IDHW v. Jane Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52745

In the Matter of: John Doe I )
A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of )
Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
HEALTH AND WELFARE, ) Filed: June 17, 2025
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
JANE DOE (2025-08), ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Bonneville County. Hon. Tawnya Rawlings, Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Eric. D. Fredericksen, State Public Defender; Elizabeth Cutler, Deputy Public
Defender, Idaho Falls, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark V. Withers, Deputy Attorney
General, Idaho Falls, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Jane Doe appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment terminating her parental rights to
her child (“Child”). Doe argues the magistrate court erred in finding that she neglected Child and,
alternatively, was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities. Doe also argues the magistrate
court erred in finding that it is in Child’s best interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights. The
magistrate court’s judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe has had four children. Regarding Child A, although Doe retains parental rights to him,
Child A was ultimately placed with his father. Doe’s parental rights to Child B were involuntarily

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terminated in 2019 and her parental rights to Child C were terminated in 2022. The child in this
case is Doe’s youngest child. Umbilical cord testing results indicated that Child was born with
methamphetamine and fentanyl in his system. It took approximately six days for the test results
to be returned, by which time Doe and Child had been discharged and returned home. Upon
obtaining the test results, the case was referred to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
(“Department”). Department workers went to Doe’s home, ultimately made contact with Doe, and
removed Child based on imminent danger. In the three days between being discharged from the
hospital and the arrival of the Department workers, Child’s weight had decreased from a birth
weight of 6.2 pounds to 5.62 pounds, a loss of twelve percent of his body weight. Child gained
several ounces within ten hours of being placed in foster care. Doe acknowledged to Susan Devine,
a Department worker, that she regularly used both methamphetamine and fentanyl while pregnant
with Child; Doe later clarified with her probation officer that her drug use had been daily until she
realized she was pregnant and then she continued to use controlled substances three to five times
a week until a few days before Child’s birth. A few days after Child’s removal, Doe was arrested
for probation violations, and her probation was revoked; Doe has remained in custody since August
20, 2024.
The Department filed a petition pursuant to the Child Protection Act (“CPA”) requesting
that Child be placed in shelter care with the Department; the magistrate court ordered Child to be
sheltered within the Department. The Department then filed a motion for a finding of aggravating
circumstances and suspending reunification efforts between Doe and Child because Doe’s parental
rights to Child B were involuntarily terminated in 2019. The magistrate court held an adjudicatory
hearing, at which the magistrate court indicated that if it found Child was subjected to aggravating
circumstances, it would hold a permanency hearing and would consider changing the permanency
plan from reunification to termination of Doe’s parental rights. Following the hearing on the
motion for a finding of aggravating circumstances, the magistrate court entered written findings,
including that Doe’s involuntary termination of her parental rights to Child B in 2019 (and perhaps
the involuntary termination of her parental rights to Child C in 2022, although it is not entirely
clear from the record) was an aggravating circumstance. The magistrate court also found
additional facts to support its conclusion that reunification efforts should be suspended, including:
(1) Doe had a chronic drug addiction for approximately 23 years at the time of Child’s birth;
(2) Doe’s drug use while pregnant with Child; (3) the loss of Doe’s prior children primarily due to

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her drug use; (4) the loss of bodyweight suffered by Child in the three days he was with Doe;
(5) Doe’s current incarceration and likely length of her retained jurisdiction program; (6) Doe’s
inability to provide for the needs of Child; and (7) the fact that Child is thriving in foster care. The
magistrate court concluded that the existence of the prior involuntary termination, coupled with
the additional facts, “suggest that a finding of aggravated circumstances is justified, i.e., that any
efforts to reunify with the parent should be suspended and the case should move to a permanency
goal of termination of parental rights.” The magistrate court modified the permanency plan to
termination of Doe’s parental rights, followed by adoption, with the concurrent plan of
reunification, and continued to suspend efforts to reunify Doe and Child. Following a hearing, the
magistrate court issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law and terminated Doe’s
parental rights to Child. Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court’s decision
must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Doe asserts the magistrate court erred in finding two statutory bases for
terminating her parental rights: that Doe neglected Child pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 16-1602(31)
and 16-2005(1)(b), and that Doe was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities pursuant to
I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d). Doe also asserts that the magistrate court erred in terminating Doe’s parental

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rights based on an aggravated circumstance and in finding that terminating her parental rights is in
the best interests of Child. The Department argues that the magistrate court did not err in any of
its legal conclusions.
Before reaching the merits of Doe’s argument, we must first address a procedural issue.
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(e) requires that, “References to the reporter’s transcript and clerk’s record
must be within the body of the brief, and shall not be included as footnotes or endnotes.” Idaho
Appellate Rule 36(b) requires that, “The type shall be no smaller than 12 point Times New Roman.
All lines must be double-spaced, except for quotations which may be indented and single spaced.”
Nothing in I.A.R. 36(b) exempts footnotes from the font and line spacing requirement. The
appellant’s opening brief contains forty-six footnotes, which include citation to authority, the
record, and the transcript. The respondent’s brief contains 180 footnotes which include citation to
authority, the record, and the transcript. In both briefs, the footnote font is smaller than Times
New Roman 12 point and is single spaced. The failure to comply with the appellate rules may
result in a waiver of the issues on appeal. However, despite the fact that both parties’ briefs are
subject to procedural default (and a waiver of their arguments on appeal), we will nonetheless
address the issues raised on appeal.
A. Statutory Bases for Termination
Statutory grounds for termination of parental rights include: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect
or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent;
(d) inability to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period, which will be injurious
to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) incarceration for a substantial period of time
during the child’s minority. I.C. § 16-2005. Upon finding a statutory ground for termination, the
court must also find that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child
relationship. I.C. § 16-2005(1). Both findings must be established by clear and convincing
evidence.
Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-
1602(31). Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child
is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary
for his or her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian, or other
custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them.

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The magistrate court found that Doe neglected Child pursuant to I.C. §§ 16-2005(1)(b) and
16-1602(31) because of her acknowledged regular use of drugs throughout her pregnancy and her
failure to tell medical personnel about her drug use. The magistrate court also found Doe’s history
of substance abuse negatively impacted her ability to care for Child. Finally, the court noted that
during the three days that Doe had custody of Child following their discharge from the hospital
after Child’s birth, Child lost a significant amount of weight and Doe did not take Child to any of
the scheduled medical appointments to address his low birth weight and jaundice. The magistrate
court also considered and found that Doe’s history of instability and criminality, her lack of current
employment or the ability to financially provide for Child, and her incarceration, were contrary to
providing for the health, morals, and well-being of Child and demonstrated Doe was not in a
position to discharge her parental responsibilities for Child.
The magistrate court also found Doe was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities
pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d). The magistrate court considered: (1) Doe’s incarceration
throughout the case; (2) Doe’s acknowledged use of methamphetamine and fentanyl during her
pregnancy with Child; (3) that Doe’s parental rights to prior children were terminated, with one of
those terminations a documented involuntary termination; (4) Doe’s twenty-three-year history of
substance abuse; (5) Doe’s history of an inability to comply with a case plan in the involuntary
termination case and her continued use of drugs during that case; (6) Doe’s inability to demonstrate
a substantial and prolonged period of stability; (7) Doe’s failure to address her substance abuse;
(8) Doe’s current incarceration due to drug offenses; and (9) Doe’s inability to demonstrate an
ability to meet Child’s needs.
In addition to finding neglect and an inability to discharge parental responsibilities, the
magistrate court also found that the termination of Doe’s parental rights was justified based on the
aggravated circumstances. The magistrate court concluded that:
The evidence in this case, together with the pattern of behavior shown toward
previous children, justifies a determination that a finding of aggravated
circumstance is appropriate with respect to [Child], and that the return of [Child] .
. . would result in an unacceptable risk to the health and welfare of [Child].
Doe argues that the magistrate court did not properly consider Doe’s efforts to mitigate the
harmful effects of her substance abuse during her pregnancy with Child because, given a previous
medical procedure, Doe did not know she was pregnant and, once she knew, she enrolled herself
in a methadone clinic. Similarly, Doe argues the magistrate court’s finding that Doe failed to care

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for Child in the days before his removal is not supported by the evidence. Finally, Doe argues that
Doe’s incarceration was due to a conviction from 2018, and Doe has not been charged with any
new offenses.
The magistrate court noted and considered all the factors Doe cites above. Doe’s argument
essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence presented at trial and determine that her conduct does
not amount to neglect. It is well established that appellate courts in Idaho do not reweigh
evidence. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2022-22), 171 Idaho 277, 282, 519 P.3d 1217,
1222 (2022). The magistrate court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that
Doe neglected Child pursuant to I.C. §§ 16-2005(1)(b) and 16-1602(31).
Doe next argues the magistrate court erred in finding Doe was unable to discharge her
parental responsibilities pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d). Doe argues that even in her prior CPA
cases, she demonstrated she is capable of bonding with and caring for her children. Doe argues
that her prior struggles with addiction are a result of, in significant part, her lack of supportive
relationships, but this time things are different because she maintained sobriety during her
incarceration, successfully completed her retained jurisdiction program, and has a support system
in friends and co-workers. Doe argues she demonstrated stability by maintaining her employment
prior to her incarceration and by having housing. The magistrate court considered these factors
and came to a different conclusion. Doe’s argument essentially asks this Court to reweigh evidence
presented at trial. As noted above, this Court will not reweigh evidence. See Doe (2022-22), 171
Idaho at 282, 519 P.3d at 1222.
Finally, Doe argues that although the magistrate court properly concluded there was a basis
for a finding of aggravated circumstances in this case for purposes of suspending reunification, it
erred in determining the aggravated circumstance was a basis for terminating Doe’s parental rights.
Doe argues that a prior involuntary termination is not a basis for terminating parental rights
pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(2), and thus, the magistrate court erred in finding aggravated
circumstances provided an independent statutory basis for terminating her parental rights. The
Department argues that although the magistrate court found an aggravated circumstance based on
the prior involuntary termination of her parental rights to another child, the magistrate court did
not treat the aggravated circumstance as a rebuttable presumption that termination of Doe’s
parental rights is in the best interests of Child. Instead, the magistrate court “merely noted in its
decree that Jane Doe had indeed subjected [Child] to aggravated circumstances, a finding which

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was a matter of record.” The Department is incorrect, as the magistrate court explicitly found that
clear and convincing evidence justified terminating the parent-child relationship between Doe and
Child because Doe subjected Child to aggravated circumstances, as defined in I.C. §§ 16-1602(6)
and 16-2005(2). The magistrate court further clarified it was not finding an aggravated
circumstance based on chronic neglect, but instead, only on the fact of the prior involuntary
termination.
Assuming, for purposes of this opinion, that a finding of aggravated circumstances based
on the prior involuntary termination of parental rights in a prior case does not provide an
independent basis for terminating parental rights pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(2), it does not affect
this Court’s determination that the record supports the magistrate court’s findings of clear and
convincing evidence of the two other statutory bases, I.C. §§ 16-2005(1)(b) and 16-2005(1)(d),
upon which Doe’s parental rights could be terminated. Because each statutory basis is an
independent basis, the magistrate court did not err in concluding there were at least two statutory
bases upon which Doe’s parental rights could be terminated: neglect and an inability to discharge
parental responsibilities.
B. Best Interests
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
In finding that it is in Child’s best interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights, the magistrate
court held that Child is thriving in his pre-adoptive foster placement, has bonded with his foster
family, has special needs that are being met, Child does not have a bond with Doe, Doe’s regular

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drug use while pregnant with Child negatively impacted Child, and Doe’s parental rights to two
prior children were terminated, at least one of which was involuntary. The magistrate court also
found that Child needs permanency, certainty, stability, and that Doe testified it is in Child’s best
interests to remain in foster care. The magistrate court noted that, “Every child deserves a safe,
secure and clean home environment with a stable caregiver who can meet his physical and
emotional needs. Stability and certainty are necessary for [Child] to continue making appropriate
developmental progress.” The magistrate court also noted Doe’s substance abuse history, Doe’s
failure to demonstrate any progress or willingness to change for a significant period of time, and
that, given Doe’s history, there is no indication she would modify her behavior in the future to be
able to maintain a safe and stable home for Child.
Doe argues the magistrate court failed to consider that Doe demonstrated a greater period
of stability in the years since the prior involuntary termination to Child B. Doe also argues there
was insufficient evidence presented at trial that showed Doe’s drug use negatively impacted Child
or that reunification between Doe and Child would take a long time.
Contrary to Doe’s assertions, ample testimony at trial indicated Doe’s instability, including
her near daily drug use prior to discovering her pregnancy and her use of controlled substances
three to five times a week after that discovery. Child was born with methamphetamine, fentanyl,
and methadone in his system and with a low birth weight due to his exposure to drugs in utero.
Moreover, Child suffered significant weight loss in the three days he was in Doe’s care following
their discharge from the hospital, during which time Doe admitted to using controlled substances.
Child suffers from tremors, also related to Doe’s drug use while pregnant. Doe’s argument
essentially asks this Court to reweigh evidence presented at trial. As noted above, this Court will
not reweigh evidence. See Doe (2022-22), 171 Idaho at 282, 519 P.3d at 1222. The magistrate
court considered the above factors and concluded that terminating Doe’s parental rights is in the
best interests of Child. The magistrate court did not err in reaching this conclusion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The magistrate court did not err in finding statutory bases for neglect and that termination
of Doe’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests because its findings are supported by substantial
and competent evidence. Therefore, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
Judge LORELLO and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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