State v. Kiefer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51850

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: December 30, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
GEORGE MAXWELL KIEFER, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Cynthia Yee-Wallace, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of seven years, with a minimum
period of confinement of two years, for aggravated battery, affirmed; order denying
I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kierra W. Mai, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
LORELLO, Judge
George Maxwell Kiefer pled guilty to aggravated battery. I.C. §§ 18-903(a), 18-907(1)(a),
and 19-2520. In exchange for his guilty plea, an additional charge that he is a persistent violator
was dismissed. The district court sentenced Kiefer to a unified term of seven years, with a
minimum period of confinement of two years, to be served consecutively to an unrelated sentence.
Kiefer filed an I.C.R. 35 motion, which the district court denied. Kiefer appeals, arguing that his
sentence is excessive and that the district court erred in denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction
of sentence. Kiefer primarily argues that the district court did not “adequately” consider his mental
health condition in either imposing sentence or in deciding his request for Rule 35 relief. In support
of his arguments, Kiefer details his “mental health struggles” and contends the district court should

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have given those struggles “more weight.” According to Kiefer, the record reveals the district
court “failed to consider” and “disregarded” his mental health because the district court “made no
mention” of his “mental health diagnoses” and did not “acknowledge” he was “diagnosed with co-
occurring mental health disorders.” As to his Rule 35 motion, Kiefer argues the district court
abused its discretion because, in its written order denying the motion, the district court did “not
once discuss[ ] his mental health records other than to note that they had been submitted in support
of his motion.” From this, Kiefer argues it is “clear” that the district court did not consider the
new information [he] submitted.” Kiefer has failed to show the district court abused its sentencing
discretion with respect to the imposition of sentence or in denying his request for Rule 35 relief.
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the
factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established. See
State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho
565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we
consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391
(2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could reach the same
conclusion as the district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154 (Ct. App.
2020).
At the change of plea hearing, when asked whether he suffered from any “psychological
or mental issues that could have a bearing on his case,” Kiefer answered, “No.” In providing a
factual basis for his guilty plea, Kiefer explained that “the incident was a mixture that was a great
example of fight or flight” and that he was “on a medication that caused [him] to be more violent
which over stimulated the brain and made it seem okay to do what [he] was going to do.” Kiefer
also explained that the incident began as “horseplay” that “got out of hand.” Kiefer also noted his
“mental health wasn’t exactly up to par,” nor was the victim’s mental health.
At sentencing, Kiefer began his recommendation by highlighting that he received
“institutional punishment” for the offense since it incurred in prison and was committed against
another inmate. Kiefer then noted that he had done well since and was moved to general
population. Kiefer’s subsequent comments addressed his remorse, his consideration of a self-
defense claim before he decided to plead guilty, and the victim’s alleged “propensity for violence,”

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before he turned to discussing his mental health. As to his mental health, Kiefer advised the district
court that he “takes his mental health very seriously,” as reflected in the certificates he received
since the aggravated battery. Kiefer noted he was “trying to be on the right medications” and
thought he was on them at sentencing. Kiefer asked the district court to “take into consideration
his mental health” before returning to highlighting his positive role in prison since the aggravated
battery and reiterating the change in his mental health medications. Finally, as part of his
allocution, Kiefer stated:
I got a lot of certificates here. Not only were they fun and experience to
have, I also influenced a lot of people to want to get more involved into mental
health. And it’s become the most number one priority in my life, to be mental
health driven. I will definitely teach this stuff to my kids.
Before imposing sentence, the district court stated:
I have considered the entire record in your case. I have also considered the
comments that were made in court today. I recognize that I have discretion in
sentencing you. I’ve considered the Toohill factors of protection of society,
deterrence of the individual and the public generally, rehabilitation and punishment,
as well as the factors set forth in Idaho Code [Section] 19-2521.
The district court expressly acknowledged Kiefer “has engaged in a lot of programming” and
commended him for doing so. The district court also noted Kiefer’s “very long, very long,
concerning criminal history,” the “level of violence inflicted on the victim,” and Kiefer’s changing
versions of what occurred. Based on the applicable standards and the mitigating and aggravating
factors, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with a minimum period of
confinement of two years. That the district court did not highlight various aspects of Kiefer’s
mental health history, which the district court also did not highlight at sentencing, does not
demonstrate that the district court did not consider the mental health information before it. As
noted, the district court expressly noted the certificates Kiefer earned and indicated it considered
the entire record and the comments made at sentencing. We will not presume the district court did
not consider the information before it, as the district court said it did, nor will we reweigh the
evidence on appeal from a discretionary sentencing decision. See State v. Deboer, 168 Idaho 520,
524, 484 P.3d 204, 208 (Ct. App. 2021).
We similarly decline to reweigh the evidence Kiefer submitted in support of his Rule 35
motion. A motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,

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addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d
23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting
a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. State
v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).
In his Rule 35 motion, Kiefer requested leniency in the form of reduced sentence--from
seven years (with a minimum period of confinement of two years) to one year (with a minimum
period of confinement of six months) to “allow [him] the opportunity to continue to show that he
has changed his behavior and allow the Department of Corrections to determine when [he] is
eligible for parole sooner.” The documents Kiefer filed in support of his motion included a series
of Mental Health Individualized Treatment Plans (dated January 11, 2023; March 29, 2023; and
June 21, 2023), which predated his April 23, 2024, sentencing hearing by several months to more
than one year. Kiefer also filed several handwritten pages in which he reiterated his remorse for
the aggravated battery, identified his mental health progress, and explained his version of events.
Substantively, it is unclear if this information qualifies as new since it is generally repetitive of the
arguments Kiefer made at sentencing. Even assuming the information is new as intended by the
parameters of I.C.R. 35, we are unpersuaded by Kiefer’s assertion that the district court “unduly
limited” the information it considered in relation to its decision denying Kiefer’s Rule 35 motion
simply because the district court did not include more specific discussion of the contents of the
mental health documents Kiefer submitted in support of his motion. The district court was aware
of the basis of Kiefer’s motion as reflected in its decision listing the documents Kiefer filed. The
district court’s ultimate determination that consideration of other factors, such as Kiefer’s criminal
history and the severity of the aggravated battery, warranted the sentence imposed was not an
abuse of discretion.
Kiefer’s judgment of conviction and sentence, and the district court’s order denying
Kiefer’s Rule 35 motion, are affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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