State v. Hubbard

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50695

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: June 26, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
ALLAN JAMI HUBBARD, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bannock County. Hon. Javier L. Gabiola, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for aggravated battery and aggravated assault, vacated; case
remanded.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Amy J. Lavin, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Allan Jami Hubbard appeals from his judgment of conviction for aggravated battery and
aggravated assault. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the judgment and remand the case
for further proceedings.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Hubbard was charged with three counts of aggravated battery, aggravated assault,
attempted strangulation, and a deadly weapon enhancement. Following mediation, Hubbard and
the State reached a binding I.C.R. 11 plea agreement providing for Hubbard to plead guilty to one
count of aggravated battery and aggravated assault. In exchange for Hubbard’s guilty pleas, the
State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and the weapon enhancement. The State also agreed

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to recommend a suspended, unified sentence of fifteen years, with a minimum period of
confinement of seven years. While the agreement was not reduced to writing, the judge who
conducted the mediation appeared at Hubbard’s change of plea hearing and recited the agreement’s
terms on the record.
During the plea colloquy, the district court informed Hubbard that, despite the binding
agreement, it reserved the right to reject the agreement pending the outcome of the presentence
investigation report. The district court further advised Hubbard that he would be entitled to
withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to trial if the agreement was rejected. Hubbard indicated he
understood the district court’s caveats. Ultimately, the district court accepted Hubbard’s guilty
pleas, finding that they were made knowingly and voluntarily. Thereafter, the district court
ordered “preparation of a presentence investigation report” and ordered Hubbard to comply with
the process of completing the report. Sentencing was scheduled for October 18, 2021. The district
court also continued Hubbard’s release1 prior to his sentencing hearing.
Thereafter, Hubbard reported to the probation office and scheduled his presentence
investigation interview. However, when an evaluator contacted Hubbard after he failed to appear
for a different interview, Hubbard indicated he was considering withdrawing his guilty pleas.
Hubbard did not attend his presentence investigation interview. As a result, the district court issued
a bench warrant on the basis that Hubbard violated the conditions of his pretrial release by failing
to meet with the presentence investigator. Hubbard was arrested and sentencing was rescheduled
for December 2, 2021. While in custody, Hubbard participated in the presentence investigation
interview, which was completed prior to the December 2, 2021, sentencing hearing. On
December 2, 2021, Hubbard’s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw, citing a breakdown of the
attorney-client relationship. The district court granted the motion to withdraw, appointed conflict
counsel, and again reset Hubbard’s sentencing hearing.
Prior to the sentencing hearing, the State filed a motion alleging Hubbard breached the
terms of the agreement when he failed to participate in the presentence investigation. Hubbard

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The record shows that Hubbard posted bond prior to the change of plea hearing. As
conditions of his release, the district court ordered Hubbard to maintain contact with his trial
counsel, not leave the State of Idaho without his trial counsel’s knowledge or permission, and not
violate any other laws.

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responded with a motion to enforce the plea agreement, asserting he did not breach the agreement
and that the State was therefore required to uphold its obligations under the terms of the agreement.
Ultimately, the district court denied Hubbard’s motion. According to the district court, the
presentence investigation was an implied term of the agreement because it ordered the report “be
finished before the sentencing hearing could be conducted.” The district court therefore found
that, because Hubbard breached the agreement by failing to complete the presentence investigation
report, there were no grounds to enforce the agreement.
Thereafter, Hubbard filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing he retained the
right to withdraw his pleas if the district court rejected the agreement. The State opposed
Hubbard’s motion, contending his noncompliance with the presentence investigation breached the
agreement and released the State from its promises. The State also asserted Hubbard failed to
provide “just reasons” for withdrawing his guilty pleas and that it would be prejudiced by the
withdrawals. The district court denied Hubbard’s motion after it determined that his guilty pleas
were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The district court also found that Hubbard
failed to establish a just reason warranting withdrawal of his guilty pleas and that he “effectively
forfeited his right to withdraw his guilty pleas by breaching the agreement.”
The district court ultimately sentenced Hubbard to a term of fifteen years, with a minimum
period of confinement of nine years, for aggravated battery and a concurrent, unified term of five
years, with a minimum period of confinement of four years, for aggravated assault. Hubbard
appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law to be reviewed by this
Court de novo, in accordance with contract law standards. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106
P.3d 397, 399 (2005). As with other types of contracts, “the interpretation of a plea agreement and
its legal effects are questions of law to be decided by the Court if the terms are clear and
unambiguous.” State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 914, 120 P.3d 299, 302 (Ct. App. 2005). The
determination that a plea agreement is ambiguous is a question of law; however, interpretation of
an ambiguous term is a question of fact. State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 226 P.3d 535, 537

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(2010). A trial court’s factual determinations shall not be set aside on review unless they are
clearly erroneous. Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Hubbard contends the district court erred when it found that he breached the plea
agreement. Alternatively, Hubbard argues he “cured the alleged breach by providing conforming
performance within a reasonable time.” Hubbard also asserts the district court’s remedies were
improper for a “non-material or cured breach” of the agreement and that he should have been
allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas. In response, the State contends Hubbard “breached an
implied material term of” the agreement and that the district court’s decisions and findings are
supported by the record. We hold the district court erred in failing to abide by the procedural rules
for rejecting a binding plea agreement.2
We begin by analyzing the nature of Hubbard’s plea agreement. Although not in writing,
the agreement’s terms were read into the record by the mediating judge at Hubbard’s change of
plea hearing:
The parties, after discussions, agreed on the following terms and wished to
enter a change of plea on the record and also bind the [c]ourt’s hand with a binding
Rule 11 agreement as follows: That the State would be dismissing all of the
[aggravated] batteries, except for the [aggravated] battery with regard to the guitar,
and he would plead guilty to that agg[ravated] battery.
And with regard to the assault, I’m afraid we didn’t actually specify which
assault, but he would also be agreeing to plead to one aggravated assault. The
agreement was that the other counts would be dismissed by the State with an
underlying sentence that the parties would stipulate and agree to being seven years
fixed and eight indeterminate. However, it would bind the [c]ourt’s hands with
regard to a stipulated agreement for probation, irregardless [sic] of the PSI, but with
the following terms.
One, he be given credit for time served already in the neighborhood of 2.8
years. Not exactly sure on the timeline there, but they will get that information to

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Because we resolve this case based on the district court’s failure to abide by the procedural
rules for rejecting a binding plea agreement under I.C.R. 11(f)(4)(A)-(D), we need not address the
remaining arguments raised by Hubbard or the State. Although not necessary to our disposition,
we note that participation in the presentence investigation was a term of Hubbard’s release, not a
term of the plea agreement. While the district court could consider Hubbard’s failure to attend his
original appointment with the presentence investigator in deciding whether to accept the binding
plea agreement, that failure did not excuse compliance with the applicable rule.

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you. That he would, as a term and condition of probation, be assigned to obtain a
domestic violence evaluation, and that he would follow all recommendations of the
evaluation as a term and condition of probation. That the two cases would run
concurrent with one another. Obviously the agg[ravated] assault is--got a 15-year
max, so it would run concurrent with the agg[ravated] battery, but they would still
be two convictions.
Then a few other terms they agreed to put in the binding Rule 11 agreement
would include that the State would waive any costs to--costs of prosecution. They
would also stipulate to no [public defender] restitution. Even though the case
started with the public defender’s office, it has ended with private counsel[.] They
agreed to leave vague and open, but also stipulate to the general term that the fines
would be minimal in consideration of what his anticipated probation costs,
domestic violence evaluation, and treatment costs, and clarified both with the State
and with the victim that there would be no request for restitution.
The parties would understand as the normal terms that they would be free
to argue for early release from probation, factoring in even the time that he’s served
since 2018, even though we know probation wouldn’t start until the sentence. But
no real agreement on that, just a general understanding that probation could end
premature with good cause. And I believe that is the full agreement.
The district court summarized its understanding of the agreement, which both the State and
Hubbard confirmed as accurate. During the plea colloquy, the district court referenced Hubbard’s
guilty plea advisory form and confirmed the waiver of his right to remain silent post-plea.
Thereafter, Hubbard provided a factual basis for his guilty pleas. Ultimately, the district court
accepted Hubbard’s guilty pleas after determining they were made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily.
Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(1) allows prosecutors and defense attorneys to resolve a
defendant’s case by agreeing on a specific sentence. Under I.C.R. 11(f)(2), if a plea agreement
includes dismissal of a charge, a specifically agreed-upon sentence or any other agreed upon
disposition of the case, the trial court may accept or reject the agreement or may defer its decision
until it reviews the presentence report. If the trial court accepts the plea agreement, it must inform
the defendant that it will be bound by the terms of the agreement in the final disposition of the
case. I.C.R. 11(f)(3). Rejection of a binding plea agreement, however, must comply with the
procedure outlined in I.C.R. 11(f)(4).
In this case, the mediating judge informed the district court that the parties intended to enter
into a binding plea agreement. The district court advised Hubbard that, while the parties intended
the agreement would bind the court, it reserved the right to reject the agreement “pending the

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outcome of the presentence investigation.” The district court notified Hubbard that, if it rejected
the agreement, he could withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to trial on all of his charges.
However, the district court denied Hubbard’s request to do so after it found that his failure to
participate in the first presentence investigation appointment constituted a breach of the agreement.
According to the district court, once Hubbard breached the agreement, “there was no longer a
sentencing agreement for [it] to reject.” The district court erred in finding Hubbard’s alleged
breach voided the binding plea agreement.
Nothing in I.C.R. 11 supports the proposition that a defendant who allegedly breaches the
terms of a binding plea agreement forfeits the right to withdraw his guilty plea or that an alleged
breach terminates the agreement itself. Although the district court relied on State v. Tyler, 139
Idaho 631, 84 P.3d 567 (Ct. App. 2003) in support of its finding, the facts in Tyler are
distinguishable. While the defendant in Tyler also entered into a plea agreement, the terms of
which were set forth orally at the change of plea hearing, that agreement was not presented as a
binding agreement under I.C.R. 11. Because the plea agreement in Tyler was not offered as a
binding plea agreement, the constraints from I.C.R. 11(f)(4) did not apply. In contrast, the record
in this case shows multiple instances during the change of plea hearing where Hubbard and the
State indicated their intent to bind the district court to the terms of the agreement. The district
court acknowledged the parties’ intent during the plea colloquy when it advised Hubbard as
follows:
THE COURT: All right. So in addition, the plea agreement as recited by
[the mediating judge] and as the parties acknowledged here today
and you did as well, Mr. Hubbard, it’s a binding plea agreement,
which means the [c]ourt can still reserve its right not to accept that
plea agreement pending the outcome of the presentence
investigation report and the domestic violence evaluation, in which
case if the [c]ourt does reject the binding Rule 11 plea agreement,
you would be entitled to withdraw your guilty pleas and proceed to
trial, jury trial on all of the charges. You understand that?
[HUBBARD]: Yes.
The plea agreement in Tyler resembles the agreements discussed in I.C.R. 11(f)(1)(B),
which states an agreement may involve a recommendation (or an agreement not to oppose the
defendant’s request) for a particular sentence, “with the understanding that the recommendation
or request is not binding on the court.” With these types of agreements, the trial court is required

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to advise the defendant that he or she has no right to withdraw his or her guilty plea should it reject
the recommendation or request. I.C.R. 11(f)(2). Conversely, the procedure and rights afforded to
a defendant differ when the parties enter into a binding plea agreement. When a trial court rejects
a binding plea agreement it must, on the record: (a) inform the parties of the rejection; (b) advise
the defendant in open court that it is not bound by the plea agreement; (c) afford the defendant the
opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea; and (d) advise the defendant that if he or she persists in
the guilty plea, the disposition of the case could be less favorable than the terms of the plea
agreement. I.C.R. 11(f)(4)(A)-(D).3 The district court failed to do so. Rather than afford Hubbard
the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas after rejecting the negotiated agreement for a
suspended sentence in favor of probation, the district court denied Hubbard’s request to withdraw
his guilty pleas and imposed a unified, fifteen-year sentence, with a minimum period of
confinement of nine years, for aggravated battery and a concurrent, unified five-year sentence,
with a minimum period of confinement of four years, for aggravated assault. The district court
erred when it failed to abide by the procedural rules for rejecting a binding plea agreement.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in failing to abide by the procedural requirements of I.C.R. 11(f)(4)
when it rejected the binding plea agreement. Accordingly, we vacate Hubbard’s judgment of
conviction for aggravated battery and aggravated assault and remand this case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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We note that, if a court rejects an I.C.R. 11(f)(3) plea agreement and permits the defendant
to withdraw his or her guilty plea, the State is no longer bound by the plea agreement and retains
the right to reinstate any and all charges dismissed or amended pursuant to the plea agreement.

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