Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-247

1982-247Kanag

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November 19, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 247
The Honorable Michael J. Peterson
State Representative, Thirty-Third District
731 Ann Avenue
Kansas City, Kansas 66101
Re: State Departments; Public Officers, Employees --
Open Meetings Act -- Executive Recess; Attorney-
Client Privilege
Synopsis: K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-4319(b) authorizes legisla-
tive and executive bodies or agencies subject to
the Kansas Open Meetings Act to conduct an execu-
tive session or recess for the purpose of "consul-
tation with an attorney for the body or agency
which would be deemed privileged in the attorney-
client relationship." However, the attorney-client
privilege may not be invoked if the attorney is
not present, or if persons, other than the attorney
and his or her agents, are parties to the communi-
cation. Moreover, the communication must be con-
fidential in character and be so regarded by the
governmental body or agency. Cited herein: K.S.A.
60-426, 75-4317, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-4319.
Dear Representative Peterson:
You inquire of this office regarding a provision of the Kansas
Open Meetings Act, K.S.A. 75-4317 et seq., which authorizes
executive recesses for "consultation with an attorney for
the body or agency which would be deemed privileged in the
attorney-client relationship." You do not offer a specific
question, but rather desire general advice on the scope of
this exception to the Act.
Separating the language of the exception for purposes of
discussion amplifies two points: First, there must be a
"consultation with an attorney for the body or agency." In
Kansas Attorney General Opinion No. 78-303, the Attorney
General concluded that the exception to the Kansas Open Meet-
ings Act was inapplicable unless the attorney was present
for the consultation. Members of boards or agencies subject
to the Act are simply not allowed to discuss legal issues
concerning the body among themselves under the guise of this
privilege, unless the attorney is a party to the consultation.
Second, the executive recess is permitted only when the com-
munication "would be deemed privileged in the attorney-client
relationship." Simply stated, not every word spoken by an
attorney or in an attorney's presence is a privileged communi-
cation. Essentially, the privilege is statutorily recognized
at K.S.A. 60-426 where exceptions to the privilege are delin-
eated.
Kansas case law further clarifies the limits of the privilege.
Of particular note is Fisher v. Mr. Harold's Hair Lab, Inc.,
215 Kan. 515, 519 (1974). There the Kansas Supreme Court
concluded that a communication made between a client and his
attorney was not a protected professional confidence when
made in the presence of third parties. In regard to the
presence of third parties, the statute [K.S.A. 60-426(c)],
recognized that the presence of agents for the attorney (clerks
and stenographers) would not remove the privilege. See also
Kan. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 78-303.
Further, the nature of the communication, as well as the
parties to it, is significant. To illustrate, one need look
only as far as the case of Pickering v. Hollabaugh, 194 Kan.
804 (1965), where the Kansas Supreme Court, quoted Cranston
v. Stewart, 184 Kan. 99 (1959), saying:
"'In order for a communication from a client
to his attorney to be confidential and to im-
pose upon the attorney the duty of not dis-
closing the same it must be of a confidential
character, and so regarded, at least by the
client, at the time, and must relate to a
matter which is in its nature private and prop-
erly the subject of confidential disclosure.
"'Where an attorney serves merely as a scriv-
ener to draft and put in legal form a contract
for the transfer of title to real estate, com-
munications concerning the drafting of the
contract or the contract itself are not pri-
vileged.' (Syl. 2 and 3. See, also, Hutton
v. Hutton, 184 Kan. 560, 337 P.2d 635.)"
Since exceptions to the general policy favoring open meetings
will be construed narrowly [see, e.g., Illinois News Broad-
casters Ass'n. v. City of Springfield, 22 Ill.App.3d 226,
317 N.E.2d 288 (1974) referring to the Illinois open meetings
law], legislative and administrative bodies or agencies would
be well-advised to exercise the right to an executive recess
for attorney-client communications very judiciously. It
should be used only when the attorney is a party and should
not be used when persons other than agents of the counselor
are present. In addition, the nature of the communication
should "be of a confidential character" and so regarded at
least by the governmental body or agency. The mere presence
of an attorney does not, in itself, make the consultation
privileged. See Smoot and Clothier, Open Meetings Profile:
The Prosecutor's View, 20 W.L.J. 241, 276 (1981) and autho-
rities cited therein.
In summary, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-4319(b) authorizes legisla-
tive and executive bodies or agencies subject to the Kansas
Open Meetings Act to conduct an executive session or recess
for the purpose of "consultation with an attorney for the
body or agency which would be deemed privileged in the
attorney-client relationship." However, the attorney-client
privilege may not be invoked if the attorney is not present,
or if persons, other than the attorney and his or her agents,
are parties to the communication. Moreover, the communica-
tion must be confidential in character and be so regarded
by the governmental body or agency.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
BradleyJ.Smoot
Deputy Attorney General
BJS:hle

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