Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-127

1985-127Kanag

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September 23, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 1 2 7
David K. Martin
Mission City Attorney
Payne & Jones, Chartered
P.O. Box 25625
Overland Park, Kansas 66225
Re: Cities and Municipalities -- Code for Municipal
Courts; Proceedings After Arrest and Prior to Trial
-- Municipal Court Diversion; Factors To Be
Considered Before Diversion Offer
Synopsis: Under the provisions of K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 22-2908
(as amended by L. 1985, ch. 48, §16) and K.S.A.
12-4415 (as amended by L. 1985, ch. 48, §11), a
county attorney or city attorney is not prohibited
from entering into a diversion agreement in lieu of
further criminal proceedings if a defendant
(charged with an alcohol related offense) has been
convicted of or pleaded nolo contendere to a
violation of an alcohol related offense in a state
other than Kansas. However, a previous conviction
in another state must be considered in determining
whether diversion of a defendant is in the interest
of justice. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
8-1567 (as amended by L. 1985, ch. 50, §5), K.S.A.
12-4415 (as amended by L. 1985, ch. 48, §11),
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 22-2908 (as amended by L. 1985,
ch. 48, §16); L. 1983, ch. 37, §2.
Dear Mr. Martin:
You request our opinion as to whether a municipal court
prosecutor has discretion to grant diversion where a defendant
charged with violation of an alcohol related offense has
previously been convicted of an alcohol related offense in a
state other than Kansas.
In responding to your question, we first note that, for
purposes of sentencing under K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-1567 (as
amended by L. 1985, ch. 50,§5), a "conviction" includes
alcohol related violations occurring in states other than
Kansas. [K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-1567(j), as amended] As
subsection (m) of the aforesaid statute prohibits cities from
adopting ordinances which deviate from the minimum penalties
prescribed by K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-1567 (as amended),
convictions in states other than Kansas also constitute prior
convictions for purposes of sentencing under municipal
ordinances.
Although convictions in other states constitute a second or
third offense for purposes of sentencing, the existence of
such convictions does not prohibit a city or county attorney
from entering into a diversion agreement. In this regard,
K.S.A. 12-4415 (as amended by L. 1985, ch. 48, §11) provides
as follows:
"(a) In determining whether diversion of a
defendant is in the interests of justice
and of benefit to the defendant and the
community, the city attorney shall
consider at least the following factors
among all factors considered:
"(3) whether the defendant is a first
time offender of an alcohol related
offense and if the defendant has
previously participated in diversion,
according to the certification of the
diversion of vehicles of the state
department of revenue;
"(b) A city attorney shall not enter into
a diversion agreement in lieu of further
criminal proceedings on a complaint
alleging a violation of an alcohol related
offense if the defendant:
"(1) Has previously participated in
diversion of an alcohol related offense;
"(2) has previously been convicted of or
pleaded nolo contendere to a violation
of an alcohol related offense in this
state;
"(3) at the time of the alleged alcohol
related offense had an alcohol
concentration of .20 or more in the
defendant's blood or breath; or
"(4) during the time of the alleged
alcohol related offense was involved in a
motor vehicle accident or collision
resulting in personal injury or death."
(Emphasis added.)
The corresponding statute which restricts the power of county
and district attorneys to enter into diversion agreements,
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 22-2908 (as amended by L. 1985, ch. 48,
§16), provides as follows:
"(1) In determining whether diversion of a
defendant is in the interests of justice
and of benefit to the defendant and the
community, the county or district attorney
shall consider at least the following
among all factors considered:
"(c) whether the defendant is a
first-time offender and if the defendant
has previously participated in diversion,
according to the certification of the
Kansas bureau of investigation or the
division of vehicles of the department of
revenue;
"(2) A county or district attorney shall
not enter into a diversion agreement in
lieu of further criminal proceedings on a
complaint if:
"(a) The complaint alleges a violation of
K.S.A. 8-1567 and amendments thereto and
the defendant: (A) Has previously
participated in diversion upon a complaint
alleging a violation of that statute or an
ordinance of a city in this state which
prohibits the acts prohibited by that
statute; (B) has previously been convicted
of or pleaded nolo contendere to a
violation of that statute or an
ordinance of a city in this state which
prohibits the acts prohibited by that
statute; (C) at the time of the alleged
violation had an alcohol concentration of
.20 or more in the defendant's blood or
breath; or (D) during the time of the
alleged violation was involved in a motor
vehicle accident or collision resulting in
personal injury or death; or
"(b) the complaint alleges that the
defendant committed a class A or B
felony." (Emphasis added.)
In accordance with the above-quoted statutes, it is our
opinion that a county attorney or city attorney is not
prohibited from entering into a diversion agreement in lieu of
further criminal proceedings if a defendant (charged with an
alcohol related offense) has been convicted of or pleaded
nolo contendere to a violation of an alcohol related
offense in a state other than Kansas. However, a previous
conviction in another state must be considered in determining
whether diversion of a defendant is in the interest of justice.
In passing, we would observe that the inconsistent treatment
of prior convictions from other states is probably the result
of legislative oversight. Specifically, the legislature
neglected to amend K.S.A. 12-4415 and K.S.A. 22-2908 when
K.S.A. 8-1567 was amended in 1983 so as to include convictions
from other states for purposes of sentencing. See L. 1983,
ch. 37, §2. It appears that the failure to amend the
diversion statutes was simple oversight, resulting in the
inconsistency noted above.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF STEPHAN
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:TRH:crw

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