State v. Manos

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51550

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: June 9, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
LOUIS DANIEL F. MANOS, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge.

Order relinquishing jurisdiction, reversed and case remanded.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Louis Daniel F. Manos appeals from the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction.
We reverse the district court’s order and remand this case for further proceedings.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Manos pled guilty to burglary with the intent to commit video voyeurism. At sentencing,
the district court imposed a unified term of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement of
two years. The district court then retained jurisdiction and sent Manos to participate in a rider
program, noting that doing so would give the Department of Correction an opportunity to place
Manos in a rehabilitative program. The district court acknowledged the Department determines
the appropriate programming. When addressing Manos at sentencing, the district court stated that

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the Department “will evaluate you and make a determination which facility to place you in that
has the treatment that you need to address your issues.” However, the district court stated that it
was “going to specifically recommend a sex-offender treatment program.” The district court
explained:
And at the end, once I receive a report back from the Department of Corrections
that either says that you’re unwilling or unable to engage in that treatment and
they’re recommending that I relinquish jurisdiction and just impose the sentence or
I get a report back that says they’re recommending probation because you’ve been
successful in that treatment, it’s actually me as the District Court that will make
that decision.
At the conclusion of the rider, the district court held a hearing and noted it had reviewed
the rider report that indicated Manos participated in the Thinking for a Change class and
acknowledged the report recommended probation. The State maintained its recommendation for
imposition of the sentence. The State argued Manos’s participation in the program as being
“surface level” and that “there was very little effort put in.” While the State noted it was concerned
that Manos did not participate in sex-offender treatment, it based its recommendation on its
“concerns about the lack of effort put into some of those classes and how that will translate into
further treatment while on probation and how that will potentially effect the community.” Manos
argued in favor of probation, noting he had a good release plan and had “completed everything the
rider folks have asked him to do.”
The district court stated that it had hoped that the Department would have addressed that
Manos needed sex-offender treatment given his evaluation showed that he was on the upper end
of a moderate risk to reoffend in a sexual way. The district court noted that the program Manos
participated in was not sex-offender treatment, noting: “So in this particular case, you did not do
any type of sex-offender treatment while on a rider, and that still needs to be significantly
addressed.” Based on this, the district court concluded, “I am going to relinquish jurisdiction” and
ordered execution of Manos’s sentence. Manos appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish
jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and will
not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712,

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639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).
When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a
multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Manos argues the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction for failing
to satisfy a condition over which he had no control--sex-offender programming during his rider.
The State responds that Manos has failed to show an abuse of discretion because the district court’s
desire for sex-offender programming was only a recommendation and, regardless of the IDOC’s
programming and placement decisions, the district court “did not lose its discretion to relinquish
jurisdiction just because the IDOC did not place Manos in sex offender treatment.” We hold that
the district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction based on the IDOC’s sole decision regarding
sex-offender programming was an abuse of discretion.
The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 426 P.3d 461
(2018) is instructive. In that case, Le Veque pled guilty to burglary and possession of a controlled
substance, and the district court placed him on probation. Id. at 112, 426 P.3d at 463. The
Department reviewed Le Veque’s criminal history, learned he had a sex-offense conviction in
South Dakota, and placed him in a sex-offender treatment program. Le Veque violated his
probation and, as a result, the district court revoked Le Veque’s probation and retained jurisdiction.
In the order retaining jurisdiction, the district court recommended sex-offender treatment and a
polygraph: “THE COURT SPECIFICALLY RECOMMENDS SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT
AFTER HE FULLY DISCLOSES HIS INVOLVEMENT IN HIS SOUTH DAKOTA CRIME,
AND THAT HIS DISCLOSURE IS VERIFIED WITH A POLYGRAPH.” Id. During his rider,
Le Veque completed a substance abuse program, but the Department did not place Le Veque in a
sex-offender treatment program. At the rider review hearing, the district court relinquished
jurisdiction, noting that Le Veque had not completed a polygraph as ordered and that he could

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have but did not arrange for a polygraph. The district court denied Le Veque’s request for more
time to obtain a polygraph. Id. at 113, 426 P.3d at 464.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that the district court’s decision was not
reached by an exercise of reason and noted that “the hallmark of a discretionary decision that is
not reached by an exercise of reason is arbitrariness.” Id. at 115, 426 P.3d at 466. The Court
recognized that, while trial courts are empowered to adjudge any person who willfully disobeys a
specific and definite order of the trial court, punishment is allowed only where “disobedience to
specific and definite orders accords with notions of fairness and due process.” Id. at 116, 426
P.3d at 467. The Court concluded the order did not have “the specificity and definition needed to
be considered an order directing Le Veque to obtain a polygraph examination.” Id. The Court
ruled that the order was ambiguous because it did not state Le Veque “shall” or “must” obtain a
polygraph; rather, it “recommended” a polygraph. Id. Further, the Court ruled that it was unclear
whether Le Veque or the Department was the subject of the recommendation. Id. As a result, the
Court held that relinquishing jurisdiction over Le Veque because he failed to follow an ambiguous
recommendation--rather than a specific and definite order--was not a decision reached through an
exercise of reason. Id. at 117, 426 P.3d at 468.
The Court held “the district court made other arbitrary decisions at the relinquishment
hearing that help inform our conclusion that it abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction
over Le Veque.” Id. (emphasis added). As an example, the Court noted the district court
previously recognized that the IDOC determines the appropriate programming; however, at the
rider review hearing, the district court stated:
I know your attorney has gone on and on and on about how you shouldn’t have
been--how you shouldn’t have been supervised as a sex offender, but you have that
in your past record so I don’t know how [the IDOC] can supervise you as anything
other than that. . . . And because of that, at least as far as I can tell right now you
are incapable of being placed on probation.
Id. The IDOC decided to place Le Veque in a substance abuse program rather than the sex-
offender treatment program that the district court recommended. The Court held that “to punish
Le Veque by relinquishing jurisdiction, even in part, because [the IDOC] had decided on a course

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of treatment contrary to the district court’s recommendation represents an unreasonable change in
position from the court’s earlier deference to [the IDOC].” Id. (emphasis added).1
This ruling is dispositive of Manos’s appeal and the State’s arguments to the contrary are
not persuasive. The State attempts to distinguish Le Veque by arguing the Supreme Court
concluded the district court abused its discretion because it relinquished jurisdiction based on
Le Veque’s failure to follow an ambiguous recommendation by the district court. However, this
argument does not address the Supreme Court’s statements that it was an arbitrary decision and
unreasonable to relinquish jurisdiction “even in part” because the IDOC decided on a treatment
program contrary to the district court’s recommendation. Id. Like Le Veque, the district court here
made a treatment recommendation which the IDOC did not follow. In both cases, the district court
recognized that the IDOC determines placement in a treatment program. In this case, the district
court relinquished jurisdiction at the review hearing based on Manos’s nonparticipation in sex-
offender treatment. As in Le Veque, for the district court to punish Manos even in part based on
the IDOC’s failure to place Manos in sex-offender treatment is arbitrary and unreasonable.
The State correctly points out that “the district court did not lose its discretion to relinquish
jurisdiction just because the IDOC did not place Manos in sex offender treatment.” However,
Manos does not make an assertion to the contrary. The State argues that Manos implied that the
IDOC “can essentially bind the district court’s probation determinations through its
recommendations and treatment placements.” Manos does not make this suggestion. Indeed, in
his reply brief, Manos explicitly states he is not claiming he is entitled to probation and, instead,
is requesting a new rider review hearing. Furthermore, citing State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137,
30 P.3d 290, 292 (2001), Manos acknowledges that good behavior while on a rider “though
commendable, does not alone create an abuse of discretion in the district judge's decision not to
place the defendant on probation or reduce the sentence.”
The State also appears to argue that the district court relinquished jurisdiction based on
Manos’s quality of participation in his treatment program. As support, the State points to the

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The Court also concluded that the IDOC’s decision not to provide Le Veque with sex-
offender programming eliminated the apparent value of the polygraph examination because the
district court’s recommendation appears to have contemplated that Le Veque’s sex-offender
programming would be informed by the results of the polygraph examination. Id.

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district court’s comments at the sentencing hearing that it was important that Manos meaningfully
engage in treatment. If the district court intended to relinquish jurisdiction based on Manos’s
failure to meaningfully engage in his treatment program, then the district court could have done
so. However, the district court did not mention Manos’s level of engagement in his treatment
program. Instead, it specifically stated it was relinquishing jurisdiction based on Manos’s failure
to engage in sex-offender treatment. We decline to interpret statements made at sentencing as
support for the district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction at the subsequent review hearing.
Moreover, it is clear from the district court’s statements that it relinquished jurisdiction based, at
least in part, if not entirely, on the IDOC’s failure to place Manos in sex-offender treatment. As
in Le Veque, this decision was erroneous.
We hold that the district court erred when it relinquished jurisdiction over Manos because
he failed to participate in sex-offender treatment as recommended by the district court given that
Manos’s ability to participate in such treatment was solely within the IDOC’s control.
Accordingly, the order relinquishing jurisdiction must be reversed and a new jurisdictional review
hearing conducted.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction was an abuse of discretion.
Therefore, we reverse the order relinquishing jurisdiction and remand this case for a jurisdictional
review hearing.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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