Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-163

1985-163Kanag

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November 25, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85-163
Phillip L. Harris
City Attorney
Justice Center
8500 Antioch
Overland Park, Kansas 66212
Re: Cities and Municipalities -- Municipal Courts;
Proceedings After Arrest -- Diversion; Factors to
be Considered
Synopsis: K.S.A. 12-4415(b), as amended by L. 1985, ch. 48,
51, sets forth factors which a city prosecutor must
consider in determining whether a person is
eligible for diversion for the offense of driving
while under the influence of alcohol. One of the
factors which precludes the offering of diversion
is the occurrence of an accident involving personal
injury at the time of the offense. Given the lack
of any legislative language to the contrary, such
personal injury may be to either the defendant or
another passenger, ,driver or third-party. In that
the legislature intended to restrict a prosecutor's
discretion in the offering of diversion to DUI
offenders, even minor injuries not involving
hospitalization are sufficient to preclude the use
of diversion, which itself is a privilege and not a
right. Cited herein: K.S.A. 12-4415, as amended
by L. 1985, ch. 48, 51; K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 22-2908;
K.S.A. 40-3103.
Dear Mr. Harris:
As City Attorney for the City of Overland Park, Kansas, you
request our opinion on the authority of your office to enter
into diversion agreements in cases involving the offense of
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Specifically,
you wish us to address three questions:
1. "Does K.S.A. 12-4415(b)(4) pertain to personal
injuries suffered by the defendant as well as second
parties involved in alcohol related accidents?
2. "What is the definition of personal injury as
conceived by the legislature in K.S.A. 12-4415(b)(4)?
3. "To what extent can a prosecutor use his discretion
to define personal injury?"
The 1985 Kansas Legislature amended Kansas law with regard to
diversion program eligibility in DUI cases. These
amendments were a part of a comprehensive act on
alcohol-related offenses and enforcement which appeared at
Laws of 1985, chapter 48. K.S.A. 12-4415(b) was amended by
section 11, and now provides:
"A city attorney shall not enter into a
diversion agreement in lieu of further
criminal proceedings on a complaint
alleging a violation of an alcohol related
offense if the defendant:
"(4) during the time of the alleged
alcohol related offense was involved in a
motor vehicle accident or collision
resulting in personal injury or death."
(Emphasis added.)
The term "personal injury" was not defined by the Kansas
Legislature when the language underscored above was added in
1985, and neither the House or Senate Federal and State
Affairs Committees heard any testimony attempting to define
these words or determine their concrete applications.
Accordingly, it would be helpful to examine other statutes in
which the term appears.
Other Kansas statutes have interpreted the term "injury" and
"injured person." The most analogous statutes to do so are
contained in the Automobile Injury Reparations Act, K.S.A.
40-3101 et seq. "Injured person" means "any person
suffering injury," while "injury" is defined as "bodily harm,
sickness, disease or death resulting from an accident arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle."
K.S.A. 40-3103(h), (i). Common law definitions of the term
are essentially the same. Strictly applying those definitions
to K.S.A. 12-4415(b) (4) would automatically preclude diversion
in any case where the defendant or other party received bodily
harm, no matter how slight or severe. While arguments can be
made for a liberal interpretation of these terms, in our
opinion such a reading would not give full effect to the
intent of the legislature in restricting the use of diversion
as an alternative to sentencing and conviction.
The legislative objective with respect to diversion in DUI
cases is to encourage an alternative to formal conviction.
See, e.g., State v. Greenlee, 228 Kan. 712, 718 (1980)
("The intent is one of rehabilitation . . ."). However,
diversion cannot be offered to everyone who is accused of a
DUI violation. Second-, third- and multiple-offenders are
barred by K.S.A. 12-4415(b) (municipal courts) and K.S.A. 1984
Supp. 22-2908(2)(a) (district courts). These restrictions
were added in the 1982 overhaul of the DUI laws.
The 1985 amendments to K.S.A. 12-4415 were designed to further
prevent drunk drivers involved in an injury accident from
escaping punishment by qualifying for diversion. By its
actions, the legislature clearly intended to put more teeth in
the DUI laws, and to make more violators experience the
penalties of the law. By precluding diversion in cases where
"personal injury" occurred, the legislature has limited a
prosecutor's discretion in applying the statute's provisions
to each individual case. The need for this result can be
demonstrated by referring to concrete examples. Specifically,
an accident in which persons required hospitalization would
preclude diversion eligibility under even a liberal
interpretation. However, one prosecutor might determine that
a small abrasion suffered by the offending driver or someone
else was not sufficient to cause an otherwise-qualified
offender to be ineligible for diversion, while another
prosecutor would reach the opposite result. Through a uniform
interpretation of the concept of "personal injury," the intent
of the legislature (i.e. to limit the use of diversion in
some DUI cases) will be given a more full effect than if the
definition was left up to each prosecutor on a case-by-case
basis.
In conclusion, K.S.A. 12-4415(b), as amended by L. 1985, ch.
48, *51, sets forth factors which a city prosecutor must
consider in determining whether a person is eligible for
diversion for the offense of driving while under the influence
of alcohol. One of the factors which precludes the offering
of diversion is the occurrence of an accident involving
personal injury at the time of the offense. Given the lack of
any legislative language to the contrary, such personal injury
may be to either the defendant or another passenger, driver or
third-party. In that the legislature intended to restrict a
prosecutor's discretion in the offering of diversion to DUI
offenders, even minor injuries not involving hospitalization
are sufficient to preclude the use of diversion, which itself
is a privilege and not a right.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHANATTORNEYGENERALOFKANSAS
Jeffrey S. Southard
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JSS:crw

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