Katsilometes v. Katsilometes

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52454

In the Matter of the Guardianship of: )
Maria Katsilometes, An Adult. )
GEORGE J. KATSILOMETES, ) Filed: July 9, 2025
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
THOMAS J. KATSILOMETES, ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Aaron N. Thompson, Magistrate.

Judgment appointing conservator, affirmed; judgment on motion for sanctions,
affirmed; order on motion for attorney fees and costs; affirmed.

Williams Law, P.L.L.C.; Matthew C. Williams, Eagle, for appellant, and Thomas
J. Katsilometes, Boise, pro se appellant.

Snake River Law, PLLC; Mark Peterson, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Thomas J. Katsilometes appeals from the judgment appointing a conservator, the judgment
on motion for sanctions, and the order on a motion for attorney fees and costs. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from magistrate court proceedings appointing George Katsilometes as
the guardian and conservator for his mother, Maria Katsilometes. Maria was born in 1930. She
lives in Pocatello and has three adult children: Anastasia, George, and Thomas. The children
agreed that appointment of a conservator was necessary for Maria’s care and significant financial

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assets. At issue before the magistrate court was the appointment of a permanent conservator. The
judgment appointing a conservator was entered following an evidentiary hearing which took place
over the course of four days spanning from May to September 2024.
Anastasia, the oldest child, did not file a petition to be appointed guardian or conservator
and neither she nor her husband testified at the hearing. Anastasia and her husband reside in
California.
George is Maria’s middle child. George lives in Pocatello and is a certified financial
planner. He filed a petition to be appointed as guardian and conservator for Maria in March 2023.
At that time, he had been acting as Maria’s temporary conservator and had acquired durable power
of attorney from Maria in 2019.
Thomas is the youngest child. He is an attorney and resides in Boise. Thomas has several
financial relationships with Maria, including an interest in a large section of land in which he owns
1/8 interest. In August 2023, Thomas filed a declaration contesting the appointment of George as
conservator and nominating TrESCo of Idaho as conservator for Maria. 1 At the May 7, 2024,
evidentiary hearing, the magistrate court acknowledged that Thomas filed an objection to the
appointment of George as conservator by virtue of Thomas’s August 2023 declaration. However,
the magistrate court held that Thomas was required to file a petition separate from George’s
because Thomas was requesting prospective relief--specifically the appointment of a third-party
conservator. Thomas then filed a petition on June 17, 2024, requesting that Anastasia’s husband,
Idaho Trust Bank, or TrESCo of Idaho be appointed as conservator for Maria.
A scheduling order including discovery deadlines was entered by the magistrate court
following George’s petition and Thomas’s declaration, and the case was initially set for trial to
commence in November 2023. A continuance was granted after Thomas promulgated several
subpoenas to financial institutions and had not yet received responsive materials. The trial was
rescheduled for March 2024. In January 2024, Thomas filed a motion to dismiss George’s petition,
which the magistrate court denied. In February 2024, counsel for Thomas filed a motion to
withdraw based on a breakdown in communication with Thomas. New counsel for Thomas filed
a notice of appearance and requested a continuance of the trial, which the magistrate court denied.

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Thomas did not object to George’s appointment as guardian.

2
In August 2024, Thomas filed a motion to allow representatives of Idaho Trust Bank and
TrESCo of Idaho to appear via zoom at the upcoming evidentiary hearing. George filed a motion
in limine to preclude the testimony based on Thomas’s failure to disclose the witnesses in
discovery or in pretrial disclosures. Thomas argued that his June 2024 petition disclosed the
companies and that the magistrate court never entered an order for discovery on Thomas’s petition.
The magistrate court granted George’s motion in limine. Thomas then filed a motion to disqualify
the magistrate judge for cause two business days prior to the final evidentiary hearing. The
magistrate court denied the motion.
The magistrate court noted in its subsequent memorandum decision that, “just prior to
every hearing that transpired, Thomas would file untimely motions that were aimed at delaying
the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the case.” The magistrate court also noted that Thomas
repeatedly filed motions that were noncompliant with the notice requirements in the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure. The magistrate court found that evidence of multiple offers to purchase
portions of Maria’s property was presented on the final day of trial. However, the magistrate court
explained that its decision pertained only to an appointment of a permanent conservator for Maria
and that the appointed conservator would be tasked with a fiduciary duty to manage Maria’s
financial affairs.
The magistrate court ultimately appointed George as the permanent conservator for Maria
in October 2024. The magistrate court concluded that George had acted competently and
consistently with his statutory fiduciary duties as the temporary conservator and there was no
evidence of theft or self-dealing. The magistrate court considered that the court-appointed home
visitor, the guardian ad litem, Anastasia, and Maria all supported George’s appointment as
conservator. The only objection came from Thomas. The magistrate court concluded Thomas’s
suggested alternatives were insufficient and noted that Anastasia’s husband never signed an
acceptance of the nomination and there was no evidence as to his qualifications or his desire to be
involved. Further, Thomas did not provide any information in discovery regarding the professional
conservators he proposed. The magistrate court considered that Thomas is an attorney and aware
of his discovery duties.

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The magistrate court ordered sanctions in the amount of $5000 against Thomas for his
“habitual conduct” of failing to comply with procedural rules and bad faith actions. Thomas filed
a motion for permissive appeal, which was granted.2
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a permissive appeal under I.A.R. 12.1, the Court reviews the magistrate court’s decision
without the benefit of a district court appellate decision. Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 356,
347 P.3d 645, 648 (2015). A trial court’s decisions regarding sanctions and discovery violations
are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Gilbert v. Radnovich, 171 Idaho 566, 572, 524 P.3d 397,
403 (2023); Sommer v. Misty Valley, LLC, 170 Idaho 413, 427, 511 P.3d 833, 847 (2021). An
abuse of discretion standard also applies to a trial court’s decision to award attorney fees. Knudsen
v. J.R. Simplot Co., 168 Idaho 256, 265, 483 P.3d 313, 322 (2021).
When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194
(2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Sanctions
Thomas argues the district court erred by imposing sanctions against him. In particular,
Thomas claims there are shortcomings in George’s requests for sanctions. Thomas notes that

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In his opening brief, Thomas argues the magistrate court erred by imposing sanctions
against him when denying his motion to disqualify for cause, requiring him to adhere to certain
discovery deadlines, awarding attorney fees and costs to George, and ruling Thomas was required
to file a separate petition for appointment of a conservator. In his reply brief, Thomas asserts the
magistrate court erred “by not allowing a professional, non-conflicted, impartial, and capable
estate management company to serve” as the conservator. This Court will not consider arguments
raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief. Midtown Ventures, LLC v. Capone as Tr. to
Thomas & Teresa Capone Living Tr., 173 Idaho 172, 180, 539 P.3d 992, 1000 (2023).

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George orally requested sanctions at the initial pretrial conference but did not indicate why he was
requesting the sanctions. George then filed motions for sanctions in June and August 2024.
George responds that the magistrate court properly ordered sanctions based on Thomas’s conduct
throughout the proceedings. We hold that the applicable law and the record support the magistrate
court’s exercise of discretion in ordering sanctions against Thomas.
It is within the trial court’s discretion whether to impose sanctions; this Court will not
overturn such a decision absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. Krinitt v. Idaho Dep’t of Fish
& Game, 162 Idaho 425, 431, 398 P.3d 158, 164 (2017). The magistrate court imposed sanctions
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(e), which provides:
(1) Grounds. The court may sanction any party or attorney if a party or
attorney:
(A) fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order;
(B) fails to appear at a scheduling or pretrial conference;
(C) is substantially unprepared to participate in a scheduling or pretrial
conference; or
(D) fails to participate in good faith.
(2) Sanctions Allowed. The court may make such orders as are just, and may,
along with any other sanction, make any of the orders allowed under
Rule 37(b)(2)(A). Also, in addition to or in the place of any other sanction, the
court must require the party or the party’s attorney, or both, pay any expenses
incurred because of noncompliance with this rule, including attorney’s fees, unless
the court finds noncompliance was substantially justified or that circumstance are
such that such an award of expenses would be unjust.
When imposing the sanctions, the magistrate court reasoned that Thomas habitually filed
late motions. The magistrate court noted that, “on repeated occasions, Thomas’s motions were
filed on the eve (or within close temporal proximate time) of an evidentiary hearing” and that, “on
most occasions, those motions were wholly noncompliant with the notice requirements within the
IRCP.” The magistrate court explained that this conduct wasted valuable time at hearings for the
magistrate court to become educated on the issues presented. As a sanction for this conduct, the
magistrate court awarded George attorney fees totaling $5000 to be paid by Thomas, determining
this amount represented fees associated with a reasonable amount of time George spent responding
to the late filings and addressing the filings during hearings. See I.R.C.P. 16(e)(2) (permitting the
court to require the party to pay any expenses incurred because of noncompliance with the rule,
including attorney fees).

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Thomas’s opening brief largely disputes the arguments in favor of sanctions contained in
George’s August motion. For instance, Thomas argues that his actions, which are described in
George’s motion, did not cause unnecessary delay. Thomas acknowledges the untimeliness of his
motions but reasons that sanctions are improper because George also made an untimely oral
request to dismiss. Thomas further notes that he “at least put his motion in writing.”
Any error in the arguments in favor of sanctions made in George’s August motion do not
support a conclusion that the magistrate court abused its discretion when imposing the sanctions.
A trial court may impose sanctions for failure to comply with I.R.C.P. 16 either upon motion or
on its own initiative. Krinitt, 162 Idaho at 431, 398 P.3d at 164. Therefore, any alleged error in
George’s motion is irrelevant given the magistrate court’s authority to impose sanctions on its own
initiative. Thomas also contends that sanctions were improperly imposed because he was not given
the opportunity to respond to the alleged conduct the magistrate court considered when imposing
sanctions that was not included in George’s motion. Again, because the magistrate court is
permitted to impose sanctions on its own initiative, this argument fails. Further, the rule does not
provide that Thomas is entitled to respond prior to the imposition of sanctions.
Finally, Thomas’s opening brief concedes he filed numerous untimely motions. That
George may have, on occasion, also filed untimely motions does not negate this. In his
respondent’s brief, George points to fourteen untimely motions and discovery responses submitted
by Thomas. Thomas does not address these is his reply brief.3 Thomas merely requests that this
Court reweigh the evidence and substitute its view for that of the magistrate court, which we
decline to do. See Nuestadt v. Colafranceschi, 167 Idaho 214, 228, 469 P.3d 1, 15 (2020) (holding
that appellate courts in Idaho do not reweigh evidence). Thomas has failed to show the magistrate
court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions.
B. Disqualification
Thomas contends the magistrate court erred in denying his motion to disqualify. Thomas
asserts that the magistrate court’s “decisions and rulings throughout the case showed a consistent

3
Instead, Thomas spends the majority of his reply brief discussing Maria’s property interests
despite the magistrate court’s clarification that its decision pertained only to an appointment of a
permanent conservator for Maria and that the appointed conservator would be tasked with a
fiduciary duty to manage Maria’s financial affairs.

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pattern of bias against Thomas.” In support, Thomas contends that the magistrate court showed
bias by requiring him to file a petition for conservatorship but preventing him from conducting
discovery on his petition by holding him to discovery deadlines that had passed. Thomas further
argues the magistrate court demonstrated bias by sua sponte striking part of Thomas’s testimony
from the record without a motion from opposing counsel. Finally, Thomas argues the magistrate
court was biased because the court repeatedly allowed George to file late motions and permitted
the filing of documents that exceeded the local rule page limits while holding Thomas to strict
compliance with various rules.
George responds that Thomas’s motion to disqualify was untimely and, alternatively, that
the magistrate court did not demonstrate pervasive bias. George characterizes Thomas’s claims
that the magistrate court repeatedly permitted George to file late motions as “false and misleading.”
We hold that Thomas’s motion to disqualify was not untimely as the rule provides that a motion
to disqualify for cause may be made at any time. See I.R.C.P. 40(b)(2). Nevertheless, Thomas
has failed to show error in the denial of his motion to disqualify.
Thomas’s motion to disqualify was filed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(b)(1)(D), which
provides that a judge may be disqualified for cause if the judge is biased or prejudiced for or against
any party or the subject matter of the action. Whatever the source of the bias or prejudice, it must
be so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784,
791, 229 P.3d 1146, 1153 (2010). Unless there is a demonstration of pervasive bias derived from
either an extrajudicial source or facts and events occurring at trial, there is no basis for judicial
recusal. Id. at 792, 229 P.3d at 1154. The standard for recusal of a judge based simply on
information that the judge has learned in the course of judicial proceedings is extremely high. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has held that judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion, noting that, “almost invariably, they are
proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Thomas’s arguments about the magistrate court’s “decisions and rulings throughout the case” fail
to demonstrate pervasive bias--a necessary basis for judicial disqualification. A review of the
record does not support Thomas’s assertions; rather, it supports the conclusion that the magistrate
court afforded Thomas ample opportunity to participate in the proceedings. This is evidenced by
the magistrate court’s allowance of numerous late filings and discovery responses by Thomas as

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well as several continuances. Thomas’s argument that the magistrate court prevented him from
presenting evidence on his own petition filed in June 2024 likewise fails. As explained below, this
Court does not conclude that the magistrate court prevented Thomas from conducting discovery
or that it erred by holding him to discovery deadlines provided in the scheduling order. Thomas
engaged in the discovery process since his August 2023 declaration. Thomas’s failure to properly
supplement discovery is his failure and is not evidence of bias on behalf of the magistrate court.
Nor does the record support Thomas’s contention that the magistrate court repeatedly allowed
George to file late motions. Finally, a trial court does not show bias by sua sponte striking
improper testimony.
Thomas has failed to demonstrate pervasive bias by the magistrate court. The magistrate
court did not err in denying Thomas’s motion to disqualify for cause.
C. Discovery Deadlines
Thomas argues the district court abused its discretion by requiring him to adhere to
discovery deadlines that expired prior to the filing of his petition in June 2024. Specifically,
Thomas contends the magistrate court erred when it granted George’s motion in limine and
sanctioned Thomas by precluding him from introducing testimony from two representatives of
third-party professional conservators. Thomas asserts that he was not obligated to abide by the
discovery deadlines contained in the magistrate court’s scheduling order entered after George’s
petition and Thomas’s declaration because the magistrate court subsequently ordered him to file a
petition.
The imposition of discovery sanctions is within the discretion of the trial court and will not
be overturned absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Sommer, 170 Idaho at 427, 511 P.3d at 847.
When granting George’s motion in limine to preclude Thomas from presenting evidence from his
proposed third-party conservators, which were not disclosed until after the discovery deadline, the
magistrate court reasoned:
So even when we started the case and even though the Court ultimately
ruled that there was a petition required, the position has always been--the position
has always been that if . . . [Thomas] was allowed to present that information that
it was going to be a third party that he wanted. So he was aware that he was going
to need a witness such as a representative from [TrESCo] when the first pretrial
memorandums were due.
....

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But probably more importantly is that there’s an ongoing duty to
supplement discovery and . . . it’s not contradicted . . . that discovery has not been
supplemented. The Court finds that there’s a discovery violation here. That
[counsel for George] was entitled on behalf of his client to know who was going to
testify, if there was an interrogatory in conjunction with that, what the scope of that
testimony was going to be and the background and the services so he can attack or
impeach the quality of that service.
Since the filing of his August 2023 declaration, Thomas participated in discovery as
evidenced by his filing of several subpoenas, interrogatories, requests for documents, and requests
for admission. The record shows that Thomas was aware of his discovery duties but failed to
disclose his proffered witnesses.
Thomas also argues that he was not bound by the scheduling order because the magistrate
court erroneously required him to file his June 2024 petition based on an incorrect interpretation
of I.C. § 15-5-404, the statute which sets out the procedure for court appointment of a conservator
for an incapacitated person. The magistrate court addressed this argument in its memorandum
decision, stating:
Even if an appellate court disagrees with this Court that a petition must be
filed to obtain prospective relief, and that Thomas’ nomination in his August 17,
2023 Declaration is solely sufficient to put the matter at issue, he was still under
an ongoing duty to supplement his discovery. His failure to do so resulted in a steep
sanction--he was precluded from presenting evidence supportive of the professional
conservators. The Court does not allow trial by ambush. Thomas has no one to
blame but himself for this sanction. Simple supplementation and providing
information to George’s counsel would have remedied the issue. He chose not [to],
and now faces the consequences of that failure.
As explained by the magistrate court, regardless of whether a separate petition was required,
Thomas’s August 2023 declaration was sufficient to trigger discovery obligations. The magistrate
court did not abuse its discretion when it sanctioned Thomas by precluding testimony from the
representatives of the third-party professional conservators as a result of Thomas’s failure to
comply with discovery requirements.4

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Because Thomas’s claim that a separate petition was not required by I.C. § 15-5-404 would
not change the result with respect to sanctions, we need not address whether the magistrate court’s
interpretation of I.C. § 15-5-404 was correct. See Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 160
Idaho 181, 189, 370 P.3d 384, 392 (2015) (explaining that a claim for relief is moot when a

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D. Attorney Fees and Costs Awarded by the Magistrate Court
Thomas contends the magistrate court erred in awarding attorney fees. George responds
that the applicable law supports the attorney fees award. We hold that Thomas has failed to show
the magistrate court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to George.
George filed a motion for attorney fees and costs in June 2024. Thomas timely filed an
objection to the motion. George then filed a second motion for attorney fees and costs and Thomas
timely filed an objection to the second motion. The magistrate court entered an I.R.C.P. 54
certification the same day it entered its judgment appointing George as conservator for Maria. The
certification indicated the judgment was final and that judgment had been entered on all claims for
relief, except attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, George filed an “Amended Motion for Attorney
Fees and Costs” on October 28, 2024, which included attorney fees and costs that were not
accounted for in the prior motions; Thomas filed a memorandum in opposition on December 24,
2024.
The magistrate court granted George’s October 28, 2024, motion for attorney fees and costs
based on its finding that Thomas’s response was untimely. The magistrate court reasoned that
I.R.C.P. 54 provides that attorney fees are considered costs in an action and are to be processed in
the same manner as other costs. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5). The rule further provides that “any objection
to a claim for attorney fees must be made in the same manner as an objection to costs as provided
by Rule 54(d)(5).” I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6).
George timely filed his motion for attorney fees and costs. See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4) (stating
that at any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, but not later than fourteen days
after entry of judgment, any party who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a
memorandum of costs, itemizing each claimed expense). Any objection to that motion was
required to be filed within fourteen days of the service of the memorandum of costs. See
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). The magistrate court concluded Thomas failed to comply with these time
requirements because he failed to file his objection within fourteen days of service. Failure to

favorable decision would not result in relief and an appellate court only reviews issues in which a
judicial determination would have a practical effect on the outcome).

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timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs constitutes a waiver of all objections to the
costs claimed. Id. Accordingly, the magistrate court concluded Thomas waived his objection.
On appeal, Thomas argues that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow an
“amended” motion to be filed and that he was not put on notice that he needed to respond to the
amended motion when he had already objected to the two prior motions. He argues an amendment
would relate back to the original proceeding, essentially taking place of that document. Based on
this reasoning, Thomas asserts his prior objections should have carried over and he was not
required to file a response.
Thomas’s arguments are not persuasive. The magistrate court noted that it made it “crystal
clear” that the matter was final when it entered its judgment and immediately filed the I.R.C.P. 54
certification. The magistrate court noted, “given the finality, George filed his ‘amended’ motion
for attorney fees and costs” within the required fourteen days. The magistrate court explained that
the motion and memorandum are entitled “amended” because George had previously filed a
motion for attorney fees and costs. However, the magistrate court had not yet ruled on attorney
fees and costs because the case was not resolved.
The magistrate court properly rejected Thomas’s argument that his prior objections carried
forward. The magistrate court reasoned there were several more hearings and filings included in
the October request and it followed a final judgment. The magistrate court concluded the rule and
case law are clear on this point, which supports a conclusion that Thomas waived any objection to
the fees requested in George’s October motion. We agree. Further, Thomas’s argument that he
was not required to file a response to the October motion appears disingenuous considering that
Thomas filed an untimely objection to the motion in December. Thomas has failed to show the
magistrate court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to George.
E. Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal
George seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 41 and I.C. §§ 12-121
and 12-123.5 George argues that attorney fees are proper based on Thomas’s “ongoing pattern of
unreasonable, frivolous, and unfounded litigation conduct.” An award of attorney fees may be

5
Idaho Code Section 12-123 governs “[s]anctions for frivolous conduct in a civil case.”
This code section does not apply on appeal. Horton v. Horton, 171 Idaho 60, 78, 518 P.3d 359,
377 (2022).

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granted under I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 to the prevailing party and such an award is appropriate
when the court finds that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation. An award of attorney fees is appropriate if the appellant only invites this
Court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence, or if the law is well settled and the
appellant has made no substantial showing that the lower court misapplied the law, or no cogent
challenge is presented with regard to the trial court’s exercise of discretion. Pass v. Kenny, 118
Idaho 445, 449-50, 797 P.2d 153, 157-58 (Ct. App. 1990). That standard for an award of attorney
fees is satisfied in this case. Accordingly, George is awarded attorney fees on appeal. George is
entitled to costs as the prevailing party pursuant to I.A.R. 40.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Thomas fails to show error by the magistrate court. The judgment appointing a
conservator, the judgment on a motion for sanctions, and the order on a motion for attorney fees
and costs are affirmed. Costs and attorney fees are awarded to George on appeal.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge Pro Tem MELANSON, CONCUR.

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