State v. Manzer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51032

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: March 5, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
RONALD ANTHONY MANZER, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Michael J. Reardon, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for two counts of lewd conduct with a child under the age
of sixteen years and seven counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen
years, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Ronald Anthony Manzer appeals from his judgment of conviction for two counts of lewd
conduct with a child under the age of sixteen years and seven counts of sexual abuse of a child
under the age of sixteen years. Manzer argues the district court abused its discretion when it
ordered him to pay a $5,000 civil penalty for each of his nine convictions without imposing the
penalties in separate written orders as required by Idaho Code § 19-5307. The State responds that
Manzer’s argument is not preserved for appeal, however, if error is found, it is easily correctable
through orders entered nunc pro tunc or by remand. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm
Manzer’s judgment of conviction, and the penalties will be enforceable nunc pro tunc, when
separate written orders are entered.

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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Manzer was indicted by a grand jury for two counts of lewd conduct with a child under the
age of sixteen years, I.C. § 18-1508, and seven counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of
sixteen years, I.C. § 18-1506. Following a jury trial, Manzer was found guilty on all nine counts.
A judgment of conviction was entered and Manzer was sentenced to a term of incarceration.
Additionally, Manzer was ordered to pay a $5,000 civil penalty on each count. The district court
included the penalties in the judgment of conviction but did not enter a separate order containing
the penalties as required by statute. Manzer appeals.
II.
ANALYSIS
Manzer argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing a $5,000 civil penalty
on each of his nine convictions without imposing the penalties in separate written orders as
required by I.C. § 19-5307. That section provides, in relevant part, that the trial court “may impose
a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) against any defendant found guilty of any felony
listed in subsection[] (2) . . . of this section.” Idaho Code § 19-5307(1) also requires that “a fine
created under this section shall be a separate written order in addition to any other sentence the
court may impose.”
The State agrees that, while the district court entered the penalties “clearly and distinctly
from other financial penalties” in the judgment of conviction, the district court erred when it failed
to enter the penalties in a separate written order as required by statute. Manzer argues that because
there is no statutory mechanism to enter new separate written orders, the portions of his judgment
of conviction that impose the penalties must be vacated. The State responds Manzer is arguing
that his sentence is illegal for the first time on appeal and therefore his argument is waived.
Nevertheless, the State requests either that this Court find the penalties will be enforceable nunc
pro tunc, when separate written orders are entered without remanding the case or remand the case
to allow the district court to enter a separate written order documenting the civil penalties imposed
on Manzer under I.C. § 19-5307 pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 36.
We first address whether the issue is properly preserved for appeal. The statute under
which the penalties were imposed, I.C. § 19-5307, reads: “a defendant may appeal a fine created
under this section in the same manner as any other aspect of a sentence imposed by the court.”

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Therefore, Manzer was not required to first challenge the penalties as illegal in an I.C.R. 35 motion
and can raise the issue for the first time on appeal.
Next, regarding the fact that the civil penalties were included in the judgment of conviction
as opposed to a separate order, a similar issue was raised in State v. Broadhead, 139 Idaho 663,
669, 84 P.3d 599, 605 (Ct. App. 2004). There, Broadhead argued a civil penalty imposed under
I.C. § 19-5307 was illegal because it was not in a separate order, but rather, in the judgment of
conviction. Broadhead, 139 Idaho at 669, 84 P.3d at 605. In the judgment of conviction, the
district court stated the statutory penalty “shall also be entered as a separate written order.” Id.
This Court concluded that the district court recognized the statutory fine was required to be entered
separately pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307, it just had not been entered yet. Therefore, we held the case
did not need to be remanded, as the mistake could be easily remedied and held “the fine will be
enforceable nunc pro tunc, when a separate order is entered.” Id.
Here, Manzer’s judgment of conviction does not contain language indicating the penalties
would be entered in a separate order. Instead, each of the penalties is included in the judgment of
conviction directly following each count. This constitutes error based upon the plain language of
I.C. § 19-5307(1). Manzer argues that because there is no statutory mechanism to enter new
separate written orders, the portions of his judgment of conviction that impose the penalties must
be vacated. The State responds the error can be corrected with or without remand because the
error was procedural and clerical in nature, did not unfairly prejudice Manzer, and did not impact
Manzer’s substantive rights. We agree with the State that the district court made a clerical error--
not a judicial error that requires remand.
A clerical mistake is one of draftsmanship whereas a judicial error is a mistake of
substance. State v. Vaughn, 156 Idaho 13, 16, 319 P.3d 497, 500 (Ct. App. 2014). Clerical errors
consist of “blunders in execution,” while judicial errors “consist of instances where the court
changes its mind.” Id. (quoting Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, n.2 (9th Cir. 1987)).
In this case, the district court intended to impose civil penalties on Manzer pursuant to
I.C. § 19-5307(1). At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated:
On each count I will impose court costs. I won’t impose a fine. On each
count I will impose a $5,000 civil penalty in favor of the victim named in that count.
And where both girls are named as victims, it will be in favor of them jointly and--I
mean, they’ll share that.

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Although entered only in the judgment of conviction and not in a separate written order, the error
is one that can be corrected without changing the substantive order or the intent of the district
court. There is no question the district court intended to enter the civil penalties against Manzer
or that the amount of each penalty is $5,000. We disagree with Manzer that the focus is on the
district court’s intent to issue a separate order as opposed to the district court’s intent to order the
penalties. As explained in Broadhead, “If a separate order was never entered, that means merely
that the fine is not yet adequately documented; it does not make the fine illegal in any sense. This
shortcoming can be remedied, and the fine will be enforceable nunc pro tunc, when a separate
written order is entered.” Broadhead, 139 Idaho at 669, 84 P.3d at 605.
Permitting the district court to enter a separate nunc pro tunc order regarding the civil
penalties simply corrects an error arising from oversight or omission, i.e., that the penalties had to
be entered in a separate order. It does not unfairly prejudice Manzer and does not impact any
substantive right of Manzer’s. Because the civil penalties were not entered in separate orders, the
penalties are simply not yet adequately documented but are not illegal. The penalties will be
enforceable nunc pro tunc, when a separate written order is entered. Because the civil penalties
will be enforceable when a separate order is entered, we need not address the State’s I.C.R. 36
argument or remand the case.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Although the district court did not abuse its discretion by including the civil penalties in
the judgment of conviction, the district court erred by not imposing the penalties in a separate
written order as required by I.C. § 19-5307. Therefore, Manzer’s judgment of conviction is
affirmed.
Chief Judge TRIBE and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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