Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-120

1983-120Kanag

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August 9, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 120
Honorable Betty Jo Charlton
State Representative, Forty-Sixth District
1624 Indiana Street
Lawrence, Kansas 66044
Re: Cities and Municipalities--Abatement of Nuisances--
Assessment of Costs
Synopsis: Ordinance No. 5380 of the city of Lawrence, which
prescribes procedures for the abatement of weed
nuisances, does not violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
is not unconstitutionally vague, does not confer
arbitrary powers upon an administrative official,
and is not invalid because it fails to provide
for appeal of an administrative finding prior to
abatement by the city. Cited herein: U.S. Const.,
14th Amend.
*
Dear Representative Charlton:
You request our opinion as to the constitutionality of a weed
ordinance (Ordinance No. 5380) adopted by the city of Lawrence.
The subject ordinance declares all weeds to be a nuisance and
provides procedures for abatement thereof (Section 18-301).
The term "weeds" is defined, in part, to include the following:
"Weeds and indigenous grasses on or about
residential property which because of its
height, has a blighting influence on the
neighborhood. Any such weeds and indigenous
grasses shall be presumed to be blighting
if they exceed 12 inches in height." [Section
18-302(c)].
The ordinance provides for the appointment of a public officer
to enforce the provisions thereof, and provides that said officer
shall notify owners or occupants of land, by certified mail,
return receipt requested, of violations of the ordinance.
[Section 18-303(a) and (b)]. Said notice must order the owner
or occupant to cut the subject weeds within 10 days of receipt
of the notice, and must inform the owner or occupant that if
the weeds are not cut, the city or its agent will cut them and
assess the cost of cutting against the owner, occupants, or
person in charge of the property. [Section 18-303(b) and (c)].
Upon default of the owner and cutting of weeds by the city, the
enforcement officer must bill the owner or occupant for the cast
of abatement, and if the cost remains unpaid, the ordinance
prescribes a procedure whereby the cost may be certified as a
special assessment against the subject property. (Section 18-304).
Finally, the ordinance authorizes the enforcement officer, and
his or her assistants, employees, and contracting agents, to
enter private property to abate weeds pursuant to the ordinance,
and prescribes that it shall be unlawful to interfere with the
cutting and destruction of weeds by the enforcement officer
(and his or her agents). (Sections 18-305 and 18-306).
You indicate that a constituent who sought to allow bluegrass
to grow to maturity at 18" was alleged to have violated the
ordinance, and ask whether the ordinance denies "constitutional
rights of a property owner to use his property in a harmless
though useful manner." You also question whether the ordinance
is unconstitutionally vague, and ask whether the city enforce-
ment officer may deviate from "additional guidelines and clari-
fications to the written text" supplied by the city commission.
Finally, you ask whether the ordinance is unconstitutional because
it "contains no provisions for appeal of a staff ruling."
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, no state
(or its political subdivisions) may deprive any person of property
without due process of law. It has generally been held, however,
that weed ordinances, similar to the Lawrence ordinance described
above, do not constitute an unlawful deprivation of a property
interest. See McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd edition)
§24.90. Courts have held that such ordinances do not constitute
an invasion of private property, but are merely the regulation
of the use of such property in order that it will not be used
to the detriment of the general public. Flesch v. Metropolitan
Dade County, 240 So.2d 504, 506 (Fla., 1970).
In regard to whether the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague,
it has been held that the term "weed" has a common meaning which
is easily understood by the average citizen. Sobocinski v. City
of Williamsport, 319 A.2d 697, 701 (Pa., 1974); Thain v. City of
Palo Alto, 24 Cal. Rptr. 515, 524 (Calif., 1962). Courts have
stated that a weed ordinance need not furnish detailed plans
and specifications, Thain v. City of Palo Alto, supra at 524,
and that a landowner's "vegetal preferences" are irrelevant to
the interpretation and enforcement of such an ordinance.
Sobocinski v. City of Williamsport, supra at 699. Ordinances
which are no more specific than the Lawrence ordinance have
been upheld by courts in other states. Sobocinski v. City of
Williamsport, supra; Flesch v. Metropolitan Dade County, supra;
Thain v. City of Palo Alto, supra; City of St. Louis v. Galt,
77 S.W. 876 (Mo. Sup. Ct., 1903). In accordance with these
authorities, it is our opinion that the Lawrence weed ordinance
is not unconstitutionally vague.
Regarding the alleged deviation by the enforcement officer from
"additional guidelines and clarifications" supplied by the city
commission, you do not indicate specifically the substance and
content of such guidelines. Generally, a municipal ordinance
must prescribe a standard or norm governing its enforcement
and the exercise of any discretion by municipal officers, and
arbitrary powers conferred upon officers cannot be sustained.
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd ed.) §18.12. In view
of this principle, we believe that it would be appropriate for
the city to include any "additional guidelines" within the ordinance
itself. However, as presently written, it is our opinion that
the ordinance does not confer arbitrary powers upon the enforce-
ment officer. The ordinance sets a definite height at which
"weeds and indigenous grasses" must be cut, and it is generally
held that the standards required to support a delegation of power
by a local legislative body may be general, so long as they are
capable of reasonable application and are sufficient to limit
and define the administrative official's discretionary powers.
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd ed.) §18.12; see also
Sobocinski v. City of Williamsport, supra at 701.
Finally, in response to your question concerning the failure
of the ordinance to provide for "the appeal of a staff ruling,"
it is generally held that municipalities may provide for the
"summary abatement" of nuisances without the necessity . of a
preliminary formal legal proceeding. McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations (3rd ed.) §24.71. In considering a weed ordinance
similar to the Lawrence ordinance, one court has noted that
the right to a prior hearing attaches only to the deprivation
of a "significant" property interest, and that the court could
not think of a less "significant" property interest than un-
cultivated weeds and grass "taken" from the landowner.
Sobocinski v. City of Williamsport, supra at 701. Accordingly,
it is our opinion that the subject ordinance is not invalid
because it fails to provide for appeal of a "staff ruling"
prior to abatement by the city.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:TRH:jm

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