State v. Labbee

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49424

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: January 31, 2023
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
NATHANIEL LABBEE, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bannock County. Hon. Javier L. Gabiola, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of seventeen years, with a minimum
period of confinement of ten years, for lewd conduct with a child under sixteen
years, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Chief Judge
Nathaniel Labbee appeals from his judgment of conviction and unified sentence of
seventeen years, with a minimum period of confinement of ten years, for lewd conduct with a child
under sixteen years. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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Upon receiving reports that Labbee had genital-to-genital contact with a one-year-old
female and genital-to-anal contact with a four-year-old male,1 the State charged Labbee with two
counts of lewd conduct with a child under sixteen years. I.C. § 18-1508. Although initially under
the jurisdiction of a juvenile court, the juvenile court waived jurisdiction to allow Labbee to be
tried as an adult and denied a motion to dismiss filed by Labbee. He appealed these decisions and
the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. See State v. Doe (2020-24), 168 Idaho 389, 483 P.3d 932
(2020).
After the resolution of his first appeal, Labbee entered into a binding I.C.R. 11 plea
agreement with the State. According to the terms of the plea agreement, Labbee would plead
guilty to one count, the State would dismiss the remaining count, and Labbee would receive a
withheld judgment with a four-year period of probation. The plea agreement also required Labbee
to complete a psychosexual evaluation and a polygraph. Based on this agreement, Labbee entered
a guilty plea to one count of lewd conduct with a child under sixteen years and the other count was
dismissed.
According to the psychosexual evaluation, the polygraph report2 noted that Labbee’s
“reaction [was] consistent with deception” and that the polygraphist “concluded that [Labbee]
should be regarded as deceptive to the tested issues.” (Bolding omitted). After reviewing Labbee’s
psychosexual evaluation and polygraph, the district court informed the parties that it would reject
the I.C.R. 11 plea agreement.
Two days before the sentencing hearing, Labbee filed a motion to continue in order to
obtain a second polygraph. In his motion, Labbee represented that he had a second polygraph
scheduled four days after the sentencing hearing. After receiving a written objection from the

1
Labbee’s relationship to the victims is unclear. On appeal, the parties describe both victims
as Labbee’s siblings. At times in the police reports, the victims are described as Labbee’s siblings.
However, the psychosexual evaluation notes Labbee represented that the victims are both his step-
siblings. Consistent with this, the district court at sentencing referred to the male victim as
Labbee’s “stepbrother.” Adding to the lack of clarity, Labbee’s father testified that he is “the
father of both the defendant as well as the victims,” which could indicate that the victims are at
least half-siblings of Labbee. Finally, the magistrate court, in its ordering waiving jurisdiction,
describes both victims as Labbee’s half-siblings.
2
The polygraph report is not in the appellate record.

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State, the district court denied Labbee’s motion to continue. At the beginning of the sentencing
hearing, the district court allowed Labbee to present additional argument on his motion to continue.
The district court again denied Labbee’s motion.
After denying Labbee’s motion, the district court reiterated its rejection of the I.C.R. 11
plea agreement. The district court gave Labbee an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, but he
declined to do so. The district court imposed a unified sentence of seventeen years, with a
minimum period of confinement of ten years, for one count of lewd conduct with a child under
sixteen years. Labbee appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision to grant a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court. State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 706, 864 P.2d 149, 152 (1993). Sentencing decisions
are also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Barr, 166 Idaho 783, 785, 463 P.3d 1286,
1288 (2020). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Labbee asserts that the district court erred by not continuing the sentencing hearing to allow
him to obtain a second “non-deceptive polygraph”3 and by imposing an excessive sentence. The
State responds that the district court properly denied Labbee’s motion to continue the sentencing
hearing and imposed a reasonable sentence. We hold that Labbee has failed to show the district
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue the sentencing hearing or in imposing
sentence.

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Nothing in the record supports Labbee’s assertion that a second polygraph would
necessarily be “non-deceptive.”

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A. Motion to Continue Sentencing Hearing
Labbee asserts that the district court acted unreasonably and should have continued the
sentencing hearing to allow him “to obtain a non-deceptive polygraph report” because it was “so
important to the district court’s sentencing decision” and the delay would have been brief. The
State responds that the district court exercised reason in denying Labbee’s motion to continue
because Labbee had sufficient time prior to the sentencing hearing to obtain a second polygraph.
The State also responds that Labbee has failed to show that the denial of his motion to continue
prejudiced one of his substantial rights. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Labbee’s motion to continue.
A defendant’s failure to act in a timely manner to obtain information may factor into a
decision on a motion to continue. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 574, 569 P.2d 916, 919
(1977) (holding that trial court did not err in denying motion to continue trial in part because
defendant “had more than seven months within which to request the evidence in order to run the
tests which were allegedly essential to defendant's case”); State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 361,
161 P.3d 675, 680 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that trial court did not err in denying motion to
continue trial in part because the defendant “waited for the issue to develop mere days before trial
and then sought a continuance, primarily based on an unsubstantiated assertion of unfair surprise”);
State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 610, 930 P.2d 1039, 1052 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that trial court
did not err in denying motion to continue sentencing hearing when defendant made the motion on
the day of the hearing and the trial court found that defendant failed to show “that there has been
any impossibility on the part of the defendant to get [the] information”).
At the sentencing hearing, Labbee’s counsel represented that he had not received a copy of
the original polygraph report until the day before. The record, however, shows that the
psychosexual evaluation contained information from the polygraph report. The psychosexual
evaluation was filed on November 26, 2021, approximately two months before the sentencing
hearing. Four days later, on November 30, 2021, the district court held a telephonic meeting with
the parties in which they discussed the psychosexual evaluation, including information from the
polygraph conducted in conjunction with the psychosexual evaluation. By at least this time,
Labbee’s counsel was aware of the relevant portions of the polygraph. The sentencing hearing
was held on January 13, 2022. Thus, Labbee had at least six weeks to obtain a second polygraph.

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Despite being aware of the relevant portions of the polygraph, Labbee waited until two days before
the sentencing hearing to request a continuance for the purpose of obtaining a second polygraph
that he believed would be more favorable. Labbee provided no details regarding his attempts to
schedule the second polygraph, including when he first attempted to schedule it or what difficulties
he may have had in getting it scheduled prior to the sentencing hearing. Based on these facts, we
cannot say the district court failed to exercise reason in denying Labbee’s motion to continue.
In addition, we hold that Labbee has failed to show prejudice to a substantial right.
Generally, the denial of a request for a continuance is not an abuse of discretion absent a showing
that the defendant’s substantial rights have been prejudiced. State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 202, 485
P.2d 144, 146 (1971). A mere claim that additional investigation or testing could have been
conducted is not sufficient to show prejudice. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 405, 958 P.2d 22,
31 (Ct. App. 1998). At the sentencing hearing, Labbee represented that he was “not looking for
something to supplant” the first polygraph but, instead, he was “just trying to get more
information.” According to Labbee, he wanted the second polygraph “to go into more details
about [certain] questions” asked in the first polygraph. Labbee, however, did not identify what
those details were or what his responses would have been. Further, both in his written motion and
in his oral argument to the district court, Labbee represented that he had scheduled a second
polygraph to take place four days after the sentencing hearing. The record does not indicate
whether this second polygraph actually occurred but, if it did, Labbee has failed to enter into the
record any of the results. If prejudice cannot be shown from the record as it existed at the time of
a hearing, it is critical for a defendant to provide additional evidence via a post-hearing
submission.4 See Hawkins, 131 Idaho at 406, 958 P.2d at 32. Because Labbee has failed to show
prejudice to a substantial right, he has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion
to continue the sentencing hearing.
B. Sentence Review
Labbee asserts that his sentence is excessive. Specifically, Labbee notes that he was in his
“mid-teens” when he committed the “acts alleged by the State,” was found amenable for treatment

4
For example, as the State notes, if Labbee obtained a second, more favorable polygraph,
he could have submitted the results of such in support of an I.C.R. 35 motion.

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and a good candidate for probation, had a “horrible childhood,” and has multiple mental health
diagnoses. Labbee also notes that, despite his challenges, he obtained employment, got married,
and has a good relationship with his mother. The State contends that the sentence imposed is
reasonable given Labbee’s risk to the public and the serious nature of both the crime he pled guilty
to and the alleged conduct underlying the dismissed count.
An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v.
Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2000). Where a sentence is not illegal, the
appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear abuse of discretion. State
v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent such an abuse
of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time
of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution
applicable to a given case. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App.
1982). Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke,
103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a
sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could reach
the same conclusion as the district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154
(Ct. App. 2020). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Labbee has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion to continue the
sentencing hearing or that his sentence is excessive. Accordingly, Labbee’s judgment of
conviction and unified sentence of seventeen years, with a minimum period of confinement of ten
years, for lewd conduct with a child under sixteen years is affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge BRAILSFORD, CONCUR.

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