Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-063

1985-063Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
AT TORN EY GENERAL
June 10, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 6 3
The Honorable Bob Vancrum
State Representative, 29th District
9004 West 104th Street
Overland Park, Kansas 66212
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- General Provisions --
Registration of Vehicles; All-Terrain Vehicles;
Operation
Synopsis: K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-128(a) provides limits upon the
locations in which an all-terrain vehicle [as defined
by K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-126(bb)) may be operated.
The statute contains a total prohibition on the
,operation of such vehicles on interstate, federal or
state highways, and on other public highways, streets
or roads at certain times without proper lighting.
While the subsection also states that no such vehicle
shall be operated within the limits of any first class
city, this language should not be read as constituting
a prohibition on the use of such vehicles on private
property, given the general limitation of statutes in
Chapter 8 to operation of vehicles on public roads and
highways. However, if a city of the first class
wished to enact an ordinance which is more restrictive
of the use of all-terrain vehicles within the city
limits, it would have the authority to do so under the
home rule provisions of Article 12, Section 5 of the
Kansas Constitution. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1984
Supp. 8-126, as amended by 1985 House Bill No. 2222;
K.S.A. 8-127, as amended by 1985 Senate Bill No.
318; K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-128; K.S.A. 8-1102; Kan.
Const., Art. 12, §5.
Dear Representative Vancrum:
As State Representative for the Twenty-ninth legislative
district, you request our opinion on a question which concerns
the effect of K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-128 as it relates to
all-terrain vehicles. Specifically, you inquire if language
contained in the statute prohibits the operation of such vehicles
within the limits of any city of the first class, regardless of
whether such operation is on the public highways and roads or on
private property. You indicate that the City of Kansas City,
Kansas has adopted a municipal ordinance which has the same
wording as does the statute as concerning to first-class cities,
which the city is interpreting as being a ban on the operation of
all-terrain vehicles on both private and public property.
As you note in your letter, the 1984 Kansas Legislature added
language to K.S.A. 8-126 and 8-128 to include provisions for
all-terrain vehicles. The former statute was amended to include
a definition of such vehicles to include:
"(bb) 'All-terrain vehicle.' Any motorized
off-highway vehicle 45 inches or less in
width, having a dry weight of 500 pounds or
less, traveling on three or more low-pressure
tires, and having a seat designed to be
straddled by the operator. As used in this
subsection, low pressure tire means any
pneumatic tire six inches or more in width,
designed for use on wheels with rim diameter
of 12 inches or less, and utilizing an
operating pressure of 10 pounds per square
inch or less as recommended by the vehicle
manufacturer."
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-128 concerns registration of certain vehicles,
and now reads [at subsection (a)1:
"(a) Farm tractors, all self-propelled farm
implements including all-terrain vehicles when
used for agricultural purposes, fertilizers
and spreaders designed and used exclusively
for dispensing liquid or dust fertilizer, road
rollers and road machinery temporarily
operated or moved upon the highways,
municipally owned fire trucks, privately owned
fire trucks subject to a mutual aid agreement
with a municipality and school buses owned and
operated by a school district or a nonpublic
school plainly painted thereon need not be
registered under this act. A truck mounted
fertilizer spreader used or manufactured
principally to spread animal dung is not a
self-propelled farm implement for the purpose
of the act of which this section is a part.
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this
subsection (a), no all-terrain vehicle shall
be operated on any interstate highway, federal
highway or state highway for agricultura
purposes or any other purpose. No all-terrain
vehicle may be operated within the limits of
any first class city. No all-terrain vehicle
shall be operated on any public highway,
street or road between the hours of 1/2 hour
after sunset until 1/2 hour before sunrise,
unless equipped with lights as is required by
law for motorcycles." (Emphasis added.)
An examination of the legislative history of the act in which the
two amendments appear (L. 1984, ch. 27), is not helpful in
fixing any specific legislative intent behind the
above-underscored language. However, several basic tenets of
statutory construction may be applied to determine the
legislature's purpose. First, the act must be read in pari
materia with other acts which deal with the registration and
operation of motor vehicles, and, if possible, harmonized so that
all may be given force and effect. Capital Services, Inc. v.
Dahlinger Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc., 232 Kan. 419 (1983). Further,
in determining legislative intent, it is proper to consider the
purpose to be accomplished and the effect of various
constructions. Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 235 Kan. 278
(1984). Finally, if a statute is susceptible of more than one
construction, effect should be given to that reading which gives
effect to the intent and purpose of the legislature, even if such
a construction may not be within the strict literal wording of
the statute. Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195 (1978).
Given the above principles, it is our opinion that the
legislature did not have the intent to prohibit the operation of
all-terrain vehicles upon private roads or private property, even
when such roads or property are located within the limits of a
first class city such as Kansas City. Each of the other
prohibitions in the statute concerning use of all-terrain
vehicles relates to their operation on public roads and highways,
with the statute as a whole exempting certain vehicles from the
registration requirement of K.S.A. 8-127, as amended, which
itself concerns operation of vehicles or "highways" of this
state.
Further, in K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-126, as amended, numerous terms
are defined in such a way as to exclude private property from the
scope of the registration statutes. For example, subsection (a)
defines "vehicle" as devices in which persons may be transported
on "public highways," while subsection (s) defines "highways" to
exclude roads on private property. While the legislature can, if
it chooses, expressly extend the scope of traffic laws to include
private property [see K.S.A. 8-1102(b) relating to abandonment
of vehicles], such cases are the exception rather than the rule.
Therefore, it is consistent with the overall intent of chapter 8
of the statutes to construe K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-128(a) to
prohibit the operation of all-terrain vehicles upon the public
roads and highways of any first class city, but not as a total
ban on their operation anywhere within such cities.
This is not to say, however, that a first class city could not,
if it desired, act to further restrict the operation of such
vehicles, or to even ban them entirely within the city. Kansas
City, like all cities in this state, is given authority over its
local affairs through the home rule provisions of the Kansas
Constitution (Article 12, Section 5), and could therefore enact a
more restrictive provision than that found in the statute. In
that the subsection is not uniformly applicable to all cities,
Kansas City could alternatively adopt a more liberal ordinance
under the holdings of City of Junction City v. Griffin, 227 Kan.
333 (1980). This determination, of course, is one which must be
left to the city council.
In conclusion, K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-128(a) provides limits upon
the locations in which an all-terrain vehicle [as defined by
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-126(bb), as amended] may be operated. The
statute contains a total prohibition on the operation of such
vehicles on interstate, federal or state highways, and on other
public highways, streets or roads at certain times without proper
lighting. While the subsection also states that no such vehicle
shall be operated within the limits of any first class city, this
language should not be read as constituting a prohibition on the
use of such vehicles on private property, given the general
limitation of statutes in Chapter 8 to operation of vehicles on
public roads and highways. However, if a city of the first class
wished to enact an ordinance which is more restrictive of the use
of all-terrain vehicles within the city limits, it would have the
authority to do so under the home rule provisions of Article 12,
Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Jeffrey S. Southard
Deputy Attorney General
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