Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-178

1985-178Kanag

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December 18, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 178
Steve Piper
City Clerk
Marquette, Kansas 67464
Re: Schools -- Organization, Powers and Finances of
Boards of Education -- Closing or Changing the Use
of School Buildings
Synopsis: Under K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 72-8213, it is a
prerequisite to the closing of a school building
that a majority of the voters approve such closing
in a special election held for that purpose.
However, that statute authorizes a school board to
change the use of a school building without an
election, and does not require that a school board
offer in any one building six grades of elementary
school, three grades of junior high, and three
grades of high school. Additionally, a statute
does not constitute an express or implied contract
between the State of Kansas and the people of the
state. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 72-8213;
L. 1982, Ch. 301, Sec. 3.
Dear Mr. Piper:
As City Clerk of Marquette, Kansas, and on behalf of that
city, you request our opinion concerning K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
72-8213, which sets forth the authority of a school board to
close or change the use of a school building. You are
particularly concerned with the effect of the 1982 amendment
to that statute.
You first inquire whether, prior to the 1982 amendment of the
statute, K.S.A. 72-8213 "guaranteed" to the people of Kansas
the right to decide whether their school could be closed. The
language of the statute at that time provided as follows:
"The board shall not close any attendance
facility that was being operated at the
time the unified district was organized if
at least three-fourths (3/4) of the
territory and at least three-fourths
(3/4) of the taxable tangible valuation of
the district which formerly owned such
building is included in such unified
district unless and until a majority of
the resident electors within the
attendance center of such attendance
facility shall give their consent thereto."
The statute's current language, contained in the 1984
Supplement, provides that a school building shall not be
closed unless a majority of those voting at an election upon
that question are in favor of such closing. K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
72-8213(c)(4)(c).
The language of the statute, both prior to and after 1982,
creates a duty on the part of the local school board to submit
the question of a school closing to the public. The same
language creates a correlative right on the part of the public
to vote on that issue. In common terms, it may properly be
said that the statute "guarantees" that a school building
shall not be closed unless a majority of those voting approve
that closing.
You next inquire whether the statute prior to its 1982
amendment "guaranteed" to the people of Kansas that at least
three high school grades, three junior high grades, and six
elementary grades be operated in one school building. The
relevant language of the statute, again prior to 1982, stated:
"Noting in this section shall be deemed to
restrict or limit the authority of any
board to change the use of any attendance
facility, so long as at least three (3)
high-school grades, three (3) junior
high school grades, or six (6)
elementary school grades are offered in
such attendance facility." K.S.A.
72-8213(e). (Emphasis added.)
Under this statute, the school board could change the use of a
school building from an elementary school to a junior high
offering three grades or to a high school offering three
grades, or take any other action which did not reduce the
number of grades offered in the building to less than the
amount required for the applicable level of education. The
statute did not require that the board offer in any one
building six grades of elementary school, three grades of
junior high, and three grades of high school.
The statute was amended in 1982 to its present language which
provides:
"Nothing in this section shall be deemed
to restrict or limit the authority of any
board to change the use of any school
building, so long as such school building
is operated or used for pupil attendance
purposes." L. 1982, Ch. 301, Sec. 3(g),
now at K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 72-8213(g).
By removing the requirement that a minimum number of grades be
offered for each appropriate educational level, the
legislature broadened the school board's authority to change
the use of a school building. In our opinion, neither the
current language, nor the language of the statute prior to
1982 guaranteed to the people of Kansas that at least six
elementary grades, three junior high grades, and three high
school grades be offered in any one school building.
You next inquire whether the statute, presumably prior to its
1982 amendment, constituted an "implied contract between the
State of Kansas and the People of Kansas in regard to closing
schools." The law recognizes two types of implied contracts:
those impled in fact, and those implied in law, which are also
known as "quasi-contracts." Contracts implied in fact arise
from facts and circumstances showing mutual intent to
contract. Mai v. Youtsey, 231 Kan. 419, 422 (1982);
Swanston v. McConnell Air Force Base Fed'l Cred.
Union, 8 Kan.App.2d 538, 541 (1983). Contracts implied in
law are not true contracts but are obligations imposed for the
purpose of doing justice without reference to the intention of
the parties. Bucher and Willis Consulting Engineers v.
Smith, 7 Kan.App.2d 467, Syl. 17 (1982).
Our research has revealed no support for the proposition that
a statute of any kind may constitute an implied contract of
either type. In our judgment, an implied contract theory,
which is premised upon the absence of express terms, is
particularly inapplicable to statutes. It has long been
established in this state that one legislature does not have
the power to bind another, and that a subsequent legislature
may make such changes in existing laws as it deems necessary,
provided that those changes are not unconstitutional or impair
vested rights. Gilleland v. Schuyler, 9 Kan. 565
(1872); Board of Education of Leavenworth v. Phillips, 67
Kan. 549 (1903). Accordingly, in our opinion it cannot be
concluded that K.S.A. 72-8213 constitutes, or at one point in
time constituted, an implied contract which is not subject to
unilateral change.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Kathryn Gardner
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:KG:crw

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