State v. Navo

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 52742 & 52743

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: February 9, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
REGINALD CHAMBERLAIN NAVO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bannock County. Hon. Javier L. Gabiola, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and ordering executing of previously suspended sentence
in Docket No. 52742, affirmed; judgment of conviction and unified sentence of six
years, with a minimum period of incarceration of three years, for felony driving
under the influence, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Abigael E. Schulz, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

Before TRIBE, Chief Judge; GRATTON, Judge;
and HUSKEY, Judge
________________________________________________

PER CURIAM
This appeal involves two consolidated cases. In Docket No. 52742, Reginald Chamberlain
Navo pleaded guilty to felony driving under the influence (DUI), Idaho Code §§ 18-
8004, -8005(6). In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to not file additional charges.
The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with a minimum period of incarceration
of two years, suspended the sentence and placed Navo on probation. While on probation, Navo
received new criminal charges in Docket No. 52743. Navo admitted to violating terms of the
probation in Docket No. 52742, and the district court consequently revoked probation and ordered

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execution of the previously suspended sentence. In Docket No. 52743, Navo pleaded guilty to
felony DUI, I.C. §§ 18-8004, -8005(9). In exchange for his guilty plea, an additional charge was
dismissed. The district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with a minimum period of
incarceration of three years, and ordered the sentence to run concurrently with the sentence in
Docket No. 52742. Navo appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion in revoking
probation in Docket No. 52742 and that the sentence in Docket No. 52743 is excessive.1
It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions
of the probation has been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325,
834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct.
App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining
whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275,
899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho
at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that
the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35
to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976,
977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction.
I.C. § 19-2601(4). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing
that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing
the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial
court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct.
App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant
to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. Id.
Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and
the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established
and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011,
1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App.
1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing
the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho

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Navo filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion in both cases, which the district court denied.
Navo does not challenge the denial of those motions on appeal.
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722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds
could reach the same conclusion as the district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d
150, 154 (Ct. App. 2020).
Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the records in these cases, we
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and ordering execution
of Navo’s sentence in Docket No. 52742 or by imposing sentence in Docket No. 52743. Therefore,
the order revoking probation and directing execution of Navo’s previously suspended sentence in
Docket No. 52742 and the judgment of conviction and sentence in Docket No. 52743 are affirmed.

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