Godwin v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50373

JASON ANDREW GODWIN, SR., )
) Filed: December 31, 2024
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
STATE OF IDAHO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Respondent. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Idaho
County. Hon. Jay P. Gaskill, District Judge.

Order of the district court summarily dismissing amended petition for post-
conviction relief, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

GRATTON, Chief Judge
Jason Andrew Godwin, Sr. appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing
his amended petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, Godwin argues that the district court
erred when it summarily dismissed his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and that the district
court erred when it dismissed his jurisdictional claim. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2016, a jury found Godwin guilty of second degree murder for shooting and killing Kyle
Anderson. This confrontation occurred after one of Godwin’s friends, James Robinette, told
Godwin that Anderson had stolen guns from Robinette and that Robinette’s father was offering a
$500 reward for recovering the guns. At the time, Anderson lived in a large motorhome on a
pullout along the Clearwater River about a half mile outside of Kooskia. Godwin drove to the

1
location and pulled up to Anderson’s motorhome while Anderson and his girlfriend, Amanda
Jones, were outside. In Godwin’s vehicle, Phyllis “Carla” Griner (aka Cutler) sat in the passenger
seat, Ernest “Ernie” Ruiz sat behind Griner in the back passenger seat, and Beau Lynch sat behind
Godwin in the driver’s side backseat.
The events that followed were contested at trial. At some point after arriving, Godwin shot
Anderson through the neck. An autopsy showed that abrasions on Anderson’s back were
consistent with someone having dragged Anderson by his feet along the gravel. Anderson’s body
was left on the gravel next to his motorhome. Godwin left the scene with Anderson’s gun and
drove back towards Kooskia.
The next morning, Godwin met with Detective Hewson at the Kooskia County Sheriff’s
office. Although he initially denied being at the scene where Anderson was shot, Godwin later
admitted to shooting Anderson in self-defense after Anderson pulled a gun on him. The State
charged Godwin with second degree murder.
Godwin filed a motion to suppress, claiming the statements he made during the law
enforcement interview “were involuntary and he had invoked his right to counsel and refused to
waive his Miranda1 rights.” The trial court denied the motion. At trial, Godwin testified and the
audio recording of Godwin’s interview with Detective Hewson was played. The jury found
Godwin guilty of second degree murder. Godwin appealed and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
the denial of Godwin’s motion to suppress. State v. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903, 436 P.3d 1252 (2019).
Godwin filed a pro se petition and affidavit for post-conviction relief. Later, Godwin,
through counsel, filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief alleging a jurisdictional claim
and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Godwin claimed the district court lacked jurisdiction
because the crime occurred on an Indian reservation and Godwin is Indian. After a two-day
evidentiary hearing on Godwin’s jurisdictional claims, the district court found that the crime had
occurred on an Indian reservation but held that Godwin failed to establish that he was recognized
as an Indian.
On the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Godwin alleged his trial counsel was
ineffective for: (1) failing to call Cutler as a witness at trial or to request a continuance to ascertain
her unavailability to testify; (2) failing to investigate a modification to the audio recording of

1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
Godwin’s interview with Detective Hewson; and (3) failing to present evidence that Godwin was
handcuffed when he arrived at the sheriff’s office for an interview in support of his motion to
suppress. The district court summarily dismissed Godwin’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. Godwin appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free
review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004).
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by
the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if
true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929
(2010); Sheahan v State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Over questions
of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069
(2009); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must prove the allegations
by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d
1216, 1220 (1990); Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 861, 243 P.3d 675, 677 (Ct. App. 2010). When
reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court
will not disturb the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 52(a); Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004); Russell v.
State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). The credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all
matters solely within the province of the district court. Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 56, 106 P.3d at 382;
Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). We exercise free review of
the district court’s application of the relevant law to the facts. Baxter, 149 Idaho at 862, 243 P.3d
at 678.
III.
ANALYSIS
Godwin claims that the district court erred in finding that he was not recognized as an
Indian and denying his jurisdictional claim. Godwin also claims that the district court erred in
summarily dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

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A. Jurisdictional Claim
Godwin argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his lack-of-jurisdiction claim,
because “the crime occurred within Indian country and Mr. Godwin was Indian.” The State argues
that, because jurisdiction may be raised at any time, Godwin is barred from raising this claim in
post-conviction because Godwin could have asserted the claim on direct appeal. We hold that
because the trial record was insufficient for the claim to have been raised on direct appeal, Godwin
properly raised the issue in his post-conviction petition. See Lewis v. State, 137 Idaho 882, 55
P.3d 875 (Ct. App. 2002).
As to the merits of Godwin’s jurisdictional claim, first, it is undisputed that the crime
occurred within Indian country. The question here is whether Godwin is considered “Indian” for
jurisdictional purposes. The Idaho Supreme Court has developed a two-prong test: “(1) the
defendant must have a significant percentage of Indian blood; and (2) the defendant must be
recognized as an Indian either by the federal government or some tribe or society of Indians.”
State v. George, 163 Idaho 936, 938, 422 P.3d 1142, 1144 (2018). The district court found that
Godwin had established that he had “some degree of Indian blood” and held that this was sufficient
under the first prong in George.2
As to the second prong, the district court found that Godwin was not recognized as Indian.
The district court heard testimony from several witnesses regarding Godwin’s activities and
affiliations with the Nez Perce Tribe in the area.3 The testimony established that while Godwin
was involved in various activities on tribal land and in association with tribal members, the
members themselves did not view Godwin as Indian, nor as a tribal member. Godwin’s argument
that his activities with the tribe constitute “significant ties” and are sufficient to satisfy George is
incorrect. It does not matter what Godwin himself perceives or does with the Nez Perce Tribe, but
rather how the Nez Perce Tribe perceives Godwin, i.e., whether the tribe recognizes him as Indian.
Godwin acknowledges that the evidence shows the Nez Perce Tribe “may not have viewed him as
a member of their tribe.” Further, none of the Nez Perce Tribe members testified that they were

2
The State claims that the proper test, as articulated by the Court in George, requires a
finding of a “significant” amount of Indian blood, not merely “some.” The State asserts that
Godwin did not establish that his 6.25% Indian blood constitutes a “significant” amount of Indian
blood and thus the first prong under George is not satisfied. As Godwin failed to satisfy the second
George prong, we need not decide this issue.
3
No evidence established that Godwin was recognized as Indian by the federal government.
4
even aware of Godwin’s Costanoan heritage. Godwin does not dispute the district court’s findings,
only its conclusion. The evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that Godwin was not
recognized as Indian. Therefore, the court’s dismissal of Godwin’s lack of jurisdiction claim is
affirmed.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Godwin claims that the district court erred in dismissing his claims that counsel was
ineffective for: (1) failing to call Cutler as a witness at trial or to request a continuance to ascertain
her unavailability to testify; (2) failing to investigate a modification to the audio recording of
Godwin’s interrogation; and (3) failing to present evidence in support of his motion to suppress
that Godwin was handcuffed when he arrived at the sheriff’s office for an interview.
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction
relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court’s own initiative, if it appears from
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact,
together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering summary dismissal,
the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner’s favor, but the court is not required
to accept either the petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence,
or the petitioner’s conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.
App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986).
Moreover, the district court, as the trier of fact, is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of
the party opposing the motion for summary disposition; rather, the district court is free to arrive at
the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidence. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho
353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not be disturbed on appeal if
the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id.
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner’s allegations are clearly disproven by
the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima
facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner’s allegations do not justify
relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushé
v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim
for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner’s favor.

5
For this reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when
the State does not controvert the petitioner’s evidence. See Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at
901.
Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege
facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be
summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004);
Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 923. If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272,
61 P.3d at 629.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 477, 224 P.3d 536, 544 (Ct.
App. 2009). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show
that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578,
580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden
of showing that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho
433, 442, 163 P.3d 222, 231 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney’s deficient performance, the outcome of the trial
would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at
442, 163 P.3d at 231. This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic
decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based
on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
evaluation. Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172, 254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011).
1. Calling Cutler as a witness
Godwin claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Cutler as a witness at
trial. Godwin contends that counsel told him that Cutler was unavailable as she had a stroke and
was too ill to testify. Godwin asserts that, in fact, Cutler only had laryngitis. Thus, Godwin argues
that counsel should have verified whether Cutler was unavailable, sought to continue the trial to
investigate her unavailability, or considered whether to depose her to present her statements to the
jury. Godwin claims there was no strategic or tactical reason not to call a witness that would

6
support his self-defense claim. He also asserts this deficiency prejudiced him because the jury did
not have the benefit of this testimony supporting his self-defense claim.
As to Cutler’s unavailability, Godwin claims that he was “later” told that Cutler only had
laryngitis. Godwin does not explain the source of this information and, thus, it is purely hearsay.
Where a petitioner’s affidavit is based upon hearsay rather than personal knowledge, summary
disposition without an evidentiary hearing is appropriate. Takhsilov v. State, 161 Idaho 669, 673,
389 P.3d 955, 959 (2016). Godwin claims that counsel should have verified the information that
Cutler had a stroke and, if necessary, sought a continuance to do so. Godwin provides no evidence
that counsel had any reason to doubt the information regarding Cutler’s availability that counsel
communicated to Godwin. Indeed, during opening statement trial counsel told the jury that
counsel planned to call Cutler to testify. Godwin provides no other evidence that Cutler could
have testified at trial or by deposition.
Godwin claimed Cutler had previously stated to law enforcement that during the incident
in question Anderson had pulled a gun on Godwin before Godwin shot Anderson. In support of
the claim, Godwin provided a “supplemental police narrative” of the interview between Cutler and
a law enforcement officer and his post-conviction counsel’s own unofficial “transcript” of a
portion of the audio recording of that interview.4 Godwin asserts that counsel knew of the
substance of Cutler’s testimony as the supplemental police narrative was provided during
discovery. As noted, counsel planned to call Cutler so it is reasonable to infer that counsel was
aware that she had knowledge of the incident.
The district court ruled that Godwin failed to provide admissible evidence regarding the
substance of Cutler’s testimony. The district court determined that Godwin’s hearsay statements
on Cutler’s testimony were insufficient. It is not enough to allege that a witness would have
testified to certain events at trial without providing through affidavit or other competent
nonhearsay evidence of the substance of the witness’s testimony. Adams v. State, 161 Idaho 485,
499, 387 P.3d 153, 167 (Ct. App. 2016).

4
Godwin did not include the “transcribed” audio as evidence in support of his post-
conviction petition.

7
Godwin argues that, aside from not calling Cutler as a witness, counsel was ineffective in
failing to present her statements via the supplemental police narrative. Both the officer’s
statements in the narrative of what Cutler told him and the “transcript” of the audio contain at least
two layers of hearsay. The supplemental police narrative contains a summary of the officer’s
interview with Cutler and indicates that Cutler “thought” she saw Anderson pull a gun on Godwin.5
The narrative and the transcript also recount purported statements made by Cutler regarding
statements Godwin made to Anderson. The narrative is the officer’s statement (first declarant),
which contains a statement by Cutler (second declarant), which contains a statement by Godwin
(third declarant). Similarly, Godwin’s transcription of the officer’s (first declarant) interview of
Cutler contains statements by Cutler (second declarant). Godwin argues that these are not hearsay
because they are being offered only to show that counsel was aware of this witness and therefore
should have presented Cutler’s testimony. However, the truth of these statements is key to
Godwin’s claim that this would support his self-defense theory.
However, Godwin argues that the supplemental police narrative is admissible pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(8)(A)(ii)(b) which provides for admission of an investigative report
by law enforcement personnel when offered by an accused in a criminal case. Godwin relies on a
footnote in Stanfield v. State, 165 Idaho 889, 454 P.3d 531 (2019) in which the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that a police report identifying a potential alternate perpetrator would be admissible
pursuant to I.R.E. 803(8)(A)(ii)(b) in a post-conviction summary dismissal proceeding. Stanfield,
165 Idaho at 896 n.1, 454 P.3d at 538 n.1. The State argues that even if the officer’s narrative was
to be generally admissible under Rule 803(8)(A)(ii)(b) it does not automatically allow in the other
layers of hearsay within the document, i.e., the statements of Godwin and Cutler, each being an
additional layer of hearsay. We agree. Each part of a hearsay-within-hearsay statement must
conform to a hearsay exception in order to be admissible. State v. Guerra, 169 Idaho 486, 500,
497 P.3d 1106, 1120 (2021); see also I.R.E. 805. Even if I.R.E. 803(8)(A)(ii)(b) would allow the
first layer of hearsay, there is nothing in the text of the rule that further excepts additional layers
of hearsay. As such, Godwin’s reliance on Stanfield is misplaced as it does not support the

5
Post-conviction counsel’s transcription of the interview with Cutler includes Cutler
allegedly saying she “think[s]” Anderson pulled a gun on Godwin but that she “didn’t see” what
the gun looked like.

8
wholesale admission of the officer’s narrative and all hearsay statements therein. The
supplemental report, as noted, contains multiple layers of hearsay for which Godwin has failed to
show an exception applies. Consequently, Godwin’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing
to introduce the report fails.
The district court also inferred from the evidence that counsel’s trial decision as to Cutler’s
purported statements was tactical because the statements were equivocal. As noted, the report
indicates that Cutler “thought” she saw Anderson pull a gun on Godwin and the “transcript”
indicates she “think[s]” Anderson pulled a gun on Godwin but that she “didn’t see” what the gun
looked like. The district court pointed out that Cutler did not say she actually observed Godwin
acting in self-defense. The district court found that Cutler gave conflicting stories and the only
thing she appeared to be sure of was that a shot was fired. In addition, the substance of Cutler’s
statements was admitted at trial through the audio of Godwin’s interview. In closing, defense
counsel stated:
We didn’t hear from Carla at trial; though we did hear in an interview between
[Godwin] and Deputy Hewson what Carla’s position was. Recall that Deputy
Hewson told [Godwin] that he heard something from Carla that supported
[Godwin’s] claim of self-defense, and in particular he was referring to what
[Godwin] had said to [Anderson] prior to the shot ringing out.
Even considering the statements, Godwin has not shown error in the district court’s determination
that Cutler failed to demonstrate that counsel’s decision was based on inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Gonzales,
151 Idaho at 172, 254 P.3d at 73.
Godwin has also not shown how Cutler’s statements would have resulted in a different
outcome at trial. The only evidence the district court was able to assess is Godwin’s allegations
of what Cutler “would have” testified to at trial. Even if Cutler’s statements were true, Godwin
has not shown how another, uncertain witness would have changed the outcome of the trial and
that counsel was, therefore, ineffective for not calling the witness. See Dunlap v. State, 170 Idaho
716, 731, 516 P.3d 987, 1002 (2022) (“Dunlap cannot simply assert on appeal that defense counsel
should have put on more witnesses, especially when the additional witnesses would have offered
similar testimony to that already presented.”). Accordingly, the district court did not err in
dismissing this claim.

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2. Interview recording
Godwin claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective with respect to an alleged
modification of the audio recording of Detective Hewson’s interview with Godwin. The alleged
modification involved a change from Godwin saying he intended to take Anderson’s body to the
“emergency shed” to saying he intended to take Anderson’s body to “the river.” First, Godwin
claimed that he was unable to listen to the recording of the interview before trial, and his trial
counsel never played the recording for him. He also alleged that jail staff took the recording away
from him prior to trial and counsel did nothing to assist in retrieving the audio and playing it for
Godwin. Further, Godwin asserted that he did not hear the full recording until trial. These
allegations are belied by Godwin’s own testimony:
Q. Nobody forced you to come talk to Detective Hewson?
A. No.
Q. And we’ve listened to that interview, right?
A. Yeah.
Q. Had you listened to it before?
A. Yeah, vaguely.
Q. Okay. What do you mean, vaguely?
A. I listened to it probably six to eight months ago with Victoria Olds as being
the attorney at that time.
That Godwin may have “vaguely” listened to the audio belies his claims. Additionally, Godwin
testified that he did not remember saying “the river.” Godwin did not claim on the stand that he
instead said the “emergency shed.” In fact, when asked if he agreed that he said “the river” to
Detective Hewson, Godwin responded “I guess I did because it’s on the tape.” Godwin did not, at
that time, claim that the tape was modified. Godwin provided no actual evidence tending to show
that the tape was modified.
Godwin claimed that the recording “could have been” modified and that he told counsel
that the tape may have been modified and counsel did nothing, including requesting a continuance
to investigate the matter or, at the very least, cross-examine Detective Hewson regarding the
alleged alteration. Godwin argues that these allegations must be taken as true.
In its notice of intent to dismiss, the district court stated:
He only states that he told his attorney the recording misrepresented what he said.
He does not present any evidence of what counsel’s response was or why the
response was deficient. Thus, the Court doesn’t know if the advice showed
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings of
counsel capable of objective review. Without such evidence, the Court can only

10
assume that any decision counsel made regarding the interview recording was a
tactical or strategical decision, which this Court does not second-guess.

Even considering Godwin’s claim that he told counsel that the audio could have been modified,
he has not shown that counsel’s decision to not further investigate was not a reasonable tactical or
strategic decision or was based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Gonzales, 151 Idaho at 172, 254 P.3d at 73.
Moreover, the district court determined that Godwin failed to make a prima facie showing
of prejudice, noting the other evidence of guilt. Other than to claim that the accuracy of the
interview was central to his claim of self-defense, Godwin makes no showing of how, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon, 114
Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. The evidence of whether Godwin intended to take Anderson’s
body to the “emergency shed” or “the river” after the shooting is of very little importance in regard
to whether the shooting was in self-defense. The district court did not err in determining that
Godwin failed to make a showing of prejudice.
Godwin has failed to show that an issue of material fact existed as to whether counsel’s
decision not to investigate the recording was based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review. We therefore affirm the district
court’s dismissal of this claim.
3. Suppression hearing
Godwin claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call him as a witness or
present his statements made during the police interview in a sworn declaration in support of his
motion to suppress. Godwin asserted he told counsel that a second officer handcuffed him when
he arrived at the sheriff’s office and took the handcuffs off when Godwin reached the interview
room. Godwin claimed he told counsel that he had been handcuffed and there was no strategic or
tactical reason not to include his testimony at the suppression hearing. He further alleged that this
fact would have been material to his claim that he was subject to a custodial interrogation. Godwin
asserts that the fact of being handcuffed prior to the interview would lead a reasonable person to
believe he was in custody. The State argues that, even if Godwin was handcuffed before the
interview, under the totality of the circumstances, it does not change the conclusion that he was
not in custody during the interview.

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The district court held that “Godwin has not presented admissible evidence that shows that
counsel’s advice to not testify was anything other than a strategic[] decision.” The district court
noted that even if Godwin had made such a showing he had not shown how he was prejudiced by
the advice:
Presumably, Godwin wanted to testify that he was handcuffed to show that
he was in custody and that his confession should be suppressed because the
Miranda warning had not been read to him prior to his confession. The Court did
find that Godwin was not handcuffed before the interview, but that was only one
factor of the many used to determine that under the totality of circumstances,
Godwin was not in custody.
The district court found that, even with the additional allegation that Godwin was temporarily
handcuffed before the interview began, the suppression motion would have failed. The district
court acknowledged that the suppression motion findings included that Godwin was not
handcuffed before the interview. However, the district court discounted the weight of this finding
because it “was only one factor of the many used to determine that under the totality of
circumstances, Godwin was not in custody.”
A person is in custody whenever subjected to a restraint on his or her liberty in any degree
similar to a formal arrest. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 795, 69 P.3d 1052, 1056 (2003). To
determine whether a person is in custody, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation. State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577, 225 P.3d 1169, 1172 (2010).
The factors to aid the custody determination include where the questioning occurred, the duration
of the interrogation, whether the defendant is informed that the detention may not be temporary,
and the intensiveness of the questions and the requests of the police officer. Godwin, 164 Idaho at
915, 436 P.3d at 1264. The test is an objective one, and the inquiry centers on how a reasonable
person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation. James, 148 Idaho at 577,
225 P.3d at 1172.
On direct appeal from his conviction, Godwin argued that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court
analyzed all of the relevant factors. First, the Court noted that while the questioning occurred at
the Kooskia Sheriff's Office, Miranda warnings are not required simply because the questioning
takes place in the station house, but only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s
freedom as to render him in custody. The Court held that the hallmarks of a coercive environment
were absent in this instance. The Court further noted that Godwin conceded that he was not in

12
custody when he sat down with Officer Hewson to answer questions. Moreover, Godwin arrived
at the police station voluntarily, was interviewed in a working part of the sheriff's office rather
than an interrogation room, the conversation was recorded with a digital audio recorder which was
visible to Godwin during the duration of the interview, and the interview lasted around fifty
minutes, during which Godwin exited the station to have a cigarette break (albeit accompanied by
an officer). The Court held: “This is not the ‘sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by
its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited.’” Godwin, 164 Idaho at 916-17, 436
P.3d at 1265-66.
Next, the Supreme Court held that “intensiveness” of police questioning did not weigh in
favor of custody. The Court noted that, although other officers interacted with Godwin while he
was at the station, Officer Hewson was the only police officer in the room with Godwin while he
was being questioned and at no time during the interview was Godwin patted down, handcuffed,
or otherwise physically restrained. Id. at 917, 436 P.3d at 1266.
Third, the Court reiterated that tactics used by the officer during an interrogation may be
considered when determining whether the interview was coercive but are only part of the totality
of the circumstance inquiry for custody. The Court noted that the district court found there was
no coercive police conduct and that while Detective Hewson did not expressly tell Godwin that he
was not under arrest or free to leave, the district court correctly noted that he did not tell Godwin
that he had to stay and answer questions. Id. The Court also held that Godwin’s subsequent arrest
did not automatically mean that Godwin was “in custody” during the interview. Id. The Court
concluded that the totality of the circumstances showed that Godwin was not in custody during the
interview with Detective Hewson. Id. at 918, 436 P.3d at 1267.
As the district court held, even assuming that Godwin was handcuffed upon arriving at the
sheriff’s office and while led to the interview room, under the totality of the circumstances, he was
not in custody during the interview. Being handcuffed prior to the interview does not alter the
totality of the circumstances analysis as detailed by the Idaho Supreme Court. Therefore, even if
Godwin had testified at the suppression hearing that he was in handcuffs prior to the interview,
the outcome would have remained the same. The district court correctly determined that Godwin
failed to show how counsel’s decision to not have him testify at the suppression hearing resulted
in any prejudice. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
Godwin has failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his jurisdictional claim.
Further, the district court did not err in holding that Godwin failed to establish a prima facie case
with respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Therefore, the judgment of the district
court summarily dismissing Godwin’s petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.
Judge LORELLO and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.

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