Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-019

1982-019Kanag

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February 1, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-19
Richard C. Dearth
City Attorney
P. 0. Box 1037
Parsons, Kansas 67357
Re: Intoxicating Liquors and Beverages -- Misdemeanors
and Nuisances -- City Ordinances Prohibiting Trans-
portation of Open Containers of Alcoholic Liquor
Synopsis: Pursuant to the provisions of K.S.A. 41-208, the
legislature has the exclusive power to regulate
the transportation of alcoholic liquor, and cities
are preempted from legislating in this area, ex-
cept to the extent authorized by the legislature.
However, K.S.A. 41-208 permits the adoption of
city ordinances which declare as unlawful or pro-
hibited any act which is unlawful or prohibited
under the Kansas Liquor Control Act, and such or-
dinances may prescribe penalties for violations
consistent with the penalites prescribed under the
Liquor Control Act. Accordingly, a city may adopt
an "open container" ordinance prohibiting those
acts proscribed by K.S.A. 41-804 and prescribing
penalties for violations thereof, including autho-
rization for the municipal court to suspend or
restrict the driver's license or operating pri-
vileges of a person convicted under such ordinance,
to the extent provided in K.S.A. 41-804. Cited ,
herein: K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-1567, K.S.A. 41-101,
41-208, 41-804, Kan. Const., Art. 12, §5.
Dear Mr. Dearth:
You indicate that the City of Parsons is considering the
adoption of an ordinance which would authorize the city's
municipal court to suspend a person's driver's license upon
such person's conviction of the ordinance's prohibition
against transportation of an open container of alcoholic
liquor. As the Parsons city attorney, you have requested our
opinion whether a city has the authority to empower its muni-
cipal court to suspend a driver's license under such circum-
stances.
It is our understanding that the proposed "open container"
ordinance is to be patterned after K.S.A. 41-804. Subsec-
tion (a) of this statute prohibits a person from transport-
ing alcoholic liquor in a vehicle, except under specified
conditions, while subsection (b) declares a violation of such
prohibition to be a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not
more than $200 or by imprisonment for not more than six months.
The statute then provides in subsection (c), as follows:
"(c) Except as provided in subsection (f) upon
conviction or adjudication of a violation of
this section, the judge, in addition to any
other penalty or disposition ordered pursuant
to law, shall suspend the person's driver's
license or privilege to operate a motor ve-
hicle on the streets and highways of this
state. Upon conviction or adjudication of the
first violation by such person, the suspension
shall be for three months. Upon adjudication
of a second or subsequent violation, the sus-
pension shall be for one year."
The entirety of subsection (c) was added by amendment in 1981,
as were subsections (d), (e) and (f). See L. 1981, ch. 201,
§1. Subsection (d) provides for the surrender of the con-
victed person's driver's license to the court, provides for
the court's transmittal of - such license to the Division of
Vehicles and prescribes the conditions and procedures for
the return of the license to the licensee. Subsection (e)
provides by reference for definitions of "highway" and
"street," and subsection (f) prescribes a procedure for re-
stricting the licensee's privilege of operating motor vehi-
cles, in lieu of suspending the license as provided in sub-
section (c).
Initially, we think it appropriate to compare K.S.A. 41-804
with K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-1567, which prohibits the operation
of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or drugs. A comparison clearly indicates that the legisla-
ture has patterned subsections (c), (d) and (f) of 41-804
after subsections (d) and (e) of 8-1567. The corresponding
provisions of these statutes are substantially identical,
except in one significant respect -- 8-1567 explicitly autho-
rizes the judge of a municipal court to suspend the license
or restrict the operating privileges of a person convicted
of violating a city ordinance which declares it unlawful to
operate a vehicle either under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or under the influence of drugs. On the other hand,
41-804 contains no such comparable provision. Thus, the
question arises as to the effect such absence of express
statutory authority has on the power of a city to adopt an
"open container" ordinance which authorizes the municipal
judge to suspend the license or restrict the operating pri-
vileges of a person convicted under the ordinance.
A city's legislative power, of course, emanates from Article
12, Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution, known as the home
rule amendment, which empowers cities "to determine their
local affairs and government," subject to specified restric-
tions. As explained in City of Junction City v. Griffin, 227
Kan. 332 (1980):
"By virtue of this constitutional amendment
cities are no longer dependent upon the State
legislature for authority to determine their
local affairs and government. Cities have
power granted directly from the people through
the constitution. They no longer need speci-
fic legislative authorization to pass a par-
ticular ordinance. Claflin v. Walsh, 212 Kan.
1, Syl. 111, 509 P.2d 1130 (1973). This home
rule power of a city is subject, however, to
optional control by legislative action in four
specific areas mentioned in the Claflin case."
Id. at 334, 335.
Considering the constitutional powers of cities, then, we
must ascertain whether the legislature has taken action to
preclude cities from enacting an "open container" ordinance.
Here, the Griffin case, supra, provides guidelines for our
consideration:
"The court has consistently rejected the doc-
trine of implied preemption of a particular
field. Legislative intent to reserve exclu-
sive jurisdiction to regulate in an ar'e'a must
be clearly manifested by State law. City of
Lyons v. Suttle, 209 Kan. 735, 738, 498 P.2d
9 (1972); City of Junction City v. Lee, 216
Kan. 495, 503, 532 P.2d 1292 (1975); Garten
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 219
Kan. 620, Syl. 113, 549 P.2d 864 (1976). Legis-
lative intent to preempt a field is only the
first of two requirements for preemption when
it concerns the rights of cities.
. . The second requirement is uniform app-
lication of the State law to all cities." Id.
at 336.
With these two requirements in mind, we have examined the
1981 enactment (L. 1981, ch. 201) in which K.S.A. 41-804 was
amended, and we find nothing therein which would render it
non-uniform in its application to all cities. Thus, it is
necessary to determine whether the legislature has preempted
the field, since even a uniformly applicable statute of state-
wide concern does not foreclose the adoption of city ordin-
ances which do not conflict with the statute, unless the
legislature has preempted the field. See, e.g., Blue Star
Supper Club, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 208 Kan. 731 (1972).
In this regard, we note that K.S.A. 41-804 is part of the
Kansas Liquor Control Act, K.S.A. 41-101 et seq. Another
section of that act is K.S.A. 41-208, which states, in part,
as follows:
"The power to regulate all phases of the con-
trol of the manufacture, distribution, sale,
possession, transportation and traffic in al-
coholic liquor and the manufacture of beer re-
gardless of its alcoholic content, except as
specifically delegated in this act, is hereby
vested exclusively in the state and shall be
exercised as provided in this act. No city
shall enact any ordinance in conflict with or
contrary to the provisions of this act and any
ordinance of any city in effect at the time
this act takes effect or thereafter enacted
which is in conflict with or contrary to the
provisions of this act shall be null and void."
The foregoing provisions were construed by the Court in Blue
Star Supper Club, supra, to have preempted certain municipal
legislative action. The Court stated:
"It occurs to us that what the legislature in-
tended by including the pre-emptive provisions
of 41-208 as part of the Liquor Control Act
was to give the state exclusive power to con-
trol and regulate the traffic in alcoholic li-
quor and the manufacture of beer. To such end
it was provided that the power to regulate and
control the 'manufacture, distribution, sale,
possession, transportation and traffic in al-
coholic liquor and the manufacture of beer
gardless of its alcoholic content' should be
vested exclusively in the state." 208 Kan. at
733.
It is clear, therefore, that the legislature has the exclusive
power to regulate the "manufacture, distribution, sale, posses-
sion, transportation and traffic in alcoholic liquor." Accord-
ingly, with the state occupying the field of regulatory acti-
vity to the exclusion of cities, cities may exercise only
those powers regarding this area as are delegated to them by
the legislature. In this regard, we. note the remaining pro-
visions of K.S.A. 41-208:
"Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed as preventing any city from enact-
ing ordinances declaring acts prohibited or
made unlawful by this act as unlawful or pro-
hibited in such city and prescribing penalties
for violation thereof, but the minimum penalty
in any such ordinance shall not exceed the
minimum penalty prescribed by this act for the
same violation, nor shall the maximum penalty
in any such ordinance exceed the maximum pen-
alty prescribed by this act for the same vio-
lation."
In our judgment, the foregoing provisions clearly authorize
a city to adopt an ordinance which declares to be unlawful
the transportation of alcoholic liquor, to the extent pro-
scribed by 41-804(a), and which provides for imposition of a
fine or imprisonment upon conviction, to the extent provided
in 41-804(b). Moreover, it is our opinion that K.S.A. 41-208
empowers a city to include in such ordinance provision for
the municipal court to suspend or restrict the driver's li-
cense or operating privileges of a person convicted of vio-
lating the ordinance. In our judgment, the suspension or
restriction of a driver's license or operating privileges
must be regarded as a penalty within the contemplation of
K.S.A. 41-208.
In State v. Finley, 199 Kan. 615 (1967), the Court found that
"[i]n its plain and ordinary sense 'penalty' means to be put
to a disadvantage, loss or hardship due to some action, such
as a transgression or error." Id-. at 620. We think it
scarcely can be contended that the suspension or restriction
of a person's driver's license or privilege to operate motor'
vehicles on the highways of this state does not constitute a
disadvantage, loss or hardship for such person. Our conclu-
sion is reinforced by a consideration of the courts' recogni-
tion of the significant interest a person has in the entitle-
ment to operate a motor vehicle on a state's highways. The
United States Supreme Court has determined that, irrespective
of whether such entitlement is denominated a "right" or a
"privilege," the termination of such entitlement is subject
to procedural due process. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539,
29 L.Ed.2d 90, 94 (1971). See, also, Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 361, 49 L.Ed.2d 547, 558 (1976).
In summary, therefore, it is clear that the legislature, pur-
suant to the provisions of K.S.A. 41-208, has the exclusive
power to regulate the transportation of alcoholic liquor,
and cities are preempted from legislating in this area, ex-
cept to the extent authorized by the legislature. However,
K.S.A. 41-208 permits the adoption of city ordinances which
declare as unlawful or prohibited any act which is unlawful
or prohibited under the Kansas Liquor Control Act, and such
ordinances may prescribe penalties for violations consistent
with the penalties prescribed under the Liquor Control Act.
Accordingly, it is our opinion that a city may adopt an
"open container" ordinance prohibiting those acts proscribed
by K.S.A. 41-804 and prescribing penalties for violations
thereof, including authorization for the municipal court to
suspend or restrict the driver's license or operating pri-
vileges of a person convicted under such ordinance, to the
extent provided in K.S.A. 41-804.
Very truly yours,,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN ATTORNEYGENERALOFKANSAS
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:hle

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