Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-096

1982-096Kanag

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April 27, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 96
The Honorable Jack H. Brier
Secretary of State
2nd Floor, Statehouse
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Elections -- Ballots -- Mail Ballots in Certain
Question Submitted Elections
Synopsis: The provisions of 1982 Senate Bill No. 778, which
would require all qualified voters in certain
question submitted elections to be furnished
ballots by mail and would permit return of these
ballots by mail or by personal delivery thereof
to the county election officer, would not impose
a poll tax in those instances where voters choose
to return the ballots by mail, thereby incurring
expense for postage. Moreover, such provisions
would not, as a matter of law, discriminate in
favor of the wealthy, in contravention of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Cited herein: U.S. Const., Amends. XIV,
XXIV.
*
Dear Secretary Brier:
You have asked for our opinion regarding certain provisions
of 1982 Senate Bill No. 778 (SB 778). In particular, you
indicate that questions have been raised regarding the con-
stitutionality of certain provisions of this bill "permitting
a voter to mail a ballot to a county election officer," and
you have inquired whether the necessity of paying postage in
order for a voter to avail himself or herself of these provi-
sions may be viewed as an "unlawful poll tax."
Senate Bill No. 778 is limited in scope, applying only to
certain question submitted elections. In these elections,
county election officers are required to mail ballots to reg-
istered electors, together with instructions for marking and
returning the ballot. With regard to the latter, section 3(b)
of the bill provides, in part:
"The elector may return the marked ballot to
the county election officer by United States
mail, if it is received by the county election
officer by the date of the election, or per-
sonally deliver the ballot to the office of
the county election officer before noon on
the date of the election." (Emphasis added.)
In considering your inquiry regarding these provisions, it
initially should be observed that the only prohibition against
a poll tax having any apparent relevance to your request is
the Twenty-fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Sec-
tion 1 of that Amendment provides:
"The right of citizens of the United States
to vote in any primary or other election for
President or Vice-President, for electors for
President or Vice-President, or for Senator
or Representative in Congress, shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or
any State by reason of failure to pay any poll
tax or other tax."
It is to be observed that SB 778 has no application to any
election where candidates are nominated or elected; hence,
its provisions are not within the purview of the foregoing
constitutional requirements.
Of equal importance, it also should be observed that the
above-quoted provisions of SB 778 do not impose a poll tax.
In Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979), a poll tax is de-
fined as follows:
"A capitation tax; a tax of specific sum levied
upon each person within the jurisdiction of the
taxing power and within a certain class (as,
all males of a certain age, etc.) without ref-
ence to his property or lack of it." id. at
1043.
Measured against this definition, it is readily apparent that
the provisions of SB 778 do not provide for the imposition
of a poll tax. However, such conclusion is not of itself
determinative of your request. Looking beyond the language
of your question to the underlying substantive issue, we
believe the question for our consideration is whether the
above-quoted provisions of SB 778 deny any elector equal pro-
tection of the law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth. Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.
Pertinent to our consideration of this issue is Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 16 L.Ed.2d
169, 88 S.Ct. 1079 (1966). At issue in Harper was a poll
tax imposed by the State of Virginia as a condition precedent
to voting, i.e., payment of the poll tax was established as
a voting qualification. In holding such requirement uncon-
stitutional as an abridgement of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
"A state violates the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes
the affluence of the voter or payment of any
fee an electoral standard, voter qualifications
having no relation to wealth nor to paying or
not paying a poll or any other tax." 16 L.Ed.
2d at 170 (Syl. 13).
In light of this decision, even though SB 778 does not impose
a poll tax, per se, it must be decided whether the quoted
provisions of section 3(b) establish wealth or affluence as
an electoral standard.
The pertinent provisions of section 3(b) are alternative in
nature. An elector may return a marked ballot to the county
election officer either by mailing it or personally deliver-
ing it. All voters are afforded these same options. There
is no requirement that some or all voters must mail the
marked ballot in order to return it. If any voter declines
to return the ballot by mail, because of the expense of
postage or because of any other reason, the voter still has
the option of personally returning the ballot to the office
of the county election officer.
Although we recognize that there are also expenses attendant
upon the travel required by the latter alternative, similar
expenses are necessitated by our present system. Election
laws currently require all voters (other than those who
qualify for absentee ballots) to travel to the various poll-
ing places established by the county election officer in
order to cast their ballots. Thus, both, of the proposed al-
ternatives potentially require some expense for all voters.
However, we are unaware of any case law or other authority
suggesting that it is improper for a state to establish a
voting system whereby direct expenses are incurred by voters
in exercising their franchise. The important consideration
is whether the proposal discriminates as a matter of law in
favor of the wealthy. In our judgment, no such discrimina-
tion exists.
We acknowledge that expenses will vary for each voter, and
that the burden of such expenses will be greater for some
voters than for others. However, we believe it is axiomatic
that "kill voting laws treat some persons differently from
others in some respects." Harper, supra at 176 (dissenting
opinion). Further, we are unable to find that such disparity
is irrational, arbitrary or results in invidious discrimina-
tions. If enacted, we believe SB 778 can be shown to evidence
a legitimate state policy. And even though some voters may
incur greater expenses than others, in our judgment there is
nothing in the proposed voting scheme which inherently dis-
criminates in favor of the wealthy.
In summary, therefore, it is our opinion that the provisions
of 1982 Senate Bill No. 778, which would require all qualified
voters in certain question submitted elections to be furnished
ballots by mail and would permit return of these ballots by
mail or by personal delivery thereof to the county election
officer, would not impose a poll tax in those instances where
voters choose to return the ballots by mail, thereby incurring
expense for postage. Moreover, such provisions would not,
as a matter of law, discriminate in favor of the wealthy, in
contravention of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEYGENERALOFKANSAS
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:hle

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