Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-082

1982-082Kanag

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April 7, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 82
Alan F. Alderson
General Counsel
Department of Revenue
State Office Building
Topeka, Kansas 66625
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- Drivers' Licenses --
Habitual Violators; Effect of Prior Conviction Based on
Plea of Nolo Contendere
Synopsis: A person's prior conviction of one of the offenses
enumerated in K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-285, based on a
plea of nolo contendere, may properly be considered
by a court in determining whether such person is an
habitual violator pursuant to K.S.A. 8-284 et seq.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 8-284, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-285,
K.S.A. 8-286, 22-3209.
Dear Mr. Alderson:
You seek our opinion on whether the district court can properly consider
a defendant's prior conviction of one of the offenses enumerated in
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-285 that was based on a plea of nolo contendere
in determining whether the defendant is "an habitual violator" of the
motor vehicle laws of the State of Kansas in a prosecution commenced
under K.S.A. 8-286. This statute provides:
"Whenever the files and records of the division shall
disclose that the record of convictions of any person is
such that the person is an habitual violator, as prescribed
by K.S.A. 8-285 the division forthwith shall certify a full
and complete abstract of such person's record of convictions
to the district, or county attorney of the county where such
person resides, as disclosed by the records of the division,
or if such person is a nonresident, to the district attorney
of Shawnee county. Upon receiving said abstract, the district
or county attorney forthwith shall commence prosecution of
such person in the district court of such county, alleging
such person to be an habitual violator. Such court shall
cause a summons to be served on the accused, ordering the
accused to appear before the court at a time and date stated
therein to show cause why he or she should not be convicted
of being an habitual violator. At the time and date stated
in the summons, the court shall hold a hearing to determine
the identity of the accused and the accuracy of the abstract
of such person's record of convictions.
"If the court finds that such accused person is not the same
person as the accused named in such records, or that the
convictions are not such as to constitute the accused 'an
habitual violator' under this act, the prosecution shall be
dismissed; but if the court finds that the accused is the
same person named in the records certified by the division,
the court shall find such person guilty of being 'an habitual
violator' of the motor vehicle laws of Kansas and shall direct
such person by appropriate order not to operate a motor vehicle
on the public highways in this state. The clerk of the court
shall file with the division a copy of such order which shall
become a part of the permanent records of the division."
Under the criminal laws of the State of Kansas, the criminal defendant
who does not wish to plead guilty to the charges contained in a criminal
complaint, indictment or information has the alternative of entering a
plea of nolo contendere. K.S.A. 22-3209(2) provides:
"A plea of nolo contendere is a formal declaration
that the defendant does not contest the charge. When a
plea of nolo contendere is accepted by the court, a finding
of guilty may be adjudged thereon. The plea cannot be used
against the defendant as an admission in any other action
based on the same act."
Nolo contendere is a Latin phrase meaning " I will not contest it."
Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition, 1979). This plea is used primarily
to avoid civil sanctions and other liabilities which might accompany
a plea of guilty. Hicks v. Oliver, 523 F.Supp. 64 (D. Kan. 1981);
Lastelic, Pleas of Guilty, 18 K.L.R. 730 (1970). With respect to the
case in which it is entered, it has the same effect as a guilty plea.
Zebelman v. United States, 339 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1964). The plea of
nolo contendere constitutes an admission of every essential element of
the offense contained in a well-pleaded charge, and it is essentially
an admission of guilt. Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421, 6 L.Ed.2d
940, 81 S.Ct. 1563 (1961); Zebelman v. United States, supra. The legal
effect of a plea of nolo contendere is as conclusive as to a defendant's
guilt as a plea of guilty. Carnes v. United States, 279 F.2d 378
(10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 846, 5 L.Ed.2d 69, 81 S.Ct. 88;
United States v. L'Aquarius, 418 F.Supp. 887 (D. Okl. 1976). See also,
United States v. William, 642 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1981).
The Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Holmes, 222 Kan. 212 (1977),
considered the effect of a conviction based on a plea of nolo contendere
and stated:
"Under this statute [K.S.A. 22-3209(2)] when a court accepts
a tendered plea of nolo contendere and adjudges a finding
of guilt thereon, the defendant at that point has been
convicted of the offense covered by the plea of nolo
contendere." Id. at 214.
The Court also held:
"While a plea of nolo contendere, unlike a plea of guilty,
may not be used as an admission in any other action based
on the same act, for all other purposes a conviction based
on a plea of nolo contendere is just like any other conviction."
Id. at 213.
The use of a plea of nolo contendere in a proceeding other than the
matter in which the defendant tendered the plea of nolo contendere is
discussed in the annotation at 89 A.L.R.2d 540 (1963), as follows:
"In a number of jurisdictions a distinction has been drawn
in regard to the effect of the plea of nolo contendere outside
the case, as between the defendant's guilt and his conviction.
This distinction is that while a conviction of the defendant
upon the plea of nolo contendere is not an admission of his
guilt, so that the defendant is not estopped in a civil
proceeding from denying the facts to which he pleaded nolo
contendere, the fact of his conviction upon the plea may be
shown in a later proceeding, and such a conviction subjects
the defendant to all the consequences of a conviction in the
same way as if it were after a plea of guilty or not guilty."
Id. at 604.
This distinction is also discussed in Tempo Trucking and Transfer Corp.
v. Dickson, 405 F.Supp. 506, 516-17 (E.D. N.Y. 1975).
In reviewing the cases of numerous jurisdictions we find that a majority
of states permit the introduction of the former judgment to show the
fact of conviction, as distinguished from an admission. In our opinion
a conviction under a nolo plea is regarded in the same manner as a
conviction under a guilty plea for purposes of multiple offense statutes.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bruno v. Reimer, 98 F.2d 92 (2nd Cir. 1938).
In United States v. Bagliore, 182 F.Supp. 714 (E.D. N.Y. 1960), the
court discussed the distinction of a conviction based on a nolo plea
being used for purposes of an admission in another proceeding and the
fact that a conviction based on a nolo plea can be introduced simply to
show that the prior conviction exists. The court related in pertinent
part:
"[T]hough [a plea of nolo contendere] . . . does not
constitute an admission of guilt in subsequent actions, it is
of no help to a defendant if the conviction (regardless of
how obtained), rather than admission of guilt, is the basis
for the subsequent action." Id. at 716.
Similarly, when a prosecution under an habitual criminal statute is
commenced, the general rule is recognized in 39 Am.Jur.2d Habitual
Criminals, Etc. §7:
"Where followed by judgment or sentence, however, a plea
of guilty or of nolo contendere is generally held to amount
to a conviction under habitual criminal statutes." (Footnotes
omitted.)
It is well accepted that the operation of a motor vehicle on the public
highways is a privilege, not a right, and is subject to reasonable
regulation under state police power in the interest of public safety
and welfare. State v. Garner, 227 Kan. 566, 571 (1980); Lee v. State,
187 Kan. 566, 570 (1961). The stated purpose of the habitual violator
act (K.S.A. 8-284 et seq.) is to provide maximum safety for all people
who use the public highways by depriving habitual violators of the
privilege of operating motor vehicles on the public highways of this
state. State v. Garton, 2 Kan. App.2d 709, 710, 711 (1978). The
objectives of the statute are necessary and proper within the police
power of the state.
Additional support for the proposition that previous convictions based
on pleas of nolo contendere can be considered in an habitual violator
proceeding lies in the Kansas Court of Appeals decision of State v.
Skeen, 3 Kan.App.2d 231 (1979), in which the court determined that
an abstract of the original court record of conviction could be
introduced by the prosecution as evidence to show that an accused was
an habitual violator under the then existing provisions of K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 8-285. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the
record of the accused's past convictions indicated "that in two
instances the convictions were based on pleas of nolo contendere."
Id. at 233. The court then found: "The record in this case is
sufficient to have made at least a prima facie case against the
accused as an habitual violator as that term is defined by K.S.A.
1978 Supp. 8-285." Id. at 233, 234.
From the foregoing, it is clear that, if a person is accused of violating
one of the offenses described in K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-285(a), and the trial
court accepts that person's plea of nolo contendere and subsequently
enters an order of conviction, such person is deemed to have been
fully and properly "convicted" of the offense charged. It is our
opinion that, during the course of a prosecution of an individual as
"an habitual violator," the defendant's prior convictions of crimes
enumerated in K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-285, including a conviction pursuant
to a plea of nolo contendere can be properly considered in determining
whether an individual is "an habitual violator" as prescribed in K.S.A.
8-286. The individual's past conviction is not being considered as an
admission against interest, but simply offered in the subsequent
proceeding to show the fact of conviction.
In summary, therefore, it is our opinion that a person's prior conviction
of one of the offenses enumerated in K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-285, based on
a plea of nolo contendere, may properly be considered by a court in
determining whether such person is an habitual volator pursuant to
K.S.A. 8-284 et seq.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General
Joseph M. Fast
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JEF:JMF:may

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