Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-001

1985-001Kanag

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RO
ATTORNEY GENERALERAL
January 2, 1985
t
ATITOCounATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 1
Jahn A. Sparks
Assistant COunty Westmoreland
Pottawatomie County Courthouse
WIstmoreland, Kansas 66549
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- Serious Traffic
Offenses—Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol;
Diversion Agreements Involving Restriction of Driver's
License
Synopsis: A county or district attorney may, at his or her
discretion, offer a person accused of the offense
of driving while under the influence of alcohol the
opportunity to enter into a diversion agreement.
While K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 22-2909 sets forth a number
of requirements for such an agreement, it specifically
does not limit the terms of a diversion agreement to
only those items. Accordingly, a diversion agree-
ment may impose restrictions on the driving privileges
of a defendant which may be the same as or similar to
those imposed by a court under K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 8-1567(c),
as amended by L. 1984, ch. 39, §9. If a-defendant
accepts such a condition in a diversion agreement, I.:-
his or her license should be forwarded to the division
of vehicles, as provided in K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 8-1567(1),
as amended. Cited herein: K.S.A-1567 Supp. 8-1008;
K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 83-1567, as amended by L. 1984, ch.
39, §9; K.S.A. 12-4416; K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 22-2909.
Dear Mr. Sparks:
As Assistant County Attorney for Pottawatomie CCounty Attorney-electte
you requestre also the CountEPHANey-elect), youuest our opinion
on a question concerning diversion agreements under K.S.A. 1983
Supp. 22-2909. Specifically, you inquire whether a county or
district attorney may, as a condition for the offering of a
diversion agreement to a defendant charged with driving under the
influence (DUI) of alcohol, require that the person agree to
restrictions on their license to drive. You indicate that the
restrictions you contemplate would be similar to those which
a district court may impose upon a person convicted of a first
offense of DUI under K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 8-1567, as amended by L-
1984, ch. 39, §9.
The statute which regulates diversion agreements made by county
and district attorneys, K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 22-2909, provides [at
subsection (a)] that any diversion agreement shall include
certain provisions, including waiver of specific constitutional
rights such as the right to trial by jury, and may also include
other requirements such as the payment of restitution, court
costs and diversion costs, maintenance of employment and
participation in rehabilitative programs. However, this list
is not inclusive, for as subsection (a) notes, the diversion
agreement "may include, but is not limited to" these particular
optional provisions.
Subsection (b) of K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 22-2909 requires the inclusion
of certain biographical data which is self-explanatory and need
nut be further discussed here. Of more interest is subsection
(c), which deals specifically with diversions for DUI. Any
diversion agreement for such an offense must include: (1) a
stipulation of facts regarding the offense and an agreement that,
in the event of a violation of the agreement, the stipulation
shall constitute the record used in any further proceedings;
(2) an agreement to pay the minimum fine, or, in lieu of the
fine, perform community service; and (3)enrollment in, and
successful completion of, alcohol treatment or education programs
of the type set forth in K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 8-1008. Again, however,
there is no provision that a diversion agreement for DUI must
contain only these elements, only that these elements must be
contained.
From the above, it would be our conclusion that, while a county
or district attorney is not required to include a provision
concerning restriction or suspension of a defendant's license to
drive in a diversion agreement, there is no limitation on the
discretion to do so. The entire concept of diversion is
governed by the premise that it is an alternative to sentencing
1While our
of county
' 'tical
discussion will be confined to the diversion authority
and district attorneys, city attorneys have virtually
powers under K.S.A. 12-4416.
which is offered at the discretion of the prosecutor. State v.
aenlee, 228 Kan. 712 (1980). Although the legislature has
imposed certain limits on the discretion of a county or district
attorney through the provisiosn of K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 22-2909,
once these "procedural standards" are met, the prosecutor
retains discretion as to other provisions which may be included.
State v. Greenlee, supra, 228 Kan. at 718.
In this regard, a county or district attorney has more discretion
concerning the driver's license of a DUI defendant than does
a district judge, who is required by the terms of K.S.A. 1983
Supp. 8-1567(c), as amended, to restrict the license of any person
who is convicted of a first violation of DUI. The inclusion of
similar restrictions in a DUI diversion agreement, or even a
provision that a license be suspended [see K.S.A. 8-1567(j), as
amended], would not in our opinion constitute an abuse of a
prosecutor's discretion. Should the defendant agree to such a
provision, the procedure to be followed in obtaining a new, re-
stricted license or in surrendering a suspended license may be
taken from K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 8-1567(1), as amended.
In conclusion, a county or district attorney may, at his or her
discretion, offer a person accused of the offense of driving_
while under the influence of alcohol the opportunity to enter
into a diversion agreement. While K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 22-2909
sets forth a number of requirements for such an agreement, it
specifically does not limit the terms of a diversion agreement to
only those items. Accordingly, a diversion agreement may impose
restrictions on the driving privileges of a defendant, which
may be the same as or similar to those imposed by a court under
K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 8-1567(c), as amended by L. 1984, ch. 39, §9.
If a defendant accepts such a condition in a diversion agreement,
--his or her license should be forwarded to the division of vehicles,
as provided in K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 8-1567(1), as amended.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Jeffrey S. Southard
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JSS:crw

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