Daniels v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51511

JOHN HUEY DANIELS, )
) Filed: June 24, 2025
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
STATE OF IDAHO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Respondent. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge.

Judgment summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Silvey Law Office Ltd; Greg S. Silvey, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
John Huey Daniels appeals from the district court’s judgment summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief. Daniels argues the district court erred in granting summary
dismissal on two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, both of which related to trial counsel’s
alleged failures at trial. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s judgment
summarily dismissing Daniels’ petition for post-conviction relief.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the underlying criminal case, Daniels was found guilty of aggravated assault with an
enhancement for use of a deadly weapon. This Court set forth the underlying facts in State v.
Daniels, Docket No. 47481 (Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2021) (unpublished):
In February 2019, multiple police officers responded to a shooting in
Garden City. One officer arrived at the scene and found a victim, who had been
shot in the abdomen. Another responding officer stopped a vehicle in Garden City

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matching the description of the suspect’s vehicle. Daniels was driving that vehicle
and had a female passenger. During a subsequent search of the vehicle, officers
located a gun in the vehicle’s passenger-door panel. The State charged Daniels
with felony aggravated battery. Daniels pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to
trial.
At trial, the State presented the testimony of numerous witnesses, including
Detective O’Gorman. Detective O’Gorman conducted a gunshot residue test on
Daniels after apprehending him. After advising Daniels of his Miranda1 rights,
Detective O’Gorman interviewed Daniels and his female passenger separately.
Detective O’Gorman testified that Daniels was initially “very adamant” he was not
involved in the shooting. For example, Daniels claimed he had been at a friend’s
home in Garden City and was taking his female passenger to another friend’s home.
Further, when Detective O’Gorman told Daniels--as a ruse--that the gunshot
residue test showed residue, Daniels explained that the prior evening he had fired a
pistol he was considering purchasing.
When Detective O’Gorman told Daniels his passenger had indicated
Daniels was the shooter, Daniels’ story changed. Detective O’Gorman testified
that, at that point, Daniels told Detective O’Gorman that Daniels picked up an
individual named Jeff at a gas station in Garden City to give him a ride to Nampa.
Jeff first needed to pick up his belongings from a friend’s trailer; Jeff asked if
Daniels had a gun; and Jeff stated he “needed backup.” When Daniels arrived at
the trailer, he learned it belonged to the victim with whom Daniels said he had a
“beef.” After Daniels entered the trailer with a gun in his pocket, the victim and
another individual became aggressive towards Daniels, including hitting him.
Daniels pulled the gun from his pocket, and it went off, shooting the victim.
Daniels was convicted and appealed; his conviction was affirmed on appeal. Daniels, Docket
No. 47481.
Daniels filed a petition for post-conviction relief and requested counsel be appointed.
Counsel was appointed and filed several amended petitions, ultimately filing the third amended
petition at issue. The State filed a motion for summary dismissal which the district court granted,
in part. The district court dismissed multiple claims; at issue here, the court dismissed two claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the district court dismissed a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to ensure that Idaho Criminal Jury
Instruction 1519, commonly referred to as the “stand your ground” instruction, was included in
the final jury instructions. The district court found that although counsel rendered deficient
performance, Daniels could not establish any prejudice as a result of the deficient performance.
Second, the district court dismissed a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
introduce into evidence a photograph of a machete found at the scene, finding neither deficient
performance nor prejudice. Daniels appeals.

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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by
the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if
true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929
(2010); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Over questions
of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069
(2009); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).
III.
ANALYSIS
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature.
I.C. § 19-4907; Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 249, 220 P.3d at 1068; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,
678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct.
App. 1992).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction
relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court’s own initiative, if it appears from
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact,
together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering summary dismissal,
the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner’s favor, but the court is not required
to accept either the petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence,
or the petitioner’s conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.
App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986).
Moreover, the district court, as the trier of fact, is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of
the party opposing the motion for summary disposition; rather, the district court is free to arrive at
the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidence. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho
353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not be disturbed on appeal if
the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id.
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner’s allegations are clearly disproven by
the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima
facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner’s allegations do not justify

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relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushé
v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim
for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner’s favor.
For this reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when
the State does not controvert the petitioner’s evidence. See Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at
901.
Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege
facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be
summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004);
Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 923. If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho
269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 477, 224 P.3d 536, 544 (Ct.
App. 2009). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show
that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578,
580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden
of showing that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho
433, 442, 163 P.3d 222, 231 (Ct. App. 2007).
The prejudice prong requires the petitioner to show that the alleged deficient conduct
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot
be relied upon as having produced a just result. We have recognized that this is a
weighty burden for a defendant to carry. Indeed, a defendant must show a
reasonable probability that the trial’s outcome would have been different but for
counsel’s deficient performance. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, 536-37, 348 P.3d 145, 151-52 (2015) (quotations and citations
omitted).
This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial
counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate

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preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.
Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172, 254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011).
Daniels argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing two claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for failing to: (1) ensure ICJI 1519 was given to the jury; and (2)
introduce into evidence a picture of the machete found at the scene.
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1519 reads:
In the exercise of the right of self-defense, one need not retreat. One may stand
one’s ground and defend oneself by the use of all force and means which would
appear to be necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation and with similar
knowledge. This law applies even though the person being attacked might more
easily have gained safety by flight or by withdrawing from the scene.
As to ICJI 1519, the district court found trial counsel was deficient for failing to ensure the
instruction was included. However, the district court found that Daniels failed to establish there
was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different because the jury
unanimously determined that Daniels failed to establish self-defense.
Daniels argues the district court’s conclusion regarding the lack of prejudice was error
because without ICJI 1519, the jury could reject Daniels’ argument that he acted in self-defense
regardless of the reasonableness of his other actions, including that he did not have to leave the
scene instead of defending himself. The State argues the district court correctly found a lack of
prejudice because the issue in the case did not come down to whether Daniels had a duty to retreat.
Instead, the State argues that the case came down to credibility and which story the jury
believed--Daniels’ or the State’s. The jury rejected Daniels’ version of events, which meant it
rejected that Daniels’ acted in self-defense.
The evidence at trial indicated that Daniels’ version of events differed over time. As noted
above, during Daniels’ interview with law enforcement, Daniels initially denied any involvement
in the shooting, lied about his whereabouts at the time of the shooting, and denied having a gun.
When confronted with the results of the gunshot residue testing, Daniels tried to explain away the
gunshot residue by claiming he talked to a person about purchasing a handgun and went and shot
the gun but had deleted any information from his cell phone relating to the calls or texts to that
unidentified person. Daniels then admitted that he had not been truthful about what happened but
still denied any involvement in the shooting or that he had a gun. When confronted with the
statements of a witness, Daniels then claimed the shooting was accidental because although he put
the gun in his back pocket before entering the trailer, he did not know there was a round in the
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chamber. Daniels told law enforcement he went to the trailer and was physically assaulted by the
victim and another individual. At trial, Daniels claimed that when he pulled the gun from his
pocket, he was only intending to scare the victim but did not intend to shoot him. However, in the
ensuing scuffle, the gun accidentally discharged, and the victim was shot but ran off. The State
played the approximately four-hour long video of Daniels’ interview with law enforcement and
highlighted the different versions of events that Daniels told the detective. Other witnesses also
contradicted various portions of Daniels’ testimony including that Daniels had no visible injuries
despite his characterization of the fight as an attack.
Daniels testified that by the time he decided it would be best if he left, the victim was in
front of him and the other person was behind him, so he was cornered. Daniels testified that he
tried to take a step back, but the victim came at him swinging. As Daniels was being hit by both
people, he thought he heard the sound of a blade on a counter and so he “went for [his] gun” with
the intent “to scare them, to get them away from me.” In the ensuing physical altercation, the gun
discharged but Daniels testified he did not intend for the gun to go off. Daniels clarified, “And
when I pulled the gun out, I pulled it out as a deterrent factor only. I was never intending to point
it at nobody or shoot anybody, but to simply stop them.” Daniels also testified that the reason he
told different versions of the events to law enforcement was because he was scared.
The district court did not err in concluding Daniels failed to establish any prejudice as a
result of the exclusion of ICJI 1519. The jury was tasked with selecting which version of events
it found more credible, that of Daniels or the State. By finding that Daniels shot the victim willfully
or intentionally, and not as an act of self-defense, the jury rejected Daniels’ version of events,
including his statements that the shooting was accidental. Nothing in the record supports a
conclusion that the jury rejected Daniels’ claim of self-defense because Daniels failed to retreat.
Daniels’ legal ability to stand his ground rather than retreat, as described in ICJI 1519 was not at
issue under the facts of the case.
Daniels argues ICJI 1519 was especially important because the State argued in closing that
Daniels had to retreat from the physical fight. We read that portion of the transcript differently.
What the State argued was that Daniels could have left before the physical altercation began, a
statement that Daniels agreed with during his interview with law enforcement. In closing, the
State also explained that Daniels had the right to defend himself during the physical fight but that
defense had to be proportional, and Daniels exceeded the reasonable force necessary to repel the

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attack. Thus, contrary to Daniels’ claim, nothing about the State’s closing argument indicates the
State argued that Daniels had to retreat. As a result, ICJI 1519 was not “especially important”
because it did not contradict or clarify an erroneous comment by the State. Because the jury
rejected Daniels’ defense, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be
different had ICJI 1519 been given. The district court did not err in finding Daniels failed to
establish any prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s failure to ensure that ICJI 1519 was given to
the jury and, as a result, failed to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Daniels next argues his attorney was ineffective for failing to introduce a photograph of
the machete found at the scene. The district court found that trial counsel was neither ineffective
by failing to introduce a photograph of the machete nor did Daniels suffer any prejudice from the
failure. While it may be true that the machete and its location was an important part of Daniels’
defense, trial counsel recognized that importance and introduced evidence and argument related to
the machete during the trial. Both sides repeatedly questioned witnesses and both sides addressed
the machete in their closing arguments to the jurors. Several witnesses describe the machete as
something between a knife and a sword and provided a detailed description of the machete.
A photograph would have been duplicative of the evidence already admitted. That Daniels
believes a photograph would have “been worth a thousand words,” does not make the failure to
introduce the photograph deficient performance. Consequently, Daniels has failed to establish a
prima facie case of deficient performance by trial counsel. Additionally, nothing in the record
shows a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had a
photograph of the machete been admitted. Various witnesses testified that no one had the machete
in hand during the altercation or threatened Daniels with the machete. The description and location
of the machete was addressed by all sides and the jury heard the testimony. Despite hearing
Daniels’ testimony that he thought he heard a blade being picked up; the jury found Daniels guilty.
Because Daniels failed to make a prima facie showing of either deficient performance or prejudice,
the district court did not err in summarily dismissing this claim.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in concluding that Daniels failed to establish a genuine issue
of material fact regarding either of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The judgment
summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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