Sedillo v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51021

JACKIE SHAYDE SEDILLO, )
) Filed: April 23, 2025
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
STATE OF IDAHO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Respondent. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Idaho
County. Hon. Mark T. Monson, District Judge.

Judgment summarily dismissing amended petition for post-conviction relief,
affirmed.

Nevin, Benjamin & McKay, LLP; Dennis Benjamin, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Jackie Shayde Sedillo appeals from a judgment summarily dismissing his amended petition
for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Sedillo pled guilty to two counts of possession of stolen property, two counts of grand theft
auto, one count of armed robbery, one count of eluding an officer, one count of unlawful
possession of a firearm, and one count of exhibition of a deadly weapon. Sedillo appealed,
asserting the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences. We affirmed
Sedillo’s judgment of conviction and sentences in an unpublished opinion. State v. Sedillo, Docket
No. 45171 (Ct. App. May 24, 2021). Relevant to the current appeal, the district court imposed a

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determinate period of confinement of two years for grand theft auto (I.C. § 18-2403(1)) and a
unified term of twenty years, with a minimum period of confinement of five years, for armed
robbery (I.C. § 18-6501), to be served consecutively.
Thereafter, Sedillo filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The district court
appointed Sedillo counsel, and he filed an amended petition. In the amended petition, Sedillo
alleged: (1) his conviction for one of the grand theft auto counts in conjunction with this armed
robbery conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of both the United States and Idaho
Constitutions; and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. The State filed a motion for summary
dismissal. Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion. The district court concluded
it was not required to address the substance of Sedillo’s double jeopardy claim because the claim
could have been raised in a direct appeal; and therefore, Sedillo is precluded from pursuing the
claim in post-conviction. The district court nevertheless analyzed the merits of Sedillo’s double
jeopardy claim in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel and concluded a double jeopardy
challenge would not have been successful. Sedillo appeals from the district court’s judgment
summarily dismissing his amended post-conviction petition.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by
the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if
true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929
(2010); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Over questions
of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068
(2009); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).
III.
ANALYSIS
Sedillo contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to make double jeopardy objections to the judgment of conviction and
consecutive sentences for one count of grand theft auto and the armed robbery of the same vehicle.
The State responds that the district court correctly dismissed Sedillo’s double-jeopardy-based
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

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A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature. I.C. § 19-
4907; Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 249, 220 P.3d at 1068; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662
P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992).
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho
269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). A petition for post-conviction relief differs from a
complaint in an ordinary civil action. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004).
A petition must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice
for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, a petition for post-conviction relief must be verified
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner, and affidavits, records, or
other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached or the petition must state why such
supporting evidence is not included with the petition. I.C. § 19-4903. In other words, the petition
must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations or the petition
will be subject to dismissal. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011).
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court’s own initiative, if it
appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering summary
dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner’s favor, but the court is
not required to accept either the petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647,
873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372
(Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, the district court, as the trier of fact, is not constrained to draw
inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary disposition; rather, the district
court is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidence.
Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not
be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id.
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner’s allegations are clearly disproven by
the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima

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facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner’s allegations do not justify
relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushé
v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim
for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner’s favor.
For this reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when
the State does not controvert the petitioner’s evidence. See Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at
901.
Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege
facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be
summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004);
Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 923. If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272,
61 P.3d at 629.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show that the
attorney’s performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900
P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing
that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v.
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). Where, as here, the petitioner was
convicted upon a guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice element, the petitioner must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pled guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629, 633 (Ct.
App. 2006). This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of
trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.
Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994).
Whether a defendant’s prosecution complies with the constitutional protection against
being twice placed in jeopardy is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v.
Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000). The Double Jeopardy Clause affords

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a defendant three basic protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal
punishments for the same offense. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994); State v. McKeeth,
136 Idaho 619, 622, 38 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2001).
Under the Idaho Constitution, Idaho appellate courts apply the pleading theory in
determining whether a charge constitutes a lesser-included offense. State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho
430, 434-35, 614 P.2d 970, 974-75 (1980). In analyzing the applicability of the pleading theory,
a court must consider whether the terms of the charging document allege that both offenses arose
from the same factual circumstances such that one offense was the means by which the other was
committed. Id. at 435, 614 P.2d at 975.
Sedillo argues that, under the pleading theory, he could not be convicted and sentenced for
both grand theft auto and armed robbery. He argues that the armed robbery charge he pled guilty
to could not be completed without the grand theft auto charge he also pled guilty to and contends
“the criminal conduct was part of one continuing event or transaction constituting a single violation
as it occurred at the same place and same time, involved the taking of the same property, and
victimized the same person.” Thus, Sedillo asserts grand theft auto is a lesser-included offense of
armed robbery in his case.
The face of the record shows that, as pled, grand theft auto is not a lesser-included offense
of armed robbery. As to the challenged grand theft auto count, the charging document alleged:
COUNT II.
GRAND THEFT AUTO
Idaho Code § 18‐2403(1) and I.C. §18‐2407(1)(b)(1)
That the Defendant, JACKIE SHAYDE SEDILLO, on or about the 3rd day
of September, 2019, while in the County of Idaho, State of Idaho, did wrongfully
take, obtain or withhold property with the intent to deprive the owner of the
property and/or to appropriate the property to himself or a third person, to wit:
[Sedillo] took a 2000 BMW, VIN#WBABM3347YJN86051, bearing Idaho license
plate I75231, with a value in excess of $1,000.00, belonging to [Victim], with the
intent to deprive [Victim] of the property and/or to appropriate the property to
himself or a third person. That such acts constitute a felony in violation of Idaho
Code § 18‐2403(1) and I.C. §18‐2407(1)(b)(1).
As to armed robbery, the charging document alleged:
COUNT IV.
ARMED ROBBERY

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Idaho Code §18‐6501 and §18‐6502
That the Defendant, JACKIE SHAYDE SEDILLO, on or about the 3rd day
of September, 2019, while in the County of Idaho, State of Idaho, did intentionally
and by means of force or fear take from the possession of [Victim] certain personal
property, to‐wit: a 2000 BMW, VIN#WBABM3347YJN86051, bearing Idaho
license plate I75231, the property of [Victim] which was accomplished against the
will of [Victim] in that [Sedillo] brandished a pistol and forcefully drug [Victim]
out of his vehicle, the 2000 BMW, VIN#WBABM3347YJN86051, bearing Idaho
license plate I75231 and threatened [Victim] with a gun if the said [Victim] did not
turn over the 2000 BMW, VIN#WBABM3347YJN86051, bearing Idaho license
plate I75231. That such acts constitute a felony in violation of Idaho Code §18‐
6501 and §18‐6502.
Theft, as defined in I.C. § 18-2403(1), is not a lesser-included offense of robbery, as defined
in I.C. § 18-6501, because theft requires proof of an element that robbery does not require.
Robbery is defined as “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from
his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”
I.C. § 18-6501. However, a “person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive
another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes,
obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.” I.C. § 18-2403(1). As apparent from
the definitions, theft requires proof of the intent to deprive the owner of the property and/or to
appropriate the property to himself or a third person. In contrast, robbery does not require proof
of such intent. Additionally, robbery requires proof of force or fear. This element is not included
in the definition of theft under I.C. § 18-2403(1). Therefore, grand theft auto is not a lesser-
included offense of armed robbery even if the property at issue is the same.
Sedillo relies on two out-of-state cases in support of his double jeopardy argument. First,
Sedillo cites Tennessee v. Hayes, 7 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) in which the appellate
court concluded (in part) that, because the theft charge was “wholly incorporated into the offense
of aggravated robbery,” the offenses were “the ‘same’ under Blockburger [v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932)].” As explained above, that principle does not apply to the offenses Sedillo pled
guilty to because both offenses had a different element not included in the other. Second, Sedillo
cites Utah v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987). In Branch, the court applied the criteria from a
Utah statute in determining whether theft was a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery in
that case. The pertinent statutory provision provides that a charge is a lesser-included offense if it
is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission

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of the offense charged. Id. at 1191 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(a) (1978)). There is no
comparative statute in Idaho that would require the same result the court reached in Branch.
Because Sedillo’s judgment of conviction and sentences for grand theft auto and armed
robbery do not violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy, counsel was not
deficient for failing to raise a double jeopardy claim, nor was Sedillo prejudiced by counsel’s
failure to do so. See Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 770, 185 P.3d 921, 926 (Ct. App. 2008)
(explaining that where the alleged deficiency is counsel’s failure to file a motion, a conclusion that
the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative
of both prongs of the Strickland test). The district court did not err in its summary dismissal
decision.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Sedillo failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to raise
a double jeopardy challenge. The district court did not err in summarily dismissing Sedillo’s
amended petition for post-conviction relief. The judgment granting summary dismissal of
Sedillo’s amended petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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