State v. Aldridge

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51158

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: October 1, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
TRAVIS LYLE ALDRIDGE, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Custer County. Hon. Stevan H. Thompson, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and being a
persistent violator, affirmed.

Greg S. Silvey, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

MELANSON, Judge Pro Tem
Travis Lyle Aldridge appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen and being a persistent violator. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Aldridge was charged with one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen after he
was accused by his girlfriend’s fourteen-year-old daughter of genital-to-genital contact. The
victim reported that the conduct occurred during an overnight trip to collect firewood in the fall of
2020 when the victim and Aldridge stayed in a travel trailer on the victim’s uncle’s property. The
victim indicated that she woke up to find Aldridge engaging in sexual intercourse with her. A jury
found Aldridge guilty of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen (I.C. § 18-1508) and found him

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subject to the persistent violator enhancement based on prior felony convictions (I.C. § 19-2514).
Aldridge appeals.
II.
ANALYSIS
Aldridge raises numerous issues on appeal, arguing that the district court erred by:
(1) granting the State’s motion to allow I.R.E. 404(b) evidence of uncharged sex crimes;
(2) limiting I.R.E. 412 evidence of a prior allegedly false accusation by the victim; (3) granting
the State’s motion for a witness to testify via Zoom but then denying Aldridge the same; (4) not
allowing a lay witness to testify about her own “experiment” with altering text messages; and
(5) allowing the information to be amended. Aldridge also argues that the cumulative effect of the
alleged errors warrants a new trial. We address each issue in turn.
A. Admission of Evidence of Uncharged Acts--I.R.E. 404(b)
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to admit I.R.E. 404(b) evidence of uncharged sexual
misconduct repeatedly committed by Aldridge against the victim over a two-year period before
the charged conduct. Aldridge filed a response, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to
establish the other acts, that the acts were relevant only to prove propensity, and that admission of
the evidence would be unfairly prejudicial. The motion was addressed at a hearing prior to trial,
at which the district court deferred making a ruling and indicated it would need to understand the
context of how the other bad acts would be introduced and the purpose for introducing them. The
district court stated:
All right. Well, I guess--and again, the [I.R.E.] 404(b) motion, the motions
in limine prior to trial starting, sometimes the Court can’t give you a definitive
ruling other than to indicate that as to testimony of the victim regarding prior
allegations of sexual abuse against her specifically as opposed to someone else, but
against her specifically by [Aldridge] in this case, that the case law - obviously, the
case law is telling me--State v. Grist, [147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009)], State
v. Truman, [150 Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2010)], others--that the same
[I.R.E.] 404(b) analysis is going to be applied to sex offense cases, as it would to
any other cases, and then the [I.R.E.] 403 analysis thereafter.
But it would seem that there are certainly a number of cases where that type
of testimony has been allowed specific to the victim and other allegations of other
claimed abuse situations with her specifically under [I.R.E.] 404(b) that’s being
offered for something other than propensity to commit this kind of offense. It is
being offered to show whether it’s intent or opportunity, lack of--to--of mistake.

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There’s a delayed disclosure issue. Grooming, I guess, comes into play sometimes
based upon the expert testimony in the case.
But, [defense counsel], I guess that’s an area that the Court is--without
making a ruling today, I think that just--I’m telling you this--the case law gives the
Court guidance that that type of testimony has certainly been approved by the
Supreme Court in other situations.
Now, when we get into allegations against other victims, other, you know,
unrelated circumstances, that’s a whole different story, I think. But I think it’s
a-with the victim herself and other allegations, I think it’s much more easily
admitted. And so you might expect the Court to grant some leeway there and allow
testimony in that regard with the proper, I guess, you know, foundation being laid
and the Court making that finding that it’s not being offered for propensity
purposes, it’s being offered for an allowed purpose under [I.R.E.] 404(b) and then
make my determination at that time under [I.R.E.] 403 if I feel the relevance is
outweighed by the prejudice to [Aldridge] in the particular case. So I’ll have to go
through that analysis. But the case law would seem to be guiding the Court that--in
favor of admitting that, you know, absent, you know, some unforeseen
circumstances that I’m not aware of today.
So I guess, again, that’s the best ruling I can give you today with some
guidance of where the Court may be headed with that.
During trial, evidence of Aldridge’s other acts of sexual abuse against the victim was
admitted through the victim’s testimony, a CARES interview video and the testimony of other
witnesses. Aldridge did not object to any of this evidence on I.R.E. 404(b) grounds. Therefore,
we first address the State’s argument that this issue is not preserved for appeal. A party preserves
an issue for appeal by properly presenting the issue with argument and authority to the trial court
below and noticing it for hearing or a party preserves an issue for appeal if the trial court issues an
adverse ruling. State v. Miramontes, 170 Idaho 920, 924-25, 517 P.3d 849, 853-54 (2022). Since
a motion in limine is based on an alleged set of facts rather than the actual testimony, the trial
court’s ruling is not a final order. State v. Radue, 175 Idaho 297, 304, 564 P.3d 1230, 1237 (2025);
State v. Young, 133 Idaho 177, 179, 983 P.2d 831, 833 (1999). The trial court may reconsider the
issue at any time, including when the actual presentation of facts is made. Radue, 175 Idaho at
304, 564 P.3d at 1237. The trial court may, in the exercise of discretion, choose to defer the ruling
until the case unfolds and the evidence is offered in context. Id.
Preservation of an issue presented in a motion in limine has been addressed by the Idaho
Supreme Court. As relevant here, when the district court defers ruling on an evidentiary objection
made in a motion in limine, the objection must be made again at trial to be preserved. State v.

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Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 265, 971 P.2d 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998). Although Aldridge argued in
opposition at the pretrial hearing, he did not renew his objection when the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence
was offered at trial. Thus, this issue was not preserved for appeal, and we do not address it further.
B. Victim’s Prior Allegedly False Accusation of Sexual Misconduct--I.R.E. 412
Prior to trial, Aldridge filed a motion in limine to permit him to introduce evidence that the
victim had made false accusations of sexual misconduct against her then-stepfather when she was
five or six years old. Aldridge also filed a notice of intent pursuant to I.R.E. 608(b) to offer
evidence of perjured testimony related to the same accusations. The district court denied the
requests. Aldridge argues the district court abused its discretion by limiting the information that
was admitted at trial regarding the victim’s prior accusations of sexual misconduct involving her
former stepfather. Specifically, Aldridge argues he should have been permitted to call the victim’s
former stepfather to testify.
Trial courts maintain broad discretion in admitting and excluding evidence. State v.
Weigle, 165 Idaho 482, 487, 447 P.3d 930, 935 (2019). When a trial court’s discretionary decision
is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries
of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices
before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261,
270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
Generally, evidence of a sex-crime victim’s past sexual behavior is not admissible in a
criminal case. I.R.E. 412(a). However, a victim’s prior false accusation of a sex crime may be
admissible. I.R.E. 412(b)(3). The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test to determine
the admissibility of false allegations of sex crimes under I.R.E. 412. State v. Chambers, 166 Idaho
837, 845, 465 P.3d 1076, 1084 (2020). The first step of the analysis for evidence of false
allegations requires the trial court to determine whether the allegations of the purported victim are
false. Id. The second part of an I.R.E. 412 analysis requires the trial court to determine whether
the evidence is relevant. Chambers, 166 Idaho at 846, 465 P.3d at 1085. The third step of the
analysis requires the trial court to engage in a balancing test set out in I.R.E. 412(c)(2). Chambers,
166 Idaho at 846, 465 P.3d at 1085.

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In the first step of the analysis, the trial court must determine whether the allegation is false
by a preponderance of the evidence. Before the trial court can admit evidence, it must conduct an
in-camera hearing at which the parties may call witnesses, including the alleged victim, and offer
relevant evidence. I.R.E. 412(c)(2). The day before trial began and after hearing argument on the
purported false accusations of sexual misconduct, the district court indicated to Aldridge that,
based on “the status of the record right now,” it could not make a determination of the falsity of
the allegations. The district court stated that, its “interpretation of the police reports is simply that
allegations were made and that charges were not brought. That doesn’t necessarily mean they
were false.” The district court stated that Aldridge was entitled to a hearing and would be given
an opportunity to make a record. After the State rested and Aldridge began his case-in-chief, an
I.R.E. 412 hearing was held at which the former stepfather testified outside the presence of the
jury as follows:
Q: I’d like to direct your attention to an accusation that was made against you
by [the victim] in February 2014. Do you remember that?
A: Not particularly.
Q: Okay. So you don’t remember being accused of touching her?
A: No, no. . . .
....
Q: Okay. So you don’t have any knowledge of [the victim] accusing you of
touching her inappropriately?
A: No. Not before that point.
Q: Okay. What about after that point?
A: Talked with [an officer] for several minutes, and he told me that it wasn’t
over and he’d be back in touch with me and nothing ever became of it.
The former stepfather further testified that he realized something had triggered law enforcement’s
involvement and acknowledged that the victim had found some pornographic magazines belonging
to him but did not know the specifics of any allegations or investigations.
In ruling on the motion, the district court considered the former stepfather’s testimony,
police reports indicating that an investigation had occurred but that no charges were filed, and
evidence admitted during the State’s case-in-chief. That evidence included the CARES interview
which was admitted at the trial in which the victim stated that she made the allegation when she
was five or six years old, but no one believed her “because of the lies she told.” After the CARES
interview was published for the jury, the victim testified at trial as follows:

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Q. [State] Okay. And I wanted to clarify some of the terms you used. So you
said that you were raped. Okay.
You also said that you were raped by your step-dad when you were
5 or 6, but then when you were asked specifically what that meant, you said
he didn’t put his penis in you. He was just rubbing in your area; right?
A. Yes.
On cross-examination, the victim then testified:
Q. [Defense Counsel] Okay. And you said that--you testified on direct that
“No one really believed me,” and that your dad [biological] made you tell
lies?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So did your dad make you lie to get it dismissed? Make the
whole thing go away?
A. No.
Q. He made you lie for it to occur?
A. Yes.
In a lengthy and detailed ruling from the bench, the district court concluded that the former
stepfather could not be called as a witness regarding the allegedly false accusation and that
Aldridge could not re-call the victim or her mother on that issue. This ruling had the effect of
limiting the evidence of the allegedly false claim to evidence which had already been admitted,
including the CARES interview and the victim’s subsequent testimony. The district court
concluded that, “it’s simply not clear to the Court that it was something intentional on [the
victim’s] part, as a six-year-old, to intentionally make a false statement regarding the prior sexual
conduct as contemplated by this rule.” The district court also found the evidence had minimal
relevancy, even if the falsity had been established, and the probative value did not outweigh the
prejudicial effect.
On appeal, Aldridge asks this Court to reweigh the evidence and second guess the district
court’s conclusions by asking us to weigh the victim’s credibility and evaluate the police reports
and the stepfather’s testimony. This Court will not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact
as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 207, 953 P.2d 645,
647 (Ct. App. 1998). The district court was in the best position to interpret the evidence submitted
during the I.R.E. 412 hearing and weigh the strength and credibility of the evidence and testimony.
The district court precluded Aldridge from calling the stepfather to testify because the falsity of

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the accusations had not been established. The district court reviewed those police reports which
indicated there was insufficient evidence and that the victim could not “remember anything like
that happening to her.” The district court took judicial notice of the trial testimony of the victim
and her mother. The district court also acknowledged the standard to be applied pursuant to
I.R.E. 412 and the process it was required to follow. See Chambers, 166 Idaho at 845, 465 P.3d
at 1084. The district court weighed Aldridge’s burden and found the scales had not been tipped in
favor of a finding of falsity.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting evidence regarding a prior
allegation of sexual misconduct because it recognized its discretion, acted within the boundaries
of its discretion, acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it, and exercised reason in reaching its decision.
C. Remote Testimony
Prior to trial, Aldridge filed motions requesting that two of his anticipated witnesses be
permitted to testify via Zoom. Aldridge contends the district court abused its discretion by
allowing two of the State’s witnesses to appear remotely but denying his motions. Aldridge argues
that the disparate treatment was unfair. The State contends that Aldridge has failed to establish
any legal entitlement for a witness to testify remotely and that, even if such entitlement existed,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting the remote testimony.
While no Idaho case has directly addressed the question, it appears that whether to permit
a witness to testify remotely is committed to the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Fueller,
173 Idaho 724, 736, 547 P.3d 1210, 1222 (Ct. App. 2024) (trial court has discretion to exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses (citing I.R.E. 611)). When a
trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a
multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. Herrera, 164 Idaho at 270, 429 P.3d at 158.
Aldridge filed motions for two witnesses to testify remotely. Only the testimony of an
investigator retained by Aldridge is at issue in this appeal. It was alleged that the investigator
could not testify in person because he had a training conference in Utah scheduled during the same

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week as the trial. In his motion, Aldridge did not cite any relevant rule or case law supporting his
request.
In denying the motion to allow remote testimony, the district court considered the
information before it, indicating its preference for live testimony and by stating it was unclear what
relevant testimony the investigator would be offering. The district court noted that the investigator
was hired by Aldridge for investigative purposes and became a witness as a result. Given the
longstanding trial setting, the district court concluded the investigator’s presence was necessary
under the circumstances and that arrangements to ensure the investigator’s attendance should have
been made. The district court also determined the testimony of the investigator involved
potentially complicated explanations and exhibits pertaining to his investigations and that he was
an important witness who had been involved throughout the case. The district court determined
the investigator’s testimony would be difficult to give remotely and gave Aldridge the option to
provide a further showing of necessity or unavailability or to make a further record.
On appeal, Aldridge contends the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion
for the investigator to testify remotely because he had a professional commitment that conflicted
with trial. In support of his argument, Aldridge cites I.C.R. 43.1, although he did not cite the rule
in support of his motion in the district court. Even assuming Aldridge could properly cite a
rule-based reason for his motion for the first time on appeal, Aldridge’s reliance on I.C.R. 43.1 is
misplaced. Remote appearances are authorized by I.C.R. 43.1 for the defendant, not witnesses,
which is perhaps the reason Aldridge did not rely on I.C.R. 43.1 in the district court. Aldridge’s
argument in the district court was instead primarily based on “fairness” because the district court
ruled that one of the State’s witnesses (a police officer) could testify remotely after having an
unexpected surgery that rendered him medically incapable of walking or driving. However, the
district court denied the State’s request to have another witness testify remotely despite a family
emergency requiring out-of-state travel and required that witness to testify in person. “Fairness”
did not require the district court to allow a significant defense witness to appear remotely simply
because the witness wanted to attend a “training conference” during the “same week.” Contrary
to Aldridge’s arguments on appeal, under the circumstances, a training conference is not a
“legitimate reason” to appear remotely, and the fact that the witness was “important” for the
defense is a reason for the witness to appear in-person and be subject to cross-examination in the

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jury’s presence. Moreover, Aldridge did not utilize the district court’s option of providing a further
showing of necessity for the investigator’s remote testimony and did not make an additional record.
Aldridge has failed to show an entitlement for any witness to testify remotely or articulate how the
district court acted outside the boundaries of its discretion in denying his motion to allow the
investigator to testify remotely.
D. Testimony By Lay Witness Re: Text Manipulation
After the trial commenced, the victim’s mother discovered old text messages between
herself and Aldridge. These text messages were sent approximately nine months before the victim
disclosed Aldridge’s sexual misconduct. In the text messages, Aldridge stated that he had ordered
thong underwear for himself, the victim’s mother, and the victim “since all of us like little or no
underwear on.” The text messages included a photo of what was described as “Women’s Sexy
Pearls Ace C String Thong Invisible Underwear Lingerie.” Aldridge did not object to the
admission of the late-disclosed text messages and they were admitted. Aldridge later argued that
the text messages were an inaccurate representation of the conversation. He sought to call a lay
witness, a personal acquaintance,1 to demonstrate through an “experiment” she had conducted
using her own cell phone which purportedly would have shown that a recipient could alter text
messages using their cell phone. The district court denied the request, explaining:
We discussed the late-disclosure issue. Counsel did not object as to that
late disclosure and also did not object to [the text messages] admission into
evidence as to authentication. It’s the--that’s that they are unadulterated and have
been modified in any respect and didn’t raise that as an issue or foundational issue.
So they’ve been admitted into evidence at this point. Now, as I understand
it, you are trying now to attack the authentication or validity of [the text] and argue
that it may not be authentic, and it may have been tampered with in some respect.
And trying to do that you through something of an “experiment,” I guess,
for lack of a better term, by [the lay witness] to simply show how can you change
entries--excuse me, on a text message.
And we don’t have any expert testimony, I guess, to talk about any of this.
And so, Counsel, I guess I’m just not seeing how I can allow you to go there.
It just does not seem to be, from a foundational standpoint, from a relevance

1 The witness was more than an acquaintance. She testified that she had most recently had
sex with Aldridge two days prior to her testimony and that she had participated in a “threesome”
with Aldridge and the victim’s mother at some time in the past.

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standpoint, from [the lay witness’s] ability as an expert or otherwise, to show how
text messaging can be theoretically modified.
Trial courts maintain broad discretion in admitting and excluding evidence. Weigle, 165
Idaho at 487, 447 P.3d at 935. A lay person may testify without being an expert witness so long
as the testimony complies with I.R.E. 701, which states:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion
or inference is limited to one that is:
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to
determining a fact in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within
the scope of Rule 702.
Aldridge has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the
proffered testimony about the text message “experiment” because the appellate record is
insufficient to demonstrate error. The nature of the “experiment” was apparently displayed
visually in the courtroom, but it is not part of the appellate record. See State v. Repici, 122 Idaho
538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that missing portions of the transcript on
appeal are presumed to support the actions of the district court). Furthermore, even if the
“experiment” showed that a text message can be altered by a recipient, there is, as argued by the
State, an “underlying scientific basis with respect to matters such as how text messages are sent
and displayed on phones, and how one can verify who created and sent particular text messages.”
This is the kind of evidence which is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of I.R.E. 702 and excluded as opinion testimony when offered by a lay witness.
Aldridge contends the manipulation of text messages by a lay person is similar to the
experiment by a lay person in U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n N.D. v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 157 Idaho 446,
337 P.3d 605 (2014), where a paralegal was allowed to testify to an experiment she performed by
scanning an image of a check using the office copy machine to determine whether staple holes
were visible in the scanned image. Whether a document had been stapled to a particular check
was a relevant fact to the case. The Idaho Supreme Court held the district court did not err by
allowing the paralegal to testify to her own experiment which did not require any technical or
specialized expertise. Id. at 452-53, 337 P.3d at 611-12.

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The U.S. Bank case is distinguishable from the case at-hand. Using applications and
software on a phone requires some level of technical knowledge, unlike using a copy machine.
Furthermore, an expert would be able to testify not only about the process of manipulating text
messages but also about methods to determine if text messages actually had been manipulated, any
visible differences that may exist between original images and altered images and could have
provided an opinion regarding whether the text images at issue had been modified. The lay witness
in this case was not qualified to speak to technological issues and could only provide speculative
testimony that it was possible the text messages had been altered, which would not help determine
a fact and would only serve to confuse the issue. Additionally, in U.S. Bank, the relevancy of the
staple holes was not challenged--unlike here where the relevancy of the lay witness’s testimony
was disputed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the lay witness from
testifying about her experiments with the text messages.
E. Amended Information
The information was filed on November 15, 2021, and alleged that Aldridge committed
lewd conduct on or about or between November 1, 2020, and November 30, 2020. This was
consistent with the victim’s statement in the CARES interview that the conduct occurred “around
November.” On September 8, 2022, the State filed a motion to file an amended information to
“correct errors” in the date of the incident, alleging that it occurred on or about or between
August 1, 2020, through November 30, 2020. Trial was scheduled to commence on November 18,
2022.
Aldridge contends the district court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend the
information to broaden the timeframe of when the offense occurred. Aldridge argues that
broadening the timeframe prejudiced his substantial right to present an alibi defense. The factual
basis for Aldridge’s alibi was not disclosed in his objection or at the hearing. On appeal, Aldridge
argues that it was based upon the victim’s mother’s testimony that she went with Aldridge to
retrieve the travel trailer for the season on November 2, 2020. The State contends the district court
acted within its discretion and that Aldridge’s substantial rights were not violated because the trial
was continued to give him time to prepare a defense for the expanded timeframe.
Under I.C. § 19-1420, an amendment to the information is permitted “in the discretion of
the court, where it can be done without prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant.” The

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information cannot be amended to charge a new or additional offense. I.C. § 19-1420; I.C.R. 7(e).
Factors relevant to determining whether the defendant was prejudiced include whether the
amendment surprised the defendant, impaired the defendant’s ability to adequately prepare a
defense, necessitated extensive further preparation by the defendant, or subjected the defendant to
double jeopardy. State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 871, 436 P.3d 683, 692 (2019). The Idaho
Supreme Court has held that “time is not a material ingredient in the offense of lewd and lascivious
conduct with a minor.” State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 253, 899 P.2d 959, 963 (1995). This is
because any other rule would too often preclude prosecutions in this type of case where the victims
are minors and where the crimes are not discovered until sometime after their commission. State
v. Roberts, 101 Idaho 199, 200, 610 P.2d 558, 559 (1980). The assertion of an alibi defense does
not make time a material element of the offense that must be proven by the State when a defendant
has had a close association with the minor over a lengthy time period. State v. Marks, 120 Idaho
727, 729, 819 P.2d 581, 583 (Ct. App. 1991).
In granting the motion, the district court acknowledged its discretion to grant an
amendment and the applicable case-law and court rules. The district court noted that the charges
remained the same, with nothing being added or modified, and it was only the timeframe that
changed. The district court continued the trial in order to provide Aldridge additional time to
prepare. Ultimately, the trial commenced on March 28, 2023. Aldridge contends the district court
abused its discretion in granting the amendment. We disagree.
The district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion when it considered the nature
of the charges, the age of the victim, and the case law. The district court acted consistently with
the legal standards applicable to the choices available to it because Idaho courts have recognized
young victims often struggle with the ability to recall exact dates and expanding the timeframe is
reasonable. See, e.g., Tapia, 127 Idaho at 253, 899 P.2d at 963. The district court reached its
decision through the exercise of reason, recognizing that the victim’s age at the time of events may
have made it difficult to pinpoint an exact date. The district court’s granting of the amendment
did not prejudice Aldridge’s substantial rights to present his alibi defense because he was granted
ample additional time to adequately prepare a defense--a point he does not dispute on appeal. The
district court did not abuse its discretion.

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F. Cumulative Error
Aldridge also contends that the cumulative error doctrine applies here. Under the doctrine
of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, may in the aggregate show
the absence of a fair trial. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483, 272 P.3d 417, 455 (2012).
However, a necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one
error. Id. Aldridge has failed to demonstrate error, a necessary predicate to the application of the
cumulative error doctrine.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Aldridge did not preserve his argument on appeal challenging the admission of the State’s
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence regarding uncharged sex crimes. Aldridge has failed to show that the
district court abused its discretion in limiting the introduction of prior allegedly false accusations,
denying Aldridge’s motion to permit witnesses to testify remotely, precluding a lay witness to
testify under I.R.E. 702, or granting the State’s motion to amend the information. Finally, because
Aldridge has failed to show any error, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. Therefore,
Aldridge’s judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and being a
persistent violator is affirmed.
Judge TRIBE, CONCURS.
Judge LORELLO, SPECIALLY CONCURRING.
I concur with the decision to affirm Aldridge’s judgment of conviction. I write separately
with respect to the resolution of Aldridge’s challenge to the admission of evidence pursuant to
I.R.E. 404(b) because, in my view, the issue is preserved for appeal.
As required by I.R.E. 404(b), the State filed a notice of its intent to introduce evidence of
prior sexual contact between Aldridge and the victim as well as evidence of incidents the State
contended would show “anger, control, and dominance” over the victim. Absent good cause, a
prosecutor must file such a notice (or motion) prior to trial in order to notify the defendant of the
State’s intent to introduce evidence covered by the rule. The pretrial aspect of this notice
requirement does not mean the notice qualifies as a motion in limine even though both “motions”
seek to obtain a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of evidence. If a motion in limine is aimed at
excluding evidence, the law is clear that a trial court may delay ruling on the motion until trial and,

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if the trial court does so, the party seeking exclusion must continue to assert an objection in order
to preserve the issue for consideration on appeal. See State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 265, 971
P.2d 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998). The reason a ruling on a motion in limine may be deferred until
trial is to afford the trial court the ability to assess admissibility in the context of the evidence
actually presented. See State v. Radue, 175 Idaho 297, 304, 564 P.3d 1230, 1237 (2025).
But I.R.E. 404(b) motions/notices are different for at least two reasons. First, motions
in limine are based on an alleged set of facts rather than the actual testimony. Radue, 175 Idaho
at 304, 564 P.3d at 1237; State v. Young, 133 Idaho 177, 179, 983 P.2d 831, 833 (1999). Idaho
Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence is more definitive because it is based on more than just alleged
facts--it involves actual evidence of a prior crime, wrong, or act. Second, although a defendant
will almost always object to the admission of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, a motion to admit evidence
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) motion is not an objection by the defendant. There is no clear reason
why a defendant would have to “object” again at trial after objecting to the State’s request to admit
in the first instance. Indeed, the framework for evaluating the admissibility of I.R.E. 404(b)
evidence is especially conducive to a determination without the need for “context” at trial. This
makes sense given the propensity concerns that underlie the rule--the point is to prevent any
reference to I.R.E. 404(b) evidence unless there is a proper purpose for its admission.
The now familiar I.R.E. 404(b) framework requires the trial court to assess three things:
(1) whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime, wrong, or act as fact;
(2) whether the other crime, wrong, or act is relevant for a permissible purpose; and (3) whether
the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. State
v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009). It is unclear to me how a trial court could
rely on the evidence presented at trial to determine whether there is sufficient evidence of the other
crime, wrong, or act without violating the Grist framework. Stated differently, a trial court could
not rely on evidence of the other crime, wrong, or act presented at trial in order to determine
whether the other crime, wrong, or act should be admitted in the first instance. That said, the first
requirement is often not at issue; in which case, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether
the other, crime, wrong, or act is relevant for a permissible purpose. But it is equally unclear to
me why this determination could not (and should not) be made based on the I.R.E. 404(b) motion
itself. This is true even if the determination was conditional, e.g., if X happens then the evidence

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is admissible to prove Y. Indeed, it appears, to some extent, that is partly what happened in this
case.
At the I.R.E. 404(b) hearing, the prosecutor argued: “It’s the same type of behavior for a
long period of time, although most of it was in Jefferson County and not in Custer County. There’s
only one instance in Custer County. Clearly that shows the opportunity . . . where it’s permitted
under [I.R.E.] 404(b).” Aldridge responded: “I don’t think it’s realistic to say that it’s admissible
to show opportunity unless [Aldridge] was to present evidence that he wasn’t there or that he never
was alone with [the victim], something like that.” And the prosecutor ultimately acknowledged
that some of the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was “probably not admissible right off the bat in the State’s
case in chief” and would only be admissible if Aldridge “open[ed] that door.” The district court
responded, in part, that it would be “in favor” of admitting prior instances of conduct if offered for
a proper purpose and that it would “go through” the I.R.E. 403 analysis “at that time,” referring to
when the evidence was presented at trial.
A ruling that evidence of a prior crime, wrong, or act is admissible for a particular purpose,
such as opportunity, if the defendant denies opportunity is a ruling that could be reviewed on
appeal. See State v. Miramontes, 170 Idaho 920, 924-25, 517 P.3d 849, 853-54 (2022) (holding
that “a party preserves an issue for appeal by properly presenting the issue with argument and
authority to the trial court below and noticing it for hearing or a party preserves an issue for appeal
if the trial court issues an adverse ruling”). That is not to say that a preservation issue could not
exist in this context; it could. For example, if the defendant agreed that a prior crime, wrong, or
act would be admissible to prove opportunity if he or she was denied opportunity at trial, he or she
could not complain about that concession on appeal because the alleged error would be invited.
See State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993) (explaining the
doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or her own
conduct induces the commission of the error). While the context of what happened at trial would
matter in terms of whether the condition for admission was satisfied, the context would not change
the reviewability of the ruling or the application of the invited error doctrine.
For the foregoing reasons, I would not resolve Aldridge’s challenge to I.R.E. 404(b) on the
basis that it is unpreserved based on his failure to again object to the evidence at trial. Instead, I
would address the merits of his challenge and hold the evidence was properly admitted. But,

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because the reasons I would hold as much do not change the outcome of this case, I need not detail
them here.

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