Jane Doe v. John Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52140

In the Matter of: Jane Doe I, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
JANE DOE, )
) Filed: December 4, 2024
Petitioner-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
JOHN DOE (2024-35), )
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the First Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John A. Cafferty, Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredricksen, State Public Defender; Jay W. Logsdon, Coeur d’Alene, for
appellant. Jay W. Logsdon argued.

Ian D. Smith, Coeur d’Alene, for respondent. Ian D. Smith argued.
________________________________________________

GRATTON, Chief Judge
John Doe (2024-35) (Doe) appeals from the decision of the magistrate court terminating
his parental rights. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jane Doe I (Child) was born to Doe and Jane Doe (Mother) in 2012. Doe and Mother
were married at the time Child was born but divorced in 2015 and Mother was awarded sole legal
and physical custody. Doe has been incarcerated for a substantial amount of Child’s life. Doe has
a history of substance abuse issues. Due to these issues, Mother required Doe to submit to a drug
test, and test clean, before allowing Doe to see Child. Doe has been unwilling to comply with this
request. Thus, Doe has had very little contact with Child since 2015. Doe has made no attempt to
modify the original 2015 custody order.

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In June of 2023, Mother filed a petition for termination. The petition sought termination
of Doe’s parental rights based on abandonment. At trial, Doe chose not to call any witnesses or
testify himself. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) submitted a financial report
pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-2008, identifying unreimbursed public assistance monies paid on
behalf of Child. Neither Doe nor Mother objected to IDHW’s analysis. The magistrate court
found that Doe had abandoned Child by not maintaining a normal parent-child relationship; Doe
had not provided stable, safe, and appropriate housing; and Doe has had frequent and prolonged
incarcerations, much of which are drug related. The magistrate court also found that it is in Child’s
best interests for Doe’s parental rights to be terminated. Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-
child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty
interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a
parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; In re Doe, 146 Idaho 759,
761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at 652.
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and

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convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. In re Doe, 143 Idaho
343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be
evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. In re Doe,
143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate’s decision must be
supported by objectively supportable grounds. In re Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
Idaho Code § 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent-
child relationship when it is in the child’s best interest and any one of the following five grounds
exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child
and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a
prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the
parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory
ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must then
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parental relationship.
Matter of Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991).
III.
ANALYSIS
Doe challenges whether a private termination can ever be in a child’s best interest where
there is no adoptive parent. Alternatively, Doe argues that the magistrate court erred in its finding
that it is in Child’s best interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights. Mother responds that
substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s termination decision.
A. The Law Does Not Require an Adoptive Parent
Doe contends that “in private terminations, it can never be in the best interest of the child
to lose one parent without a prospective adoptive parent.” As a matter of statutory interpretation,
Doe acknowledges that “it is true that I.C. § 16-2005(8) leaves open the possibility of termination
where no adoption is pending.” The statutory language in I.C. §§ 16-2007 and 16-2008 recognizes
private terminations without adoption:
Idaho Code § 16-2007(1): After a petition has been filed, the court shall
set the time and place for hearing. The petitioner shall give notice to any person
entitled to notice under section 16-1505, Idaho Code, the authorized agency having
legal custody of the child and the guardian ad litem of the child and of a parent. The
petitioner shall give notice to the Idaho department of health and welfare if the

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petition for termination was not filed in conjunction with a petition for adoption or
by an adoption agency licensed by the state of Idaho.
Idaho Code § 16-2008(1): If a petition for adoption is not filed in
conjunction with a petition for termination, or the petition for termination was not
filed by a children’s adoption agency licensed by the state of Idaho upon the filing
of a petition for termination, the court shall direct the department of health and
welfare, bureau of child support services, to submit a written financial analysis
report within thirty (30) days from date of notification, detailing the amount of any
unreimbursed public assistance moneys paid by the state of Idaho on behalf of the
child. The financial analysis shall include recommendations regarding repayment
of unreimbursed public assistance and provisions for future support for the child
and the reasons therefor.
(Emphasis added.)
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which we exercise free review.
Aguilar v. Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642, 649-50, 262 P.3d 671, 678-79 (2011). Such interpretation
must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). It is well established that where statutory
language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted
for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. Id. Only where a statute
is capable of more than one conflicting construction is it said to be ambiguous and invoke the rules
of statutory construction. L & W Supply Corp. v. Chartrand Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 743, 40
P.3d 96, 101 (2002). The statutes quoted above plainly contemplate that a petition for termination
may be filed without a concomitant petition for adoption.
Doe states that “the main question for this Court is whether the law permits a finding of
best interest of a child to reduce that child’s number of parents to one.” Doe argues that public
policy precludes a finding that termination is in a child’s best interests in a private termination
without adoption because “to do so would violate the rights of the child and the strong public
policy that parents have a duty to support their children.” Doe cites Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 146 P.3d
649 in which the Idaho Supreme Court held:
It is our strong public policy that parents have a duty to support their children.
Idaho recognizes that all parents have a duty to support and maintain their minor
children. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 93 Idaho 419, 424, 462 P.2d 512, 517 (1969). This
duty is not removed because of incarceration, Nab v. Nab, 114 Idaho 512, 519, 757
P.2d 1231, 1238 (Ct. App. 1988), nor can support obligations be removed by
contract, see Morrison v. Young, 136 Idaho 316, 319-20, 32 P.3d 1116, 1119-20
(2001). Only by terminating parental rights is this duty removed.
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Doe, 143 Idaho at 390, 146 P.3d at 656. Doe’s reliance on this case is misplaced. In Doe, the
Idaho Supreme Court held that removal of a financial obligation is not a proper consideration in
the parent’s best interests. However, the Court held that the magistrate court may consider a
parent’s lack of financial support in the best interests determination with respect to the child. Id.
Doe contends that under I.C. § 16-2001(1)(a) the purpose of providing courts with the
authority to terminate parental rights is to promote the welfare of the parties and the state of Idaho.
Additionally, Doe argues that Idaho does not benefit from parents being relieved of their financial
obligations to their children.1 Essentially, Doe argues that there is no set of circumstances where
parental rights should be terminated, in a private termination without adoption, if the parent has
the potential to eventually pay some amount of child support. Further, Doe asserts that “when
there is no replacement for a parent, termination of parental rights serves no legitimate end.” Doe
argues that custody cases can resolve the issues without termination. Indeed, parenting and support
issues are addressed in custody proceedings and, depending upon the circumstances, may well be
the more appropriate avenue. However, custody proceedings are not a statutory prerequisite to a
private termination. Moreover, as discussed below and as Doe acknowledges, in his case he did
not resort to custody proceedings relative to providing support for his Child.
Public policy does not preclude a finding of best interests in a private termination without
adoption. Certainly, a child is entitled to support from a parent and the parent has a duty of support.
And, as the Doe Court recognized, termination of a parent’s rights removes this duty. Doe, 143
Idaho at 390, 146 P.3d at 656. As Doe urges, in many, if not most, situations, custody and support
proceedings can effectively address and enforce parenting and support concerns. However, the
legislature provided for private terminations without adoption. Moreover, the legislature required
a child’s best interests analysis in private termination determinations. I.C. § 16-2005(4). To hold
that it can never be in a child’s best interests to terminate a parent’s rights in a private termination
without adoption would be contrary to the legislative scheme and underlying policy. That a

1
Doe cites to cases from other states that have held that increasing the likelihood that a child
will be a ward of the State is against public policy. While, as a general matter, increasing the
likelihood that a child will be a ward of the State may be against public policy, Doe has not shown
that in every private termination without adoption that increased risk exists such that termination
“can never be in the best interest of the child.” Therefore, such public policy does not prevent
private termination without adoption.

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parent’s duty of support is removed in a private termination is a consideration for the magistrate
court in the best interests analysis. However, it is not a determinative factor.
B. The Magistrate Court Did not Err in the Best Interests Determination
As an initial matter, the magistrate court found that Doe abandoned Child. Doe does not
contest the magistrate court’s finding of abandonment. Doe’s arguments on appeal are limited to
the magistrate court’s best interests analysis. Doe claims “the Magistrate Court erred in
terminating Father’s rights on the grounds that Father had been a drug addict and incarcerated
while Mother had parented the Child, rather than considering in what way the Child would be
better off with the termination of his rights.”
The magistrate court may consider several factors when determining whether termination
is in the child’s best interests, including the parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and
permanency of the home, the unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent
to the child’s care after the child is placed in protective custody,2 the improvement of the child
while in foster care,3 the parent’s efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing
problems with the law. In re Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); In re Doe, 156
Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that termination of parental rights is in the
best interests of the child must be made on objective grounds. In re Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57,
277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
In Matter of Doe, 164 Idaho 511, 432 P.3d 60 (2018) the Court stated:
The best interests analysis is an expansive analysis with “no set list of factors a
court must consider.” In re Doe (2015-03), 159 Idaho 192, [198], 358 P.3d 77, 83
(2015). Nonetheless, this Court has articulated numerous factors that a trial court
may consider, including a “parent’s history with substance abuse, whether the
parent has provided financial support, the child’s relationship with those currently
caring for him or her and whether the child has improved under that care, the child’s
need for stability and certainty, and the parent’s incarceration.” Id. Other factors
include:
the parent’s ability to change his or her conduct to assume parental
responsibilities, whether there is a good relationship between the child and
parent, whether the child has improved while in the parent’s care, whether
the child’s needs are being met, and the parent’s ability to provide stability
and certainty.

2
Although the Child was not in protective custody in this case, the financial contribution of
the parent (Doe) to the child’s care is still a factor that is considered.
3
This factor however is inapplicable in this case. Child was never in foster care.
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Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe I (2017-21), 163 Idaho 83, 89, 408 P.3d
81, 87 (2017).
Matter of Doe, 164 Idaho at 516, 432 P.3d at 65.
Doe argues that “there appears to be a misunderstanding that termination of parental rights
is about judging a parent as being good or bad.” Doe asserts that the magistrate court dwelt on his
culpability and the willfulness of his actions with regard to his criminal proceedings. Doe claims
that the magistrate court punished him rather than analyzing how termination would be in Child’s
best interests.
Doe draws similarities between his situation and the father’s conduct in In re Doe, 157
Idaho 14, 333 P.3d 125 (2014). In Doe, father was thirty years old, lived with his mother, dropped
out of high school, had limited marketable skills, inconsistent employment, a poor financial
situation, and a history of incarcerations. Id. at 18, 333 P.3d at 129. Mother and stepfather
petitioned the magistrate court to terminate father’s parental rights and for adoption. Id. at 15, 333
P.3d. at 126. The two primary issues addressed by the Court were harm to the children and
comparing whether the stepfather would be a better parent than father. The Court held:
Although there is no requirement that a child suffer actual harm before the
parent’s parental rights can be terminated, the lack of any evidence showing that
termination of a parent’s parental rights is necessary to prevent harm to the children
is a factor that the trial court can consider when deciding whether termination of a
parent’s parental rights is in a child’s best interests.
Id. at 17, 333 P.3d at 128. Further, the Court held that “the issue in a termination proceeding is
not whether the natural parent or the stepparent would better discharge parental responsibilities.”
Id. The magistrate court in Doe held that under the totality of the circumstances there was no
showing of harm to the children or that termination was in the best interests of the children. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court noted:
Mother wants this Court to reweigh the evidence and conclude that
termination of Father’s parental rights would be in the best interests of the children.
“Whether a matter has been proved by clear and convincing evidence is primarily
a matter for the trial court.” In re Doe, 153 Idaho 258, 263, 281 P.3d 95, 100
(2012). “On appeal, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence to determine
if it was clear and convincing.” Dep't of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 149 Idaho
207, 210, 233 P.3d 138, 141 (2010). The magistrate court found that Mother had
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s
parental rights was in the best interests of the children, and that finding is supported
by substantial and competent evidence.
Doe, 157 Idaho at 18, 333 P. 3d at 129.

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Here, the magistrate court found that Doe failed to maintain a normal relationship with
Child for most of her life. Doe failed to be present and supportive in Child’s life both physically
and financially. The magistrate court noted that this largely stemmed from Doe’s frequent and
prolonged periods of incarceration, most of which were drug related. Doe continually failed to
abstain from using illegal controlled substances. These periods of prolonged incarceration and
substance abuse resulted in Doe’s inability to maintain employment or a meaningful relationship
with Child. As a result, Child does not rely on Doe for care and support. The magistrate court
noted that Doe has been unable to provide stable, safe, and appropriate housing for Child. Doe’s
actions resulted in failing to provide Child with needed stability and certainty.
In its findings, the magistrate court noted that Child is twelve years old and resides with
Mother. Child has been exclusively cared for by Mother for the past nine years. Mother has had
physical and legal custody of child since a 2015 custody order. Mother was willing to allow Doe
to have visitation with Child pending a clean drug test. To date, Doe has never submitted to a drug
test. Further, Doe did not present any evidence explaining his failure to maintain contact with
Child. The magistrate court noted that Doe made little to no attempt to contact Child while
incarcerated, aside from sending some craft items to Child and her sister.
The magistrate court stated that Doe has a history of drug use as noted by the testimony of
multiple parties, along with his criminal history. Doe refused to submit to a drug test to exercise
in-person visitation with Child and has never tried to modify the custody order. Doe did not testify,
so there was no evidence that he wanted a relationship with Child, unlike in Doe, where the father
“commenced an action to obtain visitation with the children” and testified at trial, that he “wanted
to reestablish a relationship with his children.” Doe, 157 Idaho at 18, 333 P.3d at 129. Doe has
not had any in-person visits with Child in approximately eight years. In his appellant’s brief, Doe
admits to doing nothing except occasionally paying child support.4 Further, Mother was willing

4
Doe’s argument focuses on the financial support that will be missing if his rights are
terminated. Although Doe has paid support in the past, as of April 2024, he was in arrears
$2,624.20. Further, Doe was in arrears in the amount of $10,286.02 at one point and was only
forgiven this amount when Doe’s father paid Mother $4,000. Doe argues that he should be given
the opportunity to pay child support and retain his rights without any proof that he will be able to
do so moving forward aside from “occasionally” paying in the past. We are unpersuaded by this
argument.

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to allow Doe unsupervised visitation with Child, but he was unwilling to submit to a drug test.
Additionally, Mother meets Child’s physical, mental, and emotional well-being.5
While the magistrate court discussed Doe’s circumstances, drug use, and incarceration,
Doe has failed to show that the best interests determination was punishment to him. In addition,
the magistrate court found that Doe had abandoned Child by not maintaining a normal relationship
and failing to provide stable, safe, and appropriate housing. Doe acknowledges that “indeed, the
court’s findings as to what Father had provided the Child as a parent were correct.” Doe admits
that “[h]e had never taken Mother to court to try and get visitation” and “[l]iterally all he did was
occasionally pay child support.” Doe’s sole claim is that his potential ability to provide financial
support for Child in the future should exceed the other findings by the magistrate court. The
magistrate court has discretion to consider the other factors as outlined in In Matter of Doe, 164
Idaho 511, 432 P.3d 60. Doe argues the analysis should be limited to only the financial aspect, or
at minimum the financial factor should be given the greatest weight. The Supreme Court noted in
In Matter of Doe that “the best interest analysis is an expansive analysis,” thus indicating that no
one factor should be given significantly more weight than the others. Id.
The Court in Doe noted that the evaluation of best interests of the children “includes their
physical, mental, and emotional well-being with all parties involved.” Doe, 157 Idaho at 16, 333
P.3d at 127. Moreover, children can be negatively impacted when a parent fails to maintain a
normal parental relationship with them. Id. at 18, 333 P.3d at 129. The magistrate court’s decision
to terminate Doe’s parental rights is supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record.
Whether a matter has been proved by clear and convincing evidence is primarily a matter for the
trial court. In re Doe, 153 Idaho at 263, 281 P.3d at 100. On appeal, this Court does not reweigh

5
Doe presents extensive argument regarding an issue raised in summary judgment
proceedings prior to the termination trial. An argument there by Mother involved a concern as to
what would happen to Child if something happened to her, especially that Doe would have a right
to Child. However, the summary judgment proceedings or decision did not become part of the
record in the trial. Moreover, the concern by Mother was referenced at trial only in passing: “I
fear that if something happens to me, he’d be the first they would call to come get her, and my
family would have to fight for her back.” Finally, there is no finding as to this concern by the
magistrate court. The issue is not properly before this Court.

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evidence. Doe, 149 Idaho at 210, 233 P.3d at 141. We affirm the termination of Doe’s parental
rights.
C. Attorney Fees
Mother has requested attorney fees under Idaho Appellate Rule 41 believing that Doe’s
appeal was brought only to reweigh the evidence in a case where there was no conflicting
testimony. As a fundamental right was implicated and we do not view Doe’s arguments as
frivolous, we decline to award attorney fees. See Matter of Doe, 164 Idaho at 518, 432 P.3d at 67.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Doe has failed to show error in the magistrate court’s decision to terminate his parental
rights. Accordingly, the judgment of the magistrate court is affirmed. Costs, but not attorney fees,
to Respondent.
Judge LORELLO and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.

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