Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-139

1983-139Kanag

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September 13, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 139
C. L. Laman
Cloud County Attorney
Cloud County Courthouse
Concordia, Kansas 66901
Re: Criminal Procedure -- Costs in Criminal Cases --
Liability for Costs; Witness Fees
Fees and Salaries -- Fees, All Counties; Salaries,
Certain Counties -- Liability for Costs; Witness
Fees
Synopsis: K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 22-3801 provides that court
costs, which may include witness fees, taxed
against a convicted defendant in a criminal action
are an enforceable judgment against the defendant.
When a defendant is unable to pay witness fees
and mileage, the county is obligated by K.S.A.
1982 Supp. 28-125(d) and 28-150 to pay the witness
fees. After paying witnesses their statutory fees
and mileage, the county may execute upon the judg-
ment against the defendant. Cited herein: K.S.A.
1982 Supp. 22-3801, K.S.A. 22-3803, K.S.A. 1982
Supp. 28-125, K.S.A. 28-150, K.S.A. 1982 Supp.
28-172a.
*
Dear Mr. Laman:
As Cloud County Attorney you have requested an opinion from
the office concerning the payment of witness fees and mile-
age in criminal actions. Your inquiry concerns the proper
method of satisfying witness fees and mileage costs which
are taxed against a defendant in a criminal action who is
unable to pay such. costs. At the outset we note that the
right of witnesses to compensation is purely statutory and
that compensation may be given only by statutory direction.
See Hodges v. Lister, 207 Kan. 260, 266 (1971); Bennett v.
Krath, 37 Kan. 235 (1887).
As you note, K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 22-3801(a) provides that if
a defendant in a criminal case is convicted, "the court costs
shall be taxed against the defendant and shall be a judgment
against the defendant which may be enforced as judgments
for payment of money in civil cases." We note here that
K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 28-172a(d) provides that in criminal actions
"[a]ll other fees and expenses to be assessed as additional
court costs shall be approved by the court unless specifi-
cally fixed by statute. Additional fees shall include, but
are not limited to, fees for service of process outside the
state, witness fees . . . ." You specifically ask whether
the county, through the Clerk of the District Court, is au-
thorized to reimburse the witnesses and then pursue a con-
victed defendant through normal post-judgment remedies. In
our opinion, such procedure is proper.
An earlier version of K.S.A. 22-3801(2) (L. 1978, ch. 28, §1),
clearly provided that the county should pay court costs taxed
against a defendant unable to pay and that the county could
then execute on the judgment against the defendant seeking
reimbursement. This version of K.S.A. 22-3801 provided in
relevant part:
"(1) When the defendant in a criminal case is
acquitted or the case is dismissed the costs
incurred on the part of both the prosecution
and defense shall be taxed against the county
in which the prosecution was instituted. If
the defendant is convicted the court costs
shall be taxed against the defendant. If the
defendant is unable to pay the costs taxed
against the defendant, they shall be paid by
the county except for that portion of the
docket fee which is to be paid to the county
general fund for the services of the clerk
of the district court and sheriff. In all
cases jury fees shall be paid by the county.
"(2) When a defendant has been convicted and
costs have been taxed against the defendant,
the payment of such costs by the county shall
not relieve the defendant of liability for
payment of costs, including the full docket
fee. The costs taxed against the defendant
shall be and remain a judgment against the
defendant which may be enforced as judgments
for payment of money in civil cases. It
shall be the duty of the clerk of the court
to issue execution for unpaid fines and costs
at least once each year."
As you point out in your letter, the current version of the
statute does not contain paragraph (2) and the current para-
graph (1) fails to provide for the county's role when the
defendant is unable to pay the court costs (including witness
fees) taxed against him.
The deletion of these specific provisions from the statute
in 1982 (L. 1982, ch. 116, §4) does not appear to affect the
county's obligation to pay witness fees taxed to a convicted
defendant who is unable to pay. On the contrary, several
other statutory provisions indicate that the county is gen-
erally responsible for the payment of witness fees. For
example, K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 28-125 places the general obliga-
tion to pay witnesses on the county and provides in relevant
part:
"(a) Witnesses shall receive the following
fees:
"(1) For attending before any court or grand
jury, or before any judge, referee, or com-
mission, $10 per day;
"(2) for attending on an inquest, $10; and
"(3) for each mile necessarily and actually
traveled in going to and returning from the
place of attendance, mileage at the rate pre-
scribed by law if the distance is more than
one mile.
"(d) Witness fees shall be paid by the board
of county commissioners where the violation
of the law being investigated is alleged to
have occurred." (Emphasis added.)
Another statute speaks directly to the county's obligation
in a criminal case where certain fees prescribed by Chapter
28 have not been paid. K.S.A. 28-150 states:
"In all cases where the fees prescribed by
this act in criminal cases for the sheriff,
clerk and witnesses for the state, are not
paid by the defendant or the prosecuting wit-
ness, they shall be paid by the county in
which the criminal prosecution is instituted:
Provided, That no such fees shall be paid by
the board of county commissioners until the
sheriff shall have filed his affidavit that
said fees cannot be collected from any other
source. Jury fees in civil and criminal
cases shall be paid by the county." (Empha-
sis added.)
The statutes cited above all relate to the assessment and
collection of certain court costs including witness fees.
When these sections are read together it is clear that the
Board of County Commissioners in the county where the violation
of law being investigated is alleged to have occurred shall
pay witness fees. K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 28-125(d). Section
28-125(d) refers to all witnesses whether called by the State
or the defense. Of course, where there is a conviction,
these fees, as a portion of court costs, are taxed against a
convicted defendant and become a judgment against him or her.
K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 22-3801 and K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 28-172a. In
criminal cases where certain fees, including state's witness
fees and mileage, ultimately are not paid by the defendant
or the prosecuting witness, they shall be paid by the county
in which the criminal prosecution is instituted, but only
after the Sheriff's affidavit has been filed. K.S.A. 28-150.
We note that statutes relating to the same subject matter are
considered in pari materia and thus should be construed to-
gether and harmonized, if possible, to the end that all may
be given force and effect. Claflin v. Walsh, 212 Kan. 1
(1973); City of Overland Park v. Nikias, 209 Kan. 643 (1972).
Reading the relevant statutes in an effort to harmonize them
and give force and effect to apparently inconsistent provi-
sions, it is our opinion that in a criminal action the ulti-
mate liability for witness fees, as a part of court costs,
falls upon a convicted defendant by virtue of K.S.A. 1982
Supp. 22-3801. The county, however, has a general obligation
to satisfy all witness fees under K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 28-125(d)
and we note that as a practical matter the county will often
pay those fees long before court costs are taxed to a defen-
dant or the county. In such case the county becomes the
creditor of the judgment imposed upon the defendant and may
pursue normal post-judgment remedies against the defendant.
Despite the fact that K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 22-3801 no longer
clearly obligates the county to satisfy unpaid costs, the
county is liable for witness fees by virtue of K.S.A. 1982
Supp. 28-125(d). The policy behind allowing fees and mileage
for witnesses, whether called by the prosecution or the defense,
is to reimburse the witnesses for their time and travel in
service to the court. To insure that this policy is expressed
in practical experience, the statutes place the primary obli-
gation for witness fees on the party consistently able to pay,
that is, the county.
K.S.A. 28-150 causes some difficulty in this scheme, particu-
larly with regard to defense witnesses, as it appears to
obligate the county to pay only the state's witness fees
when they are not otherwise satisfied. That section, as
noted above, provides that in all criminal cases where the
fees prescribed by the act for "the sheriff, clerk and
witnesses for the state" are not paid by the defendant or
prosecuting witness, they shall be paid by county in which
tne criminal prosecution is instituted. As a practical matter
the county will satisfy all witness fees before costs are
taxed in a criminal case. To conclude that K.S.A. 28-150
limits the county's obligation to state's witnesses would
not only be inconsistent with K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 28-125(d),
but also with the policy expressed by that section, and with
practical experience.
When the Kansas code of criminal procedure was first enacted
in 1970, Section 22-3801 (L. 1970, ch. 129) provided that
all costs taxed against a defendant unable to pay should be
paid by the county. We can find no indication either in the
statutory language or in legislative history to indicate that
the 1982 amendments to §22-3801 changed this basic policy
despite the inexplicable deletion of much of the language
clarifying the issue. Because K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 22-3801 is
the latest expression of legislative intent on this subject,
we conclude that it should control over the apparently incon-
sistent implications of K.S.A. 28-150. It is a settled rule
of statutory construction that when an irreconcilable conflict
exists between statutes, the latest enactment will be held
to supersede, repeal or supplant the earlier by implication.
Richards v. Etzen, 231 Kan. 704, 707 (1982).
Therefore, in lieu of a legislative statement clearly placing
the obligation for fees and mileage upon the party calling
the witness, we conclude that although a convicted defendant
may be held ultimately responsible for the fees, the county
is generally responsible for those fees and upon payment
thereof, becomes the creditor on a judgment imposed against
the defendant under K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 22-3801.
As a final note, as it is the county's obligation to pay
witness fees and mileage which are not otherwise satisfied,
such sums should be paid as are other claims against the
county. See K.S.A. 22-3803.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Mary F. Carson
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:MFC:hle

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