State v. Tranmer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50077

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Opinion Filed: June 12, 2024
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
MERNA JEAN TRANMER, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Minidoka County. Hon. Jonathan P. Brody, District Judge.

Order denying motion to suppress and judgment of conviction, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jacob L. Westerfield, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Merna Jean Tranmer appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance. Tranmer argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress
evidence obtained during an unlawful seizure, thus, violating her constitutional rights provided by
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The detective did not unlawfully extend
the duration of the stop or deviate from the purpose of it. The order denying Tranmer’s motion to
suppress and her judgment of conviction are affirmed.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After citizen complaints, Detective Moss and Sergeant Murphy conducted surveillance of
a trailer where there was suspected drug activity. During the surveillance, Detective Moss
observed a silver vehicle pull up to the trailer and an individual get out of the driver’s side of the
vehicle and approach the trailer. Detective Moss contacted dispatch and was advised that the silver

1
vehicle was registered in Tranmer’s name. Detective Moss requested, and was provided, a
photograph of Tranmer and he confirmed that she was the person he saw get out of the silver
vehicle. When Detective Moss saw Tranmer leave the trailer, he contacted Sergeant Murphy to
watch for the vehicle. Sergeant Murphy saw the vehicle and began to follow it; he notified
Detective Moss of the direction of travel. Sergeant Murphy also notified Sergeant Fierro that he
and his drug dog might be needed. Detective Moss left his surveillance position, caught up with
Tranmer, and followed her vehicle.
Detective Moss witnessed Tranmer commit several traffic violations: drifting into a turn
lane; pulling back to the right causing another vehicle to brake; and failing to properly signal before
making a left turn. Based on these traffic violations, Detective Moss initiated a traffic stop and
communicated the location of the stop to Sergeant Murphy. Detective Moss testified that when he
contacted Tranmer, she was nervous and distraught because she claimed a truck almost hit her.
Detective Moss asked Tranmer if she would like medical assistance, which she declined. Detective
Moss observed that Tranmer was not wearing a seatbelt and her purse was sitting on the
passenger’s seat. Detective Moss informed Tranmer that he stopped her vehicle for traffic
infractions, and he asked for her driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance.
Tranmer informed Detective Moss she had recently licensed the vehicle. Detective Moss testified
that whenever a registration is issued within the past six months, he will always “run the vehicle
through registration and ask dispatch to run it by [vehicle identification number] as well and check
for wants.” Detective Moss also testified that he asked dispatch to verify Tranmer’s insurance
because the insurance card provided by Tranmer did not have any vehicle information. Dispatch
informed Detective Moss that the insurance was “unknown.” Detective Moss decided he was
going to issue Tranmer a citation for no insurance and failure to timely signal but would not issue
Tranmer a separate citation for a seatbelt violation because he could not verify that she was not
wearing her seatbelt while driving as opposed to taking it off once she was stopped.
While en route to the scene, Sergeant Murphy contacted Sergeant Fierro and asked him to
come to the location of the stop with his drug dog. Sergeant Murphy arrived at the scene while
Detective Moss was asking Tranmer if she required medical assistance. Sergeant Murphy
positioned himself on the passenger side of Tranmer’s vehicle.
Sergeant Fierro arrived on the scene while Detective Moss was running Tranmer’s
documents through dispatch and trying to determine if the vehicle was insured. As Sergeant Fierro

2
approached Tranmer’s vehicle, Detective Moss was sitting in his vehicle deciding whether to issue
a citation for the seatbelt and was preparing to issue the other citations. Sergeant Fierro did not
speak to Detective Moss before the drug dog sniff. Sergeant Fierro took his drug dog around
Tranmer’s vehicle for a free air sniff. The drug dog indicated on the passenger side of Tranmer’s
vehicle. While Detective Moss was still in his vehicle contemplating which citations to issue to
Tranmer, Sergeant Fierro told Detective Moss that the drug dog indicated on Tranmer’s vehicle.
Detective Moss exited his vehicle, provided Tranmer with Miranda1 warnings, and asked her to
step out of the vehicle. The officers searched her vehicle, found a purse, and located a controlled
substance and drug paraphernalia inside the purse.
Tranmer was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver, Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)(1)(A), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C.
§ 37-2734A. Tranmer filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing: (1) the officer stopped
her vehicle without reasonable and articulable suspicion; and (2) she and/or her vehicle were
searched without sufficient probable cause. A hearing was held where Detective Moss, Sergeant
Murphy, and Sergeant Fierro testified for the State and Tranmer testified in her defense. Following
the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court took the matter under advisement and gave
the parties the opportunity to submit additional briefing.
Tranmer filed additional briefing, arguing she was subject to an unlawful investigatory
detention that exceeded the stated purpose for the stop of her vehicle and the search of her purse
was not justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. On the unlawful
detention issue, Tranmer argued “[i]t is undisputed that [Detective Moss] added unnecessary time
to his detention of [Tranmer] by repeating the exact license and registration check he had dispatch
do for him earlier that day when he saw [Tranmer] at the trailer he was surveilling.” The State
filed a response to Tranmer’s brief, arguing, in relevant part, that the traffic stop of Tranmer’s
vehicle was justified and reasonable, and the traffic stop was not prolonged or delayed in any way
beyond the purposes of conducting a normal traffic stop. On the issue of whether the police added
time to the stop, the State argued that “Detective Moss did not prolong the stop by doing the exact
same license and registration check he did earlier because he in fact did not do the exact same
license and registration check.” The district court denied Tranmer’s motion to suppress, holding

1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3
Detective Moss did not deviate from the traffic stop or unlawfully prolong the stop when he called
dispatch to verify Tranmer’s driver’s license, vehicle registration, and insurance.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Tranmer entered a conditional guilty plea to an amended
charge of felony possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), reserving her right to
appeal the denial of her motion to suppress, and the State dismissed the possession of paraphernalia
charge. Tranmer appeals from her judgment of conviction, asserting the district court erred in
denying her motion to suppress.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
Tranmer argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress. Specifically,
Tranmer contends that Detective Moss unlawfully extended the traffic stop when he ran her
registration information through dispatch a second time after she was stopped for the traffic
violations. The State argues that because Detective Moss was engaged in one of the ordinary
inquiries permitted during a traffic stop, he did not unlawfully extend the stop or deviate from the
purpose of it. Alternatively, the State argues Detective Moss’s second inquiry into Tranmer’s
vehicle registration was justified as part of his inquiry into the validity of her proof of insurance.
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.
App. 1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible
criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven

4
contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131
Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). Authority for a traffic-related seizure ends
when the tasks related to the infraction are, or reasonably should have been, completed. Rodriguez
v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015); State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154
(2016). Consequently, a traffic-related seizure violates the Fourth Amendment if prolonged
beyond the time reasonably required to complete the “mission” of issuing a ticket. Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at 350-51; State v. Karst, 170 Idaho 219, 223, 509 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2022). In other words,
“a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates
the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350; see Karst,
170 Idaho at 224, 509 P.3d at 1153; Linze, 161 Idaho at 608, 389 P.3d at 153.
On appeal, Tranmer acknowledges that an officer running a vehicle’s registration
information through dispatch following a traffic stop is permissible as an ordinary inquiry incident
to a traffic stop as explained in Rodriguez. Tranmer contends, however, that because Detective
Moss already obtained information about Tranmer’s registration while conducting surveillance
earlier in the day, the subsequent inquiry unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop and deviated from
the purpose of it. Tranmer cites State v. Hale, 168 Idaho 863, 489 P.3d 450 (2021) as support for
her argument that Detective Moss’s further inquiry into Tranmer’s registration was neither
necessary nor reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In Hale, the Idaho Supreme Court
reiterated the holding of Rodriguez:
Law enforcement’s mission in conducting a traffic stop includes, but is not
limited to, addressing the traffic violation that precipitated the stop and determining
whether to issue a traffic ticket. An officer’s mission also includes “ordinary
inquiries incident to the traffic stop,” such as “checking the driver’s license,
determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and
inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.”
Hale, 168 Idaho at 867, 489 P.3d at 454 (citations omitted). Thereafter, the Court found that an
officer did not unlawfully prolong a traffic stop or exceed its scope by investigating a discrepancy
in the registration information provided to him. Id. at 869, 489 P.3d at 456. The Court found that
“further investigation as to the accuracy of that information was reasonable and served the same
purpose as checking a license and registration in the first place.” Id.
Tranmer argues that, in her case, unlike in Hale, Detective Moss had no reason to believe
the registration information provided to him by dispatch prior to the traffic stop was incomplete or
inaccurate, so checking it a second time was not an ordinary inquiry incident to a traffic stop. The

5
State argues Detective Moss did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop or deviate from the purpose
of it because although he received information about Tranmer’s vehicle registration prior to the
stop, that information could have been incorrect.
In denying Tranmer’s motion to suppress, regarding Detective Moss, the district court
found:
Detective Moss did not deviate from the original purpose of the traffic stop
until probable cause to search for drugs was developed after the free air sniff. The
presence of Sergeants Murphy and Fierro did not prevent or delay Detective Moss
from the purposes of the traffic stop. Neither officer communicated with Detective
Moss at the location of the traffic stop until the dog had indicated from the free air
sniff. In addition, Detective Moss did not add time to the traffic stop when he
sought to verify Defendant’s driving documents, even if he had seen some of
Defendant’s driving documents previously during the surveillance operation.
Therefore, Defendant’s rights were not violated since Detective Moss did not
deviate from the traffic stop, or add time to it, and the time taken to complete the
traffic stop was reasonable.
Preliminarily, we do not agree with Tranmer that Detective Moss performed the same
registration check twice. While conducting surveillance, Detective Moss obtained only
information regarding to whom the car was registered. At the traffic stop, based on Tranmer’s
statement that she had only recently registered the vehicle, Detective Moss also checked the date
of registration, including the VIN, to ensure there were no “wants” on the vehicle. Thus, contrary
to Tranmer’s assertion, there were not identical registration verification requests. Moreover, at the
traffic stop, Detective Moss also checked Tranmer’s driver’s license and the insurance for the
vehicle. While Tranmer is correct that Detective Moss spent some time calling dispatch to inquire
about Tranmer’s vehicle registration, that call also included information about Tranmer’s license
and insurance. As such, the call was properly related to the information provided by Tranmer and
the purpose of the traffic stop, and requesting different and additional information regarding the
registration did not add additional time to the stop.
While Tranmer argues Detective Moss had no reason to believe the information regarding
her vehicle registration was inaccurate, Detective Moss did not re-check the registration only to
determine whether there were any inaccuracies. He also checked the registration date. Detective
Moss testified that based on his training and experience, dispatch could have provided the wrong
information regarding to whom the car was registered. Regardless of the information he was
provided during surveillance, when Detective Moss called dispatch to obtain information
regarding Tranmer’s registration, license, and insurance, he was performing standard duties related
6
to a traffic stop and did not add unnecessary time in completing that mission. As a result,
substantial and competent evidence supports the district court’s finding that Detective Moss did
not add unnecessary time to the stop.
Next, Detective Moss did not deviate from the original purpose of the stop. In this case,
after initiating a traffic stop, Detective Moss retrieved Tranmer’s license, registration, and vehicle
insurance and returned to his vehicle to verify the information in the documents. Again, Tranmer
concedes on appeal that all of Detective Moss’s actions would normally be considered “ordinary
inquires” permitted during a stop under Rodriguez. Tranmer argues the unique circumstances of
this case, where Detective Moss had already verified her information through dispatch,
transformed his subsequent inquiry into a deviation of the purpose of the stop. Tranmer’s argument
is unpersuasive. Regardless of the information an officer is provided prior to a traffic stop, an
officer properly performs his duties by verifying the information provided to him before issuing a
citation. We see no reason why an officer conducting due diligence before issuing a citation during
a traffic stop deviates from the purpose of that stop.
Next, we are not persuaded by Tranmer’s argument that Hale indicates Detective Moss’s
further inquiry into Tranmer’s registration was neither necessary nor reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. After calling dispatch, Detective Moss prepared Tranmer’s citation and returned to
Tranmer’s vehicle to issue the citation and to speak to Tranmer about the possible seatbelt
violation. Detective Moss did not call Sergeant Fierro to the scene or speak with Sergeant Fierro
until after Sergeant Fierro informed Detective Moss that the drug dog had a positive indication on
Tranmer’s vehicle. Further, none of Detective Moss’s inquiries or actions suggest he did not
perform them “in a reasonable amount of time,” as Tranmer suggests. Thus, the district court did
not err in concluding that Detective Moss did not deviate from the purpose of the traffic stop.
Finally, because we conclude that Detective Moss did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop or
deviate from the purpose of it, we need not address the State’s alternative arguments.

IV.
CONCLUSION

7
Detective Moss did not deviate from the traffic stop or unlawfully prolong the stop in
violation of Tranmer’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court’s order denying Tranmer’s
motion to suppress and her judgment of conviction are affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

8