concluded that K.S.A. 19-1310 does not meet the
threshold requirement of the Home Rule Amendment that an
enactment from which a city wishes to exempt itself from be
applicable to cities. Brewster, 233 Kan. at 393.
Likewise, it is our opinion that K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-1322,
subsection (a), does not meet the threshold requirement of
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-101a that an enactment from which a
county wishes to exempt itself be applicable to counties.. We
reach this result because of the specific limitation contained
in subsection (a)(3) that counties may not affect the courts
located therein.
In Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill. 2d 537 (1975), the
Supreme Court of Illinois decided the identical question this
opinion examines. In that case, plaintiff brought suit
challenging the constitutionality of a Cook County ordinance
which directed the clerk of the circuit court to collect a
county law library fee of $2 to be paid at the time of the
filing of the first pleading or other appearance by each party
in all civil cases. The ordinance purported to supersede
"[a]n Act in relation to the establishment, maintenance and
operation of county law libraries," (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973,
ch. 81, par. 81), by increasing the amount of the filing fee
from $1 to $2. Similarly, Harper County has attempted to pass
a charter resolution which would supersede the limitations of
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-1322, subsection (a), and bring the
county within the limitations of subsection (b) of that
statute.
In Ampersand, the defendants contended that the ordinance
was a valid exercise of the home rule authority which Cook
County possessed under section 6(a) of Article VII of the
1970 Illinois Constitution. The grant of power to a home rule
unit as found in that section of the 1970 Constitution
provides in part:
"Except as limited by this Section, a home
rule unit may exercise any power and
perform any function pertaining to its
government and affairs including, but not
limited to, the power to regulate for the
protection of the public health, safety,
morals and welfare; to license; to tax;
and to incur debt."
The defendants argued that the filing fee was a tax and
because it was for the purpose of supporting a county law
library which the county was authorized by statute (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 81, par. 81) to maintain, the tax
related to the government and affairs of Cook County.
Ampersand, 61 Ill. 2d at 541.
Alternatively, the plaintiff assumed that the maintenance of
the law library pertained to the government and affairs of
Cook County and was a home rule function. However, plaintiff
also contended that a home rule unit has no authority to
impose a filing fee as a condition precedent to a litigant's
right of access to the courts of Illinois. Ampersand, 61
Ill. 2d at 541. Plaintiff claimed that the administration of
justice was not a function of the local governmental unit
wherein the court was located, but rather was a matter of
statewide concern under article VI of the Constitution of
1970.
In comparing the Illinois case to the case at hand, we feel it
is important to note the similarities in the Kansas and
Illinois court systems. Although the home rule powers of a
county in Kansas are derived from the legislature (K.S.A. 1985
Supp. 19-101a), while the home rule powers of a county in
Illinois are derived from the constitution [Ill. Const.,
Art. VII, §6(a)], both states offer similar guidance on the
manner in which the powers of home rule are to be construed.
K.S.A. 19-101c provides, in substance, that a county's home
rule powers shall be liberally construed for the purpose of
giving to counties the largest measure of self-government.
Likewise, section 6(m) of article VII of the Illinois
Constitution states that "powers and functions of home rule
units shall be construed liberally." However, the Illinois
court emphasized that:
"[S]uch powers are not absolute, and in
construing the ordinance we must also
consider that, as stated by the local
government committee, 'the powers of home
rule units relate to their own problems,
not to those of the state or the nation.'
(7 Proceedings 1621.)" Ampersand, 61
Ill. 2nd at 542.
We concur with the Illinois Supreme Court's reasoning that a
county's authority to exercise its home rule powers must be
limited to its local affairs. Thus, although we are aware of
the liberal construction mandate contained in K.S.A. 19-101c,
we are of the opinion that a home rule ordinance should be
struck down if it does not pertain to the local affairs and
government as authorized under the provisions of K.S.A. 1985
Supp. 19-101a.
Both Illinois and Kansas function under a unified court
system. Under Article 3, §1 of the Kansas Constitution, and
K.S.A. 20-101, the Supreme Court of Kansas has general
administrative authority over all courts in Kansas.
Similarly, under Article VI of the Illinois Constitution, only
one unified court system operates statewide. In discussing
the authority of a home rule unit to exercise power over the
Illinois court system, the Ampersand court said:
"Article VI of the 1970 Constitution does
not contemplate nor does it authorize the
exercise of any control over or permit the
imposition of a burden on the judicial
system by any local entity.
"The administration of justice under our
constitution is a matter of statewide
concern and does not pertain to local
government or affairs."
The court went on to emphasize that, as explained by the local
government committee, the powers of a home rule unit relate
only to its own affairs and not to those of the state. Thus,
the court concluded that the ordinance imposing the filing fee
was invalid, as the county had overstepped the boundaries of
its home rule powers by attempting to pass an ordinance
affecting the affairs of the state. Ampersand, 61 Ill. 2d
at 542-43. The charge of the fee, whether characterized as a
tax or otherwise, as a condition to the right to litigate in
the courts, was a burden which could not be imposed by a home
rule unit. Ampersand, 61 I11. 2d at 543.
We concur with the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to
invalidate the Cook County ordinance as an unauthorized
exercise of a county's home rule powers. In the same manner,
we find Harper County's attempt to pass a resolution affecting
the court system in Kansas to be outside the scope of that
county's home rule powers, and conclude that the resolution is
invalid.
In summary, it is our opinion that Harper County may not
exempt itself by charter resolution from limitations imposed
by K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-1322, subsection (a), which
establishes limits on the tax the clerk of the district court
shall impose as a filing fee for the benefit of the county law
library. Such resolution would violate the limitation placed
on the home rule powers a county is authorized to exercise
under K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 19-101a, subsection (a)(3), that
"counties may not affect the courts located therein."
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Barbara P. Allen
Assistant Attorney General
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