Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-085

1981-085Kanag

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April 9, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81-85
Mr. Dennis D. Roth
Buckles, Roth & Boyce
Attorneys at Law
101 South 4th, P.O. Box 206
Burlington, Kansas 66839
Re: Cities and Municipalities--Refuse Collection and
Disposal--Ordinance Describing Duties; Constitutionality
of Exclusive Privilege
Synopsis: A municipal ordinance, enacted pursuant to the
provisions of K.S.A. 12-2103, may prohibit persons
other than the municipal contractor from making
garbage collections, and such an ordinance is in
all respects constitutional. The application and
enforceability of such an ordinance against a currently
licensed garbage collector, however, during the term
of the collector's unexpired license, depends upon
the reasonableness of the ordinance. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 12-2102, 12-2103.
*
Dear Mr. Roth:
You request our interpretation of K.S.A. 12-2103. Specifically,
you pose several questions regarding the granting of an exclusive
right to collect and dispose of refuse by the city of Burlington,
Kansas. Your letter sets forth the following facts:
"On November 5, 1980, Don Attebury, d/b/a Coffey
County Sanitation (hereinafter 'Attebury'),
entered into a contract for collection and
disposal of refuse pursuant to K.S.A. 12-2102.
The contract is annexed hereto as Exhibit 'A'.
On November 19, 1980, the city council passed
Ordinance No. 289, granting Attebury the exclusive
right to collect and dispose of garbage within
the city. That ordinance was duly published
November 21, 1980, and is annexed hereto as
Exhibit 'B'.
"Before the city entered into the contract with
Attebury and passed the ordinance, the city had
one other licensed sanitation service, Fred Effinger,
d/b/a Effinger Sanitation Service (hereinafter
"Effinger'). Effinger purchased a license to do
'business from the city on October 14, 1980 pursuant
to Chapter 7, Article 8 of Burlington's Revised
Ordinances, a copy of which is annexed as Exhibit
'C'. The license is good for one year. Effinger
began to solicit for customers and had a certain
number of customers by the time that Ordinance
No. 289 became effective.
"Since the effective date of Ordinance No. 289,
Effinger has continued to solicit new customers
and Attebury has asked the City to prevent this by
virtue of the contract and Ordinance No. 289."
Section 3 of Ordinance No. 289 provides as follows:
"Section 3. That Attebury's right to collect
refuse within the City of Burlington and disposal
of the same is exclusive during the term of the
contract and any other persons, companies, cor-
porations, individuals or entities of any nature
are prohibited from making collections of refuse
within the City of Burlington or disposing of the
same."
Article 8 of Burlington's Revised Ordinances, relating to garbage
and trash collection, is attached hereto as Appendix "A."
You first inquire as to whether "the city can grant an exclusive
privilege to collect and dispose of refuse under the applicable
statutes." K.S.A. 12-2102 provides, in part, that any city may
provide for the collection and disposal of garbage or trash "by
contract." K.S.A. 12-2103 prescribes that an ordinance shall be
passed when a city makes provision for the collection and disposal
of garbage by contract, and specifies that the city may prohibit
persons other than the contractor from making collections. The
great weight of authority, both in this state and elsewhere, is
that a municipality may regulate the removal of garbage within
its limits by contracting with private removal enterprises and
in so doing grant such enterprises an exclusive license or privilege.
O'Neal v. Harrison, 96 Kan. 339 (1915); Zerr v. Tilton, 224 Kan.
394, 398 (1978); 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations, Etc., §462;
83 A.L.R.2d 801. Hence, in our judgment, the prohibition authorized
by K.S.A. 12-2103 is constitutional and enforceable, and a munic-
ipality may grant an "exclusive privilege" to remove garbage
thereunder.
You next inquire whether the contract and ordinance adopted by the
city of Burlington are "valid manifestations" of the power to grant
an exclusive privilege, and whether Effinger retains any right
to serve his current customers or solicit new business. It should
initially be noted that the license issued to Effinger by the
City of Burlington creates no contractual or property right. In
51 Am.Jur.2d Licenses and Permits, §18, the applicable principle
is stated as follows:
"Under the theory that a license is not a
contract between the sovereignty and the licensee,
and is not property in any constitutional sense,
that it does not confer a vested, permanent, or
absolute right, but only a personal privilege, it
has generally been held that the constitutional
inhibition as to the impairment of the obligation
of contracts does not extend to licenses."
Further, the granting of a license to engage in any activity does
not, in itself, invest the licensee with an absolute right to
continue in the activity. 51 Am.Jur.2d Licenses and Permits, §14.
Nor does the granting of an exclusive right to collect and dispose
of refuse violate constitutional due process or equal protection.
State ex rel. Moock v. Cincinnati, 166 N.E. 583 (Ohio, 1929);
Burns v. Enid, 217 P.1038 (Okla., 1923); 83 A.L.R.2d 815. Thus,
challenges to ordinances prohibiting refuse collection by persons
other than the city contractor have not, in most instances, been
upheld when based upon the above-cited grounds.
Although, as indicated above, a municipality may exercise broad
authority in regulating the collection and disposal of refuse,
such authority is subject to certain constraints. In the O'Neal
case, supra at 342, the court stated as follows regarding municipal
ordinances granting an exclusive privilege to remove garbage:
"The reasonableness of the course pursued, in
view of all the circumstances, and the degree
of inconvenience resulting to individuals, may
be taken into account. But where as in this
case the matter is one of great public importance,
which the legislature has entrusted to the action
of local authorities--no doubt wisely, because
of the differences in local conditions--
the action of the city commission becomes
entitled to consideration almost equal to that
accorded to a statute, and should not be
interfered with except upon grounds the force
of which is reasonably free from doubt."
Thus, applying the above-cited principle to the questions you
have posed, we believe a court would enforce the prohibition set
forth in Ordinance No. 289 unless it was patently unreasonable in
view of all the circumstances. One of the circumstances which
would be taken into account, at least during the term of the
Effinger license, is the fact that the city issued said license
only one month prior to adopting the prohibition set forth in
Section 3 of Ordinance No. 239. Effinger's right to serve his
current customers, or solicit new business, during the term of
his license, depends upon whether the prohibition adopted by the
city is reasonable. Since the reasonableness of the city's action
may depend upon disputed factual issues which may be decided only
upon trial before a court, we are unable to render a more defin-
itive opinion as to what rights, if any, Mr. Effinger may have
during the term of his license.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:TRH:jm

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