State of Idaho v. John Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 53143

In the Interest of: John Doe I and John )
Doe II, Children Under Eighteen (18) )
Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) Filed: May 4, 2026
HEALTH & WELFARE, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Petitioner-Respondent, )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
v. ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
JOHN DOE (2025-34), )
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Anson L. Call II, Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Robert O. Eldredge, Pocatello, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Jason R. Chandler, Deputy Attorney
General, Pocatello, for respondent.
________________________________________________

TRIBE, Chief Judge
John Doe (2025-34) appeals from the judgment terminating his parental rights. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe is the father of two children (Children) born in 2022 and 2023.1 This case arose after
Doe, Children’s mother, and Children moved multiple times and ultimately became homeless. In
part, the homelessness resulted from domestic violence between Doe and Children’s mother.

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Doe has a history of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare involvement, including
twenty-two intakes, sixteen assessments, and two open case management cases that resulted in the
removal and termination of his parental rights to three of his four other children in 2008.

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In December 2023 and January 2024, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
(Department) received referrals raising concerns that Children were homeless and that Doe and
Children’s mother were constantly fighting. The Department recommended temporary shelter
care, and the State filed a motion to remove Children.
The magistrate court placed Children in the Department’s legal custody. The magistrate
court ordered Doe to complete a case plan to reunify with Children. While in foster care, Children
received medical care and a stable home environment. The magistrate court conducted several
review and status hearings while Children were in the Department’s custody. The Department
filed a petition to terminate Doe’s parental rights, and the magistrate court held a termination trial.
After the trial, the magistrate court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and the
judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights, finding that Doe neglected Children and that
termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of Children. Doe appeals.2
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. Idaho Code § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of
due process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho
383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a
parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental
liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may
terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of

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The magistrate court also terminated the parental rights of Children’s mother. The decision
to terminate her parental rights is at issue in a separate appeal.

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Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386,
146 P.3d at 652.
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be
terminated. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires
a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the trial court’s decision must
be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the
parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five
factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between
the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities
for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e)
the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each
statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
III.
ANALYSIS
Doe raises two arguments on appeal. First, Doe argues the magistrate court erred in finding
that he neglected Children under I.C. § 16-1602(31). Specifically, Doe contends that he completed
his case plan and remedied the issues that led to Children’s removal. Second, Doe argues that the
magistrate court erred in determining that termination of his parental rights is in Children’s best
interests. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment terminating Doe’s parental
rights.

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A. Neglect
Doe argues that the magistrate court erred in finding there was sufficient evidence he
neglected Children. Although Doe asserts that he completed his case plan and remedied the issues
that led to Children’s removal, he fails to support this assertion with meaningful argument or
authority. Doe does not identify any specific factual findings that were unsupported by the
evidence, nor does he explain how the facts fail to support the magistrate court’s neglect
determination. Instead, Doe references the testimony of each witness and then concludes that the
“parents completed all of their case plan requirements.” This essentially asks this Court to reweigh
the evidence, which we do not do. See In the Int. of Doe Children, 163 Idaho 367, 376, 413 P.3d
767, 776 (2018) (reiterating that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence but defer to the trial
court’s unique ability to make factual findings).
Additionally, this Court generally does not address issues not supported by cogent
argument and citation to legal authority, even in a case terminating parental rights. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho 143, 147, 426 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2018). The
Court, however, may address certain narrow issues involving due process violations despite the
absence of supporting, cogent argument or citation to legal authority. Idaho Dep’t of Health &
Welfare v. Doe (2017-32), 163 Idaho 536, 538, 415 P.3d 945, 947 (2018); State v. Doe, 144 Idaho
534, 536, 164 P.3d 814, 816 (2007). For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has previously
addressed due process errors affecting parents’ fundamental rights, including procedural errors and
the application of an incorrect standard of review. Doe (2017-32), 163 Idaho at 538, 415 P.3d at
947 (addressing procedural error); Doe, 144 Idaho at 536, 164 P.3d at 816 (addressing application
of incorrect standard).
Even if we consider the merits of Doe’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding of neglect, Doe has failed to meet his burden of showing error. Idaho
Code Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-1602(31).
Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child is
without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary
for his or her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian, or
other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where the parent
has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a Child Protective Act case and the

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Department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen3 of the most recent
twenty-two months and reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth
month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the Department. I.C.
§ 16-2002(3)(b).
The record shows, and Doe does not contest, that Children were removed due to
homelessness. Although Doe later secured housing, the magistrate court found that Doe would
not maintain housing if Children were returned to his custody. The magistrate court also heard
testimony that Doe resisted efforts to maintain appropriate housing and expressed a desire to
remain homeless because “that’s how [he and Children’s mother] intend to live.” Doe failed to
comply with other portions of his case plan, such as his continued refusal to participate in drug
testing. Finally, Doe also refused to modify his parenting as required and “continue[d] to act
aggressively toward those trying to help him improve his parenting,” including toward Children’s
mother. Accordingly, substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s finding
that Doe neglected Children (as defined in I.C. § 16-1602(31)), by failing to comply with the case
plan, that the Children had been in the Department’s custody for over fifteen months, and that
reunification had not occurred within the time standards of I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b).
B. Best Interests
Doe argues the magistrate court erred in finding that termination of his parental rights is in
the best interests of Children. Doe fails to support this assertion with meaningful argument or
authority. Doe does not identify any specific factual findings that were unsupported by the
evidence, nor does he explain how the facts fail to support the magistrate court’s best interests
determination. As noted, this Court generally does not address issues not supported by cogent
argument and citation to legal authority. See Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho at 147, 426 P.3d at 1247.
Even if we review the merits of Doe’s argument, Doe fails to establish any error.
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When

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At the time the Department filed the petition to terminate parental rights, the statutory time
frame under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) was fifteen out of the most recent twenty-two months.
Subsequently, the statute was amended to twelve out of the most recent twenty-two months.

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determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
The magistrate court found that Doe made some changes, but the magistrate court
expressed concern that those changes would only last until he regained custody of Children. The
magistrate court also identified ongoing safety and stability concerns for Children despite Doe’s
changes. The magistrate court further found that Doe continued to act aggressively toward those
attempting to help him and toward Children’s mother. Doe did not consistently engage in services
or complete his case plan, limiting his ability to provide Children with permanency and stability.
The magistrate court also considered testimony that Children frequently experienced emotional
and behavioral difficulties after visitation with Doe. The magistrate court additionally found that
Children are thriving in foster care, have stability, and receive the care they require. As stated
above, evidence of improvement in foster care may support a finding that termination is in the
children’s best interests. Doe (2013-15), 156 Idaho at 111, 320 P.3d at 1270.
As with his argument regarding neglect, Doe asks this Court to reweigh the evidence,
which we decline to do. Doe does not challenge any of these factual findings but argues the
magistrate court incorrectly concluded that termination is in the best interests of Children. The
magistrate court considered Doe’s failure to complete the case plan and Children’s improvements
in foster care. Given Doe’s inconsistent engagement and inability to provide long-term stability,
substantial and competent evidence supports this finding. Doe has failed to show the magistrate
court erred in finding that it is in Children’s best interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
Doe has failed to show that the magistrate court erred in finding he neglected Children.
Doe has also failed to show that the magistrate court erred in finding that it is in Children’s best
interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights. The judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is
affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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