People v. Post

2026 IL 132403
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 132403)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
JESSE POST, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 29, 2026.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Cunningham, O’Brien, and Tailor concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
Chief Justice Neville specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice Overstreet specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice
Rochford.

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OPINION
¶ 1 The circuit court of Fulton County denied defendant, Jesse Post, pretrial release
pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725
ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2024)), as amended by Public Acts 101-652, § 10-255, and
102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act
(Act). Subsequently, defendant sought review of his pretrial detention. Following a
hearing, the circuit court determined defendant’s continued detention was
necessary to avoid the real and present threat he posed. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-
5) (West 2024). Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court, Fourth District,
affirmed. 2025 IL App (4th) 250598, ¶ 1.
¶ 2 Now on appeal, defendant asks this court to (1) define the proper standard of
review applicable to orders appealed from continued detention hearings and
(2) find the appellate court erred in affirming the circuit court’s order that he remain
in pretrial detention.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 A. Initial Pretrial Detention Proceedings
¶ 5 In November 2023, the State charged defendant by information with three
counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1)
(West 2020)). The charges alleged defendant, who was 17 years of age or older,
committed an act of sexual contact with F.W., C.W., and E.W., all under the age of
13 when the acts were committed, in that he made contact with the private parts of
the minors for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal.
¶ 6 After defendant’s arrest in May 2024, the State filed a verified petition to deny
him pretrial release, alleging he was charged with an enumerated sex offense under
the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2024)) and his pretrial
release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the
community based on the specific articulable facts of the case. See 725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(a)(5) (West 2024).
¶ 7 At the initial detention hearing, the State proffered that the victims’ mother
made a complaint in May 2020 to the police alleging defendant was having oral sex

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with the children. The children were interviewed at the Child Advocacy Center but
did not make a disclosure. A few years later, the children’s mother reported that
E.W. began talking about a sexual assault that took place in the 2020 timeframe.
Further, F.W. and C.W., both of whom had undergone counseling, began disclosing
they were sexually assaulted in 2020. Interviews with the children indicated
defendant had lured them into the kitchen with candy and performed oral sex on
them. The State also proffered that defendant lived close to the victims. In addition,
in a prior criminal case, defendant failed to show up in court and make payments
toward his fine.
¶ 8 Defendant testified he had four children but only one of them lived with him.
At the time of the hearing, he was unemployed. When asked why he had missed
court-ordered payments, he stated he started “to hold off on those payments” so he
could pay it all off at once. If released, he stated he would come to court, wear an
ankle monitor, and have no contact with the victims.
¶ 9 The circuit court found substantial articulable facts supported the charged
offenses. Noting defendant’s willful disregard of his payment order and believing
that constituted a significant concern regarding his ability to comply with court
orders, along with the minor victims being “extraordinarily vulnerable,” the court
denied pretrial release.
¶ 10 In July 2024, defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), asking the circuit court to reconsider its
detention order because there were less restrictive means than detention to secure
his continued appearance in court and conditions could be imposed to ensure he
was not a danger to the community. The court denied the motion, finding no
substantial change in defendant’s circumstances and that no less restrictive means
were available.
¶ 11 Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed. People v. Post, 2024 IL
App (4th) 241002-U, ¶ 2. The Fourth District found the circuit court failed to make
sufficient findings to allow meaningful review of its decision to deny pretrial
release. Id. ¶ 27. The appellate court vacated the order denying defendant pretrial
release and remanded with directions for the circuit court to conduct a new
detention hearing, where the State could present evidence and the court could make
express findings. Id. ¶ 29.

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¶ 12 On remand, the circuit court conducted a new detention hearing in November
2024. The State proffered that a complaint had been made in 2017 in regard to L.G.,
born in 2012, the daughter of defendant. L.G. told authorities about an incident
where she and defendant went into the woods after defendant “had thrown a frisbee
too far.” Defendant then “licked [her] butt.” Defendant denied the accusation.
¶ 13 The State also proffered that the charges in the present case were filed after
criminal sexual assault allegations were made by E.W., born in 2016, who claimed
defendant licked his penis on multiple occasions. E.W. described that defendant
would put him on the kitchen counter next to a bowl of candy, pull down E.W.’s
pants and underwear, lick his penis, give him a piece of candy, and tell him not to
tell E.W.’s father.
¶ 14 F.W., born in 2013 and E.W.’s sibling, made a statement to investigators that
defendant had previously been her father’s friend. F.W. indicated that on multiple
occasions, while alone with defendant in the kitchen, defendant pulled down her
pants and touched her vagina. C.W., born in 2014 and E.W.’s sibling, described an
occasion where defendant took her into the kitchen, gave her candy, put her on the
counter, and licked her vagina and buttocks. C.W. indicated defendant would unzip
his pants and show his penis, “shaking it around” when doing so.
¶ 15 The victims’ father stated in an interview that he previously lived in an
apartment with defendant. During that time, he would sometimes sleep on the couch
or go to bed early and leave defendant to supervise the children. Upon being
confronted with the allegations, defendant denied them but then “remained silent
and did not speak.”
¶ 16 B.L., the mother of the three victims, testified defendant lived with the victims’
father in Canton in 2020. Defendant later moved to Peoria, and his current address
was only half a mile from the home occupied by B.L. and her children. B.L.
believed defendant moved to get closer to her, which she found “extremely
terrifying.”
¶ 17 Over defense counsel’s objection, B.L. testified that other people had told her
about being victimized by defendant. Specifically, B.L. stated S.R. told her that she
rode the bus with defendant in the seventh grade and inappropriate acts occurred.
B.H. reportedly said she was 16 years old when defendant was 20 and he forced

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himself on her, such that she felt “coerced, manipulated, and violated.” B.L. stated
defendant was present at her home at the same time as 16-year-old M.M. and saw
him being “extremely inappropriate with her.” B.L. also stated M.M. said defendant
had exposed himself to her in person and in photographs.
¶ 18 Defendant testified he lived in Peoria and, if he was released from custody, he
would live in St. David with his mother. Prior to his arrest, he had been a stay-at-
home father but had applied at Walgreens. Defendant indicated he did not know
where three of his children lived and had not seen them since 2020 because he did
not “get along with their mothers.” He stated he would abide by any conditions of
release, including restrictions on his movement, wearing an ankle monitor, and not
contacting the victims or any minor.
¶ 19 The circuit court denied pretrial release. The court expressed concern for the
victims and the community at large and found, at that time, no set of circumstances
supported defendant’s pretrial release.
¶ 20 Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 604(h)(2),
arguing that the determination by the court that means less restrictive than detention
were insufficient to protect the victims and the community was against the manifest
weight of the evidence and an abuse of discretion. The court denied the motion.
Defendant appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in (1) allowing hearsay
evidence, (2) considering evidence of a minor’s interview that did not result in any
arrest or criminal charges, and (3) finding the State proved there existed no less
restrictive means of protecting the community from the threat he might pose.
People v. Post, 2025 IL App (4th) 241527-U, ¶ 37. The Fourth District affirmed the
detention order, finding the circuit court’s decision to deny pretrial release was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 49.
¶ 21 B. Defendant’s Motion for Release Based on
Change in Circumstances
¶ 22 In April 2025, defendant filed a motion for review of pretrial detention pursuant
to section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024)), asking
the circuit court to vacate the order for detention. Defendant alleged that, since the
order finding no less restrictive means other than his continued detention, there had

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been “a change in circumstance.” Specifically, defendant alleged he secured
appropriate housing and would reside with his parents, who would provide constant
and direct supervision, he would agree to wear an ankle monitor, and he would
abide by all terms and conditions the court wished to impose. Defendant contended
he was no longer a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or
the community and his continued detention was no longer necessary.
¶ 23 The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion in May 2025. Defendant
testified that, if released, he would reside with his mother in St. David. He stated
he would submit to house arrest and wear an ankle monitor. His mother and father
would provide constant supervision, and although his father worked, his mother did
not. Defendant also stated release was necessary so he could assist in obtaining
additional information for his defense.
¶ 24 On cross-examination, defendant testified he last lived with his parents from
2020 to 2022. On examination by the circuit court, defendant stated his father, age
67, was in good health but his mother, age 64, was not, due to her “heart condition”
and “artery disease.”
¶ 25 The circuit court denied the motion, finding there had been no substantial
changes in defendant’s circumstances and there were no less restrictive means
available. The court believed GPS monitoring would not work in this case. Notable
to the court, defendant’s testimony at the previous hearing was “of significant
concern,” and his mother’s age and health were also relevant factors. Further, the
court found defendant’s claim he needed to be released to obtain evidence to
support his defense was not “at all credible.”
¶ 26 Defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 604(h)(2), arguing he had
provided information relating to a change in circumstance and showed there were
less restrictive means than his continued detention. The circuit court denied the
motion, finding no substantial changes in defendant’s circumstances and no less
restrictive means were present.
¶ 27 Defendant appealed, arguing the circuit court’s continued detention order
should be reversed because he established a change in circumstances showing there
were less restrictive means of protecting the community from any threat he posed.
2025 IL App (4th) 250598, ¶ 1. The appellate court affirmed. Id.

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¶ 28 On the merits, the appellate court first addressed whether a circuit court must
find a change in circumstances has occurred before altering an existing detention
order. Id. ¶ 26. The court stated showing new information or a change in
circumstances is required for relief under section 110-6.1(i-5) because, “ ‘[i]f a
court has found that a defendant qualifies for detention and no new information or
change in circumstances is presented, it makes little sense to think that [the] court
would reverse its prior ruling for no particular reason.’ ” Id. (quoting People v.
Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 29).
¶ 29 The appellate court next considered the appropriate standard of review of a
circuit court’s decision at subsequent hearings regarding continued detention
pursuant to section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code. Id. ¶ 27. The Fourth District noted this
court had recently resolved the district conflict regarding the standard of review to
be employed at a pretrial detention hearing. Id. (citing People v. Morgan, 2025 IL
130626). In Morgan, this court held “the standard of review to be employed when
the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer is de novo and,
when live testimony is heard, the standard is manifest weight of the evidence.” Id.
(citing Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54).
¶ 30 After noting another split in the appellate court had developed, the Fourth
District distinguished between a circuit court’s initial pretrial detention decision
from its continued detention decisions and concluded the appropriate standard of
review in the latter circumstance is the abuse of discretion standard. Id. ¶¶ 27-29.
¶ 31 The Fourth District went on to find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding defendant’s continued detention was necessary to avoid a real and
present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. Id. ¶ 30. The
court found defendant failed to present any new information or demonstrate a
change in circumstances to justify changing the detention order. Id. The only “ ‘new
information’ ” was defendant’s willingness to be on house arrest with GPS
monitoring and under the supervision of his elderly parents, which the appellate
court stated were options and information available to the circuit court at the prior
detention hearing and therefore insufficient to show a change in circumstances. Id.
¶ 31. The court further found the result would have been the same under the
manifest weight of the evidence standard as well. Id. ¶ 32.

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¶ 32 This court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 315(a) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).
¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 34 Under the Act, every person charged with an offense is presumed eligible for
pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 6.1(e) (West 2024); People v. Mikolaitis,
2024 IL 130693, ¶ 16. To detain a defendant, the State must file a verified petition
requesting the denial of pretrial release, and the circuit court shall hold a hearing
on the petition. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2024). When seeking denial of pretrial
release, the State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
(1) the proof is evident or presumption great that the defendant committed a
detainable offense; (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of
any person, persons, or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of
the case; and (3)
“no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section
110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of
any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts
of the case, for offenses listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a),
or (ii) the defendant’s willful flight for offenses listed in paragraph (8) of
subsection (a).” Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3).
In any order of detention, the circuit court is required to “make a written finding
summarizing the court’s reasons for concluding that the defendant should be denied
pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and
present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.” Id. § 110-
6.1(h)(1). If the court denies pretrial release, the defendant is entitled to appeal that
order. Id. § 110-6.1(j). However, as a prerequisite to appeal, the defendant “shall
first present to the trial court a written motion requesting the same relief to be
sought on appeal and the grounds for such relief.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr.
15, 2024).
¶ 35 If the circuit court has entered a detention order,

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“[a]t each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge
must find that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat
to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific
articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from
prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024).
A defendant has a right to appeal a continued detention order, subject to the
requirements of Rule 604(h)(2).
¶ 36 A. Standard of Review
¶ 37 On appeal from an initial order of detention, this court in Morgan, 2025 IL
130626, ¶ 54, articulated the appropriate standard of review. The court held that
“(1) when live witness testimony is presented at a pretrial detention hearing, the
circuit court’s ultimate detention decision under section 110-6.1, in addition to
any underlying factual findings supporting the decision, will not be disturbed
on review unless found to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence
and (2) when the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by
proffer, the reviewing court is not bound by the circuit court’s factual findings
and may therefore conduct its own independent de novo review of the proffered
evidence and evidence otherwise documentary in nature.” Id.
¶ 38 This case presents the question of the appropriate standard of review for appeals
of continued detention orders under section 110-6.1(i-5). Determining the
appropriate standard of review is a question of law that we review de novo. Beggs
v. Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186,
2016 IL 120236, ¶ 52.
¶ 39 Initially, we note the State argues this court must first address what
determination a circuit court is called upon to make at a continued detention
hearing. The State contends the question before the circuit court was whether some
new information or change in circumstances warranted altering its prior detention
order. Defendant argues the plain language of section 110-6.1(i-5) does not require
him to demonstrate a change in circumstances or to present new information before

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his detention can be revisited. Based on a reading of the Act as a whole, we find a
showing of new information or a change in circumstances is required.
¶ 40 The Act provides three similar provisions with respect to a circuit court’s
obligation to review detention or release status at subsequent hearings. The first
provision of note requires that, when the court releases a defendant on conditions,
it is required to review the continued necessity of those conditions as follows:
“At each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge
must find that the current conditions imposed are necessary to reasonably
ensure the appearance of the defendant as required, the safety of any other
person, and the compliance of the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial
release. The court is not required to be presented with new information or a
change in circumstance to remove pretrial conditions.” (Emphasis added.) 725
ILCS 5/110-5(f-5) (West 2024).
¶ 41 The second provision deals with the circuit court’s review of detention status
when a defendant is initially released but is later detained after that release has been
revoked.
“At each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge
must find that continued detention under this Section is necessary to reasonably
ensure the appearance of the defendant for later hearings or to prevent the
defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A
misdemeanor.” Id. § 110-6(j).
¶ 42 The third provision is the one that applies in this case, where the court must
review whether the continued detention of a defendant is necessary.
“At each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge
must find that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat
to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific
articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from
prosecution.” Id. § 110-6.1(i-5).
¶ 43 “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
true intent of the legislature.” People v. Whitehead, 2023 IL 128051, ¶ 18. “The
statute should be evaluated as a whole, with each provision construed in connection

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with every other relevant section.” Nelson v. Kendall County, 2014 IL 116303, ¶ 23.
“It is well settled that where the legislature includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, courts will
presume that the legislature acted intentionally in the exclusion or inclusion.”
People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 30; see People v. Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 48
(stating that, where the legislature includes particular language in one section but
omits it in another section of the same statute, courts will presume “that the
legislature intended different results”).
¶ 44 In considering the three provisions of the Act quoted above, only section 110-
5(f-5) specifically excludes the requirement that new information or a change in
circumstances be presented. Neither section 110-6(j) nor section 110-6.1(i-5)
contains a similar exclusion. Thus, presuming the legislature acted intentionally by
not inserting that exclusion in section 110-6.1(i-5), we find a showing of new
information or a change in circumstances is required to alter a defendant’s
continued detention. Although the circuit court still has the inherent power to
reconsider and correct its own rulings (People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 171 (1990)),
the conclusion that new information or a change in circumstances must be shown
comes as no surprise because, “[i]f a court has found that a defendant qualifies for
detention and no new information or change in circumstances is presented, it makes
little sense to think that [the] court would reverse its prior ruling for no particular
reason” (Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 29).
¶ 45 With the requirement that new information or a change in circumstances be
presented, we now turn to the appropriate standard of review of a circuit court’s
continued detention order. Defendant argues Morgan’s standard is applicable to
both initial and continued detention hearings. Specifically, in the factual scenario
presented here where the circuit court heard live testimony, defendant argues the
court’s ultimate determination that he remain detained should be reviewed under
the manifest weight of the evidence standard.1 In finding the abuse of discretion
standard applied, the appellate court here focused on the fact that section 110-6.1(i-
5) does not set forth a standard of proof or impose a burden of proof. 2025 IL App
(4th) 250598, ¶ 29. It found the lack of such a standard of proof suggested the
1As the factual scenario of the parties proceeding solely by proffer is not present here,
we need not address the standard of review appropriate in that instance.

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legislature intended to leave the continued detention decision to the circuit court’s
discretion. Id. Likewise, the State argues the inquiry required by section 110-6.1(i-
5) calls on the circuit court to exercise its discretion rather than to determine
whether any party has met its burden of proving any particular fact. We disagree
with the appellate court and the State.
¶ 46 In Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 36, this court noted “determinations regarding
the appropriate standard of review on appeal historically turn on the nature and
substance of the question under review (fact, law, or discretion), not the importance
of the question.” In the context of initial detention hearings, Morgan found “the
individualized assessment of evidence in conjunction with any relevant statutory
factors and conditions is a factual exercise.” Id. Thus, we found the State’s burden
under section 110-6.1(e) “presents a unique factual question that the circuit court
must resolve based on an individualized assessment of the evidence, the credibility
of the live witnesses, and a careful analysis of the relevant statutory factors and
conditions provided in sections 110-6.1(g) and 110-10(b).” Id. ¶ 38.
¶ 47 Although Morgan dealt with an initial petition for detention in which the State
has the burden of proof, its reasoning applies equally to hearings with live
testimony on continued detention. Section 110-6.1(i-5) states that, at each
subsequent appearance by the defendant, the circuit court “must find that continued
detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person
or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or
to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-
5) (West 2024).
¶ 48 Like Morgan, the circuit court’s assessment of whether a defendant is a real and
present threat to the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case,
or to prevent his willful flight from prosecution, offers its own unique factual
exercise. The court must consider the question of continued detention based on the
evidence; the credibility of the witnesses; and a careful analysis as to whether
defendant represents a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons,
or the community. “[W]hen confronted with such factual questions, the circuit court
is in a superior position to resolve alleged inconsistencies and conflicts in the live
witnesses’ testimony, as well as to weigh the testimony and determine the
credibility of the witnesses in conjunction with the relevant statutory factors and

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conditions.” Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 38. Thus, whether a defendant’s detention
should be continued is a question of fact, not one of discretion. Accordingly, similar
to our holding in Morgan, when live witness testimony is presented at a continued
detention hearing, a circuit court’s ultimate decision under section 110-6.1(i-5), in
addition to any underlying factual findings supporting the decision, will not be
disturbed on review unless found to be contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence. To the extent the Fourth District’s decision holds the appropriate standard
of review is abuse of discretion, that portion of the opinion is hereby overruled.
¶ 49 B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence Review
¶ 50 With the appropriate standard of review in mind, we now consider whether the
circuit court’s decision to continue defendant’s detention was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence
where ‘the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.’ ” People v.
Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332
(2008)). Whether continued detention is necessary requires courts to first look at
the initial detention decision. See Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 37 (noting
“the original detention order is always the context against which a subsequent
review must be measured” and “[i]t is the baseline from which to assess the
significance of any alleged change in circumstances or new information”).
¶ 51 At the initial detention hearing, the State proffered that defendant had allegedly
performed oral sex on children and lived close to the victims. Defendant testified
that, if released, he would come to court, wear an ankle monitor, and have no
contact with the victims. In denying pretrial release, the circuit court found
substantial articulable facts supported the charged offenses and questioned
defendant’s ability to comply with court orders.
¶ 52 On remand for a new detention hearing, the circuit court heard the State’s
proffer of further sexual assault allegations and defendant’s proximity to the
victims. Defendant testified that, if released from custody, he would live in
St. David with his mother. He stated he would abide by any conditions of release,
including restrictions on his movement, wearing an ankle monitor, and not
contacting the victims or any minor. The circuit court denied pretrial release,

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expressing concern for the victims and the community and finding no set of
circumstances supported release. The Fourth District affirmed the detention order.
¶ 53 Thereafter, defendant filed his motion for review of pretrial detention pursuant
to section 110-6.1(i-5), the subject of this appeal. In the motion, defendant alleged
there had been “a change in circumstance.” He stated he had obtained appropriate
housing and would reside with his parents, his parents would provide constant and
direct supervision, he would agree to wear an ankle monitor, and he would abide
by all terms and conditions imposed by the circuit court. He contended he was no
longer a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the
community and his continued detention was no longer necessary.
¶ 54 At the hearing on the motion, defendant testified that, if released, he would
reside with his mother in St. David and would be willing to undergo house arrest
and wear an ankle monitor. His parents would provide constant supervision, and
while his father worked, his mother did not. Defendant also stated release was
necessary so he could assist in obtaining additional information for his defense. On
cross-examination, defendant acknowledged his mother was not in good health due
to her “heart condition” and “artery disease.”
¶ 55 The circuit court denied the motion. The court believed GPS monitoring would
not work in this case, defendant’s testimony at the previous hearing was “of
significant concern,” and his mother’s age and health were relevant factors. Further,
the court found defendant’s claim he needed to be released to obtain evidence to
support his defense was not “at all credible.”
¶ 56 After considering the testimony presented at the hearing, we find the circuit
court’s decision to continue defendant’s pretrial detention was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant essentially presented the same or
similar information he provided at the initial detention hearing. Living with his
parents, a willingness to wear an ankle monitor, promises to comply with any terms
and conditions, and having no contact with the victims were already available for
consideration by the court. The only “new information” or “change in
circumstances” defendant offered centered on being supervised by his ailing
mother, being agreeable to house arrest, and the need to be released so he could
obtain evidence in his defense. This evidence failed to show defendant was no
longer a real and present threat to the community. Without more showing the

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danger defendant presented had been mitigated, the circuit court had nothing before
it to conclude continued detention was no longer necessary. As such, its decision to
deny pretrial release cannot be said to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on
the evidence presented, and the opposite conclusion is not clearly evident.
¶ 57 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 58 We hold that a showing of new information or a change in circumstances is
required for relief under section 110-6.1(i-5). We also hold that, when live
testimony is presented at a continued pretrial detention hearing, the circuit court’s
decision under section 110-6.1(i-5), in addition to any underlying factual findings
supporting the decision, will not be disturbed on review unless found to be contrary
to the manifest weight of the evidence. Applying the appropriate standard, we
affirm the circuit court’s judgment continuing defendant’s pretrial detention.
¶ 59 Judgments affirmed.
¶ 60 CHIEF JUSTICE NEVILLE, specially concurring:
¶ 61 I agree with the majority’s analysis of the standard of review, and I agree with
the result the majority reaches. I write separately because I disagree with the
majority’s interpretation of section 6.1(i-5) of article 110 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963, as amended by what is commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness
Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024)). The Act provides:
“At each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge
must find that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat
to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific
articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from
prosecution.” Id.
The majority holds that, under this section, “a showing of new information or a
change in circumstances is required to alter a defendant’s continued detention.”
Supra ¶ 44.

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¶ 62 I. Interlocutory Orders
¶ 63 The legislature explicitly classified pretrial detention orders as interlocutory
orders. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1)(iii) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) (“An appeal may be taken to
the Appellate Court from an interlocutory order of court entered under section[ ]
*** 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 *** by the defendant from
an order denying pretrial release[.]”); see People v. Walton, 2024 IL App (4th)
240541, ¶ 19. Courts retain the inherent power to correct their erroneous
interlocutory orders. People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 33 (“[A] court in a
criminal case has the inherent power to reconsider and correct its *** interlocutory
rulings.”); People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 171 (1990). Therefore the legislature
cannot prevent the circuit court from reconsidering an interlocutory order for
pretrial detention (People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155, 161 (1982)), even if the defendant
has presented no new evidence.
¶ 64 The majority argues that the Act requires new evidence when a defendant seeks
pretrial release after the circuit court has ordered pretrial detention. Supra ¶ 44; see
725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024). The majority adopts the appellate court’s
reasoning: “ ‘[i]f a court has found that a defendant qualifies for detention and no
new information or change in circumstances is presented, it makes little sense to
think that [the] court would reverse its prior ruling for no particular reason.’ ” Supra
¶ 44 (quoting Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 29).
¶ 65 I think that Illinois law permits the circuit court to exercise its inherent power
to reverse its prior ruling, even with no new evidence, if it determines that it erred
by granting the State’s motion to detain the defendant before trial. See Johnson,
2017 IL 120310, ¶ 33.
¶ 66 “In furtherance of the authority of the judiciary to carry out its constitutional
obligations, the legislature is prohibited from enacting laws that unduly infringe
upon the inherent powers of judges.” Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d
367, 411 (1997); see Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 161 (“The General Assembly has the power
to enact laws governing judicial practice only where they do not unduly infringe
upon the inherent powers of the judiciary.”).
¶ 67 If courts interpret subsection (i-5) to restrict the inherent power of the circuit
court to reconsider and correct its interlocutory rulings, subsection (i-5) might

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violate the constitutional provision for the separation of powers. See Ill. Const.
1970, art. II, § 1 (“The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.”); Best, 179 Ill. 2d at
410-11. “A statute should be interpreted so as to avoid a construction which would
raise doubts as to its validity.” Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 161.
¶ 68 I think the court should interpret subsection (i-5) in a manner that preserves the
circuit court’s inherent power to reconsider and correct its interlocutory rulings,
including its rulings on petitions for release from pretrial detention. Accordingly,
the court should hold that subsection (i-5) does not require the presentation of new
evidence to support a request for pretrial release.
¶ 69 II. Law of the Case
¶ 70 However, the procedural posture of this case requires affirmance. Post appealed
from the initial detention order, and the appellate court held that the circuit court
correctly ordered pretrial detention. The appellate court’s holding established the
law of the case concerning the pretrial detention of Post on the basis of the record
before the appellate court on the appeal from the initial detention order. See PSL
Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291, 312 (1981) (“ ‘Where the
Appellate Court *** on the first appeal to it, announces a particular view of the law
governing the case[,] *** the questions decided and determined by it on the first
appeal are not open for re-consideration on the second appeal.’ ” (quoting Zerullav.
Supreme Lodge Order of Mutual Protection, 223 Ill. 518, 520 (1906))); Department
of Registration & Education v. Schmidt, 196 Ill. App. 3d 628, 631 (1990)
(“ ‘[W]here the evidence on a subsequent appeal is the same as on the first or prior
appeal, *** the adjudications of such first or prior appeal are binding on the
reviewing court on a subsequent appeal.’ ” (quoting Noe v. Chicago Great Western
Ry. Co., 130 Ill. App. 2d 36, 41 (1969))).
¶ 71 “[T]he law-of-the-case doctrine *** limits relitigation of a previously decided
issue in the same case, including decisions in an unreversed interlocutory appeal.”
Taylor v. Highline Auto Sales, Inc., 2023 IL App (1st) 221590, ¶ 22.
“The law of the case mandates that ‘issues presented and disposed of in a
prior appeal are binding and will control in the circuit court on remand ***

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unless the facts presented are so different as to require a different
interpretation.’ [Citation.] *** ‘[A] trial court is bound by the appellate court’s
determination of all questions decided and may act only in conformance with
the appellate court’s judgment.’ [Citation.]” Toushin v. First Merit Bank, 2021
IL App (1st) 192171, ¶ 45.
¶ 72 The circuit court has the power to correct its own erroneous interlocutory
orders, but it has no power to correct the appellate court’s orders. See id. Unless a
substantial change in circumstances makes the appellate court’s ruling inapplicable
to the case for continued detention, the law of the case doctrine requires the circuit
court to apply the appellate court’s ruling. See People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414,
468 (1992) (“Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, generally, a rule established as
controlling in a particular case will continue to be the law of the case, as long as the
facts remain the same.”); People v. Lyles, 208 Ill. App. 3d 370, 376 (1990) (“ ‘[A]n
appellate court’s determination on a legal issue is binding on both the trial court on
remand and appellate court on a subsequent appeal given the same case and
substantially the same facts.’ ” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 887 (6th ed.
1990))).
¶ 73 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 74 I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Post did not present significant new
information that could justify a result different from the result reached by the
appellate court on the appeal from the initial detention order. Accordingly, I concur
with the result reached by the majority: the circuit court did not err by ordering
Post’s pretrial detention to continue.
¶ 75 JUSTICE OVERSTREET, specially concurring:
¶ 76 I agree with my colleagues that the circuit court did not err in denying
defendant’s “motion for review,” which followed an evidentiary hearing and
alleged a change of circumstances since the entry of the initial detention order that
made conditions of release available to mitigate any risk defendant posed should
he be granted pretrial release. I write separately, however, for four reasons.

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¶ 77 First, appellate review of the circuit court’s order denying defendant’s motion
for review does not require a determination of whether section 110-6.1(i-5) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024))
mandates changed circumstances in order to release a defendant. The circuit court
denied defendant’s “motion for review” after an evidentiary hearing, finding
defendant had not proven his allegations, as per that motion, that a change in
circumstances rendered conditions of pretrial release available that would mitigate
any risk he posed. To review the propriety of that order, the appellate court needs
only to review whether that finding was supported by the evidence. A determination
of whether a change in circumstances is, in fact, required by section 110-6.1(a)(5)
of the Code in order for the circuit court to release a defendant it has initially
detained is not required under the facts of this case, considering defendant was not
released. As such, the appellate court improperly issued an advisory opinion on that
issue, and I would vacate the corresponding portion of the appellate court’s opinion.
See 2025 IL App (4th) 250598, ¶ 26.
¶ 78 Second, while I would decline to render an advisory opinion on the issue
presented, I disagree with the majority’s finding that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (i-5) (West
2024)) requires the circuit court to find a change of circumstances in order to release
a defendant it has initially detained.
¶ 79 Third, my colleagues’ discussion of the standard of review is stated broadly to
encompass all “continued detention orders under section 110-6.1(i-5).” (Emphasis
in original.) Supra ¶ 38. However, that section requires the circuit court to make
findings at every appearance of a defendant in pretrial detention, regardless of the
status of any appeal of the initial detention decision and whether or not defendant
affirmatively seeks release from pretrial detention by motion or otherwise. As such,
it is important to limit the court’s holding on the standard of review to the
circumstances presented here, where, after the initial detention decision was
affirmed on appeal, defendant’s appearance before the circuit court was occasioned
by his own motion, in which he made allegations of changes in circumstances and
affirmatively sought release from pretrial detention.
¶ 80 Finally, as expressed in my special concurrence in People v. Morgan, 2025 IL
130626, ¶¶ 58-86 (Overstreet, J., specially concurring, joined by Theis, C.J., and

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Rochford, J.), where defendant’s appeal raises the issue of whether the circuit court
erred in determining that no condition or combination of conditions would mitigate
the risk imposed by him to any person or the community, the abuse of discretion
standard is the appropriate standard of review. I continue to believe the abuse of
discretion standard of review is the correct standard, that good cause exists to depart
from stare decisis, and that this court should overrule Morgan. See People v. Colon,
225 Ill. 2d 125, 146 (2007) (prior decision should not be overturned absent “ ‘good
cause’ ” or “ ‘compelling reasons’ ” (quoting People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 50
(2007))). Defendant’s motion for review alleged a change of circumstances
resulting in mitigating conditions of pretrial release, and the circuit court
determined that this was not the case. Thus, I would hold that the abuse of discretion
standard of review applies. See Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶¶ 57-85. Because the
circuit court’s order denying defendant’s motion for review is supported by the
evidence, based upon the appropriate legal criteria, and reflects reasoned judgment,
I would affirm the circuit court’s order. See id. ¶ 77 (abuse of discretion standard
of review ensures circuit court exercised its discretion within the bounds of the law
and factual determinations are supported by the evidence of record).
¶ 81 A. Interpretation of Section 110-6.1(i-5) of the
Code Is Advisory
¶ 82 As the appellate court noted, in defendant’s motion for relief, filed pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), defendant argued the
circuit court erred in denying his motion for review because a change in
circumstances had occurred, establishing there were less restrictive means than
continued confinement to protect the victims and the community. 2025 IL App (4th)
250598, ¶ 24. Following the circuit court’s denial of the motion for relief, defendant
filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 604(h)(3), and the Office of the State
Appellate Defender filed a notice that it did not intend to file the optional
memorandum supplementing the motion for relief as provided in Rule 604(h)(7).
Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(3), (7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). Accordingly, as per Rule 604(h)(7),
the motion for relief served as defendant’s argument, and only the issue raised
therein was properly before the appellate court.

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¶ 83 In defendant’s motion for relief, he did not argue that the circuit court is
required to find a change of circumstances in order to grant his motion for review
and order his pretrial release, and he does not cite section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code
(725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024)) or make any argument that it is applicable
to his motion for review. Rather, he argued that the circuit court erred in denying
his motion for review because, at the evidentiary hearing on his motion, he showed
a change of circumstances had occurred that indicated the availability of mitigating
conditions and that thus required his release.
¶ 84 In its appellee’s memorandum, the State argued that the circuit court’s denial
of the motion for review and order of continued detention was not contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence. The State argued that, based on the entire record
before the circuit court following the evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion for
review, it had continued to carry its burden to show, based on clear and convincing
evidence, that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and
present threat to the safety of any persons or the community, based on the specific
articulable facts of the case, as required by section 110-6.1(e) of the Code. Id.
§ 110-6.1(e).
¶ 85 In fact, there is no reference to section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code anywhere in the
legal memoranda that were before the appellate court, other than the State’s
recitation of the title of defendant’s motion in paragraph 11 of the “Background”
section of its memorandum, as a “Motion for Review of Pre-Trial Detention
Pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5).” This court has held that the appellate court’s
sua sponte consideration of issues not considered by the circuit court and never
argued by the parties in the circuit court constitutes error. See People v. Hunt, 234
Ill. 2d 49, 56 (2009).
¶ 86 In addition to the absence of any argument by the parties before the appellate
court concerning the applicability of section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code to the facts of
this case, it was improper for the appellate court to decide whether that section
requires a change of circumstances to release a defendant, because a holding on that
issue is unnecessary to a determination of the propriety of the circuit court’s order
denying defendant’s motion for review. Regardless of whether section 110-6.1(i-5)
requires a change of circumstances to release a defendant, a change of
circumstances was the stated basis for defendant’s motion for review. Defendant’s

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motion for review was based on his contention that, because a change of
circumstances had occurred since the initial order was entered, the State could no
longer meet its burden to show that no conditions of release could mitigate any risk
he poses to the victims or community. The State’s argument was that there had been
no change in circumstances, and the circuit court agreed, thus denying defendant’s
motion for review. The circuit court was not called upon to determine whether a
change in circumstances is required to release a defendant, pursuant to section 110-
6.1(i-5) of the Code or otherwise, but only to determine the propriety of defendant’s
argument that a change in circumstances had occurred making mitigating
conditions available.
¶ 87 Despite the reference in defendant’s motion for review, section 110-6.1(i-5) of
the Code does not address the filing of any motion, for review or otherwise, and it
does not set forth a procedure for the adjudication of any motion. See 725 ILCS
5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024). Rather, section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code simply
provides that, at each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court
following an initial order granting the State’s petition to detain, the judge must
make a finding that continued detention is necessary, and it reiterates the standards
set forth in section 110-6.1(e) of the Code, as relevant here, “to avoid a real and
present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the
specific articulable facts of the case.” Id.; accord id. § 110-6.1(e).
¶ 88 Although defendant’s motion for review prompted an appearance by defendant
before the circuit court and that appearance implicated section 110-6.1(i-5) of the
Code, resolution of defendant’s appeal does not require the reviewing court to
determine whether, as a matter of law, a circuit court must find a change of
circumstances in order to release a defendant that it initially detained. Rather, the
appeal requires the reviewing court to determine whether, as a factual matter, the
circuit court erred in determining that continued detention is required under the
standards set forth in section 110-6.1(e).
¶ 89 Determining whether section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code requires a change of
circumstances to release a defendant is unnecessary because the circuit court
ordered defendant’s continued detention, not his release. The appropriate standard
for determining that an initially detained defendant should be released would
become necessary upon the State’s appeal of an order releasing a defendant, which

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is not the case here. For these reasons, the appellate court’s holding that a change
of circumstances is required by section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code before a circuit
court may release a defendant is wholly advisory, and I would vacate those portions
of the appellate court’s opinion that addressed that issue. See Stone Street Partners,
LLC v. City of Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings, 2017 IL 117720,
¶ 27 n.4 (statements or holdings by the appellate court that are not necessary to the
disposition of the case are wholly advisory as would be any statements made by
this court on the issue, resulting in this court vacating those portions of the appellate
court’s opinion that addressed same).
¶ 90 B. The Majority’s Statutory Interpretation Analysis
Is Incorrect as a Matter of Law
¶ 91 While I would decline to adopt an advisory opinion on the issue of whether
section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code requires a change in circumstances in order to
release a defendant who the circuit court has initially detained, the majority’s
statutory interpretation analysis, which concludes that the statute mandates such a
requirement, is incorrect as a matter of law. Supra ¶ 44. For ease of reference, I
restate the language contained in section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code here, which
applies in cases where the circuit court has granted the State’s petition to detain a
defendant:
“At each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge
must find that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat
to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific
articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from
prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024).
¶ 92 To reach its advisory conclusion, the majority adopts the reasoning of the
Fourth District in People v. Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 28, finding that,
because section 110-5(f-5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-5(f-5) (West 2022))
specifically excludes the requirement of a change of circumstances when removing
conditions of pretrial release, section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code necessarily includes
a requirement of a change in circumstances in order to release a previously detained
defendant. Supra ¶ 44. While I agree that we presume the legislature acted
intentionally where it includes particular language in one section of a statute but

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omits it in another section, I disagree that this canon applies in the manner stated
by my colleagues.
¶ 93 It is crucial to reiterate that section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code is only implicated
here because defendant’s motion for review was addressed at a “subsequent
appearance of the defendant before the court,” triggering the circuit court’s duties
to make findings regarding the necessity of continued detention. See 725 ILCS
5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024). Section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code does not provide for
the filing of a motion, an evidentiary hearing, or even an “order of continued
detention.” It also does not purport to provide any standard governing the release
of a defendant. In contrast, section 110-5(f-5) expressly governs the review and
removal of conditions of release. See id. § 110-5(f-5). For this reason alone, it is
inappropriate to derive the legislature’s intent to exclude a provision in section 110-
6.1(i-5) based on its inclusion of that provision in section 110-5(f-5).
¶ 94 Even if these two sections could be properly compared in the manner advanced
by my colleagues, section 110-5(f-5) of the Code expressly excludes the
requirement of a change of circumstances when removing conditions of pretrial
release. Thus, we presume the legislature acted intentionally in not excluding such
a requirement in section 110-6.1(i-5). Applying the canon correctly, the inference
is that the legislature declined to bar the circuit court from considering whether
there had been a change of circumstances in carrying out the mandates of that
provision, not that it intended to prohibit the circuit court from releasing a defendant
absent a change of circumstances. As the majority recognizes, the circuit court
retains the inherent power to reconsider and correct its own rulings. Supra ¶ 44
(citing People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 171 (1990)). What the majority fails to
acknowledge, however, is that its advisory ruling effectively eliminates this power
under the guise of a statutory provision that does nothing more than require the
circuit court to exercise its inherent power in relation to a detained defendant at
each subsequent appearance.
¶ 95 The plain language of section 110-6.1(i-5) neither requires nor prevents the
circuit court’s reconsideration of its detention decision based on a change of
circumstances. Rather, it requires, at every appearance of a detained defendant, that
the circuit court renew its initial detention findings based on the specific, articulable
facts of the case as they are known to the circuit court at the time of the appearance.

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To find this provision requires, by silence, a change of circumstances to release a
defendant is a departure from the plain language of the statute, which defines
clearly its directive. See People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 117 (2005) (canons of
statutory interpretation, such as expressio unius est exclusio alterius, are aids of
statutory construction and are applicable only to help ascertain the intent of the
legislature when that intent is not clear from the plain language of the statute).
¶ 96 Section 110-6.1(e) of the Code allows the circuit court to detain a defendant if
it makes the findings, based on clear and convincing evidence or proffer, set forth
therein. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2024). These are the same findings that are
mandated for continued detention in section 110-6.1(i-5). Whether or not, as a
practical matter, it makes sense for a circuit court to reverse an initial detention
decision without a change of circumstances (supra ¶ 44 (citing Walton, 2024 IL
App (4th) 240541, ¶ 29)), I disagree that section 110-6.1(i-5) imposes such a
mandate. Indeed, we are not reviewing the State’s appeal of a circuit court’s
decision to release defendant but rather defendant’s appeal of an order denying his
motion for review and continuing his pretrial detention. Thus, I turn to the issue of
the appropriate standard of review applicable to defendant’s appeal.
¶ 97 C. The Majority Holding Should Not Apply to All Orders
Entered Pursuant to Section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code
¶ 98 My colleagues indicate that “[t]his case presents the question of the appropriate
standard of review for appeals of continued detention orders under section 110-
6.1(i-5).” (Emphasis in original.) Supra ¶ 38. However, it is important to reiterate
that section 110-6.1(i-5) simply requires the circuit court to revisit the initial
detention order and make a finding that defendant’s pretrial detention continues to
meet the requirements of section 110-6.1 of the Code. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1
(West 2024). In addition, this section is implicated at every appearance of defendant
after the initial detention order, whether or not defendant makes an affirmative
request for release, based on changed circumstances or otherwise, and regardless
of whether defendant has appealed the initial detention order or the status of any
such appeal. See id. As such, the majority’s application of its holding to “continued
detention orders under section 110-6.1(i-5)” (supra ¶ 38) is overbroad.

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¶ 99 For example, in this case, when the circuit court entered its initial detention
order on May 28, 2024, following which defendant was admonished regarding his
right to appeal, the circuit court entered docket entries into the record at each
subsequent appearance prior to the order on appeal, stating “[d]efendant’s detention
reviewed” and “[d]efendant remains detained.” In addition, the circuit court made
this finding in every order setting the next pretrial or status hearing. During the
pendency of both prior appeals from the initial detention order, these docket entries
and hearing orders continued at every appearance of defendant before the circuit
court.
¶ 100 While each of the above-referenced docket entries and/or findings set forth in
the circuit court’s scheduling orders is mandated by section 110-6.1(i-5) of the
Code and specifically orders defendant’s continued detention, they are outside the
scope of review for this appeal, which is from an order denying defendant’s motion
for review following an evidentiary hearing in which defendant presented evidence
and argument and requested release. Indeed, I question whether “continued
detention orders” entered without an affirmative motion by a defendant for release
are appealable pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024),
which allows appeals by a defendant from an order revoking pretrial release or
denying pretrial release. Additionally, Rule 604(h)(11) prohibits subsequent
appeals during the pendency of an appeal from a prior order, making orders “of
continued detention” pursuant to section 110-6.1(i-5) unappealable until the
mandate issues on any prior appeal. Id. Thus, the majority holding as to the standard
of review should be limited to continued detention orders in which a defendant has
requested affirmative relief from the circuit court, as defendant requested here
through his motion for review.
¶ 101 D. The Appropriate Standard of Review Is
Abuse of Discretion
¶ 102 The standard of review for a circuit court’s order denying defendant’s motion
for review, thus continuing defendant’s detention, rests on the nature of the inquiry
the circuit court had to make in disposing of that motion. See Morgan, 2025 IL
130626, ¶¶ 59, 62. As in Morgan, defendant’s argument rests with the availability
of appropriate conditions of release that would mitigate any risk defendant poses to

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any person or the community. See id. As I expressed in my special concurrence in
Morgan, regardless of whether evidence is presented or proffered, the circuit court
is in a better position to make this determination and should be afforded deference.
Id. ¶ 73. As I stated in Morgan:
“[T]he circuit court is in a much better position than is the appellate court to
consider whether any condition of pretrial release, or combination thereof, can
mitigate the risk defendant poses to any person, or the community, or the risk
of willful flight, as the Code may require, depending on the crime charged. See
[725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022)]. Pursuant to the pretrial provisions of the
Code, the circuit court is tasked, in all criminal cases, with determining ‘which
conditions of pretrial release, if any, will reasonably ensure the appearance of a
defendant as required for the safety of any other person or the community’ as
well as to assess the ‘likelihood of compliance by defendant with all the
conditions of pretrial release.’ Id. § 110-5(a). In the absence of a petition to
detain, the circuit court is to make these statutorily mandated calculations ‘on
the basis of available information’ for each person that is charged with a crime,
using the same nonexhaustive list of factors that the circuit court must consider
when ruling on a petition to detain. Id. Thus, it has become the daily business
of the circuit court to make predictive determinations regarding which
conditions of pretrial release are necessary to ensure the safety of victims and
the community, to ensure appearance by defendants at future proceedings, and
to prevent defendants from committing further crimes. In addition, it must make
these determinations based on the limited information available to it at the
earliest stages of criminal proceedings. As implementation of this system
proceeds, circuit courts will continue to develop expertise in making these
predictive risk assessments as those circuit courts witness firsthand the relative
effectiveness of conditions and combinations of conditions of release.” Id.
¶ 103 For the same reasons, when a defendant moves for release based on his
contention that a change in circumstances has made conditions of pretrial release
available to mitigate any risk defendant poses, the abuse of discretion standard of
review is the appropriate standard by which to review the circuit court’s order
denying the motion and continuing pretrial detention. The nature of the
determination to be made by the circuit court is based on an assessment of the
effectiveness of particular conditions of release to deter a defendant and a balancing

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of this effectiveness with the risk a defendant poses. An abuse of discretion standard
of review accommodates all aspects of the multifaceted determination to be made
by the circuit court, mandating reversal if the evidence does not support the circuit
court’s assessment or if the circuit court used improper legal criteria to make the
determination. At the same time, this standard defers to the circuit court’s
prudential determination based on its risk assessment under all potential conditions
of pretrial release or combinations thereof. For these reasons, I would hold the
abuse of discretion standard of review applies and affirm the circuit court’s decision
to continue defendant’s detention.
¶ 104 Conclusion
¶ 105 My colleagues accept the parties’ invitation to advise the circuit courts as to
what standard is required to release a defendant under the guise of section 110-
6.1(i-5) of the Code. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024). The true answer to that
question depends on the appeal posture of the case and whether defendant has made
an affirmative motion for release and is not governed by section 110-6.1(i-5) of the
Code. Id. Here, after the initial detention decision was appealed and affirmed,
defendant moved the court for release based on a change of circumstances, and the
circuit court found there had been no such change and there continued to be no
condition or combination of conditions that could mitigate any risk defendant poses
to the alleged victims or the community. Because the circuit court’s decision was
supported by the evidence, employed the correct legal criteria, and indicated a
reasoned judgment, I would affirm its decision on the basis that there has been no
abuse of the circuit court’s discretion. Accordingly, I specially concur.
¶ 106 JUSTICE ROCHFORD joins in this special concurrence.

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