Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-059

1983-059Kanag

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April 15, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 59
The Honorable John Carlin
Governor of the State of Kansas
2nd Floor - Statehouse
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Kansas Constitution -- Legislative Article --
Requirements for Passage of Bill
Synopsis: When the House of Representatives amended 1983
Senate Bill No. 384 so as to transform it from a
bill relating to the collection of delinquent
taxes owed by nonresidents into a bill providing
for the imposition of a severance tax, a new bill
was introduced. Thus, when said bill was passed
by the House on the same day it was introduced,
without the declaration of an emergency, serious
questions are raised regarding the validity of
this bill in light of Article 2, Section 15 of
the Kansas Constitution. Cited herein: Kan.
Const., Art. 2, S§15, 16, 1983 Senate Bill No.
384.
Dear Governor Carlin:
You have requested our opinion regarding the legislative pro-
cedure in passage of 1983 Senate Bill No. 384, which would
impose and provide for the collection of a severance tax on
coal, salt, oil and gas. Specifically, you are concerned
whether this procedure has resulted in a violation of Article
2, Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution, which states:
"No bill shall be passed on the day that it
is introduced, unless in case of emergency
declared by two-thirds of the members present
in the house where a bill is pending."
Your concern regarding this constitutional requirement is
prompted by the fact that, as introduced in the Senate,
Senate Bill No. 384 concerned the collection of delinquent
taxes owed by nonresidents. As introduced, this bill con-
sisted of ten sections (including a repealer and effective
date), and the title stated as follows:
"AN ACT relating to taxation; relating to the
collection of delinquent taxes owed to the
state by persons not residing or domiciled in
this state; authorizing the secretary of rev-
enue to contract with debt collection agencies
and to enter reciprocal agreements with other
states for the collection of such taxes; amend-
ing K.S.A. 79-3614 and K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 79-1587
and 79-3234 and repealing the existing sec-
tions."
We note that this bill was amended by the Senate Committee on
Assessment and Taxation and by the Senate Committee of the
Whole prior to its passage by the Senate. It was further
amended by the House Committee on Assessment and Taxation,
to which the bill was referred upon its introduction in the
House of Representatives. None of these amendments, however,
affected the subject of the bill as expressed in its title.
Accordingly, no amendments to the bill's title had been made
at the time the bill was reported out of the House Committee
on Assessment and Taxation.
To recount the subsequent legislative action regarding this
bill, it is appropriate to refer to the legislative journals.
The Journal of the House for April 4, 1983, indicates that
"[o]n emergency motion of Rep. Hoagland, SB 247, 112, 44, 362,
10, 384 were advanced to Final Action on Bills and Concurrent
Resolutions, subject to amendment, debate and roll call."
(H.J., p. 669.) Thereafter, under the order of business
"Final Action on Bills and Concurrent Resolutions," the House
adopted the committee report to SB 384. Id. at 671. In
addition, "on motion of Rep. Rolfs to amend, Rep. Braden
offered a substitute motion to amend and SB 384 was amended
. . ." by striking, in effect, all after the enacting clause
and inserting in lieu thereof 15 new sections providing for
the imposition and collection of a severance tax. Id. at
671-677. The title also was amended by striking all of its
provisions except "AN ACT relating to taxation;" and substi-
tuting therefor the following:
"imposing an excise tax upon the production
of oil and gas from the earth or water of the
state; providing for the levy and collection
of such taxes and the administration and en-
forcement of the provisions of the act; pre-
scribing penalties for violations thereof and
providing for the use and disposition of rev-
enues derived therefrom." Id. at 677.
By a roll call vote of 87 yeas and 35 nays, with 3 members
absent or not voting, "[t]he bill passed, as amended." Id.
at 678. As a consequence, we believe the House transformed
SB 384 from a bill concerning the collection of delinquent
taxes owed by nonresidents into a bill providing for the
imposition and collection of a severance tax, and the thres-
hold question for our consideration, therefore, is whether
this action effected the introduction of a new bill.
In determining this question, we believe the issue to be
resolved is whether the amendments made to SB 384 by the
House on Final Action are germane to the subject of the
original bill. This issue is most often addressed by the
courts when considering whether a legislative act violates
a constitutional requirement similar to Article 2, Section
16 of the Kansas Constitution, prohibiting a bill from con-
taining more than one subject. As noted in lA Sutherland
Statutory Construction §17.03 (4th Ed.):
"The general test used to determine whether
the inclusion in an act of numerous provisions
violates the constitutional prohibition against
plurality of subject matter is that of deter-
mining whether the various provisions are ger-
mane to the subject expressed in the title.
'Germane' is defined as meaning in close rela-
tionship, appropriate, relevant, or pertinent
to the general subject, and no portion of a
bill not germane to the general subject can be
given the force of law. The constitution is
complied with if the various provisions relate
to, and are a means of carrying out the gener-
al purpose of an enactment. 'When the subject
is expressed in general terms, everything
which is necessary to make a complete enact-
ment in regard to it, or which results as a
complement of the thought contained in the
general expression, is included in and autho-
rized by it.' If there is any reasonable
basis for grouping the various matters to-
gether, and if the public will not be de-
ceived, the act will be sustained. No accur-
ate mechanical rule may be formulated by use
of which the sufficiency of an act in relation
to its title may be determined. Each case
must be decided on its own peculiar facts."
(Footnotes omitted.)
The germaneness of amendments to bills is a familiar propo-
sition to the Kansas Legislature. Rule 2101 of the 1983-84
Rules of the Kansas House of Representatives states:
"Germaneness. Amendments to bills and resolu-
tions shall be germane to the subject of the
bill or resolution. The principal test of
whether an amendment is germane shall be its
relationship to the subject of the bill or
resolution, rather than to wording of the
title thereof."
Similarly, we note the following relevant provisions of Rule
44 of the 1983-84 Rules of the Kansas Senate:
"(1) Amendments to bills shall be germane to
the subject of the bill being amended, except
the fact that an amendment is to a section in
the same chapter of Kansas Statutes Annotated
as an existing section in the bill shall not
automatically render the amendment germane."
In addition, the following rules of the Senate are particu-
larly pertinent here:
"Rule 72. Subject Change by Senate.--When-
ever an amendment adopted by the Senate has
materially changed the subject of a bill, the
title of the bill so amended shall be read in
the manner prescribed for the introduction of
bills, and take its place upon the Calendar
under the order of business Final Action.
"Rule 73. Subject Change by House.--Whenever
the House adopts amendments to a Senate bill
which materially changes its subject, upon re-
turn of such bill to the Senate, the title of
such bill shall be read in the manner pre-
scribed for the introduction of bills and
such bill shall be referred as provided in
Rule 32.
"Rule 74. Determination of When Subject of
Bill Materially Changed.--The President may
determine when a bill is subject to Rule 72
or 73."
In light of these rules, we note that the Journal of the House
contains no indication that the issue of germaneness was raised
regarding the House amendments to SB 384. However, the Journal
of the Senate for April 5, 1983, indicates the Senate's receipt
of a message from the House announcing "passage of . . . SB
384 as amended" (S.J., p. 526), and it further recounts
that:
"Upon consideration of SB 384, the President
announced he would not apply Rule 73 regarding
material changes in the subject matter of a
bill.
"On motion of Senator Burke the Senate non-
concurred in the House amendments to SB 384
and requested a conference committee be ap-
pointed." S.J., p. 542.
Hence, the legislative journals reveal that the legislature
regarded the House amendments to SB 384 to be germane and
appropriate. Nonetheless, the issue presented is not merely
a question of compliance with pertinent legislative rules
of procedure. Instead, the issue under consideration is a
question of law that is appropriate for resolution by the
courts. Are the amendments made by the House germane to the
original subject of SB 384, or did they so alter the subject
that the bill lost its identity and a new bill was created,
thereby subjecting the new bill to scrutiny under Article 2,
Section 15 of our constitution? We have no hesitancy in
concluding that the action of the House effected the intro-
duction of a new bill.
Although we are unaware of any Kansas case precisely deter-
minative of this issue, we find the following statements of
the Court in The State, ex rel., v. Akers, 92 Kan. 169 (1914),
to be instructive:
"The legislative history of chapter 259 shows
that it was legally adopted by the legislature.
The original bill was known as house bill No.
219. It was read three times in each branch
of the legislature and on separate days. The
main objection to the manner of its passage
is, that in the senate the judiciary committee
simply reported a substitute for house bill
No. 219. It appears, however, that the sub-
stitute was germane to the title and that ex-
actly the same result could have been accom-
plished by returning the original bill and
recommending its passage with the amendments.
The precise question was before the supreme
court of Tennessee in a recent case. (Rail-
road v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S.W. 662,
41 L.R.A., n.s., 828.) The language of the
court in disposing of the contention is so
pertinent that we adopt and approve it. In
the opinion it was said:
"'It is said the committee on municipal af-
fairs simply reported a substitute for House
Bill No. 175. The distinction sought to be
made between reporting a substitute bill and
an amendment by substitution is more fanciful
than real. As stated, the title of the bill
remained the same, and the substitute offered
for the original is germane to the title, and
is otherwise unobjectionable. The bill can-
not be destroyed upon a mere matter of termino-
logy. If it were competent, as is conceded,
for the original bill to have been amended by
substitution, so as to ingraft upon it the
same matter that was contained in the substi-
tute bill, we can see no substantial reason
why it is not just as permissible to offer the
same subject-matter under the original title
as a substitute for the original bill.' (p.
293.)" (Emphasis added.) Id. at 209, 210.
Because of our Court's enthusiastic reliance upon the Tennessee
case quoted above, we note other decisions of the Tennessee
Supreme Court relevant to this subject. In Erwin v. State,
93 S.W. 73 (Tenn. 1906), the Tennessee court considered
whether a bill had been enacted in compliance with pertinent
requirements of that state's constitution. In so doing, it
stated the following general principles:
"Every bill has two parts, the title and the
body.
"The title must contain the subject of the
proposed legislation, and that subject must
be single. This was intended to serve a two-
fold purpose. The subject must be expressed
in the title, so that the members of the Leg-
islature may have their attention drawn di-
rectly to the matter about which they are to
concern themselves in the discharge of their
legislative duties: a second purpose is that
the people of the state may know what their
representatives are doing, and may interpose,
if they choose, by petition, or remonstrance.
The title must be single, to prevent omnibus
legislation and logrolling.
"It is obvious that to serve these purposes,
the title must be a constant quantity, not
subject to amendment, or at least not subject
to any alteration that will effect any sub-
stantial change in it. It fixes the identity
of the bill. There may, indeed, be made a
substantial change in a title, but if so, it
becomes a new title, the caption of a new
bill.
"What is said in the constitutional provisions,
quoted, concerning amendments, refers to the
body of the bill. This, as a matter of
course, may be amended in the house in which
the bill originated. The Constitution also
permits amendments to be engrafted upon it in
the other house. No restriction is placed
upon this power of amendment further than re-
sults from the rigidity of the title and the
necessity of conforming thereto, and the re-
quirement that there shall be a concurrence
of the two houses upon the whole bill. One
section may be stricken out and its place
supplied by another containing a different
provision; all may be stricken out except the
title and the enacting clause, and new provi-
sions inserted quite different from those
which first constituted the body of the bill,
but upon this liberty there rests one unyield-
ing limitation, one imperious requirement.
Every amendment, be it great or small, must
harmonize with the title, must be germane to
it, must fall within its scope.
"If an amendment foreign to the title be in-
troduced, one of two results must follow;
either the title must be so altered as to em-
brace it, or the bill, as it stands, will be
vitiated by it; but if the title be so changed,
the bill is no longer the same; the title is
new, and the bill is radically different from
the thing it was before." (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 75, 76.
The Erwin decision has been relied upon with respect to the
principles stated above in a number of subsequent decisions.
See, e.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. City of Memphis, 148 S.W. 662
(Tenn. 1912); State v. Persica, 168 S.W. 1056 (Tenn. 1914);
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Hooper, 175 S.W. 1146 (Tenn.
1915); State v. City of Nashville, 210 S.W. 649 (Tenn. 1919);
and Metro. Gov't of Nashville, Etc. v. Mitchell, 539 S.W.2d
20 (Tenn. 1976). In the latter case, the Tennessee court
quoted portions of the above-quoted excerpt from Erwin and
further stated:
"Our cases have consistently given a differ-
ent treatment to changes in the title or cap-
tions of bills from that given to changes in
the bodies of bills. Thus, we have held that
when the title or caption of a bill is altered
'substantially' or changed to introduce 'new
or foreign matter,' the bill loses its iden-
tity and a new bill is thereby created which
must, itself, be passed on three different
days." (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
539 S.W. 2d at 21.
The principles enunciated in the foregoing Tennessee cases
are entirely consistent with the rules applied by the Kansas
Supreme Court in resolving questions arising under Article 2,
Section 16 of the Kansas Constitution, which states in per-
tinent part:
"No bill shall contain more than one subject,
except appropriation bills and bills for re-
vision or codification of statutes. The sub-
ject of each bill shall be expressed in its
title."
Although this section of our constitution was amended in 1974,
the essence of the requirements as to a single subject which
must be expressed in the bill's title has remained unchanged
since statehood. State ex rel. Stephan v. Carlin, 230 Kan.
352, 256-257 (1981). And the myriad of cases construing these
requirements have consistently held that an act may contain
"innumerable minor subjects, provided all these minor subjects
are capable of being so combined and united as to form only
one grand and comprehensive subject" [The State v. Barrett,
27 Kan. 213, 217 (1882)] and the single subject is expressed
in the title. Id. As stated in Barrett:
"Where a section of an act is assailed as be-
ing in contravention of said provision of
§16, article 2 of the constitution, it is
sufficient if it is germain [sic] to the
single subject expressed in the title, and
included therein, provided the act itself
does not contain more than this single sub-
ject." Id. at 218.
We shall not burden this opinion with further recitation of
cases to this effect. "Although Barrett is an old case it
still accurately states the relevant law of Kansas." State
ex rel. Stephan v. Thiessen, 228 Kan. 136, 143 (1980).
Clearly, then, our Court has recognized that a valid bill
must contain but a single subject. All provisions of the
bill must be germane to that subject, as expressed in its
title. Thus, where provisions are added to a bill which are
foreign to the bill's subject, as expressed in its title,
the title must be amended so as to redefine the bill's scope.
However, once the title is amended to express the bill's new
subject, it is our opinion "the bill is no longer the same;
the title is new, and the bill is radically different from
the thing it was before." Erwin v. State, supra at 76.
With respect to the House amendments to SB 384, it might be
argued that the subject of the bill is "taxation" and that the
provisions added by these amendments (i.e., imposition and
collection of a severance tax) are germane to this subject.
The fallacy of this argument can be illustrated by consider-
ing whether the original provisions of the bill concerning
collection of delinquent taxes owed by nonresidents could
have remained in the bill along with the severance tax provi-
sions, without violating the constitutional proscription of
plurality of subjects. If the severance tax provisions are
to be regarded as germane to the subject of the bill as it
was introduced in the Senate, then the original provisions
and the amendatory provisions should be capable of co-existing
in the same bill, assuming they do not conflict with one
another. No such conflict is apparent; yet, we do not think
it could be seriously contended that the original and amenda-
tory provisions "can be so united and combined as to form
only one single subject." State v. Barrett, supra at 217.
An analogous question was addressed in State, ex rel., v.
Shanahan, 178 Kan. 400 (1955). There, the Court was consider-
ing a bill which originally repealed statutes on one subject
and to which was added provisions repealing statutes on
another subject. The Court rejected the contention that
there was a single subject of the bill, as follows:
"It is next argued that the 'subject' of the
legislation is 'repeal'; and even if there
are plurality of objects, the subject is
single. This contention has been previously
suggested, and discounted. The subject of the
bill is the matter to which the legislation per-
tains. The subject of the bill as introduced
by the Senate is the registration of motor
vehicles brought into this state by nonresi-
dents. The subject of the amendment added by
the House related to the Kansas State Board
of Review and to censorship of motion pictures
by that agency. The amendment pertains to an
entirely different subject matter than that of
the bill as first introduced." Id. at 404.
In our judgment, therefore, the amendments made to SB 384 by
the House are not germane to the subject of that bill. Hence,
when the severance tax provisions were added and the bill's
title was amended so as to reflect the substitution of these
provisions for those pertaining to collection of delinquent
taxes owed by nonresidents, a new bill was created. Thus,
we must consider whether the procedures attending the pas-
sage of SB 384 by the House were in concert with the require-
ments of Article 2, Section 15.
This constitutional section also was amended in 1974, but
there have been no appellate court decisions construing the
amended provisions. Prior to its amendment, this section
read as follows:
"§15. Reading of bills; suspension of rules.
Every bill shall be read on three separate
days in each house, unless in case of emer-
gency. Two-thirds of the house where such
bill is pending may, if deemed expedient, sus-
pend the rules; but the reading of the bill
by sections on its final passage, shall in no
case be dispensed with." (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that original Section 15 of Article 2 focused on
the actions of each house in acting upon a bill, independently
of the actions of the other house regarding that bill. It
did not concern joint action of both houses, but imposed re-
quirements on each house. Even though significant wording
changes were effected in this section by the 1974 revision
of the legislative article of our constitution, we believe
this section's scope has remained unchanged.
We are prompted to this conclusion not only by the plain
language of the section, but also because of the reported
deliberations of the legislative body which recommended the
change in this section which ultimately was adopted by the
electorate. The concurrent resolution which was submitted
to the voters in 1974 was originated after several years of
study by the Legislative Budget Committee. In its report to
the 1974 Kansas Legislature, the following comments were made
regarding the proposed changes in Section 15:
"7. The antiquated provision that every bill
shall be read on three separate days in each
house has been eliminated. It is proposed
that no bill shall be passed on the day it is
introduced, unless an emergency is declared
by a two-thirds vote of members present. (Sec-
tion 15.)
"The present 'three-readings' requirement pre-
dates modern printing and reproducing methods.
Proposed Section 15 is not radically different
from present practice." (Emphasis added.)
Reports of Special Committees to the 1974
Kansas Legislature, p. 26-4.
Thus, we are of the opinion that no change in the essential
scope of this section was effected by the 1974 amendment,
and its proscription remains applicable to the actions of
each house working independently of the other. Hence, it
is clear that, by virtue of Section 15, neither house of the
legislature may pass a bill on the same day it is introduced
therein, except in an emergency declared by two-thirds of
the members present in that house.
Applying this proscription to the actions of the House on
April 4, 1983, regarding SB 384, several observations may
be made. First, as we previously concluded, the House amend-
ments to SB 384 transformed it from a bill relating to the
collection of delinquent taxes owed by nonresidents to a
bill imposing a severance tax, and that action amounted to
the introduction of a new bill on April 4, 1983.
Second, the House and Senate Journals, as previously noted,
conclusively show that the new bill was passed by the House
on April 4, 1983 (H.J., p. 678; S.J., p. 526), the same day
it was introduced.
Finally, the House Journal for April 4, 1983, is silent as
to an emergency being declared by two-thirds of the members
present in the House for the purpose of passing the new bill
on the same day it was introduced. It is true that the House
adopted an emergency motion to advance SB 384 to the order
of business "Final Action on Bills and Concurrent Resolutions."
(H.J., p. 669). However, that motion concerned a bill relat-
ing to the collection of delinquent taxes owed by nonresi-
dents. That was the bill advanced to final action, and we
find no indication in the House Journal for April 4, 1983,
that an emergency motion was made regarding SB 384 after it
had lost its identity as a measure pertaining to the collec-
tion of delinquent taxes and had been transformed into a
severance tax bill.
The foregoing observations support a conclusion that the
House passed a bill on the day it was introduced therein,
without having declared an emergency by the requisite vote
of its members, contrary to the requirements of Article 2,
Section 15. However, such conclusion is necessarily predi-
cated on an interpretation of this section of our constitution
without the benefit of supporting case law, since Section
15 of Article 2 has not been construed by our appellate courts
since its amendment in 1974. Further, "there is a strong
presumption in favor of the validity of any bill passed by
the legislature." State, ex rel., v. Shanahan, supra at
404. Hence, it must be recognized that our Court might
interpret the language of this section in a way which would
uphold the validity of SB 384.
Of course, without benefit of a definitive judicial construc-
tion of Article 2, Section 15, we cannot do more than indi-
cate that arguments may be made on either side of this issue.
In our judgment, however, the legislative procedure attending
the passage of SB 384 raises serious questions regarding the
constitutional validity of this bill. While it is possible
that our Supreme Court might find that the bill's passage
was in concert with the spirit and reason of the pertinent
constitutional provision, the absence of judicial precedent
precludes us from concluding, with any degree of certainty,
as to the appropriate interpretation, particularly in light
of prior cases which have strictly construed constitutional
requirements. See, e.g., State v. Kearns, 229 Kan. 207 (1981)
(strict construction of Article 2, Section 20 invalidated
provisions of Campaign Finance Act) and State ex rel. v.
Kirchner, 182 Kan. 622 (1958) (severance tax declared invalid
because subject of bill not "clearly expressed" in title).
Thus, it would not be unreasonable for the Court to find that
this bill was passed in violation of constitutional require-
ments.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
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