Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-057

1982-057Kanag

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March 4, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 57
The Honorable William R. Novak
State Representative, Seventieth District
Room 182-W, Statehouse
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: State Departments; Public Officers, Employees -- Department
of Transportation -- Secretary's Per to Reorganize Department
Synopsis: The Secretary of Transportation has express statutory authority
to organize the Department of Transportation in any manner
he deems most efficient, so long as it is not in conflict with
the act creating the Department (L. 1975, ch. 426) or other
provisions of law. Thus, to reorganize the Department so
as to eliminate the statutorily-created Division of Aviation
and the statutorily-created position of Director of Aviation,
exceeds the Secretary's authority and creates a direct conflict
with manifested legislative intent. Cited herein: K.S.A.
75-5006, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-5007, 75-5008, K.S.A. 75-5009,
75-5010, 75-5015.
Dear Representative Novak:
You have requested our opinion regarding the Secretary of Transportation's
reorganization of the Department of Transportation. Specifically, you
have inquired whether the Secretary has the authority to reorganize the
Department so as to eliminate the Division of Aviation and its chief
administrative officer, the Director of Aviation.
Initially, we note that the Department's Division of Aviation and the
Director of Aviation are provided for in K.S.A. 75-5010, which states:
"There is hereby established within and as a part of
the department of transportation a division of aviation,
which shall be administered, under the supervision of
the secretary of transportation, by the director of
aviation, who shall be the chief administrative officer
of said division. The director of aviation shall be
appointed by the secretary of transportation and shall
serve at the pleasure of the secretary. The director
of aviation shall be in the unclassified service under
the Kansas civil service act and shall receive an
annual salary fixed by the secretary of transportation,
with the approval of the state finance council."
From our review of the materials submitted with your request, as well
as additional materials furnished us by the Department's chief attorney,
it is clear that the Secretary of Transportation has, in fact, reorganized
the Department of Transportation, effective January 1, 1982. The
information provided us regarding the details of the reorganization
indicates that, as a result of the reorganization: (1) the Division of
Aviation has been eliminated; (2) the functional responsibilities of this
division have been assigned to the Division of Planning and Development;
(3) the position of Director of Aviation has been eliminated; and (4) the
chief administrative officer of the Division of Aviation has become a
subordinate officer of the Division of Planning and Development. Thus,
the Secretary of Transportation's reorganization of the Department has
resulted in an organizational structure which ignores the provisions of
K.S.A. 75-5010, and the question arises, then, as to the Secretary's
authority to effect such changes.
Of pertinence to our consideration is the general principle of law
stated in Murray v. State Board of Regents, 194 Kan. 686, 689, 690
(1965):
"Governmental agencies are creatures of the legislature,
and can exercise only such powers as are expressly
conferred by law and those necessary to make effective
the powers expressly conferred. ( State, ex rel., v. City
of Kansas City, 181 Kan. 870, 317 P.2d 806; State, ex rel.,
v. City of Overland Park, 192 Kan. 654, 391 P.2d 128)."
As a corollary, the predominant view is that the determination of implied
powers should be limited to situations where, without them, the governmental
agency would have no way to carry out its express statutory powers. See,
e.g., Edwards County Commissioners v. Simmons, 159 Kan. 41 (1944); Womer
v. Aldridge, 155 Kan. 446 (1942); State, ex rel., v. Davis, 114 Kan.
270 (1923); The State, ex rel., v. Wooster, 111 Kan. 830 (1922); The
State, ex rel., v. Younkin, 108 Kan. 634 (1921); Young v. Regents of
State University, 87 Kan. 239 (1912); and Brown County v. Barnett, 14
Kan. 627 (1875).
Here, we note the express authority granted the Secretary by K.S.A.
75-5015(a) which provides, in part, that "[t]he secretary of transportation
may organize the department of transportation in the manner he or she deems
most efficient, so long as the same is not in conflict with the provisions
of this act or other provisions of law . . . ." (Emphasis added.) It is
clear, therefore, that the legislature has granted the Secretary latitude
in organizing the Department, with the stipulation that the product of
his efforts not be in conflict with the act which established the Department
(L. 1975, ch. 426) or with other provisions of law. Is there such a
conflict created by the Secretary's reorganization? We believe there is.
In reaching this conclusion we have been guided by well established rules
of statutory construction. Of principal significance is the following
statement in Southeast Kansas Landowners Ass'n v. Kansas Turnpike Auth.,
224 Kan. 357 (1978):
"The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which
all others are subordinate, is that the purpose and intent
of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained
from the statutes. Easom v. Farmers Insurance Co., 221 Kan.
415, Syl. 2, 560 P.2d 117 (1977); Thomas County Taxpayers
Ass'n v. Finney, 223 Kan. 434, 573 P.2d 1073 (1978);
Brinkmeyer v. City of Wichita, 223 Kan. 393, 573 P.2d 1044
(1978)." 224 Kan. at 367.
Also relevant is the Court's pronouncement in Lakeview Gardens, Inc.
v. State, ex rel. Schneider, 221 Kan. 211 (1976):
"[T]his court must ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the legislature. In so doing we must consider the
language of the statute; its words are to be understood
in their plain and ordinary sense. ( Hunter v. Haun, 210 Kan.
11, 13, 499 P.2d 1087; Roda V. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, 511,
407 P.2d 471.) When a statute is plain and unambiguous this
court must give effect to the intention of the legislature
as expressed rather than determine what the law should or
should not be. ( Armco Production Co. v. Armold, Director
of Taxation, 213 Kan. 636, 647, 518 P.2d 453; Jolly v.
Kansas Public Employees Retirement System, 214 Kan. 200,
204, 519 P.2d 1391.)" 221 Kan. at 214.
Moreover, "[i]n order to ascertain the legislative intent, courts . are
not permitted to consider only a certain isolated part or parts of an
act but are required to consider and construe together all parts thereof
in pari materia." Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 200 (1978).
Applying these principles to the question at hand, it is evident from
the plain and unambiguous language of K.S.A. 75-5010 that the legislature
intended to establish within the Department of Transportation a Division
of Aviation, the chief administrative officer of which is the Director of
Aviation. In addition, from a review of the entire enactment by which
the legislature established the Department of Transportation, we find
manifest a legislative purpose that (1) there be five divisions of the
Department, i.e., Division of Transportation Administration (K.S.A.
75-5006), Division of Transportation Operations (K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
75-5007), Division of Engineering and Design (K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75 -5008),
Division of Planning and Development (K.S.A. 75-5009) and Division of
Aviation (K.S.A. 75-5010); (2) these five divisions are to be the major
subdivisions of the Department; and (3) each division is to be administered
by a chief administrative officer with the title of "director." We also
find no indication that the legislature intended the five major subdivisions
of the Department to enjoy other than a co-equal status within the
Department's organizational structure.
Thus, even though the functions of the Division of Aviation are being
perpetuated through the Division of Planning and Development, the fact
remains that, through plain and unambiguous language, the legislature
has clearly stated its intent that there are to be five major subdivisions
of the Department of Transportation, one of which is to be the Division
of Aviation, administered by the Director of Aviation. Clearly, then,
to eliminate the Division of Aviation and the position of Director of
Aviation is in direct contravention of expressed legislative intent.
Hence, the Secretary's reorganization of the Department is in obvious
conflict with the act creating the Department, and thus within the
proscription of K.S.A. 75-5015. The Secretary has exceeded his express
statutory authority, and even though his reorganization plan may be more
convenient or efficient, there is nothing to indicate that such
reorganization is necessary to the exercise of his express powers.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:may

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