State v. Finch

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51807

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: December 4, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JOSHUA JAMES FINCH, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Jonathan Medema, District Judge.

Order denying Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) motion, affirmed.

Joshua Finch; Eloy, Arizona, pro se appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Joshua James Finch appeals from the district court’s order denying his Idaho Criminal
Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. Finch argues the district court erred in denying
his motion because the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) did not apply his 237 days of
credit for time served to his consecutive sentences. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Finch pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault,
Idaho Code §§ 18-901(b), -905(a) (Count I); one count of unlawful possession of bombs or
destructive devices, I.C. §§ 18-3319, -3318, -3321 (Count II); one count unlawful possession of
firearms, I.C. § 18-3316 (Count III); and two counts of injury to child, I.C. 18-501(1) (Count V

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and Count VI).1 For each of Counts I, II, and III, Finch was sentenced to five years determinate,
with the sentences to run concurrently with each other. For Count V, Finch was sentenced to a
unified term of ten years, with a minimum period of incarceration of seven years, to run
consecutively to Counts I, II, and III. For Count VI, Finch was sentenced to a unified term of ten
years, with a minimum period of incarceration of one year, to run consecutively to Count V. The
judgment of conviction provides that “the defendant shall receive credit for two hundred thirty-
seven (237) days served.”
Finch appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive
sentences. In an unpublished opinion, this Court affirmed Finch’s judgment of conviction and
sentences. State v. Finch, Docket No. 42414 (Ct. App. May 14, 2015) (unpublished).
Eight years into serving his sentences, Finch filed an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an
illegal sentence, arguing that he was not given proper credit for his time served. Finch asserted
that under State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 343 P.3d 30 (2015), his 237 days of credit for time served
must also be applied to each consecutive sentence for Counts V and VI, for a total of 711 days of
credit, and IDOC had only applied 237 days to the concurrent sentences for Counts I, II, and III.
Although Finch filed an I.C.R. 35(a) motion, based on Finch’s argument, the district court
considered the motion to be an I.C.R. 35(c) motion. The district court found the judgment of
conviction accurately reflected the number of days Finch spent incarcerated before the judgment
was entered and Finch’s complaint was with IDOC’s application of the credited days and not the
district court’s calculation. Because there was no challenge to the district court’s computation of
Finch’s credit for time served, the district court found that it lacked jurisdiction to tell IDOC how
to apply the credited days and denied Finch’s motion.
Finch filed another I.C.R. 35(a) motion and renewed his argument that his sentences are
illegal under Owens and I.C. § 18-309 and must be corrected to reflect 237 days of credit for time
served on each of his concurrent and consecutive sentences. Finch argued that while the district
court properly calculated his credit for time served as 237 days, pursuant to I.C. § 18-309, the
district court did not properly apply the credit to all of Finch’s sentences as required under Owens.
Finch recognized that Owens only applied prospectively and to cases on direct review.
Finch, however, asserted that his case properly qualified for application of Owens because his

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Pursuant to Finch’s plea agreement, Count IV was dismissed.
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direct appeal was not final until June 3, 2015, after Owens was issued. The district court again
denied Finch’s I.C.R. 35(a) motion. The district court agreed that if Owens applied, Finch is
entitled to credit for the time he spent incarcerated prior to the entry of judgment. However, the
district court disagreed that it could correct how the calculation was applied by IDOC. The district
court explained that an option available to Finch was for Finch to file an application for a writ of
habeas corpus under I.C. § 19-4205.
Finch then filed two motions to file his notice of appeal nunc pro tunc contemporaneously
with a notice of appeal and various related filings. The district court issued an order denying
Finch’s motion to file a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc finding the motion was either moot or
outside of the district court’s jurisdiction to decide. Finch again filed an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to
correct an illegal sentence, raising the same arguments based on Owens and I.C. § 18-309. The
district court denied Finch’s motion, again concluding that the district court could not grant the
relief Finch requested because Finch was not asserting the district court incorrectly calculated his
credit for time served, only that the credited days were applied incorrectly by IDOC. The district
court again stated that Finch “simply needs to raise the argument in an application for a writ of
habeas corpus where the State Board of Correction will have an opportunity to respond to his
arguments.” Finch appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit for time served to
the facts of a particular case is a question of law which is subject to free review by the appellate
courts. State v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 381, 384-85, 373 P.3d 699, 702-03 (2016). We defer to the trial
court’s findings of fact unless those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent
evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170,
139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006).
III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Finch renews his argument that his credit for prejudgment incarceration was
not properly applied to his concurrent and consecutive sentences and, therefore, his aggregate
sentence, as imposed, is illegal in violation of I.C. § 18-309. Finch does not argue the credit for
time served of 237 days is an incorrect computation. Instead, Finch argues the district court’s

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failure to specify how that credit applied to his sentence resulted in an incorrect application by
IDOC. Finch asserts that under Owens, an I.C.R. 35(a) motion is the appropriate judicial remedy
to correct not only a court’s incorrect computation of credit for time served, but also the improper
application of that computation. The State asserts the district court correctly held that the proper
avenue for Finch to raise his argument is through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the
district court lacked jurisdiction to order IDOC to apply Finch’s credited time in a specific way.
The awarding of credit for time served is governed by I.C. § 18-309. The language of I.C.
§ 18-309 is mandatory and requires that, in sentencing a criminal defendant or when hearing an
I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served, the trial court give the appropriate credit for
prejudgment incarceration. State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21, 319 P.3d 501, 504-05 (Ct. App.
2014). This means that the defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent incarcerated before
judgment. Id. at 21, 319 P.3d at 505.
The writ of habeas corpus is a constitutionally mandated mechanism to effect the discharge
of an individual from unlawful confinement. See IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 5; I.C. §§ 19-4201 to
19-4226; Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 231, 392 P.2d 279, 280 (1964); Gawron v. Roberts, 113
Idaho 330, 333, 743 P.2d 983, 986 (Ct. App. 1987). “A prisoner may file a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to request that a court inquire into state or federal constitutional questions
concerning conditions of confinement, the revocation of parole, miscalculation of a sentence, loss
of good time credits, or detainers lodged against the prisoner.” State v. Martin, 159 Idaho 860,
865, 367 P.3d 255, 260 (Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation omitted). The appropriate mechanism to
challenge IDOC’s interpretation, application, or calculation of a sentence is through filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. Trial courts do not have jurisdiction to order IDOC to
recalculate the credit for time served pursuant to an I.C.R. 35(a) motion. Martin, at 865, 367 P.3d
260.
Contrary to Finch’s assertions, Owens does not support the proposition that I.C.R. 35 is an
effective mechanism to correct IDOC’s alleged improper application of credit for time served.
Although on appeal Finch again presents his arguments as an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an
illegal sentence, the relief he seeks involves his credit for time served, I.C.R. 35(c). Idaho Criminal
Rule 35(c) addresses only the trial court’s computation of the number of days of prejudgment
incarceration for which the defendant receives credit. However, I.C.R. 35(c) does not address
IDOC’s application of that credited time.

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Finch’s claim that his credit for time served was not applied to all five counts implicates a
misapplication by IDOC of Finch’s credit for time served in determining Finch’s parole eligibility
date. Thus, Finch must file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As this Court has previously
held, the district court lacks jurisdiction to order IDOC to recalculate Finch’s parole eligibility date
pursuant to I.C.R. 35(a) or (c). As a result, the district court did not err in dismissing Finch’s I.C.R.
35(a) motion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in denying Finch’s motion to correct an illegal sentence
because the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order to IDOC on the application of Finch’s
correctly calculated 237 days of credit for time served. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
denial of Finch’s I.C.R. 35(a) motion.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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