State v. Marc Joseph Sullivan

CourtListener 891086Idahoctapp23 de jul. de 2010

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 36180

STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 561
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: July 23, 2010
)
v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
MARC JOSEPH SULLIVAN, ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
Defendant-Appellant. ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified five-year sentence
with two-year determinate term for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth A. Allred, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
______________________________________________

Before LANSING, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;
and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM
Marc Joseph Sullivan pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. I.C. § 37-
2732(c). The district court imposed a unified five-year sentence with a two-year determinate
term, but suspended the sentence and placed Sullivan on probation.1 Subsequently, Sullivan
admitted to violating the terms of the probation, and the district court consequently revoked
probation and ordered execution of the original sentence. Sullivan appeals, contending that the
district court abused its discretion in revoking probation, that the sentence is excessive, and that

1
Sullivan also pled guilty to two misdemeanors and was sentenced concurrent terms in jail
with credit for time served. Those judgments of conviction and sentences are not an issue on
appeal.

1
the district court erred in failing to sua sponte reduce Sullivan’s sentence upon revocation of his
probation.
It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122
Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772
P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App.
1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v.
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834
P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation
has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the
court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at
326, 834 P.2d at 328; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). A
decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court
abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328.
Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review
and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well
established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822
P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-
73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v.
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id.
Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering
execution of Sullivan’s original sentence without modification. Therefore, the order revoking
probation and directing execution of Sullivan’s previously suspended sentence is affirmed.

2

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.