State v. TAMS

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 36539

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) 2010 Opinion No. 65
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Filed: September 21, 2010
v. )
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
CLARENCE TAMS, )
)
Defendant-Respondent. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Boundary County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. Hon. Quentin Harden,
Magistrate.

Order of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate division,
vacating judgment of conviction for placing debris on a highway, affirmed.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Rebekah A. Cudé, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Rebekah A. Cudé argued.

Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., Sandpoint, for respondent. Daniel P. Featherston
argued.
______________________________________________
MELANSON, Judge
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court’s intermediate appellate decision
vacating Clarence Tams’ judgment of conviction for placing debris on a highway. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Tams was hauling cattle from Canada to a slaughterhouse in Washington. Prior to
crossing the border into the United States, Tams passed through a significant rainstorm, which
added rainwater to the mixture of cattle manure and urine accumulating in the trailer. While
traveling through northern Idaho en route to the slaughterhouse, Tams made a slow turn onto a
local highway. A nearby officer observed a mixture of cattle manure, urine, and water spill from
Tams’ cattle trailer onto the roadway. When the officer pulled Tams over, more of the mixture

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spilled out of the trailer. The officer cited Tams with misdemeanor placing debris on a highway.
I.C. § 18-3906.
At trial, Tams argued that I.C. § 18-3906 did not apply to the dumping of cow manure or
urine. The magistrate disagreed, holding that a mixture of cow manure and urine is a waste
substance under the statute and that Tams negligently permitted the deposit of a waste substance
onto a public highway. The magistrate found Tams guilty of violating I.C. § 18-3906 and
sentenced him to sixteen hours in the sheriff’s labor program and a $100 fine.
Tams appealed to the district court, which vacated Tams’ judgment of conviction. The
district court determined that the magistrate erred because the manure mixture was not
considered a waste substance under the statute. Specifically, the district court reasoned that,
unlike the other substances expressly mentioned in the statute, the mixture leaking from Tams’
trailer was a liquid. Further, the district court concluded that the magistrate erred because the
state had not proven that Tams was criminally negligent. The state appeals.
II.
ANALYSIS
The state argues that the district court erred when it vacated Tams’ judgment of
conviction. Specifically, the state asserts that the district court erred by concluding that the
mixture spilled from Tams’ trailer was not a waste substance under I.C. § 18-3906. Further, the
state asserts that the district court erred when it held that there was not substantial evidence to
support the magistrate’s finding that Tams was criminally negligent.
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, we review
the decision of the district court directly. State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217
(Ct. App. 2008). We examine the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s
conclusions of law follow from those findings. Id. If those findings are so supported and the
conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we
affirm the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure. Id.
A. Idaho Code Section 18-3906
The state argues on appeal that I.C. § 18-3906 prohibits the spilling of a mixture of cow
manure, urine, and rainwater onto our public roadways. Idaho Code Section 18-3906(1) states,
in relevant part:

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If any person shall willfully or negligently throw from any vehicle, place,
deposit, or permit to be deposited upon or alongside of any highway, street, alley
or easement used by the public for public travel, any debris, paper, litter, glass
bottle, glass, nails, tacks, hoops, cans, barbed wire, boards, trash or garbage,
lighted material or other waste substance, such persons shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding three hundred dollars ($300) or by
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding ten (10) days.

(Emphasis added). The magistrate determined that a mixture of cow manure and urine is a waste
substance for purposes of the statute. However, the district court disagreed, holding that,
because the materials specifically listed in the statute are solid substances, the legislature must
have intended the “other waste substance” language to denote only solid materials. The state
argues on appeal that the magistrate’s interpretation of I.C. § 18-3906 properly reflects the plain
meaning of the statute.
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State
v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688
(1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134
Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of the statute is to be given its
plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative
history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this
Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and
give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. To ascertain the intent of
the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of
those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative history. Id. It is incumbent
upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. State v. Beard,
135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). Constructions of a statute that would
lead to an absurd result are disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525
(2004); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004).
Waste is defined as “refuse from places of human or animal habitation,” such as garbage,
rubbish, excrement, or sewage. Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 1333 (10th ed. 1994).

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Substance is defined as “physical material from which something is made or which has a discrete
existence.” Id. at 1175. Testimony presented at trial indicated that the substance leaking from
Tams’ trailer was cow manure mixed with urine and rainwater. Manure and urine are types of
refuse from a place of animal habitation, consistent with the definition of waste. Further, a
mixture of cow manure and urine is a physical material that has a discrete existence, consistent
with the definition of substance. As such, the magistrate did not err in determining that a
mixture of cow manure and urine comes under the purview of I.C. § 18-3906.
Tams also urges this Court to examine the legislative intent behind I.C. § 18-3906.
Specifically, Tams argues that drivers of vehicles transporting livestock should not be subject to
I.C. § 18-3906 due to the important role that agriculture plays in Idaho’s economy. In support of
this argument, Tams relies upon provisions of Idaho law to demonstrate that the legislature
intended to separately regulate the waste products of the livestock industry.1 However, as
mentioned above, if the plain meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not engage
in statutory construction. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. A mixture of cow manure
and urine falls within the plain meaning of the phrase “waste substance.” Therefore, we will not
go beyond the language of the statute to examine the legislative intent behind I.C. § 18-3906. As
such, the magistrate’s conclusion that the mixture spilled from Tams’ trailer fell under the
purview of I.C. § 18-3906 was not in error.
B. Negligence
In order to convict a defendant under I.C. § 18-3906, the state must prove that the
defendant negligently or willfully placed, deposited, or permitted to be deposited a waste
substance on a public highway. Idaho Code Section 18-101(2) defines “negligently” as “a want
of such attention to the nature of probable consequences of the act or omission as a prudent man
ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns.”

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It should be noted that the statute provisions cited by Tams involve the authority of the
Idaho Department of Agriculture to regulate cattle feed lots and the odor emanating from such
lots. See I.C. §§ 22-4902 and 25-3807. For example, I.C. § 22-4902 requires cattle feed lots to
comply with state and federal clean water standards. Idaho Code Section 18-3906, however, is a
criminal statute, regulating conduct on public roads and highways. There is no exception for
drivers transporting livestock or other agricultural products.

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At trial and at the close of the state’s evidence, Tams moved for a judgment of acquittal
pursuant to I.C.R. 29, arguing that the state had not presented substantial evidence that Tams had
acted willfully or negligently. The magistrate ruled as follows:
In ruling in this case I would note that the court has reviewed I.C. 18-3906
as well as I.C. 18-101 and the negligence required is not criminal negligence in
the sense that his behavior must be reckless or heedless or wanton. All it requires
is the willfulness which may be an indifference to the safety or rights of others
and so the court would deny the motion to dismiss.

At the close of evidence, the magistrate ruled from the bench. After reciting the
definition “willfully or negligently” in I.C § 18-101(2), the magistrate ruled that Tams’ operation
of the truck while the manure mixture sloshed onto the highway constituted a “willful
indifference to the safety or rights of other members of the motoring public.” This standard
differs from the standard set forth in I.C. § 18-101 but is consistent with State v. McMahan, 57
Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156 (1937). In that case, the Court held that an involuntary manslaughter
statute prohibiting acts committed “without due caution and circumspection” (an ordinary
negligence standard) must be read together with I.C. § 17-114. Id. at 256, 65 P.2d 162. Idaho
Code Section 17-114 was later renumbered to its current designation of I.C. § 18-114. Both
versions of the statute provide that, “in every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or
joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence.” The McMahan Court ruled that the
term “criminal negligence” means gross negligence. Id. at 256, 65 P.2d 162. Such negligence
“amounts to a reckless disregard of consequences and of the rights of others.” Id. at 256, 65 P.2d
at 162-63. The McMahan Court acknowledged the definition of negligence found in
I.C. § 18-101 (then codified at I.C. § 17-101), but essentially held that it was subordinate to the
I.C. § 18-114 requirement of “criminal negligence.” Id. at 257-58, 65 P.2d at 163. The Court
reasoned as follows:
The legislature did not intend every act done negligently, resulting in what
would have been a crime if done intentionally, to be criminal because of the
negligence, but intended only to constitute such acts criminal in the event such
negligence amounted to the degree contemplated by [I.C. § 18-114].

Id. at 257, 65 P.2d at 163. See also State v. Sibley, 138 Idaho 259, 263-64, 61 P.3d 616, 620-21
(Ct. App. 2002). Such criminal negligence may be committed by commission or omission. State
v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 735, 87 P.2d 454, 459 (1939). The McMahan interpretation of

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I.C. § 18-114 and its interaction with I.C. § 18-101(2) continues to be controlling unless the
legislature has specifically altered this negligence standard in defining a particular offense. See
Haxforth v. State, 117 Idaho 189, 190, 786 P.2d 580, 581 (Ct. App. 1990). See also State v.
Long, 91 Idaho 436, 441-42, 423 P.2d 858, 863-64 (1967); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 487-
88, 680 P.2d 1383, 1387-88 (Ct. App. 1984). Consistent with this line of authority, Idaho
Criminal Jury Instruction No. 342 defines criminal negligence as “a wanton, flagrant or reckless
disregard of consequences or willful indifference of the safety or rights of others.”
We next consider whether there was substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate’s finding that Tams was criminally negligent. The state introduced photographs at
trial, taken after the officer had stopped Tams for littering, which depicted waste on the ground
next to Tams’ cattle trailer. The magistrate found that such photographic evidence demonstrated
that the waste was sloshing out of the vents of the trailer, creating a safety hazard for other
drivers. As a result, the magistrate held that Tams negligently spilled manure on the highway
because he failed to meet his obligation to pull the trailer over and open the drains to release the
manure prior to driving further.
The officer testified that, at the intersection of two state highways near Bonners Ferry, he
witnessed a large amount of cow manure and urine spilling out from underneath Tams’ trailer,
along each side of the trailer near the rear wheels. The officer also testified that the liquid
leaking from the trailer during the traffic stop came from the underside of the trailer. Further, the
officer testified that the manure and urine continued to leak while the trailer was stopped and
more liquid accumulated on the ground near the trailer after the officer took the photos. In
addition, both Tams and a former truck driver testified that cattle shift around in the trailer while
being hauled. Tams and the former driver stated that, at times, cattle step on or near a floor
drain, causing the floor to flex and leak manure and urine onto the road. Therefore, based on the
testimony presented at trial, it appears that the manure and urine leaked through the floor of the
trailer. While the photographs presented at trial indicate that some of the mixture may have
spilled out of the truck’s vents, testimony by the officer indicates that the majority of the liquid
leaked onto the roadway came from underneath the trailer.
Tams presented evidence that the floor drains were properly closed and locked at the time
of the traffic stop, that the trailer and its drains had not been tampered with, that the trailer was
sealed pursuant to United States and Canadian regulations, and that it was common practice for

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trailer drivers not to open drains while cattle are in the trailer because it may do harm to the
animals should they step through a drain opening. In addition, Tams testified that access to the
inside of his trailer, after it had been sealed, was limited to using a door on the roof of the trailer,
which he considered to be unsafe. Both Tams and the former driver testified that there was no
place between Canada and the slaughterhouse to unload the cattle to clean out the trailer. Such
testimony was undisputed by the state. The state argued that Tams’ negligence was a matter of
common sense because it was a rare event for manure to spill onto public roadways and, when
something rare like that occurs, it must be negligence that caused it. Nevertheless, the state did
not present evidence of any facility where Tams could have cleaned out his truck prior to
crossing into the United States. Rather, the state argued that the amount of manure placed on the
roadway was so significant that negligence was to be presumed.
The evidence presented at trial, however, is contrary to the magistrate’s finding that Tams
acted negligently. While the amount of manure on the road was significant, the state failed to
present evidence that Tams demonstrated a reckless disregard of the consequence of the leaking
manure and urine or to the rights or safety of others. Further, the magistrate’s assertion that
Tams should have opened the drains to dump manure and urine onto a rural field was not
supported by any evidence that doing so could be done safely and legally. In addition, while the
state now contends on appeal that Tams should have opened the drains and cleaned out his trailer
prior to sealing the truck and entering the United States, it presented no evidence of a facility
where he could have done so. Tams also testified that the rainstorm lasted until about five miles
before he arrived at the border and that there were no facilities near the border to open the drains
and clean out the trailer after the rainstorm had subsided, but prior to his truck being sealed.
Therefore, substantial evidence did not support the magistrate’s conclusion that Tams was
criminally negligent. Accordingly, the district court did not err by vacating Tams’ judgment of
conviction.
Tams raises other issues on appeal. However, because we affirm the district court’s
decision to vacate Tams’ judgment of conviction, we decline to address those remaining issues.
III.
CONCLUSION
The magistrate did not err by concluding that a mixture of cow manure and urine is
considered a waste substance under I.C. § 18-3906. However, the magistrate erred by

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determining that Tams was criminally negligent. Therefore, the district court’s order vacating
Tams’ judgment of conviction for placing debris on a public highway is affirmed.
Chief Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR.

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