State v. Claus

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49992

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: November 21, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
VICTOR ARDELL CLAUS, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Kootenai County. Hon. Scott Wayman, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for first degree murder, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
TRIBE, Judge
Victor Ardell Claus appeals from his judgment of conviction for first degree murder. Claus
argues the district court erred by allowing the State to introduce character and expert testimony in
violation of Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(a). We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to evidence adduced at trial, in March 2021, M.S. began a romantic relationship
with Claus, who lived in Idaho and was separated but was not yet divorced from his now
ex-wife.1 By early 2021, M.S. was dividing her time between California and Idaho, with plans to
relocate to Idaho permanently. On April 13, Claus picked M.S. up from the airport. Security

1
During the pendency of the case, Claus’s wife filed for and obtained a divorce from Claus.

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footage from a gas station showed Claus and M.S. appearing happy and affectionate. A short time
afterward, however, while M.S. was driving Claus’s vehicle with Claus in the passenger seat, M.S.
suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the head. The vehicle crossed the median into oncoming traffic,
collided with an SUV, clipped a motorcycle, and rolled before coming to rest on the shoulder.
Claus consistently told first responders and law enforcement that M.S. shot herself during
an argument about his delayed divorce. Multiple bystanders also heard Claus state that M.S. shot
herself. One of the witnesses recovered a gun from the passenger side of the vehicle and later gave
it to the officers who arrived on the scene. Notably, at trial, family members and other witnesses
testified that, at that time, M.S. was optimistic about her future, and none indicated that she showed
any signs of being suicidal.
Sometime later, Claus was transported to the hospital. There, he was interviewed by
Detective Sergeant Lallatin of the Kootenai County Sheriff’s Office. Detective Lallatin noted
signs of Claus’s intoxication--a strong odor of alcohol, glassy eyes, and impaired speech; Claus
also acknowledged he had been drinking. Claus told Detective Lallatin that M.S. was driving the
vehicle when she reached for his gun off the dashboard and committed suicide. A few days later,
Detective Lallatin interviewed Claus at the sheriff’s office. This time, Claus stated the gun was
most likely in the center console underneath some items but that he did not remember with
certainty where the gun was on the day of the incident.
Ultimately, the State charged Claus with first degree murder, and the case proceeded to
trial. The trial spanned over eight days and involved over forty witnesses.
Claus’s ex-wife testified at trial. She testified that Claus habitually kept one of his guns in
a holster in the center console of his vehicle. Claus’s ex-wife also testified that accessing the gun
required someone to press a latch and lift the console up and then remove the gun from the holster.
She testified that, in her experience, Claus did not keep his gun on the dashboard. Claus’s ex-wife
also testified that, during their marriage, Claus had a “short fuse”; had mood swings; and would
go from happy to angry quickly, which was exacerbated with alcohol. The State argued that these
episodes showed Claus was capable of affectionate behavior quickly followed by violence.

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Pertinent to the issues raised on appeal, the following witnesses testified for the State.
Detective Jerry Northrup testified that, at the scene of the accident, he observed neither “high
velocity” blood spatter nor brain matter on M.S.’s hands--findings he would have expected had
M.S. shot herself. He further noted the absence of soot, stippling, or powder burns at the entry
wound--indicators typically present in a close-range or near-contact gunshot. The medical
examiner, Dr. Jennifer Nara, testified that, during the autopsy, examination of the entrance wound
indicated that M.S. was shot from an indeterminate or distant range, indicating that M.S. died of
homicide. Over Claus’s objection, a bloodstain pattern analyst, Randolph Beasley, testified that
stains in the vehicle and on clothing showed M.S. had been struck in the face before she was shot.
Doctor Ryan Rambaran, a trauma surgeon, testified that he had treated between 750 to 800 gunshot
wounds during his residency training. Doctor Rambaran further testified regarding the effect of
ammunition type on the appearance of bullet injuries. He described testing that he conducted by
firing the same ammunition used in the shooting of M.S. into pig’s heads at varying distances. The
results showed burns, thermal injuries, and sooting at contact range and at three inches but none at
eighteen inches. Based on these findings, Dr. Rambaran concluded that M.S.’s wound was not
consistent with a close-range, self-inflicted gunshot wound.
Pertinent to the issues raised on appeal, the following witnesses testified for Claus. Kenn
Meneely, a private forensic consultant, testified that bloodstain patterns can be affected by
movements during car accidents or the handling of bodies. He also testified that human hair may
filter or conceal stippling or sooting from contact gunshot wounds. Meneely testified that his own
testing with tanned pigskins at varying distances supported those observations. Doctor Barbara
Wolf, a forensic pathologist, testified that the injuries on M.S.’s face were consistent with those
sustained in a motor vehicle collision and that, in her opinion, the entrance wound was a hard
contact wound. Finally, Dr. David Fowler, also a forensic pathologist, testified that the notion of
skin being seared in a contact gunshot wound is a “myth” and that his observations indicated M.S.’s
entrance wound was a contact wound.
After trial, the jury found Claus guilty of first degree murder, Idaho Code
§§ 18-4001, 18-4003(a). Claus timely appeals.

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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, including evidentiary
issues, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of
such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices
before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261,
270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Claus argues the district court abused its discretion when deciding several evidentiary
issues. First, Claus argues the district court erred by allowing the State to introduce character
evidence regarding his mood and irritability. Second, Claus argues the district court erroneously
allowed an expert witness to give testimony based on speculation. Third, Claus argues the district
court abused its discretion by allowing an unqualified expert to testify about ballistics. Finally,
Claus argues that the cumulative error doctrine applies here, necessitating a reversal of his
conviction.
A. Admission of Character Evidence
First, Claus argues the district court erred in deciding that testimony about his short temper
and mood swings were exceptions to I.R.E. 404(a) as indicative of his motive. Claus contends the
district court conflated I.R.E. 404(a) with I.R.E. 404(b). Claus also contends the district court
erred by relying on I.R.E. 404(b) to admit testimony of his character, which, he argues, could only
be admitted under I.R.E. 404(a). The State responds that, “while the challenged testimony
referenced and invited inferences about Claus’s character, this does not defeat a finding that the
testimony ultimately recounted and described acts.” Therefore, according to the State, the district
court correctly assessed the exception to the testimony under I.R.E. 404(b)(2). The State further
contends that, if the district court erred, the error was harmless.
The State filed a notice of intent to introduce I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, providing that it
intended to introduce testimony of Claus’s ex-wife indicating that Claus has a “short fuse” and
would have mood swings, especially when under the influence of alcohol. Claus objected, arguing

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that the State presented direct references to his character that were precluded from admissibility
by I.R.E. 404(a). The district court determined that this testimony described specific instances of
behavior but was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b)(2) to prove motive. As a result, the following
exchange took place between the State and Claus’s ex-wife:
Q: In terms of his moods, did Mr. Claus have a short fuse or not?
A: Yes.
Q: What do you mean yes?
A: Um, he could be in a really great mood and things would be going well and
with . . . any little thing could set him off and he would get angry.
Q: How fast could this change from being in a good mood to a bad mood
happen?
A: Fairly rapidly.
Q: Can you tell us based on your being around him for this period of time
whether or not drinking alcohol magnified that change?
A: Absolutely.
Q: What do you mean by that?
A: Um, when he drank, um, it was particularly bad. Um, and the more he
drank, the worse it was. Um, when he was sober, it was not--not nearly as bad, you
know. Um, but as soon as he’d have a few beers, he--he--his whole temperament
changed. He--any little comment might set him off.
Assuming without deciding the district court abused its discretion by admitting testimony
about Claus’s mood swings and bad temper--because it is impermissible I.R.E. 404(a) evidence of
a character or trait offered to prove Claus acted in conformity with that character or trait on the
day M.S. died--we conclude the error is harmless.
Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial. State v. Stell, 162 Idaho 827, 830, 405 P.3d
612, 615 (Ct. App. 2017). Where a criminal defendant shows an error based on a
contemporaneously objected-to, nonconstitutional violation, the State then has the burden of
demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the
jury’s verdict. State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017). Thus, we examine
whether the alleged error complained of in the present case was harmless. See id. Harmless error
is error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as
revealed in the record. State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 674, 462 P.3d 1125, 1138 (2020). This
standard requires weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while excluding the
erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of the error. Id.
If the error’s effect is minimal compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt

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beyond a reasonable doubt without the error, then the error did not contribute to the verdict
rendered and is harmless. Id. The reviewing court must take into account what effect the error
had, or reasonably may have had, on the jury in the context of the total setting and in relation to
all else that happened, which necessarily includes the evidence presented. Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
The testimony regarding Claus’s mood and temper was exceedingly brief--comprising of
only five sentences in a transcript exceeding 2300 pages or five direct-examination questions in
an eight-day trial involving more than forty witnesses. Moreover, the record contains substantial
independent evidence suggesting that Claus had a “short fuse” and experienced mood swings that
were aggravated by alcohol consumption. Text messages exchanged between Claus and M.S.
reflect this pattern--shifting abruptly from affectionate declarations to demands that M.S. stay
away from him or not leave California. Text messages recovered from M.S.’s phone show
communications between her and Claus on April 12 and 13, 2021. On the afternoon of
April 12, Claus texted M.S. that he looked forward to seeing her, and M.S. later texted that she
loved him. Later that night, after multiple calls and messages, Claus wrote, “You deserve better
than me!!! Leave me alone!!!” and “By for ever [sic].” Following further contentious exchanges
on the evening of April 12, Claus texted M.S. on the morning of April 13 that he loved her but
shortly thereafter wrote, “Stay down there!!! Finish all your things!!! Call me when you get
back!!! Until then leave me alone!!” He later added that he was too drunk to drive to the airport,
repeating, “Stay down there!! Leave me alone!!” Later that day, Claus picked M.S. up from the
airport. Surveillance footage from the gas station similarly depicts Claus as initially affectionate
toward M.S. before a sudden argument ensued, culminating in her erratic driving and subsequent
death. In his recorded interrogation with Officer Lelland, which was admitted without objection,
Claus acknowledged having an argument with M.S.
In addition, Claus’s temper was not a central component of the State’s case. The
prosecution did not emphasize Claus’s temper or mood swings in its opening argument, and his
ex-wife was not a key witness for the State. In fact, the first time the jury heard testimony of
Claus’s ex-wife was on the third day of trial, after the expert testimony and testimony of the
officers. The State primarily relied on the expertise of law enforcement and expert witnesses to
rebut Claus’s theory that M.S. committed suicide. As set forth below, Claus’s arguments regarding

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the lack of foundation for the State’s experts’ testimonies are without merit. This includes the
testimony from Beasley, the State’s expert witness, that M.S. suffered head wounds before the
shot. While the trial may have been a battle of the experts, the jury rejected the opinion of the
defense’s experts that the gunshot was a contact wound (seemingly necessary for a self-inflicted
wound) as opposed to the State’s experts’ opinion that the gunshot was from some distance. Given
the brief nature of the challenged testimony, and in light of the overwhelming independent
evidence, we conclude that the admission of the character evidence was harmless.
B. Testimony of Randolph Beasley
Next, Claus argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting testimony from
Randolph Beasley. Claus contends that Beasley’s testimony should have been excluded because
his observations about the blood spatter were improperly based on a false belief that one of the
witnesses observed Claus striking M.S. in the face before she died. Claus asserts that there was
no independent evidence supporting that the battery may have taken place. As a result, Claus
contends that Beasley’s testimony, in its entirety, was speculative and of no assistance to the jury.
The district court found that Beasley made two references to the witness’s testimony about
an altercation between Claus and M.S. The district court noted that Beasley’s opinion is largely
supported by the facts in the record and not witness testimony alone. The district court determined
that Beasley cited to multiple bases for his conclusion that Claus hit M.S., including the pattern of
the blood spatter, the autopsy results, and the testimony of the other expert witness. The district
court found that inconsistencies in Beasley’s report, if any, go to the weight of the evidence not
the admissibility of the entire report. Ultimately, the district court held that Beasley’s report was
not based on speculative witness testimony and was supported by the evidence in the record.
A trial court’s determination on the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Herrera, 164 Idaho at 272, 429 P.3d at 160. A witness who is qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion
or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. I.R.E. 702. An expert’s opinion
that is speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is inadmissible because it would not
assist the trier of fact. State v. Caliz-Bautista, 162 Idaho 833, 836, 405 P.3d 618, 621 (Ct. App.

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2017). Testimony is speculative when it theorizes about a matter as to which evidence is not
sufficient for certain knowledge. Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, 538, 348 P.3d 145, 153 (2015).
Claus relies on State v. Samuel, 165 Idaho 746, 452 P.3d 768 (2019), to support his
argument. However, the facts in Samuel differ from the facts in the instant matter. In Samuel, an
expert witness testified about the possible level of intoxication of Samuel. See id. at 776, 452 P.3d
at 798. The expert acknowledged he could not state with certainty that Samuel had a certain drug
in his bloodstream at the time of the incident since he did not have his blood drawn. Id. Instead,
the expert relied on a hair sample taken three weeks after the charged conduct that did not show
the quantity of drug use but chronic use. Id. Therefore, while the hair sample reflected chronic
use, the drug might not have been administered the particular day at issue. Id. Similarly, when
questioned about his report noting six missing pills from Samuel’s father’s prescription, the expert
conceded that, although they were “presumably” administered to Samuel, absent a blood sample
the expert could not confirm this. Id. The district court excluded any opinions of the expert witness
that were based upon intoxication from the drug because the expert did not know if the drug was
in Samuel’s system at the time of the charged conduct. Id. at 777, 452 P.3d at 799.
Unlike in Samuel, Beasley did not base his opinions and conclusions about an altercation
taking place between Claus and M.S. on nonexistent evidence. In his report, Beasley indicates
that the observed impact bloodstain pattern2 on the left side of the steering wheel and drip
bloodstain patterns3 on the driver’s seat were consistent with blunt force trauma and may have
been part of an altercation described by some witnesses. In fact, Beasley’s report references
several other bloodstain patterns on the side of M.S.’s face, her jeans, and the steering wheel that
are consistent with blunt force trauma but omits any mention of a domestic dispute. At trial,
Beasley testified that the location and the type of bloodstain patterns mentioned above indicate
that M.S. must have been positioned directly above her thighs in a more upright posture, consistent
with her sitting in the driver’s seat before her death or the deployment of an airbag. Finally,

2
As stated in Beasley’s report, an “impact pattern” is defined as a bloodstain pattern
resulting from an object striking liquid blood.
3
As stated in Beasley’s report, a “drip stain” is a bloodstain resulting from a falling drop
that formed due to gravity.

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Beasley’s conclusion that Claus struck M.S. in the face at least twice is based on: (1) Beasley’s
reconstruction of the approximate position of M.S.’s head at the time of the shooting, (2) the
trajectory of the wound path determined during the autopsy, (3) the absence of “backspatter” on
M.S.’s right hand, and (4) the opinion of Dr. Nara related to the examination of the entry wound.
Beasley’s opinion was based on the blood spatter in the vehicle as indicated in his report and
testimony. Because it correctly determined that Beasley’s report was not based on speculative
witness testimony, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Beasley’s testimony.
C. Unqualified Expert Witness
Next, Claus argues the district court erred by allowing the State’s expert witness, Dr. Ryan
Rambaran, to testify as a ballistics expert. Specifically, Claus challenges Dr. Rambaran’s
testimony regarding the effect a certain type of bullet would have on the shape and thermal
characteristics of a gunshot wound.
Although Claus cites to the record, he does not present any legal support or citations for
his argument. Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) requires appellants to do more than point to
background facts underlying their position; it requires reasons those facts constitute legal error
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the transcript and record relied upon. Wood
v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 172 Idaho 300, 307, 532 P.3d 404, 411 (2023). Claus fails to provide any
legal authority to support his argument, and when an appellant fails to support his position with
sufficient authority, it is too indefinite to be decided by this Court. Consequently, assignments of
error that are not argued and supported in compliance with I.A.R. 35(a)(6) are deemed to be
waived, and we will not consider them. Even if we were to consider Claus’s argument, the
argument fails.
After reviewing Dr. Rambaran’s report and curriculum vitae during pretrial motions, the
district court reserved its decision on whether Dr. Rambaran qualified as an expert. At trial, Claus
again objected to Dr. Rambaran’s testimony on foundational grounds, challenging his
qualifications as a ballistics expert. Specifically, Claus objected to Dr. Rambaran’s testimony,
arguing that he could be qualified as a trauma surgeon but should not be qualified as an expert in
ballistics. The district court overruled the objection.
On appeal, Claus asserts that Dr. Rambaran is not qualified as a ballistics expert
because he: (1) had never previously testified as one; (2) was not certified to perform ballistic

9
testing; (3) was not certified to examine evidence from firearms; (4) had no affiliation with any
forensic lab, medical societies, or groups having to do with ballistics; (5) had never reviewed
manuals related to ballistics testing or analytical methods; (6) did not have any formal firearms
training beyond basic functions, safety, and accuracy; and (7) was not a forensic pathologist.
A trial court’s determination on the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Herrera, 164 Idaho at 272, 429 P.3d at 160. Idaho Rule of
Evidence 702 provides that a qualified expert witness may testify if the expert’s “scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue.” The five sources of expert qualifications identified in the rule are
disjunctive. State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77, 82, 190 P.3d 896, 901 (Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Eytchison, 136 Idaho 210, 212-13, 30 P.3d 988, 990-91 (Ct. App. 2001). Therefore, contrary to
Claus’s assertions, academic training is not always a prerequisite to be qualified as an expert;
practical experience or specialized knowledge may be sufficient. See State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho
410, 414, 3 P.3d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 2000). However, there must be some demonstration that the
witness has acquired, through some type of training, education or experience, the necessary
expertise and knowledge to render the proffered opinion. Id.
At the time of trial, Dr. Rambaran had been an attending trauma surgeon for the past four
years and general surgeon for the previous twelve years. Doctor Rambaran has formal training
and significant clinical experience “identifying types of gunshot wounds.” This training included
“the nature of high and low velocity gunshot wounds, their presentation, their effect on wound
tissue and the necessary steps of repairing the tissue/organ after injury.” His practical experience
included being involved in the treatment of “about 800-1000 shootings of all calibers.” Doctor
Rambaran has also been a consultant in terminal ballistics for Lehigh Defense, where he performs
testing of ballistic tissue injuries. In addition to his professional experience, Dr. Rambaran testified
about his extensive personal knowledge of firearms that included building his own firearms and
reloading his own ammunition.
This testimony established Dr. Rambaran’s specialized expertise in gunshot wounds and
how particular types of bullets influence the shape and thermal effect of the wound. In the context
and circumstances of this case, Dr. Rambaran did not require any specialized certification in

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ballistics. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Rambaran to testify
regarding the difference between the impact of different types of bullets on a wound.
As to the experiment Dr. Rambaran conducted, Claus asserts that it should not have been
admitted because it had no accepted scientific basis. This is not the legal standard for the
admissibility of a scientific experiment in Idaho. The standard for admissibility of a scientific
experiment in Idaho is that experiments “based upon reasonably similar circumstances are
admissible to show the existence or nonexistence of a fact, and the circumstances do not need to
be exactly the same as those surrounding the event.” State v. Cypher, 92 Idaho 159, 171, 438 P.2d
904, 916 (1968). Similarity of circumstances and conditions must be left to the sound discretion
of the trial court and determined by it, subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Id. “If
the conditions [of an experiment] are substantially similar, then the differences in conditions go to
the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility.” Lopez v. Allen, 96 Idaho 866, 871, 538
P.2d 1170, 1175 (1975).
Doctor Rambaran was required only to recreate circumstances reasonably similar to those
of the shooting of M.S. He testified that he used a pig’s head, given the similarity of pig and
human skin at the cellular level, to evaluate the thermal effects of a gunshot wound. He conducted
the experiment with the same type of ammunition used in the shooting of M.S., a firearm of a
similar model, and human hair to replicate the conditions as closely as possible. Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Rambaran’s testimony regarding the
experiment.
D. Cumulative Error Doctrine
Finally, Claus also contends that the cumulative error doctrine applies here, necessitating
a reversal of his conviction. Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors (harmless in
and of themselves) may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Adamcik, 152
Idaho 445, 483, 272 P.3d 417, 455 (2012). However, a necessary predicate to the application of
the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. Id. Claus has failed to demonstrate at least two
errors, a necessary predicate to the application of the cumulative error doctrine.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
Assuming the district court abused its discretion by admitting testimony about Claus’s
mood swings and bad temper, any error was harmless. Claus has failed to meet his burden that the
district court abused its discretion by admitting: (1) “speculative” expert testimony about M.S.’s
wounds; and (2) ballistics opinions and an experiment from a trauma surgeon. Additionally, Claus
is not entitled to relief based on cumulative error. Therefore, Claus’s judgment of conviction for
first degree murder is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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