Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-088

1981-088Kanag

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April 8, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81-88
Ms. April Brown
City Clerk
Manchester, Kansas 67463
Re: Cities of the Third Class--Election, Appointment
and Removal of Officers--Eligibility to Office;
Conflict of Interest
Synopsis: Persons who are related, and who are otherwise
qualified, may serve concurrently as members of the
governing body of a city of the third class having
a mayor-council form of government. Similarly, a
person related to a member of any such city's governing
body may hold the office of city clerk in such city,
if the person is otherwise qualified to be appointed
to the office.
An arrangement whereby certain members of such city's
governing body perform compensated maintenance services
for the city may create a conflict of interest subject
to scrutiny under K.S.A. 75-4304, which proscribes
self-dealing contracts by public officers and employees,
or if such arrangement creates an employment relation-
ship, it would be proscribed by the doctrine of
incompatibility of offices, if the city council members
also are compensated for serving in such capacity.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 12-105a, 12-105b,
K.S.A. 13-2903, 15-204, 15-209, 75-4301, 75-4304,
75-4306.
Dear Ms. Brown:
You indicate that the mayor and city council of Manchester have
requested you to inquire of this office regarding several
matters concerning the officers of such city. It is our
understanding that Manchester is a city of the third class,
having a mayor-council form of government.
First, you have inquired whether "two members of the same family"
may serve on the city council at the same time. We are unaware
of any statutory prohibition against persons who are related
concurrently serving as members of the governing body of a
third class city having a mayor-council form of government. K.S.A.
15-209 prescribes the qualifications of the elected officers in
such a city, requiring only that they be qualified electors
of such city. Accordingly, since we know of no other legal
principle that would preclude relatives being members of the
same municipal governing body, we are of the opinion that,
as long as such persons are otherwise qualified, persons who
are related may concurrently serve as members of Manchester's
governing body.
A similar response is required for your second question as
to whether it is legally permissible for a member of Manchester's
city council to be related to the city clerk of such city.
Pursuant to K.S.A. 15-204, the city clerk is an appointive
officer of a third class city having the mayor-council form
of government, and the qualifications thereof also are specified
in K.S.A. 15-209, being only that appointive officers must be
qualified electors of the city. Exceptions are made for certain
of the city's appointive officers, but such exceptions are not
pertinent here.
The statutes governing third class cities with a mayor-council
form of government do not contain a provision similar to K.S.A.
13-2903, which disqualifies relatives of the mayor or any
commissioner in first class cities having the commission form
of government from holding any city office during the mayor's or
commissioner's term of office. Thus, absent any similar
statutory prohibition applicable to the situation you have
posed, and being unaware of any other principle of law precluding
such officeholding, it is our opinion that a person related to
a member of Manchester's city council may hold the office of
city clerk in such city, if the person is otherwise qualified
to be appointed to the office.
Finally, you have inquired whether it is permissible for members
of the city council to charge the city an hourly wage for
maintenance work for the city, e.g., maintenance work on city
streets and water lines, since the city has no maintenance
employees.
Because we are not apprised of all the factual circumstances
surrounding your request, we cannot provide you with a definitive
response to your request. However, based on certain alternative
assumptions as to the pertinent facts, we can suggest several
possible answers to this inquiry.
Initially, we must assume that the city council has acquiesced
to the performance of these maintenance services by various
members of the council, thereby providing an adequate basis
for the city paying their claims for compensation. See K.S.A.
1980 Supp. 12-105a, 12-105b. From your statement of the facts,
it would appear that the city's acquiescence was accomplished
either through specific agreements or by virtue of employment
relationships.
Assuming that the maintenance work performed by these council
members is a contractual service, we believe the provisions of
K.S.A. 75-4304 are applicable. This statute provides:
"(a) No public officer or employee shall in
his or her capacity as such officer or employee,
make or participate in the making of a contract
with any person or business by which he or she
is employed or in whose business he or she has
a substantial interest, and no such person or
business shall enter into any contract where
any public officer or employee, acting in such
capacity, is a signatory to or a participant
in the making of such contract and is employed
by or has a substantial interest in such person
or business. A public officer or employee does
not make or participate in the making of a con-
tract if he or she abstains from any action in
regard to the contract.
"This section shall not apply to the following:
"(1) Contracts let after competitive bidding
has been advertised for by published notice; and
"(2) Contracts for property or services for
which the price or rate is fixed by law.
"(b) Any public officer or employee who is
convicted of violating this section shall forfeit
his or her office or employment."
The obvious purpose of this statute is to prevent self-dealing
contractual arrangements by public officers and employees. In
our judgment, any contractual arrangement by the city council
with any of its members to provide maintenance work for the city
could be subject to scrutiny under this section. That is, it
would appear that any such contract would be one in which the
council members in question would have a "substantial interest"
in a "business." These quoted terms are defined in K.S.A. 75-4301,
and we commend them to your attention. But, to avoid unduly
burdening this opinion, we will not quote them here, although
noting it would seem quite probable that performing contractual
maintenance services for the city would constitute a "business
interest" in which the respective council members involved would
have substantial interests.
Thus, based on that assumption, if council members who contract
with the city are to avoid the sanctions prescribed by K.S.A.
75-4304 (forfeiture of office) and 75-4306 (class A misdemeanor),
the contract must be one removed from the purview of K.S.A. 75-4304
by subsection (b) thereof, or such council members must not have
made or participated in the making of the contract. Please note,
in this regard, that the last sentence of K.S.A. 75-4304(a) states:
"A public officer or employee does not make or participate in
the making of a contract if he or she abstains from any action
in regard to the contract."
On the other hand, your reference to the "hourly wage" paid
to these council members for maintenance work suggests the
possibility that an employment relationship exists. In that
event, and if the City of Manchester provides compensation to
persons serving on its city council, we believe that the doctrine
of incompatibility of offices precludes service in the dual
capacity of officer and employee of the city.
There are two principal Kansas cases concerning the incompati-
bility of offices. In Abry v. Gray, 58 Kan. 148 (1897), the
Court adopted the essential language of 19 American and English
Encyclopedia of Law, 562, as follows:
"'The incompatibility which will operate to
vacate the first office must be something
more than the mere physical impossibility of
the performance of the duties of the two
offices by one person, and may be said to arise
where the nature and duties of the two offices
are such as to render it improper, from
considerations of public policy, for one person
to retain both.'"
Subsequently, in Dyche v. Davis, 92 Kan. 971 (1914), the Court
held:
"Offices are incompatible when the per-
formance of the duties of one in some way
interferes with the performance of the
duties of the other . . . . It is an
inconsistency in the functions of the two
offices." Id. at 977.
It is important to note, and pertinent to your inquiry, that
this common law principle is, for the most part, limited to
situations involving the simultaneous holding of two public
offices, as opposed to public positions. The general rule is
stated thusly:
"The prohibition against one person holding
more than one office at the same time is
referenced to offices as distinguished from
positions in public service that do not rise
to the dignity of office. It does not extend
to a position which is a mere agency or
employment." (Emphasis added.) 63 Am.Jur.2d
Public Officers and Employees §64 at 669, 670.
Although some jurisdictions have now enlarged this doctrine to
include both public offices and public employment without
restriction (see 70 A.L.R. 3rd 1188), the majority of states
follow the traditional rule. See 63 Am.Jur.2d Public Officers
and Employees §64, at 669, 670. While the Kansas Supreme Court
has for the most part adhered to the majority rule, in Dyche v.
Davis, supra, the Court applied the doctrine to a situation
where a public officer also held a position of public employ-
ment and the compensation for the public office and employment
were both payable from public funds. 92 Kan. at 977. Thus,
if council members do not receive compensation for service on
the city council we see no application of the doctrine enunciated
in Dyche v. Davis, supra. However, if council members are
compensated by the city for service in such capacity, an employment
relationship must be scrutinized in light of this common law
doctrine.
In reading together the previously cited Kansas cases, it is
apparent that the Kansas Supreme Court has determined that
incompatibility of offices requires more than a physical impossibility
to discharge the duties of both offices at the same time. There
must be an inconsistency in the functions of the two offices,
to the extent that a performance of the duties of one office
in some way interferes with the performance of the duties of
the other, thus making it improper, from a public policy stand-
point, for one person to retain both offices. This rule is
in accord with general authorities. In 89 A.L.R. 2d 632, it
is stated:
"It is to be found in the character of the
offices and their relation to each other,
in subordination of the one to the other,
and in the nature of the duties and functions
which attach to them and exist where the
performance of the duties of the one interferes
with the performance of the duties of the other.
The offices are generally considered incompatible
where such duties and functions are inherently
inconsistent and repugnant, so that because
of the contrariety and antagonism which would
result from the attempt of one person to dis-
charge faithfully, impartially, and efficiently
the duties of both offices, considerations of
public policy render it improper for an incumbent
to retain both." (Citations omitted.) Id. at 633.
Further, general authorities provide assistance in determining
when the nature and duties of two offices are inconsistent, so
as to render them incompatible. For example:
"[A] conflict of interest exists where
one office is subordinate to the other, and
subject in some degree to the supervisory
power of its incumbent, or where the incumbent
of one of the offices has the power of appoint-
ment as to the other office, or has the power
to remove the incumbent of the other to punish
the other. Furthermore, a conflict of interest
may be demonstrated by the power to regulate
the compensation of the other, or to audit
his accounts." 67 C.J.S. Officers §27.
With these principles in mind, we would advise that our assumed
employment relationship would be contrary to the doctrine of
incompatibility of offices. It would place the council members
in question in the position of supervising their own work as
employees, as well as passing upon the amount of compensation
to be paid for such work, a situation clearly precluding these
individuals from faithfully and impartially discharging the
functions and duties of both positions.
Although incomplete knowledge of the facts regarding your third
question has precluded a specific response, we trust that the
foregoing legal considerations can be readily applied to the
factual situation with which you are confronted.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
AttorneyGeneralofKansas
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:jm

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