Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-215

1982-215Kanag

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September 27, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 215
Gregory 0. Clark
Chief of Police
Ness City Police impartment
Ness City, Kansas 67560
Re: State Departments; Public Officers, Employees --
Kansas Tort Claims Act -- Liability of a City for
Volunteer Reserve Police Officers
Synopsis: A city would be liable to reserve police officers for
injuries sustained by them while on duty under the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and such
liability cannot be waived. Because a city's reserve
police officers are employees of the city for purposes
of the Tort Claims Act, the negligent or wrongful
conduct of a reserve police officer may subject the
city to liability under that Act, unless such conduct
is circumscribed by one of the exemptions from
liability provided therein. Cited herein: K.S.A.
44-501, 44-505, 44-508, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6101,
75-6102 (as amended by L. 1982, ch. 374, §1), 75-6103,
75-6104.
*
Dear Chief Clark:
You request an opinion regarding potential liability of a city for
injuries arising from the actions of reserve police officers. You state
that Ness City has a reserve police unit comprised of four adults who
volunteer their time to provide back up assistance to regular police
officers while on patrol. We understand that these reserve officers
receive no compensation for their services. You specifically ask
whether the city may adopt a procedure to protect itself from civil
liability in the event that one of the reserve officers is injured
while he is on patrol, and secondly, whether the city would be liable
to a member of the public who is injured by a reserve officer while
said officer is assisting a regular police officer in the performance
of his or her duties.
We first consider whether the city may adopt a procedure to protect
itself from liability for injuries incurred by reserve officers while
performing their official duties in light of K .S.A. 44-501 et sea,
the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act. K.S.A. 44-501 provides in
pertinent part:
"If in any employment to which the workmen's compensation
act applies, personal injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of employment is caused to an employee,
his or her employer shall be liable to pay compensation
to the employee in accordance with the provisions of the
workmen's compensation act."
K.S.A. 44-508(a) defines "employer" as including "any city, county,
school district, or other political subdivision or .municipality or public
corporation and any instrumentality thereof." 44-505 mandates
that the act shall apply to all "employments" not specifically exempted.
Boyd v. Barton Transfer & Storage, 2 Kan.App.2d 425, 249 (1978).
Employment as a reserve police officer has not been so exempted. To
the contrary, K.S.A. 44-508(b) defines "workman" or "employee" as including
"persons serving on a volunteer basis as duly authorized law enforcement
officers . . . but only to the extent and during such periods as they
are so serving in such capacities."
Therefore, construing these provisions together, we conclude that volunteer
reserve police officers are employees of the city who are covered by
the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act while they are on
patrol or are performing other official duties. Hence, the city would
be liable for any injuries sustained by reserve officers within the course
of their employment in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. That act provides the exclusive remedy for an employee
to seek redress from his or her employer for injuries suffered in the
scope of the employee's employment and arising out of such employment.
Davidson v. Hobart Corp., 643 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1981) Yocum v .. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 228 Kan. 216, 224 (1980). Moreover, it has long been held
that public policy precludes an employer from requiring an employee to
waive his rights to workmen's compensation. Red Rover Copper Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 118 P.2d 1102 (1941); Industrial Commission
of Arizona v. J. & J. Construction Co., 231 P.2d 762 (1951). Accordingly,
we also are of the opinion that the city may not secure waivers from
reserve police officers which would remove the officers from coverage
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
We now consider whether the city would be liable to members of the
public who may be injured by a reserve police officer while that officer
is on patrol. The Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6101
et seq., sets forth the circumstances in which a municipality may be
sued for the tortious actions of its employees. In our opinion because
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6102(d), as amended by L. 1982, ch. 374, §1,
defines "employee" as "any officer, employee or servant . . . including
elected or appointed officials and persons acting on behalf or in
service of a governmental entity in any official capacity, whether
with or without compensation," reserve police officers while on duty
must be considered to be employees of the city for purposes of the
Tort Claims Act. This view is consistent with Kansas case law which
discusses when a master-servant relationship is said to exist.
"[A] master is a principal who employs another to perform
service in his affairs and who controls or has the right
to control the physical conduct of the other in the per-
formance of the service. A servant is a person employed
by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical
conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or
is subject to the right to control by the master. ( Evans v.
Board of Education of Hays, 178 Kan. 275, 278, 284 P.2d
1068.) It is not the exercise of direction, supervision or
control over a workman which determines whether he is a
servant or an independent contractor, but the right to
exercise such direction, supervision or control. ( Bowler
v. Elmdale Developing Co., 185 Kan. 785, 787, 347 P.2d 391;
Schroeder v. American Nat'l Bank, 154 Kan. 721, 121 P.2d
186; Davis v. Julian, 152 Kan. 749, 756, 107 P.2d 745.)
The necessity of the control element was also recognized
in Henderson v. Sutton's Food City, 191 Kan. 145, 379 P.2d
300." Atwell v. Maxwell Bridge Co., 196 Kan. 219, 224(1966).
See, also, Chasteen v. Childers, 218 Kan. 519, 530 (1976).
The right to control the actions of another is the primary test in
determining whether a master-servant relationship exists, and payment
of compensation is not a necessary factor. In re Read's Petition,
224 F.Supp. 241 (S.D. Fla. 1963); BolIman v. Kart Rendering Plant,
418 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1967); Lunt v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,
28 A.2d 736 (Maine, 1942); Lowry v. Kneeland, 117 N.W.2d 207 (Minn.
1962). The city would have the right to control the actions of reserve
police officers while on duty as it would the actions of regular police
officers. Therefore, we believe a city's reserve police officers must
be regarded as employees of the city for purposes of the Kansas Tort
Claims Act.
As to the city's liability under the Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
75-6103 states in pertinent part:
"Subject to the limitations of this act, each governmental
entity shall be liable for damages caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any of its employees while
acting within the scope of their employment under circum-
stances where the governmental entity, if a private person,
would be liable under the laws of this state."
Thus, the liability of the city would be limited to those instances in
which a court determined that a reserve police officer had acted negligently
or wrongfully within the scope of his employment. The rule for determining
whether an employee is acting within the scone of his employment was
stated in Hollinger v. Stormont Hospital and Training School for Nurses,
2 Kan. App.2d 302, 311-12 (1978), thusly:
"An employee is acting within the scope of his authority
when he is performing services for which he has been employed
or when he is doing anything which is reasonably incidental
to his employment. The test is not necessarily whether the
conduct was expressly authorized or forbidden by the employer,
but whether such conduct should have been fairly foreseen
from the nature of the employment and the duties relating
to it. The liability of an employer for the acts of his
employees depends not upon whether the injurious act of the
employee was willful and intentional or was unintentional,
but upon whether the employee, when he did the wrong, was
acting in the prosecution of the employer's business and with-
in the scope of his authority or had stepped aside from that
business and had done an individual wrong. The now generally
recognized rule is that the employer is liable for the
reckless, willful, intentional, wanton, or malicious acts
of his employee as well as for his heedless and cureless
acts if they are committed while the employee is acting in
the execution of his authority and within the course of his
employment, or with a view to the furtherance of his employer's
business, and not for a purpose personal to the employee.
Williams v. Community Drive-In Theater, Inc., supra. See
also, Beggerly v. Walker, 194 Kan. 61, 397 P.2d 395 (1964)
. . . If an assault by an employee is motivated entirely by
personal reasons such as malice or spite or by a desire to
accomplish some unlawful purpose, and does not have for
its purpose the furtherance of the employer's business, it
will be considered personal to the employee and not such
as will make the employer answerable. Williams v, Community
Drive-In Theater, Inc., supra."
However, the Tort Claims Act prescribes a number of instances where a
governmental body is exempted from tort liability, even though its
employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment.
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6104 provides in pertinent part:
"A governmental entity or an employee acting within the
scope of the employee's employment shall not be liable
for damages resulting from:
"(c) enforcement of or failure to enforce a law, whether
valid or invalid, including but not limited to, anv statute,
regulation, ordinance or resolution;
"(d) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee
whether or not the discretion be abused;
"(m) failure to provide, or the method of providing, police
or fire protection. . . ."
Therefore, even though alleged negligent or wrongful conduct of a city's
reserve police officer occurs during the course of such officer's employment,
the city may be exempt from liability, if such conduct is circumscribed
by any of the foregoing exemptions. In this regard, we are enclosing a
copy of Attorney General Opinion No. 81-98, which concluded that no tort
liability resulted from the discretionary acts of a probation officer
in carrying out his duties under a work restitution program. Also,
for a discussion of the exemption within the Tort Claims Act for
discretionary actions of police officers, see the recent decision of
the Kansas Supreme Court in Robertson v. City of Topeka, et al. (No.
53, 613, decided May 8, 1982).
In light of the foregoing authorities and provisions of the Tort Claims
Act, it is apparent that a precise answer cannot be provided to your
second inquiry. Whether the city would be liable in tort for the
actions of a reserve police officer cannot be determined in the abstract.
That issue must be resolved on a case by case basis, by applying the
relevant statutory and case law to all the facts and circumstances of
each case, as determined by the ultimate trier of fact.
In conclusion, a city would be liable to reserve police officers for
injuries sustained by them while on duty under the Provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, and such liability cannot be waived.
Because a city's reserve police officers are employees of the city
for purposes of the Tort Claims Act, the negligent or wrongful conduct
of a reserve police officer may subject the city to liablity under
that Act, unless such conduct is circumscribed by one of the exemptions
from liability provided therein.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Brenda L. Hoyt
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JEF:BLH:may

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