Reggie Deshawn Horton v. State of Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-3307 | October 20, 2026 	Page 1 of 9
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in
reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Reggie Deshawn Horton,
Appellant-Defendant,
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff.
October 20, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-3307
Appeal from the
Marion Superior Court
The Honorable
Jeffrey L. Marchal, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49D31-2407-MR-19848

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-3307 | October 20, 2026 	Page 2 of 9
Memorandum Decision by Senior Judge Crone
Judges Mathias and Felix concur.
Crone, Senior Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] 	Reggie Deshawn Horton appeals from his convictions of murder and unlawful
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, arguing that his convictions
violate double jeopardy principles. Concluding that Horton’s convictions do
not constitute double jeopardy, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] 	On July 8, 2024, Horton, his girlfriend Kyree Hayes, and his cousin Moriah
Robinson consumed alcohol and were swimming in the pool at the Lawrence
Landing Apartment complex. Later, Horton and the two women left the pool
and got into Robinson’s car. Dartanian Cole bumped the car as he walked by,
and he and Robinson exchanged words.
[3] 	As Cole continued walking, Robinson drove up next to him and exited her car.
The verbal exchange continued, and Robinson grabbed Cole’s shirt. Horton
approached the man and attempted to punch him but missed. Horton then
fired a gun several times, hitting Cole. Horton and the women fled in
Robinson’s car. Cole died from a gunshot wound to his chest.

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[4] 	The State charged Horton with murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by
a serious violent felon (UPFSVF), a Level 4 felony. Horton was tried by a jury
in three phases. During the first phase, the jury was asked to determine
whether Horton murdered Cole. The jury returned a guilty verdict for the
charge of murder, and the court proceeded with phase two in which the jury
was asked to determine whether Horton knowingly possessed a firearm after
having been convicted previously of a serious violent felony. The jury also
found Horton guilty in phase two. In the third and final phase of Horton’s trial,
the jury was asked to determine whether Horton was a habitual offender. The
jury adjudged Horton a habitual offender, and the court sentenced him to an
aggregate term of eighty-five years. Horton appeals his convictions of murder
and UPFSVF.
Discussion and Decision
[5] 	Horton argues that his convictions constitute double jeopardy because the
offense of UPFSVF is inherently included in the offense of murder. Appellant’s
Br. pp. 11-13. Alternatively, Horton contends that a double jeopardy violation
has occurred because the charging information is ambiguous as to whether the
UPFSVF charge may have been factually included in the murder charge. Id. at
13-18. We review de novo claims of a double jeopardy violation. Gaunt v.
State, 209 N.E.3d 463, 465 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.
[6] 	Horton’s substantive double jeopardy claim is governed by our Supreme
Court’s decision in Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020), as subsequently

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clarified by A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060 (Ind. 2024). The analysis under
Wadle consists of three steps, beginning with the statutory language of the
offenses. “If the language of either statute clearly permits multiple punishment,
either expressly or by unmistakable implication, the court’s inquiry comes to an
end and there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy.” Wadle, 151
N.E.3d at 248 (footnote omitted).
[7] 	Murder is established by proof that a person knowingly or intentionally killed
another human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (2018). UPFSVF is established
by proof that a serious violent felon knowingly or intentionally possessed a
firearm. Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c) (2023). The parties agree that these statutes
do not clearly permit multiple punishment and that our analysis does not end at
this step. Appellant’s Br. p. 11; Appellee’s Br. p. 8. We agree with that
conclusion.
[8] 	Under the second step, we apply our state’s included-offense statutes to
determine statutory intent. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. Indiana Code section
35-38-1-6 (1983) forbids a trial court from entering judgment of conviction and
sentence for both an offense and an included offense. The term “included
offense” is defined as an offense that:
(1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less
than all the material elements required to establish the
commission of the offense charged;
(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an
offense otherwise included therein; or

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(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less
serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or
public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to
establish its commission.
Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168 (2012). “If neither offense is an included offense of
the other (either inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double
jeopardy[,]” and the analysis ends. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. “But if one
offense is included in the other, the court must proceed to Step 3.” A.W., 229
N.E.3d at 1067. Accordingly, we begin by assessing whether one offense is
inherently included in the other, and then we evaluate whether one offense is
included in the other as charged.
[9] 	To constitute an inherently included offense, the offense must fit within one of
the three enumerated subsections of Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-168. Id.
Horton alleges that the offense of UPFSVF is inherently included in the offense
of murder under subsection (3). Appellant’s Br. p. 12. He reasons that the
offense of UPFSVF poses a risk of harm to the public interests of personal
safety and community peace, while the offense of murder creates the most
serious harm to the same public interests. Id.
[10] 	Subsection (3), however, requires that the offenses differ only in that one creates
a less serious harm or risk of harm than the other. See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168(3).
A conviction for murder does not require SVF status, and a conviction for
UPFSVF does not require the killing of another person. In other words, these
offenses differ in ways that involve more than just the level of the risk of harm.

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Therefore, the offense of UPFSVF is not inherently included in the offense of
murder.
[11] 	Next, we determine whether the offense of UPFSVF is included in the offense
of murder as charged. The concept that an offense is an included offense of the
other “as charged” is synonymous under Wadle with an offense being “factually
included” in another offense. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067. Our inquiry on this
topic is limited to only the facts on the face of the charging instrument. Id. And
we consider whether “‘the charging instrument alleges that the means used to
commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser
included offense.’” Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 251 n.30). Where
ambiguities exist in a charging information concerning whether one offense is
factually included in another, courts must construe the ambiguities in the
defendant’s favor and find a presumptive double jeopardy violation at step 2.
Id. at 1069. In such a situation, the State can later rebut this presumption at
step 3. Id.
[12] 	Here, the State charged Horton with murder and UPFSVF as follows:
COUNT I
On or about July 8, 2024, REGGIE HORTON did knowingly
kill another human being, to-wit: Dartanian Cole[.]
COUNT II
On or about July 8, 2024, REGGIE HORTON having
previously been convicted of a serious violent felony, to-wit:
Armed Robbery, a Class B Felony, in Marion Superior Court

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under Cause Number 49G03-1401-FB-002536, did knowingly
possess a firearm[.]
Appellant’s App. Confid. Vol. II, p. 23 (Information).
[13] 	Horton’s alternative argument in this case is that the charging information is
ambiguous as to whether the UPFSVF charge is factually included in the
murder charge because the murder charge is silent as to how Cole was killed.
Appellant’s Br. p. 17. Horton asserts that if he committed the murder using the
firearm that he knowingly possessed for the UPFSVF offense, all the elements
of the lesser offense of UPFSVF are factually included in the murder offense.
Id. As to the element that he is a serious violent felon, Horton states it is merely
a “status” such that “[n]o matter what [he] does, he will always be a serious
violent felon while doing it.” Id.
[14] 	While we may use the term “status” to refer to the fact that a person is a serious
violent felon, such reference in no way eliminates the State’s burden of proving
that fact in cases involving an UPFSVF charge. A defendant’s status as a
serious violent felon is a required element of the offense of UPFSVF and must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., McAnalley v. State, 134 N.E.3d
488, 513 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (Bradford, J., concurring in result) (clarifying that
“what makes a person a serious violent felon is that he has committed a crime
that has been deemed a serious violent felony under Indiana Code section 35-
47-4-5, which is an essential element that the State must prove in cases
involving an SVF charge.”), trans. denied. Accordingly, even though Cole’s
murder was carried out by Horton shooting him with the same firearm he

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-3307 | October 20, 2026 	Page 8 of 9
possessed for purposes of the UPFSVF charge, the murder offense as charged
does not allege that Horton had been previously convicted of a serious violent
felony. Stated another way, the murder charge precludes the element that
Horton committed a crime deemed to be a serious violent felony. There is no
ambiguity here.
[15] 	Thus, as neither offense is an included offense of the other, either inherently or
as charged, there is no violation of double jeopardy, and our analysis ends here.
[16] 	To the extent that Horton relies on Eversole v. State, 251 N.E.3d 604 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2025), trans. denied, and Brothers v. State, 271 N.E.3d 589 (Ind. Ct. App.
2025), trans. denied, we observe that those cases are distinguishable. Both cases
addressed a murder conviction and either an attempted robbery by use of
force/firing a handgun or a robbery resulting in serious bodily injury
conviction, and the charging informations for the murders did not specify how
the killings were carried out. Because of the way the informations were drafted,
it was ambiguous as to whether the use of force alleged in the robbery counts
was the murder or something other than the murder. Here, unlike in Eversole
and Brothers, the fact that the firearm that Horton used to kill Cole was the same
firearm that he was convicted of possessing in the UPFSVF offense is of no
moment. Horton’s UPFSVF conviction required not only possession of a
firearm but also his previous conviction of a serious violent felony. Such
offense cannot constitute an included offense of murder, which does not require
a previous conviction of a serious violent felony.

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Conclusion
[17] 	Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Horton’s possession of a firearm as
the basis for his UPFSVF conviction and his possession and use of that firearm
as the basis for his murder conviction do not implicate double jeopardy.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
[18] 	Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Talisha R. Griffin
Matthew D. Anglemeyer
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
George P. Sherman
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana