51440 State v. Skidmore

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 51439/51440

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: January 13, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
MICHAEL ALAN SKIDMORE, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Jerome
County. Hon. Rosemary Emory, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of ten years with a minimum period
of confinement of six years for burglary, affirmed; judgment of conviction and
consecutive, unified sentence of five years with one year determinate for
influencing a witness, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; HUSKEY, Judge;
and LORELLO, Judge
________________________________________________

PER CURIAM
In Docket No. 51439, Michael Alan Skidmore pled guilty to one count of burglary, Idaho
Code § 18-1401. In exchange for his guilty plea, an additional charge was dismissed. The district
court imposed a unified term of ten years with six years determinate, suspended the sentence, and
placed Skidmore on probation for a period of four years. Subsequently, Skidmore admitted to
violating the terms of the probation, and the district court consequently revoked probation and
ordered execution of the original sentence.

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In Docket No. 51440, Skidmore pled guilty to influencing a witness, I.C. § 18-2604(3). In
exchange for his guilty plea, an additional charge was dismissed. The district court imposed a
unified term of five years with one year determinate, to be served consecutively to the sentence in
Docket No. 51439. Skidmore appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion when
it ordered Skidmore’s sentences to be served consecutively and by failing to retain jurisdiction.
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the
factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and
need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984);
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the
length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722,
726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could
reach the same conclusion as the district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150,
154 (Ct. App. 2020).
The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to
obtain additional information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential and suitability for
probation, and probation is the ultimate objective of a defendant who is on retained jurisdiction.
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 687 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,
567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. App. 1982). There can be no abuse of discretion in a trial court’s
refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court already has sufficient information upon which to conclude
that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation. State v. Beebe, 113 Idaho 977, 979,
751 P.2d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 1988); Toohill, 103 Idaho at 567, 650 P.2d at 709.
Applying these standards, and having reviewed the records in these cases, we cannot say
that the district court abused its discretion. Therefore, Skidmore’s judgments of conviction and
sentences are affirmed.

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