Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-082

1985-082Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
July 12, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 82
Micheal A. Ireland
Jackson County Attorney
Jackson County Courthouse, Room 205
Holton, Kansas 66436
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles--Uniform Act
Regulating Traffic; Powers of State and Local
Authorities--Provisions of Act Uniform Throughout
State
Synopsis: An ordinance which allows a vehicle on a two-way
road to park with the left hand wheels parallel to
and within twelve (12) inches of the left hand curb
conflicts with subsection (a) of K.S.A. 8-1572, and
is invalid pursuant to K.S.A. 8-2001. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 8-1432, 8-1572, 8-2001, 8-2002.
*
Dear Mr. Ireland:
You request our opinion concerning regulation of traffic in the
City of Holton. Specifically, your questions are as follows:
"1. Whether or not the City of Holton can
change their traffic ordinances to allow under
K.S.A. 8-1572 for the left hand wheels to be
parked within twelve inches of a left hand
curb or as close as practicable to the left
hand edge of the shoulder. That would then
make the car being on the left hand side of
the road for parking purposes.
2. Whether or not the City Commissioners have
any affirmative duty to require the Police
Chief to strictly enforce the letter of the
law as to parking regulations for vehicles
which are parked on the left hand side of the
road with their left hand wheels close to the
left shoulder."
K.S.A. 8-1572 is part of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on
Highways, and subsection (a) thereof provides as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided in this section,
every vehicle stopped or parked upon a
two-way roadway shall be so stopped or parked
with the right-hand wheels parallel to and
within twelve (12) inches of the right-hand
curb or as close as practicable to the right
edge of the right-hand shoulder." (Emphasis
added.)
K.S.A. 8-2001 prohibits any "local authority" (which term
includes cities--see K.S.A. 8-1432) from enacting or enforcing
any ordinance in conflict with the Uniform Act:
"The provisions of this act shall be
applicable and uniform throughout this state
and in all cities and other political
subdivisions therein, and no local authority
shall enact or enforce any ordinance in
conflict with the provisions of this act
unless expressly authorized; however, local
authorities may adopt additional traffic
regulations which are not in conflict with the
provisions of this act." (Emphasis added.)
K.S.A. 8-2002 states that the Uniform Act "shall not be deemed
to prevent local authorities with respect to streets and highways
under their jurisdiction and within reasonable exercise of the
police power from . . . [r]egulating or prohibiting stopping,
standing or parking."
In construing the above-quoted sections of the Uniform Act
Regulating Traffic on Highways, we are bound to follow
established rules of statutory construction recognized in this
state. A summary statement of the rules pertinent here is found
in Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195 (1978), as follows:
"The fundamental rule of statutory
construction, to which all others are
subordinate, is that the purpose and intent of
the legislature governs when that intent can
be ascertained from the statute, even though
words, phrases or clauses at some place in the
statute must be omitted or inserted. (Farm &
City Ins. Co. v. American Standard Ins.
Co., 220 Kan. 325, Syl. 13, 552 P.2d 1363
[1976].) In determining legislative intent,
courts are not limited to a mere consideration
of the language used, but look to the
historical background of the enactment, the
circumstances attending its passage, the
purpose to be accomplished and the effect the
statute may have under the various
constructions suggested. (State, ex rel., v.
City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 700, Syl.
110, 527 P.2d 1340 [1974].) In order to
ascertain the legislative intent, courts are
not permitted to consider only a certain
isolated part or parts of an act but are
required to consider and construe together all
parts thereof in pari materia. When the
interpretation of some one section of an act
according to the exact and literal import of
its words would contravene the manifest
purpose of the legislature, the entire act
should be construed according to its spirit
and reason, disregarding so far as may be
necessary the literal import of words or
phrases which conflict with the manifest
purpose of the legislature. Kansas Commission
on Civil Rights v. Howard, 218 Kan. 248,
Syl. 12, 544 P.2d 791 [1975].)" 224 Kan. at
199, 200.
Additionally, it is well established that statutes in pari
materia should be construed together so as to harmonize their
respective provisions, if reasonably possible to do so. Callaway
v. City of Overland Park, 211 Kan. 646, 650 (1973).
Applying these rules, it is our opinion that a city's authority
to regulate parking under K.S.A. 8-2002 is limited by the
language of K.S.A. 8-2001, and that no city may enact a parking
ordinance which conflicts with any section of the Uniform Act
Regulating Traffic on Highways. In our judgment, an ordinance
which allows a vehicle upon a two-way road to park with the left
hand wheels parallel to and within twelve inches of the left
hand curb conflicts with subsection (a) of K.S.A. 8-1572, and is
invalid pursuant to K.S.A. 8-2001.
In regard to your second question, the police chief and all
police officers are under a general duty to enforce the law. See
Dauffenbach v. City of Wichita, 233 Kan. 1028, 1033 (1983).
While such officers should exercise discretion in enforcing the
law, no officer may enforce any ordinance or policy which
conflicts with K.S.A. 8-1572.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
TerrenceR.Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:TRH:jm

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