Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-097

1981-097Kanag

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April 21, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81- 97
Mr. James T. Akers
Superintendent of Schools
U.S.D. No. 386
P. 0. Box 398
Madison, Kansas 66860
Re: Schools -- Boards of Education; Organization,
Powers, Finances -- Distribution of Health Insur-
ance Premium Refunds
Synopsis: In the absence of contractual provisions indicat-
ing otherwise and where an employment contract
requires a fixed employer contribution to an in-
surance premium paid by employees, any refund of
such premiums shall be paid to the employees and
the employer may not retain any portion thereof
unless the refund exceeds the entire employee con-
tribution.
Dear Mr. Akers:
You request the opinion of this office regarding the proper
distribution of Blue Cross-Blue Shield insurance premium
refund money received by U.S.D. No. 386 from Blue Cross-Blue
Shield of Kansas. You inform us that:
"USD 386 has for a number of years designated
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas as the offi-
cial carrier of our health insurance policy
covering employees, both certified and non-
certified in the school system.
"As a part of the individual compensation and
benefit program extended to USD 386 employees,
our Board of Education has paid a portion of
the monthly health insurance premium for each
employee. The amount of the board's contri-
bution to the Blue Cross Premium has varied
from year to year according to the total com-
pensation and benefit package negotiated
annually between the Board of Education and
the Madison Teachers Association. The monthly
health insurance premium benefit extended to
USD 386 employees has ranged over the past
seven years from a low of $10 per month, to
the present $60 per month provided in the
1980-81 Negotiated Agreement between the
Association and the Board of Education. The
employees of the district, if they desire to
be included in the Blue Cross Insurance Plan,
contribute the balance of the cost of the
monthly health insurance premium.
"Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas has, over
past years, forwarded to the district office
checks representing refunds on premiums deter-
mined by an internal Blue Cross formula related
to total group usage of health insurance in any
given year. These refund payments are totally
unanticipated by the district and vary in
amount from year to year with no refund being
received during some years . . . . It has been
the policy of our district to pro-rate the Blue
Cross Blue Shield Refund money among subscribers
to the Blue Cross Blue Shield Plan and our Uni-
fied District General Fund on a basis bearing
a direct relationship to the amount of the
premium contributed by each party during the
year for which the refund was applicable. The
premise behind this distribution policy has
been, that since both Board of Education and
the individual subscriber contributed a part
of the monthly premium, both parties should
share in any refunds which accrued to the dis-
trict."
A similar question has been litigated at least once in Kansas,
in Bd. of Education, U.S.D. No. 392, Osborne County v. Able,
Dist. Ct. Osborne County, Kansas, No. 7754. In that declara-
tory judgment action, the court ruled in favor of the teachers
holding that the teachers were entitled to the entire amount
of the insurance premium refund. That decision was never
appealed and we have been unable to find any Kansas appellate
decisions with respect to the refund issue.
There are, however, appellate decisions from other jurisdic-
tions concerning circumstances similar to those presented by
you regarding distribution of insurance refunds. In Pelelas
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1940),
a former employee of the defendant company brought a class
action to compel his former employer to account for dividends
paid to employer by insurer under a group policy. The policy
provided that "divisible surplus" was to be distributed or
applied by the employer according to the respective rights,
if any, of the parties contributing to the premium payment.
The court upheld the trial court decision in favor of the
defendant, stating in relevant part:
"[B]efore plaintiff could recover, it was
necessary for him to show by some contract
either express or implied, a liability upon
the defendant to pay plaintiff. Failing to
do so, the complaint was fatally defective."
Keniston v. Amer. Nat. Insurance Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 803,
107 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1973), involved a class action against a
group life and credit disability insurer. According to the
court:
"The action was brought to recover a portion
of credit insurance premiums allegedly refunded
by American to Budget pursuant to the provi-
sions of group credit life and group credit
disability insurance policies which American
issued to Budget, and under which plaintiff
and the other members of the class became
insured upon borrowing money from Budget and
paying premiums for coverage under the group
policies." Id. at 584.
Although deciding many issues not relevant to our inquiry,
the California Court of Appeals held:
"A policy of group insurance is a contract, and
the rights and duties of the parties thereto
are governed by the provisions of the master
policy. (See: Boseman v. Connecticut General
Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196, 202-203, 57 S.Ct.
686, 81 L.Ed. 1036, 1039-1040 [19371.) There-
fore, where the master policy expressly pro-
vides that premium refunds or dividends are to
be paid to the policyholder, the individual
members of the group insured under the policy
have no right to receive such payments from the
insurer. (Slattery v. Pullman Co., 38 Del. Ch.
387, 153 A.2d 575, 577 [1959].)" Id. at 587.
Finally, in Peterson v. City of Colorado Springs, 548 P.2d
1285 (Colo. App. 1976), city employees brought a class
action to recover a proportionate share of annual surplus
distributions paid to the city by an insurer under a group
life insurance policy paid partially by the city and partially
by employee payroll deductions. Deciding in favor of the
defendant city, the court stated:
"Plaintiffs' right, if any, to a proportionate
share of the annual surplus distributed prior
to December 7, 1964, must be premised upon the
policy, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. De Salvo, 174 Colo. 115, 482 P.2d 380; 3
J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice -§1571,
or upon a contract, express or implied, between
the City and the employees. Pelelas v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 700, 61 S.Ct. 138, 85
L.Ed. 454 . . . .
"Plaintiffs contend that since all employees
are required to pay a portion of the premium
from which the surplus distributions are de-
rived, a contract to share those distribu-
tions should be implied. However, the record
does not contain the insurance policy, the
City council resolution authorizing the insur-
ance program, nor any agreement, employment
contract, or contracts between the City and
the employees relating to the policy program.
"Since plaintiffs have shown no right to share
in the surplus distributions, there is no need
to discuss the City's statute of limitations
defense." Id. at 1286.
The similarities between the above cases and the fact situa-
tion outlined in your request are obvious. The decisions ren-
dered in those cases therefore would be persuasive in the
present case, should this case be litigated. We would sum-
marize the above case law somewhat more succintly as follows:
Where surplus distributions (refunds) are paid to an employer
(contract holder) by an insurer under an insurance policy
paid for partially by the employer and partially by the em-
ployees (contract subscribers/beneficiaries), the rights to
the surplus distributions (as between the employer and employees)
are contractual and depend upon the provisions, if any, of the
master policy, or upon a contract, express or implied, between
the employer and the employees.
In the present case, there appear to be no provisions in the
master policy, in which U.S.D. No. 386 is designated "Holder,"
which specify the method of distribution of any refunds.
This is unusual. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Kansas informs
this office that, as a general rule, a "Divisible Surplus
Rider" (Form No. 80-3500 1/80) is attached to the master
policy of group insurance plans of the type held by U.S.D.
No. 386. That rider states in pertinent part:
"[A]ny part of the Divisible Surplus that is
paid in cash and is in excess of the Contract
Holder's share of the dues shall be applied
for the sole benefit of the Subscribers."
If the policy held by U.S.D. No. 386 contained this rider
and there was no other contract, express or implied, between
the school district and its employees as to disposition of
refunds, it would appear this language would entitle the
school board to retain any amount of refund moneys less than
or equal to the total amount of the insurance premiums paid
by the school board. However, as noted above, the rider
appears not to have been a part of your master policy.
Absent such a rider, and absent any contract, express or
implied, between U.S.D. No. 386 and its employees, case law
suggests the school board would be entitled to the entire
amount of the refund. E.g., Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., supra. The burden of proof that a refund disposition
contract between the employer and employees existed would
be on the employees. See, e.g., Peterson v. City of Colorado
Springs, supra.
The remaining inquiry, therefore, is whether an express or
implied refund disposition contract existed between U.S.D.
No. 386 and its employees. According to 17 Am.Jur.2d
Contracts §3 (1964):
"Contracts are said to be either express,
implied or constructive. Contracts are ex-
press when their terms are stated by the
parties, and they are often said to be implied
when their terms are not so stated. Thus, an
implied contract is one inferred from the con-
duct of the parties, though not expressed in
words.
"Contracts may be implied either in law [Wil-
liams v. Jones, 105 Kan. 282, 182 P.391 (1919)]
or in fact. Contracts implied in fact are
inferred from the facts and circumstances of
the case, and are not formally or explicitly
stated in words.
"It is often said that the only difference
between an express contract and a contract
implied in fact is that in the former the
parties arrive at their agreement by words,
whether oral or written, while in the latter
their agreement is arrived at by a consider-
ation of their acts and conduct, and that in
both of these cases there is, in fact, a con-
tract existing between the parties, the only
difference being in the character of evidence
necessary to establish it." (Footnotes omitted.)
Id. at 334-335.
Also, as stated in 66 Am.Jur.2d. Restitution and Implied
Contracts §2 (1973):
"[Implied contracts] . . . are more properly
called quasi-contracts or constructive con-
tracts. They are contracts in the sense that
they are remediable by the contractual remedy
of assumpsit. In the case of such contracts,
the promise is purely fictitious and is implied
in order to fit the actual cause of action to
the remedy. The liability exists from an im-
plication of law that arises from the facts
and circumstances independent of agreement of
presumed intention. The intention of the par-
ties in such case is entirely disregarded,
while in cases of express contracts and con-
tracts implied in fact the intention is of the
essence of the transaction. As has been well
said, in the case of actual contracts the agree-
ment defines the duty, while in the case of
quasi-contracts the duty defines the contract . . • •
"It has been said that the doctrines of 'unjust
enrichment' and 'restitution' -- modern terms --
have largely supplanted the former designation
of 'quasi-contracts.' (Footnotes omitted.)
Id. at 943 and 945.
The concept of unjust enrichment is explained in 66 Am.Jur.2d.
Restitution and Implied Contracts 0 (1973) thusly:
"The phrase 'unjust enrichment' is used in law
to characterize the result of effect of a fail-
ure to make restitution of, or for, property
or benefits received under such circumstances
as to give rise to a legal or equitable obli-
gation to account therefor . . . .
"Recovery in an action of unjust enrichment
depends upon whether, by the receipt of the
funds in controversy, the defendant was en-
riched at the loss and expense of the plain-
tiff. A right of recovery under the doctrine
of unjust enrichment is essentially equitable,
its basis being that in a given situation it
is contrary to equity and good conscience for
one to retain a benefit which has come to him
at the expense of another. A person who has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of
another is required to make restitution to
the other . . . .
"One is not unjustly enriched, however, by
retaining benefits involuntarily acquired which
law and equity give him absolutely without any
obligation on his part to make restitution.
No person is unjustly enriched unless the re-
tention of the benefit would be unjust."
(Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 945-946.
From the facts we have gathered, it is clear U.S.D. No. 386
and its employees do not have an express contract as to dis-
position of health insurance premium refunds, because there
is no written or oral agreements regarding such refunds. An
"implied in fact" contract arguably exists, however, because
the past practice of the Board is to distribute such refunds,
when made, in proportion to the amount paid. Part is retained
by U.S.D. No. 386 and the rest is paid to the participating
employees. Arguably, this course of conduct is evidence of
an implied in fact contract to so distribute such health
insurance premium refunds. We are, however, forced to reject
this reasoning because the result is contrary to the terms of
the teachers' employment contract and unjustly enriches the
district at the expense of the teachers.
A final possibility is that an implied in law or quasi-
contract exists. As noted above, this is a contract born
of equity rather than law. By express contract, U.S.D.
No. 386 has agreed to pay $60.00 per month toward each parti-
cipating employee's health insurance premium. If the school
board retains all or any part of such refunds, the actual
cost to the board of its share of the insurance premiums is
less than the $60.00 sum it had agreed to pay. The $60.00
sum was identified in the employment contract as a fringe
benefit to the teachers in lieu of salary; thus, if the
actual cost to the board for its share is lowered, the
teachers are not receiving the full benefit promised pursu-
ant to the negotiated contract and the board is unjustly
enriched.
The reason for such refunds is important. Such refunds are
made as a result of a lower incidence of use of insurance
benefits by the subscribers (the U.S.D. No. 386 employees)
than is anticipated when the contract is made. Therefore,
it is the behavior of the subscribers which determines whether
refunds are made. If the total actual cost of a share of the
insurance premium cost is to be lowered, given the fact the
board has contractually agreed to pay a flat sum of $60.00
per month, it should be the teachers' share of the premium
cost which should be lowered. The board agreed to pay $60.00
and the participating employees agreed to pay the difference
necessary to purchase the health insurance. Under the above
facts, when the total actual cost of the insurance coverage
is lowered as a result of the premium refund, such refund is
to be distributed to the employees since the employees' con-
tribution was not fixed by contract while the employer contri-
bution was so fixed and did not flucuate depending on the total
cost of subscription.
The result could be different if the contract between the
Board and the teachers was for the former to pay a percentage
of the premiums. In such a case equity could dictate the
Board's retention of the same percentage of the refund as it
paid towards the total premium cost. But here, U.S.D. No.
386 agreed to pay a flat sum and now should not suggest that
its actual contributions to the cost of the insurance premiums
should be lowered as a result of lower incidence of insurance
benefit use by the employee subscribers.
It is, therefore, our opinion that any moneys in this case,
received by U.S.D. No. 386 from Blue Cross-Blue Shield of
Kansas which are designated divisible surplus (insurance
premium refunds) should be paid over to the subscribers
(teachers) and that the Board is not entitled to retain any
of such divisible surplus for its own use, unless the refund
exceeds the entire employee contribution.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Brad J. Smoot
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:BJS:hle

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