Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-066

1981-066Kanag

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

March 10, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81-66
The Honorable Joe Warren
State Senator, Thirty-Second District
State Capitol, Room 136-N
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Corporations -- Corporate Instruments -- Execution
of Deeds or Other Instruments of Conveyance
Synopsis: The statutory requirements for the execution of
deeds and other instruments for the conveyance
of a corporation's real property or an interest
therein are prescribed by K.S.A. 17-6003(g).
As long as there is compliance with such require-
ments, provisions in the corporation's bylaws
requiring execution of such instruments by officers
of the corporation in addition to those specified in
said statute are permissible. However, failure to
comply with these bylaw requirements does not, as
a general rule, affect the validity of a conveyance
made in compliance with the statutory requirements.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 17-6003, K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
17-6009, G.S. 1868, ch. 23, §38.
*
Dear Senator Warren:
You have inquired as to the conveyance of lands or interests
therein by corporations. Specifically, you are interested in
knowing the legal requirements regarding the corporate officers
who must execute such conveyances.
Relevant to your inquiry are the following provisions of
subsection (g) of K.S.A. 17-6003:
"Whenever any corporation shall convey any
lands or interests therein by deed or other
appropriate instrument of conveyance, such
deed or instrument shall be executed on behalf
of the corporation by the president, vice-
president or presiding member or trustee of
said corporation; and such deed or instrument,
when acknowledged by such officer to be the
act of the corporation, or proved in the same -
manner provided for other conveyances of lands,
may be recorded in like manner and with the same
effect as other deeds . . . . Corporations like-
wise shall have power to convey by an agent or
attorney so authorized under letter of attor-
ney or other instrument containing a power to
convey real estate or any interest therein,
which power of attorney shall be executed by
the corporation in the same manner as herein
provided for the execution of deeds or other
instruments of conveyance."
From the foregoing, it is apparent that a deed or other instru-
ment of conveyance, or a power of attorney authorizing the
execution of either, must be executed and acknowledged on behalf
of a corporation by one of the specified corporate officers, viz.,
the president, a vice-president or the presiding member or
trustee.
Although K.S.A. 17-6003(g) provides a direct response to your
specific question, it is apparent from our conversation regard-
ing this matter that there are two ancillary issues of concern
to you. One issue arises from the situation where the grantee
under a deed or other instrument of conveyance, wherein a corpora-
tion is the grantor, requests that such deed or instrument be
executed on behalf of the corporation by a corporate officer
or officers in addition to those specified in K.S.A. 17-6003(g).
While the grantee in this situation might refuse to enter into
the transactions unless the deed or instrument is executed by
the additional officers of the corporation, we are aware of no
legal authority which would compel the corporation's acquiescence
to the grantee's demands. Thus, in our judgment, this is
strictly a matter to be resolved by agreement of the parties.
The second issue arises from the situation where a deed or
instrument of conveyance is executed on behalf of a corporation
in compliance with K.S.A. 17-6003(g), but does not comply with
additional requirements imposed by said corporation's bylaws
for the execution of corporate instruments, in general, or
for the execution of deeds and other instruments of conveyance,
in particular. The question that arises is whether a deed or
instrument of conveyance executed on behalf of corporation
under these circumstances is valid.
In addressing this issue, we note initially that we are aware
of no Kansas case specifically construing subsection (g) of
K.S.A. 17-6003. Moreover, even though the provisions of this
subsection had their origin in Section 38 of Chapter 23 of the
General Statutes of 1868, there also is a dearth of cases
construing these provisions prior to their codification in
17-6003. However, of the few instances in which these pro-
visions have been judicially construed, we note that in Allen
v. Brown, 6 Kan. App. 704 (1897), the court stated that
"authorities are agreed that in making conveyances of real
estate corporations must follow the method laid down in the
statute." Id. at 706. To the same effect is Detmer v. Salinger,
101 Kan. 701, 705 (1917).
As we read these cases, they require that the statutory require-
ments must be fulfilled, but we do . not construe them as precluding
additional requirements being imposed by the bylaws. Bylaws,
after all, merely provide the groundrules for the internal
management of the corporation. As prescribed by K.S.A. 1980
Supp. 17-6009(b), a corporation's "bylaws may contain any pro-
vision, not inconsistent with law or with the articles of
incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation,
the conduct of its affairs, and its rights and powers or the
rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or
employees." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, where the bylaws of a corporation require that deeds or
other instruments conveying real property owned by the corporation,
or any interest therein, be executed by officers of the
corporation in addition to those specified by K.S.A. 17-6003(g),
it may be questioned whether such bylaw requirements are "incon-
sistent" with the statutory requirements regarding the execution
of such instruments. In our judgment, however, no such incon-
sistency obtains. As long ad these instruments are executed by
one of the officers specified in 17-6003(g), and in the manner
prescribed therein, these statutory requirements have been
fulfilled, and the fact that additional officers subscribe
such instruments does not operate in contradiction thereof.
Conversely, we do not believe that, as a general rule, failure
to satisfy these bylaw provisions, as long as there is compliance
with the statute, impairs the validity of the conveyance. Here,
we have formed our opinion without benefit of pertinent Kansas
case law, but have relied upon decisions from other jurisdictions.
The general rule in the majority of jurisdictions is that the
bylaws of a corporation affect only the members of that corpora-
tion and its directors and those third persons who, in dealing with
the corporation, have actual knowledge or are legally bound to
take notice of the bylaws of that corporation. Bankers Trust Co.
v. McCloy, 109 Ark. 160, 159 S.W. 205 (1913); Iowa-Missouri Grain
Co. v. Powers, 198 Iowa 208, 210, 196 N.W. 979, 33 A.L.R. 1268
(1923); Bank of Holly Springs v. Pinson, 58 Miss. 421, 435 (1880).
In Dempster Mfg. Co. v. Downs, 126 Iowa 80, 101 N.W. 735 (1904),
the court stated that bylaws are imposed for the management and
control of the corporate affairs and are not usually intended
for strangers who do not subject themselves to their influence.
101 N.W. at 735, 736. The court in First National Bank v. Briggs,
69 Vt. 12, 37 A. 231 (1894) carried this concept further by
saying: "Strangers are not bound to know bylaws which are
merely provisions for the government of a corporation, and
notice of them will not be presumed." 37 A. at 234.
Consequently, a third person dealing with the corporation without
knowledge of its bylaws cannot be legally bound by them. Ashley
Wire Cc. 7. Illinois Steel Co., 164 Ill. 149, 157, 45 N.E.
410 (1896); Uline Loan Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 45 S.D. 81, 185 N.W.
1012, 1012, 27 A.L.R. 585 (1921); Kelly, Glover & Vale, Inc. v.
Heitman, 220 Ind. 625, 635, 44 N.E. 2d 981 (1942); Bank of
Holly Springs v. Pinson, 58 Miss. 421, 436, 38 AM Rep. 330 (1880).
Although there is some authority to the contrary, this statement
has been given force in most courts as the general rule. With
respect to the instant situation, the application of this rule
in two cases are worthy of note. In American Steel Export Co.,
Inc. v. White and Associates, Inc., 224 App. Div. 659, 229 N.Y.S.
41 (1928), the rule was applied thusly:
"Where a bylaw of a corporation requires spe-
cific authorization of indorsements by its
officers, but such bylaw has not been brought
to the attention of one dealing with the
officers, who act within the scope of their
authority in regard to the business of the
corporation in making indorsements, such
person is not affected by such bylaw."
229 N.Y.S. at 42.
Also, we believe the following statement of the South Dakota
Supreme Court is relevant:
"Bylaws limiting the authority of an officer
to enter into a contract for the sale of land
are not binding upon a purchaser dealing with
such corporate officer in ignorance of the
officer's apparent authority." Uline Loan Co.
v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 185 N.W. at 1012.
Finally, it should be noted that these principles have been
qualified in some jurisdictions, where the courts have found
that the grantee or purchaser of corporate property had actual
knowledge of the bylaws requirements or was charged by law with
knowledge thereof. See, e.g., Parent v. Bank of Washington, 10
Pet. 596, 9 L. Ed. 547, 614 (1836). However, without benefit of
pertinent Kansas case law, we are unable to speculate whether
Kansas courts would apply similar principles in considering the
validity of transactions conveying corporate property.
Therefore, based on these authorities, it is our opinion that
third persons dealing with a corporation as strangers and at
arm's length are unaffected by the corporation's bylaws, unless
such persons are charged by law with knowledge thereof. Thus,
as long as there has been compliance with the requirements of
K.S.A. 17-6003(g), the failure to comply with a corporation's
bylaws regarding the execution of deeds or other instruments
conveying the corporation's real property, or an interest therein,
does not affect the validity of such conveyance.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN AttornyGeneralofKansas
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:hle

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.