Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-049

1985-049Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
May 9, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 49
85-
Colt Knutson
Riley County Attorney
6th and Humboldt, Suite 1
Manhattan, Kansas 66502
Re: State Departments; Public Officers, Employees --
Public Officers and Employees -- Open Public Meetings;
Bodies Subject Thereto; Not-for-Profit Corporations
Synopsis: A not-for-profit corporation is subject to the Kansas
Open Meetings Act if it: (1) receives public support
in its operations such as public funds or the use of
public facilities; and (2) acts as a governmental
agency in providing services to the public that would
otherwise be provided by state or local government.
Additional factors include the degree of control which
a government body has over the activities of the
corporation, the degree to which the corporation's
directors are selected by a government body, and
whether, in the absence of the legal relationship it
has with a government body, the corporation could
independently exist. Upon applying these factors to
the Memorial Hospital Association, Inc., it is our
opinion that the association is subject to the
provisions of the act, and must hold meetings for the
conduct of its affairs in public, subject to the
provisions of the act. Cited herein: K.S.A.
75-4318; 75-4319.
,
Dear Mr. Knutson:
As County Attorney for Riley County, Kansas, you request our
opinion concerning the application of the Kansas Open Meetings
Act to the Board of Directors of the Memorial Hospital
Association, Inc. (hereinafter "the association"). Questions
have been raised whether, following a reorganization of the joint
body which oversaw the operations of the hospital, the Open
Meetings Act applies to both of the new bodies which were
created. While the association has taken the position that the
act does not apply to its meetings, the second entity created by
the reorganization, the Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital,
Inc. (hereinafter "trustees"), observes the act in its
proceedings. Acting on behalf of several interested parties, you
accordingly seek our opinion.
Included with your request were a number of documents which
provide a factual background to your inquiry, including a
memorandum and stipulation of facts from the association's
attorney and statements of position from a local radio station
and the local newspaper. From these documents, we believe the
following facts can be taken as undisputed:
1. The association is a not-for-profit corporation organized
and operated under the laws of the state. Under by-laws
which have been in effect since November, 1984, it is
governed by a board of directors who are selected by other
board members. However, several, if not all, of the present
board members were originally appointed by the County
Commissioners of Riley County prior to the time the joint
board (see paragraph 3 below) split into the board of
directors of the association and the trustees.
2. The board of trustees are presently appointed by the
county commission and are responsible for allocating the
proceeds of a mill levy which the county imposes for the
upkeep of the physical facilities of Memorial Hospital, which
is owned by Riley County. Mill levy money represents about
5% of the operating budget for the hospital.
3. Prior to November, 1984, only one board was in charge of
the operations of the hospital. This joint board was
composed of persons who served as both trustees and as
directors of the association. All were appointed by the
county commission, and met publicly. The split was achieved
by the joint board itself, with several members elected to
the board of directors of the association and the rest
remaining as trustees.
4. The joint board managed all of the affairs of the
hospital from March, 1982 until November, 1984, when the
split occurred. In December, 1984, the directors and the
trustees entered into a lease agreement for the hospital,
under the terms of which the association pays an annual rent
of one dollar. The trustees, and through them, the county
commission, retains ultimate control over the hospital
through provisions in the lease which provide for remedies if
the lessee (i.e. the association) is deemed to be in default
through the occurrence of various events. According to
newspaper accounts, the lease had been in the process of
being drafted since at least March, 1984. Manhattan Mercury,
March 22, 1984. This same article quotes one of the county
commissioners as saying that the split of the two boards,
which was formally approved at a meeting that day, would
allow the association to hold private, rather than in open,
meetings.
Given the above facts, it remains to determine whether the
association as now structured continues to fall under the
provisions of the Kansas Open Meetings Act. K.S.A. 75-4318
defines the scope of the act as follows:
. . . all meetings for the conduct of the
affairs of, and the transaction of business
by, all legislative and administrative bodies
and agencies of the state and political and
taxing subdivisions thereof, including boards,
commissions, authorities, councils,
committees, subcommittees and other
subordinate groups thereof, receiving or
expending and supported in whole or in part by
public funds shall be open to the public . . .
The above language sets forth a two-part test which must be met
before a body can be found to be included within the act's
provisions, namely that: (1) the body be a legislative or
administrative agency of the state or one of its political or
taxing subdivision, or be subordinate to such a body; and (2) the
body receives, expends or is supported in whole or in part by
public funds, or, in the case of subordinate groups, has a parent
or controlling body which is so supported. See also State ex
rel. Murray v. Palmgren, 231 Kan. 524, 535 (1982).
Initially, it may be concluded with little difficulty that the
trustees are subject to the act, for they are a subordinate board
to the county commission, which in turn is a legislative body
which heads a political and taxing subdivision of the state. The
same situation was found in the Palmgren case, in which both the
Thomas County Commission and four of the six members of the board
of trustees of the Thomas County Hospital were found to have
violated the act. The Riley County trustees are appointed by the
county commission, take their direction from the county
commission, and receive public moneys which are raised as a
result of a tax levy imposed by the county commission. Hence,
the board of trustees is a subordinate group of the county and is
subject to the act.
In examining the board of directors of the association, it is
readily apparent that the same level of control is not present, a
result which was apparently consciously sought by the joint board
during the time that the split was being discussed and carried
out. During the past several years, our office has on numerous
occasions examined this type of factual situation (i.e. where a
non-profit where a corporation exists that receives public funds
and is in someway related to a governmental unit) in order to
determine whether the act applies. In Attorney General Opinion
No. 79-221, we concluded that a private nursing home was not
subject to the act, as it did not exercise any powers of either
state or local government, and had no directors appointed by a
government agency. While state money was clearly paid to the
home (in addition to federal funds, insurance reimbursements and
private moneys), such money was for services which the home
rendered which were supplemental to, rather than in lieu of,
actions taken by the state. The home existed apart from
receiving public funds, and would continue to do so even in the
absence of any agreements with the state.
A similar conclusion was reached in Attorney General Opinion No.
80-239, which concerned the activities of the Kansas University
Endowment Association. In addition to the absence of any state
control over the activities of the association, the opinion noted
that:
"The Kansas Open Meetings Act has not been
interpreted to apply to truly private entities
whose association with the state or its
political and taxing subdivisions in based on
'arms-length' contractual obligations. For
example, the fact that a building contractor
performs the service of constructing a new
hospital or office building for the State for
which he receives a considerable sum of tax
dollars does not subject his corporate board
of directors to public scrutiny under K.S.A.
75-4317 et seq." Id. at 7.
The same conclusion was reached in Attorney General Opinions No.
81-253 and 82-256, involving the application of the act to
Planned Parenthood of South-Central Kansas, Inc., and the Kansas
Cosmosphere and Discovery Center, Inc., respectively. In each
case, it was found to be conclusive that: (1) the corporation,
which was private and not-for-profit, did not administer a
government program for which state or local government would
otherwise be responsible; (2) the corporate directors were not
appointed by a governmental body; and (3) the county exercised no
control over the activities of the corporation, although the
corporation did comply with necessary federal and state
regulations in order to qualify for public funds.
However, in Opinions No. 79-284 and 84-10, we found that
non-profit corporations were subject to the act where they (1)
received public funds in their operations and (2) acted as a
governmental agency in providing services to the public. The
former opinion concerned McPherson County Diversified Services,
Inc. (MCDS), which was supported by tax revenues and provided
services to the developmentally disabled citizens of McPherson
County. It was pertinent to our conclusion that the McPherson
County Commissioners confirmed all appointments to the board of
directors of MCDS and that MCDS was required to report back to
the county concerning the handling of its funds and types of
services it provided. The opinion concluded that these
activities constituted "governmental affairs of the kind which
the Act intended to be open to public scrutiny." Id. at 3.
Additionally, the opinion noted that MCDS was providing services
that the county would be providing but for the existence of MCDS,
and thus MCDS was essentially acting in a governmental capacity.
The latter opinion, concerning the Economic Opportunity
Foundation, Inc. (EDF) of Kansas City, Kansas, reached the same
conclusion for similar reasons.
While the above groups of opinions reach opposite results, they
are reconcilable because of the differences in the relationships
between the corporations and their respective governmental units.
We note a recent law journal article which observed that "a
concept fundamental to the application of the Act is the
requirement that the legislative or administrative body be 'of'
the state or political or taxing subdivisions." Smoot and
Clothier, Open Meetings Profile: The Prosecutor's View, 20
W.L.S. 241, 252 (1981). As noted in Attorney General Opinion
No. 79-284, supra, MCDS was "of" the county government, because
the organization was providing services that the county
government would normally provide and was legally responsible to,
and substantially controlled by the county government. Moreover,
while we concluded that organizations such as MCDS and EOF would
cease to exist but for the continued approval and support of a
state or local unit of government, it was also our conclusion
that entities such as Planned Parenthood would continue to exist
and provide services even in the absence of a relationship with a
governmental body. While the amount of public funds which an
agency receives is clearly one factor to consider, also relevant
are legal agreements between the corporation and a governmental
body, or legal action taken by the body without which the
corporation would be unable to exist. Thus, a corporation could
be found to be dependent upon state or local government and yet
receive only a portion of its funds in the form of public money.
When these considerations are applied to the Memorial Hospital
Association, Inc., it is our opinion that the Riley County Board
of Commissioners has retained control in several significant
respects. First, although the present by-laws of the association
do not permit the county to appoint directors, all of the present
directors, as former members of the "joint board," were appointed
by the county. Since it is these members who will choose
subsequent members, the decisions made by the county commission
will have an on-going effect.
Second, the commissioners maintain control over the association
through the terms of the lease agreement which was entered into
between the association and the trustees, acting on behalf of the
county commission. As previously noted, the lease was not an
II arms-length" agreement, in that negotiations between the
commission and the joint board were underway, if not essentially
concluded, prior to the time of the split. In addition, the
association is dependent for its operational existence on the
terms of the lease, for while the by-laws set forth a purpose of
managing and operating a hospital in Riley County, the present
facility is owned by the county, and the association remains
there at the county's leave. Should default occur on the lease
(Article 1, S§1.25, 1.25), the association will be stripped of
its authority and will be without a hospital to manage.
Finally, the association is clearly providing services which, but
for its existence, the county would otherwise have to provide,
either directly or through another corporation. In keeping with
past opinions, this is sufficient to make the association
involved in the "affairs of" the county. While the amount of
mill levy money is not a major part of the association's budget,
it must be remembered that the association is managing a facility
that is not its own, as in the case of a nursing home. This is
not therefore a situation, as in the Planned Parenthood opinion,
where the corporation could carry on its functions in the absence
of a legal relationship with a unit of government.
In closing, it should be acknowledged that the Kansas Open
Meetings Act contains no hard and fast rules for determining the
application of the act to corporations like the association which
are not clearly public or private in nature, but which instead
fall somewhere in between. In such situations, it is helpful to
note the language used in State ex rel. Murray v. Palmgren,
supra, when the Kansas Supreme Court found that the act is
subject to broad construction in order to carry out the stated
legislative intent:
"This court has long adhered to the rule a
penal statute should be strictly construed.
See, e.g., State v. Kearns, 229 Kan. 207,
208, 623 P.2d 507 (1981); State v. Doyen, 224
Kan. 482, 488, 580 P.2d 1351 (1978). Thus,
if the KOMA can be characterized as penal, it
might arguably be strictly construed. This
theory, however, flies in the face of the
purpose of the KOMA, stated in K.S.A.
75-4317(a): 'In recognition of the fact that
a representative government is dependent upon
an informed electorate, it is declared to be
the policy of this state that meetings for the
conduct of government affairs and the
transaction of governmental business be open
to the public.' Obviously, the intent behind
the statute is to protect the public. In
Johnson v. Killion, 178 Kan. 154, 158-59,
283 P.2d 433 (1955), this court stated: 'It
is fundamental that where a statute is
designed to protect the public, the language
must be construed in the light of the
legislative intent and purpose and is entitled
to a broad interpretation so that its public
purpose may be fully carried out.' See also
Smith v. Marshall, 225 Kan. 70, 75, 587 P.2d
320 (1978)." 231 Kan. at 530.
In conclusion, it is our opinion that in so far as Memorial
Hospital Association, Inc., is (1) controlled to a significant
degree by the Riley County Commission, acting through the
trustees of the hospital, and (2) receives public funds and the
use of a public facility, it is subject to the provisions of the
Kansas Open Meetings Act. Accordingly, while executive sessions
may be held for those subjects set forth at K.S.A. 75-4319(b),
the general conduct of the business of the association must be
done in meetings open to the public.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Jeffrey S. Southard
Deputy Attorney General
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