Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-083

1981-083Kanag

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April 9, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81- 83
The Honorable Paul Hess, Chairman
Senate Committee on Ways and Means
State Capitol, Room 123-S
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: State Departments; Public Officers, Employees --
Leases of Real Property by State Agencies --
Powers of Legislature
Synopsis: If enacted, the proposal under consideration by
the Senate Committee on Ways and Means that would
statutorily require a legislative committee to
approve certain leases of real property by state
agencies would constitute a significant interfer-
ence with the operations of the executive depart-
ment in an area that is essentially executive in
character, thereby violating the separation of
powers doctrine. However, the legislature may
exert control over the lease of office space by
state agencies through appropriations, and the
conditions, limitations and qualifications im-
posed on them, and through the enactment of sub-
stantive laws prescribing such restrictions on
state agencies' powers in this regard as the
legislature deems necessary and appropriate.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 75-3025, K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
75-3739, 75-3765, 75-3766, 75-5411.
Dear Senator Hess:
As chairman of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means you
have requested, on its behalf, our opinion as to action
comtemplated by the committee. You advise that the committee
"is considering introduction of a bill which would prescribe
•that any state agency contract for the lease of office space,
buildings, or land for a term of more than ten years or for
a term which is renewable for more than ten years or which
involves an option for purchase shall first be approved by
the Joint Committee on State Building Construction, but that
this approval remain subject to legislative appropriations."
You further indicate that the constitutionality of the fore-
going proposal has been questioned, and you have requested our
opinion in this regard.
It would appear that the constitutional principle involved in
your inquiry is that of separation of powers, which is an
issue that has been considered quite extensively by our Supreme
Court on several occasions in recent years. In State, ex rel.
v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285 (1976), the Court discussed the his-
tory and purpose of the doctrine, as follows:
"Like the Constitution of the United States,
the Constitution of Kansas contains no express
provision requiring the separation of powers,
but all decisions of this court have taken for
granted the constitutional doctrine of separa-
tion of powers between the three departments
of the state government -- legislative, execu-
tive and judicial. The separation of powers
doctrine was designed to avoid a dangerous
concentration of power and to allow the respec-
tive powers to be assigned to the department
most fitted to exercise them. (Van Sickle v.
Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 446, 511 P.2d 223.)"
Id. at 287.
Subsequently, the Court expressed its opinion that strict
application of the doctrine is impossible:
"In our judgment a strict application of the
separation of powers doctrine is inappropriate
today in a complex state government where ad-
ministrative agencies exercise many types of
power including legislative, executive, and
judicial powers often blended together in the
same administrative agency. The courts today
have come to recognize that the political
philosophers who developed the theory of separa-
tion of powers did not have any concept of the
complexities of government as it exists. today.
Under our system of government the absolute
independence of the departments and the com-
plete separation of powers is impracticable.
We must maintain in our political system suffi-
cient flexibility to experiment and to seek new
methods of improving governmental efficiency.
At the same time we must not lose sight of the
ever-existing danger of unchecked power and the
concentration of power in the hands of a single
person or group which the separation of powers
doctrine was designed to prevent." Id. at
288, 289.
In this case, the Court summarized the general principles of
law necessary to a consideration of the separation of powers
doctrine where the executive and legislative branches of
state government are involved. However, we find the follow-
ing statement of these principles by Justice Holmes in State v.
Greenlee, 228 Kan. 712 (1980), to be more appropriate, since
it also includes the principles developed in State, ex rel., v.
Bennett, supra:
"There have been a number of cases in Kansas
dealing with the separation of powers and in
them the following general principles are
established:
"(1) A statute is presumed to be consti-
tutional. All doubts must be resolved in
favor of its validity, and before a sta-
tute may be stricken down, it must clearly
appear the statute violates the constitu-
tion. Leek v. Theis, 217 Kan. 784.
"(2) When a statute is challenged under
the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers, the court must search for a
usurpation by one department of the powers
of another department on the specific
facts and circumstances presented. Leek
v. Theis, 217 Kan. at 785; State, ex rel.,
v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652, 308 P.2d 537
(1957).
"(3) A usurpation of powers exists when
there is a significant interference by one
department with operations of another de-
parment. State, ex rel., v. Bennett, 219
Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786 (1976).
"(4) In determining whether or not a
usurpation of powers exists a court should
consider (a) the essential nature of the
power being exercised; (b) the degree of
control by one department over another;
(c) the objective sought to be attained
by the legislature; and (d) the practical
result of the blending of powers as shown
by actual experience over a period of
time. State, ex rel., v. Bennett, 219 Kan.
285." 228 Kan. at 716.
It is clear, therefore, that the validity of the proposal
before your committee depends on whether it constitutes a
usurpation of the powers of the executive department. That
is, it must be determined whether the involvement of the
legislature's Joint Committee on State Building Construction
in the long-term leasing of office space by agencies of the
executive department constitutes "a significant interference"
with the operations of that department. Such determination
can be achieved by measuring the contemplated action against
the considerations stated in State, ex rel., v. Bennett, supra,
as the same are summarized above in paragraph (4) of the excerpt
from State v. Greenlee, supra.
The first factor to be considered "is the essential nature
of the power being exercised. Is the power exclusively exec-
utive or legislative or is it a blend of the two?" State,
ex rel., v. Bennett, supra at 290. Here, the power in
question is the acquisition of office space by state agencies.
In our judgment, this is a purely executive or administrative
power that has traditionally been exercised by the executive
department.
Persuasive to our conclusion is State, ex rel., v. State Office
Building Commission, 185 Kan. 563 (1959), where the Court had
under consideration a seven-member commission whose membership
was composed entirely of legislators appointed by the governor.
The powers of this commission were discussed by the Court as
follows:
"The powers of the defendant commission are
set out in the act as amended and are to be
found in the General Statutes and the Supple-
ment thereto following section 75-3601. Plain-
tiff's brief has summarized these powers as
follows:
"'1. To construct and equip a state office
building on the tract now occupied by that
structure. 2. To sue and be sued and to make
all contracts necessary and convenient for the
accomplishment of its authorized purposes and
and for the carrying on of its business. 3. To
accept gifts and grants and to contract with
the federal agencies in connection therewith.
4. To borrow money and issue evidences of
indebtedness in the name of the state of Kansas,
and to secure payment thereof or of any or all
obligations of the Commission by pledging all
or any of its revenues. 5. To select and de-
termine the number of its employees and their
compensation and duties. 6. To permit the use
of the office building by any state agency
selected by the Commission; and to fix and
charge such rentals therefor as it may deter-
mine to be necessary to pay the expenses of the
Commission, the construction and equipment of
the building and payment of the principal and
interest on its obligations allocable to such
building. 7. To rent unoccupied space in said
building to others on month to month leases.
8. To acquire a parking lot and improving the
same from the state office building fund, raze
buildings on said property, regulate parking on
said lot, fix and collect charges therefor,
and to make rules for the removal and impound-
ment of vehicles unlawfully parked thereon.
9. To take title to and hold the parking lot
real estate and to take title to and hold under
and as against the state the interest of the
state to the office building site.'" (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 565, 566.
In concluding that the commission's powers were executive in
nature, the Court relied upon a well-accepted encyclopedic
statement as to the distinction between legislative and exec-
utive powers:
"A standard and often used definition of leg-
islative power is found in 16 C.J.S. 545, §130:
"'As a general rule, under constitutional prin-
ciples with respect to the division of powers,
legislative power as distinguished from execu-
tive power is the authority to make laws, but
not to enforce them.'" Id. at 566.
Thus, it is clear that the legislative branch of government
has the power to make laws, while the executive branch has
the responsibility to enforce or execute the laws so enacted.
In our view, the provision of office space for state agencies
established by laws duly enacted by the legislature is a
power necessary to the implementation of such laws, and a
review of existing statutory provisions reflects that this
power has traditionally been exercised by the executive branch.
For example, subsection (8) of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 75-3739
provides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided
by law, no state agency shall enter into any lease of real
property without the prior approval of the secretary of
administration." This section also grants to the secretary
of administration the power to "approve, modify and approve
or reject" any state agency's proposed lease. Further, pur-
suant to K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 75-3765, the secretary of admin-
istration is authorized to "assign space and facilities in
all state owned or operated property or buildings" in Shawnee
County, with certain exceptions, and is authorized to
"determine, fix and establish a system of rental charges"
for such space and facilities. Also of note are the provisions
of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 75-3766, which state:
"Any state agency assigned office space in the
state office building by the secretary of
administration is hereby authorized to enter
into agreements with the secretary of admin-
istration for the use and occupancy of such
space, such rental to be paid by such state
agency from any available funds or moneys
authorized to be spent by such state agency."
When these statutory provisions are considered in conjunction
with the general contractual authority conferred on most
state agencies and, in some cases, the specific power given
particular state agencies to lease property, it is apparent
that the executive rather than legislative nature of the
power to lease office space for state agencies has been
recognized by legislative enactments. Based on the foregoing,
it is our opinion that the leasing of office space by state
agencies is a governmental function that is essentially exec-
utive in nature.
Having established the executive character of this govern-
mental function, it is necessary to consider the additional
factors prescribed by the Court in State, ex rel., v. Bennett,
supra, in order to determine whether the committee's pro-
posal would effect a "significant interference" by the leg-
islature with the executive department.
"A second factor is the degree of control by the legislative
department in the exercise of the power. Is there a coercive
influence or a mere cooperative venture?" State, ex rel., v.
Bennett, supra at 290. As you have described the proposed
legislation, it does not appear to us that the legislature
is intended to be a mere cooperative participant in the
process of entering into long-term leases for office space
by state agencies. Rather, the proposed legislation would
vest absolute control over this process in the legislature.
By requiring approval of all such leases by the Joint Com
mittee on State Building Construction, it is our opinion
that the legislative branch would exert "a coercive influ-
ence" over the executive department's exercise of its right-
ful authority.
A third consideration
"is the nature of the objective sought to be
attained by the legislature. Is the intent
of the legislature to cooperate with the
executive by furnishing some special exper-
tise of one or more of its members or is the
objective of the legislature obviously one of
establishing its superiority over the execu-
tive department in an area essentially execu-
tive in nature?" Id.
Applying these considerations to the subject of your inquiry
we must conclude that the obvious purpose of the proposal is
to establish the legislature's superiority over the execu-
tive department in an area we have previously found to be
"essentially executive in nature." While we have no doubt
as to the particular expertise of the Joint Committee on
State Building Construction, or of its individual members,
regarding the acquisition of space and facilities for the
various state agencies, the manner in which such expertise
would be brought to bear upon this matter extends far beyond
an effort to cooperate with the executive department. The
practical effect of the proposal being considered by your
committee would, in fact, usurp the executive department's
prerogatives.
It should be noted that the proposal under consideration is
quite distinct from other existing statutory procedures pro-
viding for legislative involvement in the acquisition of
space and facilities for state agencies. For example,
K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 75-5411 provides in part:
"(a) The secretary of administration shall
issue monthly reports of progress and advise,
consult with and cooperate with the joint
committee on state building construction.
• • •
"(c) No change order or change in plans involv-
ing costs of twenty-five thousand dollars
($25,000) or more, and no change in the pro-
posed use of any new or remodeled building
shall be authorized or approved by the secre-
tary of administration without having first
advised and consulted with' the joint committee
on state building construction." (Emphasis
added.)
In our view, the procedure outlined in this statute represents
a cooperative venture between the legislative and executive
departments in the accomplishment of an apparent executive
department function. It provides for the furnishing of the
joint committee's special expertise without encroaching upon
the executive department's prerogatives, and it is quite
distinguishable from the proposal to vest in the joint commit-
tee the ultimate control over long-term leases of office space
for state agencies. By withholding approval of any such
lease, the joint committee can negate the exercise of the
executive department's legitimate powers regarding the exe-
cution of such leases.
The fourth and final factor suggested in State, ex rel., v.
Bennett, supra, for evaluating a legislative enactment's
adherence to the separation of powers doctrine does not appear
to be applicable to the situation you have described. The
Court suggests that consideration should be given to "the
practical result of the blending of powers as shown by actual
experience over a period of time where such evidence is avail-
able." Id. at 290, 291. Obviously, evidence of actual exper-
ience is not available in this instance.
Therefore, in light of the relevant factors suggested by the
Court for determining conformity to the separation of powers
doctrine, it is our opinion that the proposal under consi-
deration by the Senate Ways and Means Committee violates
this doctrine. If enacted, the requirement of this proposal
that there be obtained the Joint Committee on State Building
Construction's prior approval of any lease of office space, a
building or land for a term of more than ten years or for
a term renewable for more than ten years, or which contains
an option to purchase, would, in our judgment, constitute
a "significant interference" with the operations of the
executive department in an area that is essentially executive
in nature.
Before concluding, it should be noted that the legislature is
not without recourse to maintain fiscal control over long-term
contractual commitments by state agencies. In this connection,
we note K.S.A. 75-3025, which provides, in part:
"Any officer or agent of the state who shall
be empowered to expend any public moneys, or
to direct such expenditures, is hereby prohi-
bited from making any contract for the erec-
tion or repair of any building, or for any
other purpose, whereby the expenditure of any
greater sum of money shall be contemplated,
agreed to, or required, than is expressly
authorized by law . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing provisions are in practical effect the state's
equivalent of the cash basis law, which is applicable to
local units of government. By its terms, contracts requiring
the payment of money in excess of appropriations made for
such purpose are prohibited. Thus, any lease agreement pro-
viding office space to a state agency that contemplates a term
longer than the period in which appropriated moneys have
been made available for such purpose would be prohibited by
75-3025, unless such agreement is made contingent upon the
appropriation of moneys necessary to carry out the agreement.
This is standard procedure in all state contracts.
The Department of Administration requires its form DA-146a,
Contractual Provisions Attachment, to be incorporated in and
made a part of state contracts, either expressly or by refer-
ence. Paragraph 3 of that form provides a procedure whereby
the contract in which such form, has been incorporated is
terminated if the legislature fails to appropriate suffici-
ent moneys "to continue the function performed in the agree-
ment." Not only does this provision achieve compliance with
K.S.A. 75-3025, but it also recognizes the fundamental power
of the legislature to control expenditure of public funds,
which was addressed in State, ex rel., v. Bennett, 222 Kan.
12 (1977), as follows:
"As pointed out in State, ex rel., (Anderson)
v. Fadely, supra, except as is restricted by
the constitution, the legislature has the
exclusive power to direct how, when and for
what purpose the public funds shall be applied
in carrying out the objects of the state
government." Id. at 18, 19.
Therefore, since the duration of any such lease agreement is
contingent upon the extent of appropriations made for such
purpose, it is clear that the legislature has effective
control over such leases through the appropriation process.
In addition to controlling the amount of funds available,
the legislature may impose conditions, limitations or quali-
fications upon the expenditure of moneys appropriated to a
state agency, so as to ensure that public funds will not be
expended in contradiction of the will and purpose of the
legislature. Finally, even though it is stating the obvious,
the legislature may enact substantive laws restricting the
authority of state agencies to lease real property.
Accordingly, although the proposal before your Committee
would be a direct intrusion on the executive department's
operations, the legislature may exert control over the
_lease of office space by state agencies through appropria-
tions, and the conditions, limitations and qualifications
imposed on them, and through the enactment of substantive
laws prescribing such restrictions on state agencies'
powers in this regard as the legislature deems necessary
and appropriate.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
W. Rdb4'rt Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:hle

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