Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-116

1982-116Kanag

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June 1, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-116
Mr. Stan Martin
Attorney at Law
325 Broadway
Abilene, Kansas 67410
Re: Intoxicating Liquors and Beverages -- Prohibited
Acts and Penalties -- Consumption of Alcoholic
Beverages on Public Property
Synopsis: K.S.A. 41-719, which prohibits inter alia the
consumption of alcoholic liquor on public property,
is a legislative enactment which does not apply
uniformly to all cities. Hence, a city to which
this enactment applies may exempt itself by char-
ter ordinance from the whole or any part thereof,
and may also provide substitute or additional pro-
visions, so as to permit consumption of alcoholic
liquor on specified city property. However, the
consumption of alcoholic liquor on such property
remains subject to the limitations of the Private
Club Act (K.S.A. 41-2601 et seq.), which has as
its purpose the regulation and control of all con-
sumption of alcoholic liquor by any person in this
state. Thus, where a charter ordinance exempts a
city from the prohibitions of K.S.A. 41-719, but
authorizes consumption of alcoholic liquor on city
property in a manner which is in conflict with the
Private Club Act, such conflicting provisions are
invalid. Accordingly, the provisions of Hering-
ton's Charter Ordinance No. 8 which authorize
consumption of alcoholic liquor in the Herington
Community Building irrespective of whether the
general public has access are invalid since they
contravene the limitations prescribed by the Pri-
vate Club Act. Cited herein: K.S.A. 41-719,
41-2601, 41-2602, 41-2604, 41-2609, 41-2615, 41-2623,
Kan. Const., Art. 12, §5.
Dear Mr. Martin:
As city attorney for the City of Herington, Kansas, you have
requested our opinion as to the validity of Herington's
Charter Ordinance No. 8, which exempts the city from the pro-
visions of K.S.A. 41-719(a) and adopts substitute provisions
in lieu thereof. The effect of this ordinance, as provided
in section 2 thereof, is to permit the consumption of alco-
holic liquor in the Herington Community Building, the title
to which is vested in the City of Herington, and such consump-
tion would be allowed "whether or not the general public has
access, and whether or not an admission or other fee is
charged or collected."
A city's authority to exempt itself by charter ordinance
from the application of a particular statutory enactment is
provided by the cities' home rule amendment to the Kansas
Constitution (Kan. Const., Art. 12, §5). This amendment em-
powers cities "to determine their local affairs and govern-
ment," and such determination is subject only to specified
legislative enactments. Subsection (c)(1) of the home rule
amendment authorizes a city to adopt a charter ordinance re-
moving the city from the application of "the whole or any
part of any enactment of the legislature applying to such
city, other than enactments of statewide concern applicable
uniformly to all cities, other enactments applicable uniformly
to all cities, and enactments prescribing limits of indebted-
ness." Subsection (c)(2) also provides that a charter ordin-
ance "may provide substitute and additional provisions on the
same subject." Thus, the validity of a charter ordinance
must be measured against these constitutional requirements.
As noted earlier, Herington's Charter Ordinance No. 8 exempts
the city from certain provisions of K.S.A. 41-719, which pro-
vides as follows:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), no
person shall drink or consume alcoholic liquor
upon the public streets, alleys, roads or high-
ways; in beer parlors, taverns, pool halls or
places to which the general public has access,
whether or not an admission or other fee is
charged or collected; upon property owned by
the state or any governmental subdivision
thereof; or inside vehicles while upon the pub-
lic streets, alleys, roads or highways.
"(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall
not apply to the drinking or consumption of
alcoholic liquor:
"(1) Upon real property leased by a city to
others under the provisions of K.S.A. 12-1740
to 12-1749, inclusive, and amendments thereto,
if such property is actually being used for
hotel or motel purposes or purposes incidental
thereto.
"(2) In any state owned or operated building
or structure and upon the surrounding pre-
mises which are furnished to and occupied by
any state officer or employee as a residence.
"(3) In a club which is licensed by the di-
rector and which is located upon property
owned or operated by an airport authority
created pursuant to chapter 27 of the Kansas
Statutes Annotated.
"(4) In a club which is licensed by the di-
rector and which is located upon property
owned or operated by an airport authority
established by a city having a population of
more than 200,000.
"(5) Upon property exempted from the provi-
sions of subsection (a) pursuant to subsection
(c) or (d).
"(c) Any city having a population of more than
200,000 may exempt, by ordinance, specified
property, title of which is vested in such city,
from the provisions of subsection (a).
"(d) The board of county commissioners of any
county having a population of not less than
150,000 may exempt, by resolution, specified
property, the title of which is vested in such
county, from the provisions of subsection (a).
"(e) Violation of any provision of subsection
(a) is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of
not less than $50 or more than $200 or by im-
prisonment for not more than six months, or
both."
Although Charter Ordinance No. 8 concerns itself with the
provisions of K.S.A. 41-719(a), we have quoted this statute
in its entirety, to illustrate that, while K.S.A. 41-719 is
applicable to all cities in the state, its applicability is
not uniform. In particular, subsection (c) authorizes cities
having a population of more than 200,000 to exempt city-owned
property from the proscriptions of subsection (a), a power
not vested in other cities by this statute. Hence, the non-
uniformity of the legislative enactment, which is a prerequi-
site to a charter ordinance, clearly exists.
A second issue is whether consumption of alcoholic liquor
is a proper subject of legislation for a city's governing
body, i.e., it must be determined whether the subject matter
of Charter Ordinance No. 8 may be regarded as a "local affair"
of the City of Herington.
In our judgment, the fact that K.S.A. 41-719 specifically
permits certain cities to legislate on the consumption of
alcoholic liquor in public places and places to which the
general public has access indicates that the legislature re-
gards these matters as proper subjects for local legislation.
Several decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court also acknow-
ledge the power of cities to legislate regarding the consump-
tion of alcoholic liquor. For example, the decisions in
Leavenworth Club Owners Assn. v. Atchison, 208 Kan. 318 (1971),
and Blue Star Supper Club v. City of Wichita, 208 Kan. 731
(1972), recognized that city ordinances pertaining to the
consumption of alcoholic beverages were not preempted by
enactment of the legislature, and the respective ordinances
considered in these cases were upheld as valid exercises of
a city's police power.
Moreover, with regard to the question of preemption, we be-
lieve the following excerpt from City of Junction City v.
Griffin, 227 Kan. 332 (1980), clarifies the limitations on
the legislature's ability to preempt action by cities:
"The court has consistently rejected the doc-
trine of implied preemption of a particular
field. Legislative intent to reserve exclu-
sive jurisdiction to regulate in an area must
be clearly manifested by State law. City of
Lyons v. Suttle, 209 Kan. 735, 738, 498 P.2d
9 (1972); City of Junction City v. Lee, 216
Kan. 495, 503, 532 P.2d 1292 (1975); Garten
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 219
Kan. 620, Syl. 113, 549 P.2d 864 (1976). Leg-
islative intent to preempt a field is only the
first of two requirements for preemption when
it concerns the rights of cities.
". . . The second requirement is uniform ap-
plication of the State law to all cities.
"The grant of home rule power to cities under
Article 12, §5 of the Kansas Constitution has
therefore added a new dimension to be consi-
dered in determining whether the legislature
has occupied a field. Legislative intent to
preempt a field is alone insufficient. It is
now necessary to examine the provisions of the
State enactment to determine whether the con-
stitutional standard of uniform application to
cities has been met. If not uniform, legisla-
tive intent as expressed within the enactment
will not overcome the constitutional require-
ment for uniform application. Clark v. City
of Overland Park, 226 Kan. 609, 602 P.2d 1292
(1979). The legislature may preempt the con-
stitutional powers of cities only in the man-
ner prescribed in the constitution. 'As be-
tween the will of the people expressed in the
constitution, and that expressed in the sta-
tute, the former always prevails.' State, ex
rel. Goodin v. Thoman, 10 Kan. 191, 197 (1872).
"So, even if a legislative enactment by the
State addresses a matter which may be consi-
dered of statewide concern, a city remains
free to take legislative action by charter
ordinance concerning that same matter unless
the legislative enactment by the State applies
uniformly to all cities. Regardless of whether
an enactment of the State legislature addresses
a matter of statewide or a matter of local con
cern, a city may in either case act by charter
ordinance to exempt itself from all or part of
the enactment unless the State enactment ap-
plies uniformly to all cities. Kan. Const.
art. 12, §5(c)(1). The legislature may fore-
close municipal legislative action only by an
enactment of uniform application to all cities."
Id. at 336, 337.
Thus, even though the consumption of alcoholic liquor on pub-
lic property and property to which the general public has
access may be regarded as matters of statewide concern, K.S.A.
41-719 is nonuniform in its application to all cities of
this state, thereby permitting municipal legislation on these
matters through the adoption of charter ordinances.
The remaining issue presented by your request is whether the
provisions of Herington's Charter Ordinance No. 8, although
not precluded under the Kansas Liquor Control Act, may be
in conflict with the Private Club Act (K.S.A. 41-2601 et seq.).
You indicate that agents of the Division of Alcoholic Bever-
age Control of the State Department of Revenue have advised
that, notwithstanding Charter Ordinance No. 8, consumption
of alcoholic beverages at gatherings in the Herington Community
Building to which the general public has access is in viola-
tion of the Private Club Act. While Herington's charter or-
dinance has exempted the city from certain provisions of
K.S.A. 41-719(a), the ordinance does not address the Private
Club Act. Thus, it must be determined whether the provisions
of this act regulate or control the consumption of alcoholic
beverages in the Herington Community Building.
Resolution of this issue requires a determination of legisla-
tive intent, which is the fundamental requirement of statu-
tory construction, to which all others are subordinate.
Southeast Kansas Landowners Ass'n v. Kansas Turnpike Auth.,
224 Kan. 357, 367 (1978). The Court also has provided guid-
ance in ascertaining the legislature's intent, and we believe
the following statement of the Court to be of importance here:
"A primary rule for the construction of a sta-
tute is to find the legislative intent from
its language, and where the language used is
plain and unambiguous and also appropriate to
the obvious purpose the court should follow
the intent as expressed by the words used and
is not warranted in looking beyond them in
search of some other legislative purpose or
extending the meaning beyond the plain terms
of the Act. (Alter v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 443,
273 Pac. 474; Hand v. Board of Education, 198
Kan. 460, 426 P.2d 124; City of Overland Park
v. Nikias, 209 Kan. 643, 498 P.2d 56; Hunter
v. Haun, 210 Kan. 11, 499 P.2d 1087.)" City
of Kiowa v. Central Telephone & Utilities
Corporation, 213 Kan. 169, 176 (1973).
Furthermore, it is well established that, in determining
legislative intent, statutes in pari materia should be con-
strued together so as to harmonize their respective provisions,
if reasonably possible to do so [Callaway v. City of Overland
Park, 211 Kan. 646, 650 (1973)], and statutes need not be
enacted at the same time in order to be regarded as in pari
materia. Claflin v. Walsh, 212 Kan. 1, 8 (1973). We believe
these principles compel a conjunctive construction of K.S.A.
41-719 and the Private Club Act.
It was recognized by the Court in Blue Star Supper Club v.
City of Wichita, supra at 733, 734, that both K.S.A. 41-719
and the Private Club Act regulate and control the consumption
of alcoholic beverages. Moreover, there is a clear legisla-
tive intent to coordinate the provisions of the Private Club
Act with those of the Liquor Control Act, of which K.S.A.
41-719 is an integral part. For example, in K.S.A. 41-2601(a),
certain words and terms used in the Private Club Act are
given the respective meanings provided them in the Liquor
Control Act, and various other sections of the Private Club
Act incorporate by reference certain requirements of the
Liquor Control Act (e.g., K.S.A. 41-2609, 41-2615 and 41-2623).
Hence, we believe K.S.A. 41-719 and the sections of the Pri-
vate Club Act must be construed together as statutes in pari
materia, so as to harmonize and reconcile their respective
provisions, if reasonably possible to do so [Callaway v. City
of Overland Park, supra], and so that all may be given full
force and effect within their intended field and scope of
operation. Marshall v. Marshall, 159 Kan. 602, 606 (1945).
When the Private Club Act was enacted in 1965 (L. 1965, ch.
316), the only prohibition regarding the consumption of alco-
holic liquor was found in K.S.A. 41-719, which had been en-
acted in 1949 as section 82 of the Liquor Control Act (L.
1949, ch. 242). At the time the Private Club Act took effect,
there were no exceptions to the prohibition in K.S.A. 41-719
regarding alcoholic beverage consumption on public property.
It is within this context, then, that we must consider the
legislative purpose underlying the Private Club Act, since
it is essential in determining legislative intent to consider
statutes in existence at the time of a statute's enactment.
Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 (1937). Legis-
lative intent must be determined with reference to the situa-
tion and existing conditions at the time of enactment. State,
ex rel., v. Murphy, 183 Kan. 698, 702 (1958). And as noted
in Callaway v. City of Overland Park, supra, "[t]he histori-
cal background and changes made in a statute are to be con-
sidered by the court in determining legislative intent for
the purpose of statutory construction."
We also find pertinent the following statement of the Court
in Rogers v. Shanahan, 221 Kan. 221 (1977):
"It is presumed the legislature had and acted
with full knowledge and information as to the
subject matter of the statute, as to prior and
existing law and legislation on the subject of
the statute and as to the judicial decisions
with respect to such prior and existing law
and legislation." Id. at 225.
Moreover, "'any changes and additions made in existing legis-
lation raise a presumption that a change in meaning and
effect is intended.'" (Emphasis added.) Shapiro v. Kansas
Public Employees Retirement System, 211 Kan. 452, 456 (1973),
quoting Curless v. Board of County Commissioners, 197 Kan. 580
(1966). Certainly, the enactment of the Private Club Act must
be regarded as a supplementary addition to the Liquor Control
Act. Hence, we must presume that the Private Club Act was
enacted with the legislature's full knowledge that K.S.A.
41-719 proscribed consumption of alcoholic beverages on public
property, and that a change in the existing law was intended.
With these principles in mind, we have examined the various
provisions of the Private Club Act to determine its underly-
ing purpose. One section of that act having obvious pertinence
to our consideration is K.S.A. 41-2602, which provides as
follows:
"The consumption of alcoholic liquor by any
person shall be authorized in this state:
"(a) Upon private property by those occupying
such private property as an owner or as the
lessee of an owner and by the guests of said
owner or lessee provided that no charge is
made by the owner of lessee for the serving or
mixing of any drink or drinks of alcoholic
liquor or for any substance comixed with any
alcoholic liquor; and if no sale of alcoholic
liquor in violation of K.S.A. 41-803 takes
place on said private property;
"(b) at a club licensed by the director under
the provisions of this act;
"(c) in a lodging room of any hotel, motel or
boarding house by the occupant of said lodg-
ing room or his guests provided the occupant
is not engaged in a sale of liquor in viola-
tion of K.S.A. 41-803; and if the occupant
makes no charge for (1) serving or mixing any
drink or drinks of alcoholic liquor, or (2)
for any substance comixed with any alcoholic
liquor;
"(d) in a private dining room of a hotel, mo-
tel or restaurant when said dining room is
rented or made available on a special occasion
to an individual or organization for a private
party and if no sale of alcoholic liquor in
violation of K.S.A. 41-803 takes place at said
private party."
In conjunction with this section, we also have considered K.S.A.
41-2604, which states:
"Any person allowing consumption of alcoholic
liquor in violation of this act on any pro-
perty owned, leased or otherwise under his
control shall thereby subject himself and
the property on which said illegal consump-
tion takes place to the penalties hereinafter
provided.
"(a) The person allowing such consumption
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon con-
viction thereof shall be subject to a fine not
to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) or con-
finement in the county jail not to exceed six
(6) months or both such fine and imprisonment.
"(b) The property on which the violation takes
place is declared to be a public nuisance and
as such is subject to abatement as provided
for any other liquor nuisance in K.S.A. 41-805."
Here, several important observations must be made. First,
neither of the foregoing statutes have been amended since
they were enacted. Hence, we must conclude that the legis-
lative purpose prompting their enactment has remained un-
changed.
A second observation is that, unlike K.S.A. 41-719 as it
existed when the Private Club Act was enacted, the Private
Club Act does not constitute an absolute prohibition as to
the consumption of alcoholic beverages. Rather, K.S.A.
41-2602 enumerates the places and conditions under which such
consumption is authorized, and K.S.A. 41-2604, in effect,
prohibits all consumption of alcoholic beverages which is
not in conformity with the parameters prescribed by K.S.A.
41-2602.
Amplifying the foregoing is the fact that the Private Club
Act has the obvious purpose of regulating all consumption of
alcoholic liquor. This is abundantly clear from the provi-
sions of K.S.A. 41-2602 and 41-2604 quoted above. The former
statute begins by declaring that "[t]he consumption of alco-
holic liquor by any person shall be authorized in this state"
(emphasis added), and then defines the limits of such autho-
rized consumption. Thus, it is apparent the legislature in-
tended to proscribe and penalize any consumption of alcohol-
ic liquor which exceeds these limits. Such purpose is in
perfect harmony with the provisions of K.S.A. 41-719 as it
was constituted in 1965, since that section contained an un-
qualified prohibition regarding consumption of alcoholic bev-
erages on public property. Nothing in the then existing ver-
sion of that statute mitigates the underlying purpose of the
Private Club Act to regulate all authorized consumption of
alcoholic liquor.
The question then arises as to whether the subsequent amend-
ments to K.S.A. 41-719 have altered this legislative scheme.
In our judgment, these amendments preserve the integrity of
the Private Club Act in regulating all authorized consumption
of alcoholic beverages. We again note that subsection (a)
of K.S.A. 41-719 prohibits consumption of alcoholic liquor
in particular places, including "property owned by the state
or any governmental subdivision thereof." Subsection (b),
however, provides that "[t]he provisions of subsection (a)
shall not apply to the drinking or consumption of alcoholic
liquor" on the various properties specified in paragraphs
(1) through (5) of this subsection. It is important to rec-
ognize that the only effect produced by this subsection is
to remove these properties from the prohibition in subsection
(a). Nothing in subsection (b), or elsewhere in K.S.A. 41-719,
for that matter, authorizes the consumption of alcoholic
beverages. The only legislative pronouncement permitting
such consumption is found in K.S.A. 41-2602. Thus, in our
judgment, even though the properties specified in subsection
(b) are no longer subject to the restraints of subsection
(a), consumption of alcoholic beverages on these properties
is subject to regulation and control under the Private Club
Act, and we believe this is precisely what the legislature
intended.
The various paragraphs of K.S.A. 41-719(b) support this con-
clusion. In fact, paragraphs (1) , (2) , (3) and (4) manifest
a legislative intent that consumption of alcoholic beverages
on the various properties specified therein be subject to the
Private Club Act. Paragraph (1) addresses a situation where
a hotel or motel is situated on particular public property;
paragraph (2) deals with residences of state officers and
employees which are situated on public property; and para-
graphs (3) and (4) address situations where private clubs
licensed under the Private Club Act are located on specified
public property. Clearly, were it not for the fact that
these premises and facilities are situated on public pro-
perty, consumption of alcoholic beverages thereon would be
authorized and regulated under the Private Club Act. The
character and use of these premises and facilities are essen-
tially private in nature. Thus, it is readily apparent that
the only purpose for these four paragraphs is to remove the
prohibition regarding consumption of alcoholic beverages on
public property, so that such consumption will be authorized
in accordance with the limitations of the Private Club Act.
We also find the intent underlying K.S.A. 41-719(b)(5), the
remaining exception to the provisions of K.S.A. 41-719(a),
to be consistent with the purpose of the other four exceptions.
Paragraph (5) exempts from the provisions of subsection (a)
those public properties specifically designated either by
ordinance of a city having a population of more than 200,000
or by resolution of a county having a population of not less
than 150,000. Here, again, we believe the only purpose of
this paragaph is to remove these public properties from the
constraints of subsection (a). We reiterate that nothing in
this paragraph or elsewhere in K.S.A. 41-719 indicates that
the legislature's intent was to remove all statutory restraints
concerning consumption of alcoholic beverages on these proper-
ties. To the contrary, from the time the Private Club Act
was enacted in 1965 there has existed an obvious legislative
intent to coordinate the provisions of that act with the
Liquor Control Act. Nothing in paragraph (5) of K.S.A.
41-719(b) detracts from that purpose. That paragraph does
not authorize unrestrained consumption of alcoholic beverages
on the specified local government property; it merely removes
such property from the restraints of subsection (a), thereby
permitting consumption of alcoholic beverages on such property,
but only in accordance with the Private Club Act.
Before proceeding, it is appropriate to restate the necessity
of effectuating the legislature's intent. Southeast Kansas
Landowners Ass'n v. Kansas Turnpike Auth., supra. In ascer-
taining the purpose of a statute susceptible of more than
one construction, it is essential to consider the effect the
statute may have under the various possible constructions.
State, ex rel., v. City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 700, Syl.
1110 (1974). Thus, were we to conclude that the exemption of
public property from the constraints of K.S.A. 41-719(a) af-
forded unrestrained consumption of alcoholic beverages on
such property, we would attribute to the legislature an in-
tent that consumption of alcoholic beverages on private pro-
perty be subject to greater restraint than on public property.
We find nothing in the pertinent statutes which reflects such
an intent, and to give effect thereto would produce unreason-
able and absurd results and contravene all established rules
of statutory construction. "It is a cardinal rule of statutory
construction that the legislature intended a statute be given
a reasonable construction so as to avoid unreasonable and
absurd consequences." Williams v. Board of Education, 198
Kan. 115, 125 (1967), and cases cited therein.
Accordingly, we have concluded that the effect of K.S.A.
41-719(b) is merely the exemption of the various public
properties specified therein from the constraints of K.S.A.
41-719(a), but consumption of alcoholic beverages on these
properties remains subject to regulation and control under
the Private Club Act. And that also is precisely the legal
effect of Herington's Charter Ordinance No. 8.
The governing body of Herington has accomplished for its
Community Building by charter ordinance what the legislature
has done statutorily for property specified by ordinance of
any city having a population of more than 200,000--it has
exempted the Herington Community Building from the restraints
of K.S.A. 41-719(a). However, just as the various exemptions
in K.S.A. 41-719(b) do not have the effect of providing un-
restrained consumption of alcoholic beverages on the public
properties specified therein, neither does Herington's char-
ter ordinance have the effect of permitting unrestrained con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages in the Herington Community
Building. From its inception, the Private Club Act has pro-
vided the only authority for the consumption of alcoholic
beverages, and as we previously stated there is an express
legislative intent that the provisions of that act apply
throughout the state. K.S.A. 41-719 has never authorized
such consumption; it has only prohibited it. Thus, just as
the only effect produced by the exemptions set forth in
K.S.A. 41-719(b) is to remove the properties from the con-
straints of subsection (a), thereby permitting consumption
of alcoholic beverages on such properties in accordance with
the Private Club Act, the only result of a city's charter
ordinance which exempts the city from the provisions of K.S.A.
41-719(a) is to remove the city from the constraints of that
statute, thereby permitting consumption of alcoholic bever-
ages on city property specified in the ordinance in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Private Club Act.
Therefore, consumption of alcoholic beverages in the Herington
Community Building must comport with the limitations of the
Private Club Act, specifically the provisions of K.S.A.
41-2602. We note, of course, that the limitations of this
statute are couched in the context of private property.
This is understandable, since consumption of alcoholic bev-
erages on public property was absolutely prohibited at the
time this section was enacted, and as we noted previously,
it has not been amended. However, because of the obvious
legislative intent expressed by the provisions of K.S.A.
41-719(b) that the provisions of the Private Club Act be
made applicable to public property which has been exempted
from the restraints of K.S.A. 41-719(a), we are compelled to
construe K.S.A. 41-2602 so as to give force and effect to that
intent. As stated in Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195 (1978):
"The fundamental rule of statutory construction,
to which all others are subordinate, is that the
purpose and intent of the legislature governs
when that intent can be ascertained from the
statute, even though words, phrases or clauses
at some place in the statute must be omitted or
inserted. (Farm & City Ins. Co. v. American
Standard Ins. Co., 220 Kan. 325, Syl. 1(3, 552
P.2d 1363 [1976].) In determining legislative
intent, courts are not limited to a mere consid-
eration of the language used, but look to the
historical background of the enactment, the
circumstances attending its passage, the purpose
to be accomplished and the effect the statute
may have under the various constructions suggested.
(State, ex rel., v. City of Overland Park, 215
Kan. 700, Syl. 1110, 527 P.2d 1340 [1974.1.) In
order to ascertain the legislative intent, courts
are not permitted to consider only a certain
isolated part or parts of an act but are re-
quired to consider and construe together all
parts thereof in pari materia. When the
interpretation of some one section of an act
according to the exact and literal import of
its words would contravene the manifest purpose
of the legislature, the entire act should be
construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding so far as may be necessary the
literal import of words or phrases which conflict
with the manifest purpose of the legislature.
(Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Howard,
218 Kan. 248, Syl. 1[2, 544 P.2d 791 11975].)"
Id. at 199, 200.
By application of these well-accepted rules of statutory
construction to the provisions of K.S.A. 41-2602, it is our
opinion that consumption of alcoholic beverages in the
Herington Community Building must comport with the limitations
of subsection (a) of that statute. That is, such consumption
is limited to private gatherings. Assuming that a private
club, hotel, motel or restaurant will not be located on the
premises of this building, consumption of alcoholic liquor
on these premises is limited to situations where the premises
are leased to an individual or organization, and only the
lessee and guests of the lessee may drink or consume alcoholic
beverages, "provided that no charge is made . . . by the
lessee for the serving or mixing of any drink or drinks of
alcoholic liquor or for any substance comixed with any alco-
holic liquor; and if no sale of alcoholic liquor in violation
of K.S.A. 41-803 take place." K.S.A. 41-2602(a).
It is obvious that such restrictions are in conflict with
the provisions of Herington's Charter Ordinance No. 8 which
purport to authorize consumption of alcoholic liquor in the
Herington Community Building "whether or not the general pub-
lic has access." Accordingly, it is our opinion that these
provisions are of no force or effect. By authorizing what
the Private Club Act prohibits, the Herington ordinance is
in conflict with these statutes, and the ordinance must yield.
City of Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495, 501 (1975). Thus,
even though Herington's Charter Ordinance No. 8 is a valid
exercise of the city's home rule power to exempt itself
from a legislative enactment (K.S.A. 41-719) which applies to
such city, but does not apply uniformly to all cities, those
provisions of the ordinance which authorize consumption of
alcoholic liquor in contravention of the Private Club Act
are invalid.
In summary, therefore, it is our opinion that K.S.A. 41-719,
which prohibits inter alia the consumption of alcoholic
liquor on public property, is a legislative enactment which
does not apply uniformly to all cities. Hence, a city to
which this enactment applies may exempt itself by charter
ordinance from the whole or any part thereof, and may also
provide substitute or additional provisions, so as to permit
consumption of alcoholic liquor on specified city property.
However, the consumption of alcoholic liquor on such property
remains subject to the limitations of the Private Club Act
(K.S.A. 41-2601 et seq.), which has as its purpose the regu-
lation and control of all consumption of alcoholic liquor by
any person in this state. Thus, where a charter ordinance
exempts a city from the prohibitions of K.S.A. 41-719, but
authorizes consumption of alcoholic liquor on city property
in a manner which is in conflict with the Private Club Act,
such conflicting provisions are invalid. Accordingly, the
provisions of Herington's Charter Ordiance No. 8 which au-
thorize consumption of alcoholic liquor in the Herington
Community Building irrespective of whether the general public
has access are invalid since they contravene the limitations
prescribed by the Private Club Act.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN AttorneyGeneralofKansas
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:hle

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