51835, 51836 State v. Dixey

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 51834/51835/51836

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: May 30, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
INA GRACE DIXEY, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bannock County. Hon. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge.

Appeal from the orders revoking probation and executing previously suspended
sentences in Docket Nos. 51834 and 51835, dismissed; judgment of conviction and
unified sentence of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years,
for felony eluding in Docket No. 51836, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

Before HUSKEY, Judge; LORELLO, Judge;
and TRIBE, Judge
________________________________________________
PER CURIAM
This appeal involves three consolidated cases. In Docket No. 51834, Ina Grace Dixey pled
guilty to possession of a controlled substance. Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1). The district court
sentenced Dixey to a unified term of four and one-half years, with a minimum period of
confinement of one and one-half years, and retained jurisdiction. In Docket No. 51835, Dixey
pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). The district court
sentenced Dixey to a unified term of four and one-half years, with a minimum period of

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confinement of one and one-half years, and retained jurisdiction.1 In both cases, after the period
of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the sentences and placed Dixey on probation
for four years. Subsequently, Dixey admitted to violating the terms of probation in both cases.
The district court continued Dixey on probation and extended the term for an additional two years
in both cases. Subsequently, Dixey admitted to violating the terms of probation in both cases. The
district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original suspended
sentences in both cases.
In Docket No. 51836, Dixey pled guilty to felony eluding. I.C. § 49-1404(2). The district
court sentenced Dixey to a unified term of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of
two years, and retained jurisdiction.2 Dixey filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, which the
district court denied.3
In Docket Nos. 51834 and 51835, Dixey appeals, contending that the district court abused
its discretion by revoking probation and executing the underlying sentences in both cases,
specifically that she should have been allowed to continue on probation. During the pendency of
this appeal, the district court suspended Dixey’s sentences and placed her on probation for four
years. Given that, the State argues that Dixey’s appeal is now moot. A case becomes moot when
the issues presented are no longer live or the defendant lacks a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982); Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816
P.2d 986, 989 (1991). Even where a question is moot, there are three exceptions to the mootness
doctrine: (1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person
raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is
capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public
interest. State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010). The only relief Dixey has
requested on appeal cannot be granted because she has been granted the relief she requested, and

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This sentence was ordered to run concurrently to the sentence in Docket No. 51834.
2
This sentence was ordered to run consecutively to the sentences in Docket
Nos. 51834, 51835, and another unrelated case.
3
On appeal, Dixey does not challenge the district court’s denial of her Rule 35 motion for
reduction of sentence.

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she has not identified an exception to the mootness doctrine that would otherwise make her claim
of error justiciable. As such, any judicial relief from this Court would have no effect on either
party. See id.
In Docket No. 51836, Dixey appeals, arguing that her sentence is excessive. Sentencing is
a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered
in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and need not be repeated here.
See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho
565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we
consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391
(2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could reach the same
conclusion as the district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154 (Ct. App.
2020). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in Docket No. 51836, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion.
Therefore, the appeal from the orders revoking probation and directing execution of
Dixey’s previously suspended sentences in Docket Nos. 51834 and 51835 are dismissed. The
judgment of conviction and sentence in Docket No. 51836 is affirmed.

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